Revisiting the Dove's Dilemma: - Program on Strategic Stability ...

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Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>” Although <strong>the</strong> NPT bars all non-nuclear signatories from developing nuclear weapons, 4 many states have never<strong>the</strong>less established nuclear weapons programs and only sometimes abandoned <strong>the</strong>m. Legal obligations aside, <strong>the</strong> incentives to pursue nuclear weapons are strong: Nuclear weapons are <strong>the</strong> most powerful security measure available to states, as well as a symbol of international prestige. In an effort to limit proliferation, <strong>the</strong>refore, leading states committed to stemming proliferation may have to offer rewards and punishments in addition to those provided by <strong>the</strong> NPT regime. In particular, inducements that address would-be nuclear states’ security and/or prestige concerns – like <strong>the</strong> transfer or denial of major conventional weapons systems – may be important tools for controlling nuclear proliferation. To that end, this paper asks an enduring yet often-overlooked question: Are states seeking nuclear weapons ―punished‖ by being denied access to conventional arms, or do <strong>the</strong>y get ―rewarded‖ with more conventional arms, in order to reduce <strong>the</strong>ir perception of a need for nuclear weapons? Anecdotes, of course, exist for both enhanced access to and denial of conventional arms, but we lack a systematic analysis of <strong>the</strong> relationship between conventional arms transfers and nuclear weapons development. To fill this gap, this paper examines major conventional arms transfers from <strong>the</strong> top nine major conventional exporters from 1960 to 2001. 5 We find that, during <strong>the</strong> Cold War, policymakers were willing to trade conventional proliferation for nuclear non-proliferation. Countries pursuing nuclear weapons received enhanced access to major conventional weapons systems. However, once a country ―goes nuclear,‖ <strong>the</strong> benefits of conventional arms sales are withdrawn. Conventional arms transfers do <strong>the</strong>refore serve as a significant policy tool in <strong>the</strong> politics of nonproliferation but how <strong>the</strong>y are used will depend on a 4 The NPT recognizes only <strong>the</strong> states that had tested nuclear devices by January 1, 1967 as legitimate nuclear weapons states: China, France, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom, and <strong>the</strong> United States. 5 Why just <strong>the</strong> top nine? Because we didn’t finish collecting data for <strong>the</strong> top 15 in time for <strong>the</strong> first draft of this paper. The next version will cover <strong>the</strong> top 15 major arms exporters. 3
Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>” recipient’s progress in developing nuclear weapons, with only uncertain effects on convincing states to abandon <strong>the</strong>ir nuclear programs regardless. We also find that <strong>the</strong> reward pattern vanishes in <strong>the</strong> post-Cold War era. A Dove’s <strong>Dilemma</strong>? Conventional Arms Transfers to Would-Be Nuclear States How might states use <strong>the</strong> selective provision of conventional arms as a means to influence o<strong>the</strong>r states’ nuclear ambitions? Assuming <strong>the</strong>y do use conventional arms in this way, two possible strategies are available. As Leslie Gelb (1976/77) notes, ―What is not wholly clear‖ is whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> US was ―prepared to sell conventional weapons that o<strong>the</strong>rwise would not have been sold as an inducement for a country to refrain from developing nuclear arms‖ or whe<strong>the</strong>r it would threaten to restrict access to arms for <strong>the</strong> same reason (11-12). First, arms exporting states could withdraw <strong>the</strong> provision of conventional arms both to punish recipients who seek to go nuclear and to deprive <strong>the</strong>m of potentially fungible weapons technology that could be adapted to enhance nuclear weapons programs or delivery systems. Alternatively, arms exporting states could explicitly provide conventional arms to would-be nuclear powers to encourage <strong>the</strong>m to give up <strong>the</strong>ir nuclear ambitions by enhancing <strong>the</strong>ir sense of security or prestige. Doing so would presumably reduce <strong>the</strong>ir incentives to acquire nuclear weapons by satisfying <strong>the</strong> perceived needs driving any nuclear aspirations. However, distributing more conventional arms risks fuelling arms races and making volatile regions even more dangerous. The question may be straightforward, but <strong>the</strong> qualitative evidence is not clear-cut. Policy-makers and experts disagree in particular on <strong>the</strong> trade-offs at <strong>the</strong> heart of this decision: Is <strong>the</strong> chance for nuclear nonproliferation worth <strong>the</strong> price of conventional proliferation? 4
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