Revisiting the Dove's Dilemma: - Program on Strategic Stability ...

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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>” During <strong>the</strong> Cold War, this trade-off was known as <strong>the</strong> ―dove’s dilemma.‖ Lewis Dunn (1981) summarizes <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma as ―<strong>the</strong> necessity to choose between efforts to slow conventional arms transfers abroad and to head off more widespread nuclear weapon proliferation by using arms transfers as an instrument of nonproliferation policy‖ (181). In essence, <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma asks policymakers to choose between <strong>the</strong>ir nonproliferation objectives, noting that although states may value both conventional and nuclear nonproliferation, <strong>the</strong>y can only realistically pursue one or <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r in practice. The idea behind providing conventional arms to nuclear weapons aspirants rests on <strong>the</strong> assumption more and better conventional arms supplies will assuage those states’ security concerns, provide <strong>the</strong>m with adequate means to defend <strong>the</strong>mselves, and reduce <strong>the</strong>ir incentives or perceived need for nuclear weapons (Catrina 1988: 126; Kemp and Miller 1979: 57; Pierre 1982: 29-30). ―If anything alleviates objective security incentives for nuclear weapons,‖ argues Richard Betts (1977), ―an increase in conventional defense capabilities does‖ (177). And, from <strong>the</strong> exporters’ perspective, as Nolan (1997) states, <strong>the</strong> United States at least ―has always seen conventional weapons as a benign alternative to nuclear proliferation‖ (132). This, of course, assumes that states’ incentives for developing nuclear weapons are purely related to <strong>the</strong>ir security concerns. And certainly many states do pursue nuclear weapons in search of greater security. As Singh and Way (2004) observe, ―Participating in enduring rivalries or taking part in more frequent militarized disputes strongly increase <strong>the</strong> chances a state will pursue nuclear weapons, but credible support from a great-power ally dampens <strong>the</strong> temptation‖ (861). T.V. Paul (2000) complements <strong>the</strong>se findings in a qualitative study emphasizing <strong>the</strong> degree of conflict in a state’s regional environment as a key determinant of pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, security is not <strong>the</strong> only reason states may have for developing nuclear weapons. Barry 5
Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>” O’Neill (2006) and o<strong>the</strong>rs note that ―several nuclear weapons programs have had prestige as a significant motive,‖ since possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology can serve as a symbol of modernity and international status (3,4). In a similar vein, Scott Sagan notes that nuclear weapons may fulfill a desire to appear modern or technologically advanced (Sagan 2000). By providing sophisticated modern weaponry and weapons technology, conventional arms exporters may also seek to address not only security concerns, but also recipients’ quest for prestige and acknowledgement of <strong>the</strong>ir status as among <strong>the</strong> most advanced, modern states in <strong>the</strong> international system. Eyre and Suchman (1996), for example, observe that not only is ―one of <strong>the</strong> defining characteristics of <strong>the</strong> nation-state…<strong>the</strong> possession of a modern military‖ (92), but also that ―highly technological militaries symbolize modernity, efficacy, and independence‖ (86). Of course, in both security and prestige-motivated nuclear weapons development, conventional arms do not have <strong>the</strong> absolute military-strategic or symbolic power to match fully those of nuclear weapons. 6 Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> logic behind resolving <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma in favor of nuclear nonproliferation assumes that <strong>the</strong> relative gains in security and prestige from providing advanced conventional weaponry will be sufficient to persuade states from moving forward with <strong>the</strong>ir nuclear programs. This is a costly and potentially dangerous trade-off, however. First, some critics argue that engaging in conventional weapons proliferation can have adverse affects on regional peace and stability. By encouraging conventional weapons transfers to would-be nuclear powers -- especially those in insecure neighborhoods -- exporters risk setting off regional conventional arms races (Dunn 1981: 185; Gelb 1976/77: 12). In addition to increasing regional tensions, small and major conventional arms transfers may enable conflicts to break out or last longer 6 And on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, conventional weapons lack much of <strong>the</strong> stigma that may attach to nuclear weapons increasingly over time as <strong>the</strong> non-proliferation regime deepens and takes hold as an international norm (Sagan 2000). 6
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