Crastvell Trading Limited v Bozel SA - Radcliffe Chambers

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE No. Folio 2009 1315 

QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION 

COMMERCIAL COURT 

[2010] EWHC 0166 (Comm) 

Royal Courts of Justice 

Friday, 22 nd January 2010 

Before: 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL 

B E T W E E N : 

CRASTVELL TRADING LTD. 

Claimant 

- and - 

BOZEL SA 

Defendant 

__________ 

Transcribed by BEVERLEY F. NUNNERY & CO 

Official Shorthand Writers and Tape Transcribers 

Quality House, Quality Court, Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1HP 

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__________ 

MR. A. POLLEY (instructed by Nabarro) appeared on behalf of the Claimant. 

MR. S. MAJUMDAR (instructed by Edwin Coe) appeared on behalf of the Defendant. 

__________ 

J U D G M E N T 

(As approved by the Judge)

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: 

1 This is an application by the claimants for summary judgment. It is the claimants’ 

case that there is no realistic prospect of the defendants successfully defending the 

claim that is brought against them and that there is no other compelling reason why 

the case should be disposed of at trial. I do not understand that alternative avenue 

as being a live proposition in the present application. Accordingly, the court can 

focus on the question whether the defendants have or have not a realistic prospect 

of defending the claim successfully. 

2 That criterion or test is the subject of numerous authorities. There is no dispute 

between the parties as to what it means. The defendants have got to establish that 

they have a case which is better than merely arguable. It is not sufficient that they 

can establish that there is a fanciful or imaginary prospect of fending off the claim. 

It is of course also established law that where there are substantial issues of fact the 

court will not conduct a mini trial, but nonetheless, the court is entitled to inspect 

the material that has been put before the court on factual issues and be satisfied that 

the defendants’ case on the issues of fact has some degree of conviction. 

3 The parties know what this case is all about and therefore I can introduce it very 

briefly. It is a claim for monies under three loan agreements. The defendants, 

Bozel, are a subsidiary of a company called Welgate. Bozel’s business is in the 

metals and minerals field. It is not necessary to recite the relevant terms of the 

agreement, save one provision which is common to all three of them, which is 

Clause 14 of the mezzanine loan agreement, and Clause 15 of the convertible 

mezzanine and convertible senior loan agreements. The principal part reads: 

“(1) Except as required by law, all payments due to the lender under this 

agreement will be made free and clear of all deductions and withholdings 

whether in respect of taxation, set-off, counterclaim or otherwise.” 

4 The monies had been borrowed to finance acquisition by Bozel of various other 

companies. The monies were originally repayable in July and August 2009. By 

January that year the Bozel Group (of which the defendants form a part) found 

itself in financial difficulties in the worldwide downturn, and in particular the fall 

in demand for steel. Two creditors of Bozel and the Bozel Group, namely the 

claimant and another company called Trafalgar Capital who had also effected 

loans, entered into a standstill agreement with Bozel. This agreement contemplated 

that Bozel would seek to restructure or refinance its obligations. To that end the 

creditors agreed not to take any enforcement action under the various loan 

agreements until June 2009, despite the fact that there had already accrued an event 

of default. It appears that Trafalgar were and remain on friendly terms with 

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Welgate and Bozel, but the relationship between Welgate and Bozel on the one 

hand and the claimants on the other deteriorated. 

5 When the standstill agreement came to an end in July 2009 the claimants sought to 

enforce its rights by taking various proceedings against Bozel and, for that matter, 

Welgate to whom they had also made a loan. The sum at stake was significant, 

some £13.5 million of which only a very small proportion had been repaid. One of 

the features of the various loans to Bozel, and indeed to Welgate, were share 

pledges in respect of the shares of Bozel and various subsidiaries. Those share 

pledges play somewhat of a significant role in the disputes that have subsequently 

arisen. 

