Revisiting the Dove's Dilemma: - Program on Strategic Stability ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>” (Craft 1999; Craft and Smaldone 2002; Kinsella 1994; Maniruzzaman 1992). The price of such policies may <strong>the</strong>refore be to instigate conflict, violence, and instability in vulnerable regions. Second, conventional weapons proliferation may inadvertently bring about what it was designed to help avoid: nuclear proliferation. This can happen in two ways. In one pathway, greater provision of conventional arms may fuel regional arms races, rendering states more insecure and ultimately perceive a need to acquire nuclear weapons to ensure <strong>the</strong>ir security (Ferguson 2010). In ano<strong>the</strong>r pathway, conventional arms transfers can provide advanced defense technology that might be applied to nuclear weapons development. For example, conventional arms transfers may ―increase <strong>the</strong> likelihood of nuclear proliferation by providing delivery systems for nuclear weapons‖ (Catrina 1988: 126; Dunn 1981: 187). In addition, according to Andrew Pierre (1982), ―<strong>the</strong> acquisition of new, sophisticated arms might [paradoxically] serve to whet <strong>the</strong> appetite of military and political leaders for fur<strong>the</strong>r enhancing <strong>the</strong> nation’s defense forces and its status by acquiring nuclear weapons‖ (30-1). As a result, resolving <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma in favor of nuclear nonproliferation may backfire, creating new problems and/or enhancing <strong>the</strong> problems it was meant to resolve. From this perspective, <strong>the</strong> solution should not be to offer enhanced access to conventional weapons for would-be nuclear powers, but ra<strong>the</strong>r to restrict or withdraw access to conventional weapons. This both sends a signal that nuclear weapons development outside <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> NPT should be punished, and is a practical measure to prevent technologies from being converted for illegitimate weapons programs. For example, <strong>the</strong> Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established as a voluntary organization in 1987 in which members commit to ―[tightening] up <strong>the</strong>ir arms transfer policies with <strong>the</strong> intention of controlling <strong>the</strong> proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons‖ (Spear 1990: 183). The UN Security Council has also at 7
Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>” times sought to punish nuclear weapons developers by imposing arms embargoes, such as in <strong>the</strong> cases of Iran and North Korea. Recent research has found that, on average, nuclear weapons developers are significantly more likely to become targets of unilateral or multilateral arms embargoes than o<strong>the</strong>r states (Erickson 2010). This suggests that states may not always resolve <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma at <strong>the</strong> cost of conventional nonproliferation. Yet a systematic analysis of how nuclear weapon states (NWS) or o<strong>the</strong>r major arms exporters in particular have chosen to resolve <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma over time is an open question, which this paper seeks to explore. The <strong>the</strong>oretical arguments point both ways, and how policy makers resolve this debate on average is ultimately an empirical question. We <strong>the</strong>refore hypo<strong>the</strong>size that <strong>the</strong>re is a significant relationship between major conventional arms transfers and nuclear weapons development. However, <strong>the</strong> nature of that relationship could fall into one of two camps: First, <strong>the</strong>re may be a negative relationship between arms transfers and nuclear weapons development, in which states are unwilling to incur <strong>the</strong> security costs associated with conventional arms proliferation in order to stave off nuclear proliferation. In fact, states may even punish nuclear weapons developers by withdrawing <strong>the</strong>ir access to conventional arms. Second, <strong>the</strong>re may be a positive relationship between arms transfers and nuclear weapons development, in which states use access to conventional weapons as incentives to would-be nuclear powers to abandon <strong>the</strong>ir nuclear programs. As Nolan (1997) contends, ―transfers of conventional weapons remain <strong>the</strong> most common instrument of dissuasion in <strong>the</strong> efforts to stop new states from going <strong>the</strong> nuclear route‖ (132). In this case, exporters would use conventional arms to attempt to assuage recipients’ security concerns or build-up <strong>the</strong>ir international prestige. 8
Page 1 and 2: Rough Draft: Please contact us for
Page 3 and 4: Erickson and Way, “Doves
Page 7: Erickson and Way, “Doves
Page 33: Erickson and Way, “Doves

Revisiting the Dove's Dilemma: - Program on Strategic Stability ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?