Revisiting the Dove's Dilemma: - Program on Strategic Stability ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>” Although we primarily analyze exporters’ aggregate behavior, we also consider <strong>the</strong> possibility that <strong>the</strong>re may be differences between <strong>the</strong> US and o<strong>the</strong>r exporters, and across all exporters over time. For example, exporters with more explicit economic motivations behind <strong>the</strong>ir arms sales – like European producers during <strong>the</strong> Cold War and <strong>the</strong> early 1990s – might be less willing to engage in more restrictive practices and less concerned about conventional arms proliferation. This leaves open <strong>the</strong> possibility that not all states will resolve <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma similarly. Certainly, it possible that practices will change over time. Dunn (1981), for example, suggests that early US nuclear nonproliferation efforts were more willing to sacrifice conventional nonproliferation, but when <strong>the</strong>se efforts later proved less successful, it sought alternate means (189). In addition, norms of conventional weapons sales have changed over time and become more restrictive in <strong>the</strong> post-Cold War era (Erickson 2009). Understanding how states resolve <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma – and how <strong>the</strong>ir resolutions might vary between states and over time – might in turn provide insights into larger <strong>the</strong>oretical questions. In particular, this is a case in which we can observe states making difficult trade-offs between policy objectives, nonproliferation norms, and security concerns. How states resolve <strong>the</strong>se trade-offs over time can suggest changes in states’ policy priorities, international normative pressures, and perceived threats to international and regional peace and stability. Especially as multilateral initiatives to restrict conventional arms transfers for unstable regions, conflict zones, and human rights violators have gained increasingly wide acceptance since <strong>the</strong> late 1990s, resolutions for <strong>the</strong> dove’s dilemma may become more and point to <strong>the</strong> growing importance of conventional nonproliferation. In addition, <strong>the</strong> results may indicate to one way (conventional arms transfers) states purposefully enforce and reinforce international treaty law, normative taboos and traditions of nuclear nonuse, and expectations of nuclear nonproliferation through 9
Erickson and Way, “Doves <strong>Dilemma</strong>” material means. States may not be content, especially early on in <strong>the</strong> nuclear nonproliferation regime, to leave o<strong>the</strong>rs to change <strong>the</strong>ir practices in response to social or legal pressure from international institutions. The dove’s dilemma is not only an important and difficult choice, but also an instructive one. Research Design and Data To assess whe<strong>the</strong>r countries pursuing nuclear weapons enjoy increased access to major conventional arms transfers, we estimate a series of statistical models of conventional arms imports from 1960 to 2001. At present, we have data covering <strong>the</strong> nine largest arms exporters and 182 importers. 7 The following sections describe our dependent, independent, and control variables, as well as expected relationships among <strong>the</strong>m. Dependent Variable: Major Conventional Weapons Transfers Major conventional weapons (MCW) are defined as large weapons with a military purpose, falling into one of nine categories: aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, sensors, air defense systems, missiles, ships, engines or an ―o<strong>the</strong>r‖ fulfilling specified qualifications (SIPRI 2007: 428-29). We focus on major conventional weapons, ra<strong>the</strong>r than small and major conventional weapons, because MCW have historically been tools of major power foreign policy, symbols of prestige, and <strong>the</strong> stuff of conventional arms races. In comparison, small arms are lower-tech and were less politically important to importers and exporters until <strong>the</strong> advent of multilateral control processes in <strong>the</strong> late-1990s and beyond. 7 We are in <strong>the</strong> process of expanding this to cover <strong>the</strong> top 15 exporters. The current nine exporters are (in no particular order): United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Spain, (West) Germany, Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, Italy, and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union/Russia. 10
Page 1 and 2: Rough Draft: Please contact us for
Page 3 and 4: Erickson and Way, “Doves
Page 9: Erickson and Way, “Doves
Page 33: Erickson and Way, “Doves

Revisiting the Dove's Dilemma: - Program on Strategic Stability ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?