6 It is one of the contentions that is advanced by the defendants that the history of 

events since the standstill agreement was entered into and the subsequent 

enforcement action that has been taken by the claimants demonstrates that far from 

being anxious to be repaid the money they loaned, the claimants want somehow to 

obtain the ownership of Bozel and its subsidiaries, or the shares in those 

companies, at some under value. I am bound to say that I see nothing in the 

documents which begins to support any such contention. To the contrary, it seems 

to me that the claimants have advanced their claim for recovery of the loan monies 

with some considerable vigour. It would be, on any view, a surprising situation if, 

in the context of a Part 24 application, the reality was that the claimants were 

anxious to lose and not recover the monies that were due to it. 

7 The fact that it has pursued its claim with some vigour is the source of some 

complaint on the part of Bozel and Welgate. The fact that the claimants have 

behaved in a somewhat hard-nosed manner may have ruffled feathers, but it does 

not seem to me to have any bearing on the justice of the matter or the appropriate 

outcome to this application. 

8 It seems that a significant number of proceedings have been instituted. First, even 

before the standstill agreement came to an end, a claim was instituted in Florida 

against a Bozel subsidiary incorporated in that state and various individuals. In the 

event, those proceedings were stayed by the Florida courts on the grounds of forum 

non conveniens. I need say no more about them. Secondly, as I have already 

intimated, there was a claim against Welgate in this court and judgment in default 

of acknowledgement of service or defence (I am not quite sure which) resulted. 

9 Having obtained judgment, the claimants took various steps. Firstly, and this is of 

particular materiality, they seized shares in Bozel owned by Welgate which had 

been pledged to them. They were situate in Luxembourg. 



10 Secondly, they obtained a freezing order in the BVI, the jurisdiction of 

incorporation of Welgate, in which Welgate were restrained from disposing of any 

assets save in excess of the value of the claimant’s claim, and also sought an order 

for winding up of the company following a statutory demand. 

11 That latter order was duly made. It was followed by an application by Welgate to 

set that order aside. The grounds for so doing have an echo of the points that are 

being made by Bozel in the present proceedings, namely to the effect that in some 

respect the claimants had taken steps to prevent Welgate from obtaining refinance 

or otherwise repaying the loan from some other source. The application to set 

aside failed. The court held that there was no cross claim of the kind in fact 

intimated in the present proceedings which Welgate wished to pursue. 

12 Lastly, in relation to the proceedings in Luxembourg, the claimants sought a 

winding up order. That application was dismissed on the grounds that, as I 

understand it, the court was not satisfied that the inability to meet the loan 

repayments may have been only temporary. All this activity, in my judgment, 

supports the proposition that the interest of the claimants is indeed to recover its 

money and no more. 

13 The defendants say that the reason why the loans have not been repaid is because 

the defendants have been unable to refinance the loan. It is submitted that the 

reason they have been unable to refinance the loan is because the claimants have 

taken every possible step to be obstructive and prevent the defendants from making 

a successful agreement with third parties to provide funds, almost all those 

potential agreements being on the basis that the third party would purchase the 

shares in the Bozel group of companies. 

14 This immediately raises what seems to me to be an important threshold issue, 

namely whether, on the assumption that such a counterclaim is a good claim 

(namely that the claimants did indeed conduct itself in that way and secondly that 

such conduct was in breach of the loan agreement, and thirdly that the impact of 

the conduct was to prevent the refinancing) does the consequential counterclaim 

constitute a ground for refusing judgment on the claim? Of course, in this respect, 

the claimants rely upon the no set-off clauses (if I may call them that) in the 

various loan agreements. 

15 The legitimacy of the parties entering into an agreement whereby they separate out 

frontline claims on their agreement from cross claims, so that judgment can be 

accorded on the claim, leaving the defendant to advance his cross claim in due 

course, has received the clearest possible judicial approval in Coca Cola Financial 

Corporation v. Finsat (six) [1998] QB 43. Just to cite from the judgment of Neill 

LJ at page 52: 



“Moreover, I can see no reason in principle why parties who are in general 

a contractual relationship cannot isolate one contract or one aspect of their 

dealing and provide their rights in relation thereto are to be treated 

separately from their other dealings.” 

16 Accordingly, what the claimants say in the present proceedings is that they are 

fully entitled to obtain judgment on their claim, leaving the defendants (if so 

advised) to advance their counterclaim in due course. 

