Revisiting the Dove's Dilemma: - Program on Strategic Stability ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>” European exporters, arms transfers were promoted as a matter of economic necessity, ra<strong>the</strong>r than carefully restricted, as <strong>the</strong>y needed to achieve scale for <strong>the</strong>ir arms industries. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> results show that nuclear weapons developers got special treatment during <strong>the</strong> Cold War, even when controlling for enduring rivalries and dispute involvement, where demand might be higher and <strong>the</strong> temptation to send more conventional arms to support and win allies would be strongest. Fur<strong>the</strong>r statistical and case study analysis will be necessary to draw more thorough conclusions about <strong>the</strong> reasons for this variation across time and for US exceptionalism, and to understand precisely why a ―buy off‖ ra<strong>the</strong>r than a punishment pattern emerged as <strong>the</strong> Cold War standard. A plausible initial explanation might look to both differences in <strong>the</strong> perceived security threats posed by conventional and nuclear proliferation, as well as differences in <strong>the</strong> legal and normative environments associated with <strong>the</strong> two types of weapons. Both security and normative arguments suggest that states will deem nuclear proliferation much more costly and dangerous than conventional proliferation, despite <strong>the</strong> low likelihood of nuclear weapons actually being used, unlike conventional weapons, which are of course central to <strong>the</strong> conduct of war. The destructive potential for nuclear weapons is simply so much greater than that of conventional weapons and <strong>the</strong> illegitimacy of nuclear production and use so well established, in contrast to <strong>the</strong> firm legitimacy of <strong>the</strong> production and use of conventional weapons. Perhaps, <strong>the</strong>n, <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma is not so much a dilemma during much of <strong>the</strong> Cold War after all. Certainly, concerns for conventional proliferation really only surfaced during <strong>the</strong> Carter administration in <strong>the</strong> United States and were o<strong>the</strong>rwise weak. Aside from very specific types of conventional weapons bans in <strong>the</strong> post-Cold War era (anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions), no international ban exists on <strong>the</strong> import, export, or use of conventional weapons more broadly – nor is one likely to form any time soon. Indeed, while most states are 23
Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>” legally barred from developing nuclear weapons by international treaty law and strong norms persist against <strong>the</strong> use of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons present a very different picture. The right to possess and use conventional weapons is enshrined in international law as a part of states’ right to self-defense. During <strong>the</strong> Cold War and often since, states have defended <strong>the</strong>ir right to trade conventional arms without external interference or scrutiny. In <strong>the</strong> post-Cold War era, nuclear proliferation remains as significant a concern as ever, with new threats associated with <strong>the</strong> possibility of non-state actors like terrorist groups acquiring nuclear capabilities adding to it. However, <strong>the</strong> situation for conventional weapons has changed during this same period, which may account for <strong>the</strong> changes we find in <strong>the</strong> relationship between nuclear weapons development and conventional arms access. Since <strong>the</strong> mid-1990s, international rules and norms have for <strong>the</strong> first time emerged and spread related to <strong>the</strong> restriction of conventional arms transfers to conflict zones and unstable regions in particular (Erickson 2009). As a result, major supplier states may have become less willing to exploit importer demand for conventional arms in some cases. Greater international attention to conventional weapons in <strong>the</strong> post-Cold War era and <strong>the</strong> resulting multilateral agreements (existing or in <strong>the</strong> works) might <strong>the</strong>refore mean that resolving <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma with a ―buy out‖ strategy has become much more difficult for many states. Just as <strong>the</strong> international community is confronting both new and enduring nuclear security threats, conventional weapons buy-offs have become a much less legitimate means to address those threats. 24
Page 1 and 2: Rough Draft: Please contact us for
Page 3 and 4: Erickson and Way, “Doves
Page 23: Erickson and Way, “Doves
Page 33: Erickson and Way, “Doves

Revisiting the Dove's Dilemma: - Program on Strategic Stability ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?