Revisiting the Dove's Dilemma: - Program on Strategic Stability ...

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>”
war. And, most importantly, countries pursuing nuclear weapons received notably greater
conventional arms transfers, even after conditioning on <strong>the</strong>ir security environment.
In <strong>the</strong>se models, our dependent variable is in logs whereas <strong>the</strong> explanatory variables are
not (that is, <strong>the</strong>se are semi-logarithmic equations), meaning <strong>the</strong> coefficients can be read as partial
elasticities: <strong>the</strong> coefficient indicates roughly <strong>the</strong> approximate percentage change in arms transfers
for a one unit change in <strong>the</strong> explanatory variable. For example, <strong>the</strong> model in column one
indicates that countries pursuing nuclear weapons receive roughly 77% more in arms transfers
than those that are not pursuing nukes. 20 Similarly, participation in an enduring rivalry also has a
substantively significant effect: countries in a rivalry receive roughly 83% more arms than o<strong>the</strong>r
countries. Clearly, states that are pursuing nuclear weapons do not, in general, become pariahs of
<strong>the</strong> international arms market. In fact, <strong>the</strong>y receive more than one would expect conditional on
<strong>the</strong>ir general security situation. Interestingly, this ―bonus‖ seems to vanish if <strong>the</strong>y actually cross
<strong>the</strong> nuclear threshold and acquire nuclear weapons. The model in column 3 suggests than when
pursuing weapons, countries import 108% more weapons than would o<strong>the</strong>rwise be expected;
however, once <strong>the</strong>y cross <strong>the</strong> threshold and possess nuclear weapons, <strong>the</strong>ir import propensity
becomes indistinguishable from that of o<strong>the</strong>r states in similar security environments. Yet states
also do not in <strong>the</strong> aggregate get punished – in terms of reduced access to conventional arms – for
pursuing nuclear weapons. We explore <strong>the</strong> reasons for this intriguing pattern in our case studies.
This finding is not sensitive to <strong>the</strong> particular coding of nuclear weapons program. Although <strong>the</strong>
results reported above are based on <strong>the</strong> updated version of <strong>the</strong> Singh and Way codings, results
20 The coefficients in <strong>the</strong> table can be read as a rough approximation of <strong>the</strong> partial elasticity, but as values increase
in size <strong>the</strong> approximation becomes progressively less accurate. The precise proportional change in <strong>the</strong> outcome
variable resulting from a non-infinitesimal change in <strong>the</strong> explanatory variable is calculated as exp(bΔX) – 1 (<strong>the</strong>
percentage change reported in <strong>the</strong> text multiplies this result by 100). Thornton and Innes (Thornton and Innes 1989)
provide a careful explanation of <strong>the</strong> proper interpretation of semi-logarithmic regressions.
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