17 The answer that is advanced in regard to that proposition is that the claim which the 

defendants wish to advance on the basis of the alleged implied term (which, for 

present purposes we must assume to be a good claim) means that there will be a 

claim which is pari passu with the loan monies, and accordingly, within the 

meaning of the set-off provisions in the loan agreements, the payments said to be 

due to the lender under the agreement are not in fact “due”. Therefore the bar to 

the effect that the claim be free and clear of deductions and withholdings such as 

set-off has no application on the facts of this case. 

18 The basis of this submission, as I understand it, is founded on a judgment of Mr. 

Geoffrey Brice QC in a case called Schenkers Ltd v. Overland Shoes. In that case 

the relevant clause provided that: “The customer shall pay to the company in cash 

or as otherwise agreed all sums immediately when due, without reduction or 

deferment on account of any claim, counterclaim or set-off”. The issue that arose 

from that case was the question whether such a provision fell foul of the Unfair 

Contract Terms Act. Perhaps not surprisingly, the plaintiff was anxious to restrict 

the apparently wide nature of that provision so as to support its claim that the term 

was a reasonable one. 

19 The outcome can be discerned from a passage at page 502 in the report [1998] 1 

Lloyd’s Rep 498 where the learned judge said this: 

“The no set-off provision of Clause 23(a) is very wide indeed. Mr. Irvine 

for the plaintiff contended that the clause did not apply to a defence to a 

particular transaction as opposed to complaints arising from other earlier 

transactions. Indeed, it was, or appeared to become, common ground that 

the reduction or deferment referred to in the clause related only to 

transactions other than the particular transaction with which the plaintiff’s 

invoice was concerned. The reason for this was the use of the expression 

‘when due’, and it was accepted that if there was a defence to an individual 

invoice when the sum so claimed was not due, I agree with this 

construction.” 



20 It is always difficult to extract from a passage of that kind the precise scope of the 

conclusion of law that was being reached, not least because what the learned judge 

concluded was in effect the outcome of an agreement. The parties were ad idem on 

this topic. 

21 It is consistent with the proposition that where a claim to a debt, for instance, can 

be met by a substantive defence to the claim, then by definition the sum that is 

claimed is not due. But if, as is suggested by the defendants, the effect of the 

application of that decision to the present case is to conclude that some but not all 

set-offs result in the consequence that there is no sum due, that is a surprising 

outcome, if not a commercially absurd one. 

22 My conclusion is that it is necessary for the relevant cross claim to actually impugn 

the claim itself and such does not arise on any view in this case. That conclusion is 

consistent, it seems to me, with authority. 

23 So far as the textbooks are concerned, in Derham The Law of Set-Off Third 

Edition paragraph 5.86 the topic is dealt with in this way: 

“A contract may include a provision to the effect that one party must pay all 

sums immediately when due without deduction or set-of. It is unlikely that 

a contract in those terms would be affected … equitable set-off in relation 

to a damages cross claim which is inseparably connected with a debt the 

subject of the plaintiff’s claim because the substantive nature of the set-off 

would mean the plaintiff could not assert that the debt is due for the 

purposes of the clause.” 

24 On the facts of the present case that does not arise. The cross claim does not 

impugn the claim. In July 2009 all the sums under the loan agreements became 

due. The liability of the defendants accrued. The cross claim and the alleged setoff 

all arise out of subsequent events giving rise to a claim for breach arising during 

the course of the period in which the defendants were seeking to obtain monies to 

repay the claim. In my judgment, that cannot possibly constitute a bar to the 

recovery of the claim, having regard to the terms of the loan agreements. 

25 I am fortified in that conclusion by two decisions of the Court of Appeal: Stewart 

Gill Ltd. v. Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] 1 QB 600 and Fastframe v. Lohinski a 

decision of the Court of Appeal in March 1993 where although the issue was not 

the subject of any dispute between the parties, both courts concluded in agreement 

with the parties that a clause of this kind would preclude a cross claim which does 

not impugn the debt. As I say, although not argued, it seems to me to be significant 

support for the conclusion that I have reached. 



26 The defendants’ counter to this was broadly along the lines that the circumstances 

here, as they contend, where the claimants prevented the defendants from 

refinancing the loans did establish a very close connection, or at least a sufficiently 

close connection, with the claim to justify the cross claim being treated as not 

excluded by the terms of the agreement. It was submitted that there was a difficultto-define 

spectrum of cross claims giving rise to potential equitable set-offs, some 

of which were sufficiently closely connected with the claim and some of which 

were not. 

27 I am bound to say that my view is that the cross claim, even if this approach is 

correct, does not have remotely sufficiently close connection with the claim, given 

that the claim became due well before the cross claim did ever arise. But in my 

judgment any commercial reading of the terms of the set-off clause in these 

agreements must be read as justifying the disregard of all set-offs and all 

counterclaims, unless the impact of the set-off is such as to render the underlying 

claim invalid or void. 

28 That is sufficient to dispose of the present proceedings in the sense that it is 

common ground that if that conclusion is correct, any analysis of the cross claim is 

rendered redundant. But I will, nonetheless, say a little about the cross claim itself. 

This is said to arise under an implied term within the agreement. I think the 

defendants recognise that they had some difficulty in formulating the precise terms 

of the implied term. What eventually was contended, as I understand it, is that 

there was an implied term that the claimants would not take active steps to prevent 

or impede the defendants from raising finance with which to repay the loan. 

29 I have of course been reminded of the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney 

General of Belize v. Belize Telecom [2009] 1 WLR and the various passages in the 

speech of Lord Steyn and relating to the basis upon which it is appropriate to imply 

a term. By way of summary, the Privy Council found that whilst there were a 

number of criteria which had been used from time to time by the courts in 

embarking upon the task of finding what should be implied and/or what the 

contract would mean (namely reference to what is reasonable and equitable, 

reference to what gives business efficacy to the contract, what is so obvious it goes 

without saying, what is capable of being clearly expressed, and what does not 

contradict an express term of the contract) were not to be seen as independent tests. 

There was a collection of different ways in which the judges have tried to express 

the central idea that the implied term must spell out what the contract actually 

means. 

30 The starting point here, it seems to me, is that any attempt to imply a term in regard 

to this contract must be embarked on by an analysis of the express terms in the 

factual matrix in which the contract was entered into. The fact that in due course, 



after the loans became due, a dispute arose with regard to the ability of the 

defendants to repay the loan and the extent to which the claimants were interfering 

with it, were not matters which were within the consideration of the parties when 

they entered into the agreement. Of course, I readily accept that the court would 

imply a term to the effect that the claimants would not take steps to prevent the 

performance of the defendants’ repayment obligations, namely their obligation to 

repay when those sums came due. But at the due date it is not suggested that the 

claimants had, at that stage, taken any steps to impede the defendants from 

repaying the loan. The reason why the defendants did not repay the loan was quite 

straightforward: they did not have any money. That is why they did not pay on the 

due date. 

31 There seem to me to be serious difficulties about implying a term relating to what 

steps the claimants could take after their loan became due and repayable. It is 

obvious that the claimants will wish to enforce its right to repayment and in the 

process to ensure that it does not lose any security. In that latter regard, the 

claimants would want to ensure that a third party is not invited to embark on a 

course of action which would prejudice the claimants’ claim and/or defendants’ 

security. The term that is being suggested by the defendants would effectively 

impede the claimants from enforcing its justified rights. I see absolutely no need to 

incorporate or imply any such term. To the contrary, it would be quite improper. 

32 There is, it seems to me, some force in the proposition that what the defendants are 

seeking to do by virtue of this argument is either to raise a complaint in regard to 

the standstill agreement (which is not made), or alternatively to promote a claim 

which might more properly be advanced by way of economic tort. Furthermore, 

there is, it seems to me, a serious difficulty on the facts. The high spot of the 

defendants’ case is that an agreement with a firm called Trilliant with Welgate was 

stymied by the claimants. The material that touches on that issue, which is 

contained within the bundle and has been read to the court, does not seem to me to 

begin to make good that complaint. 

33 What had happened was that Welgate had entered into negotiations with a firm 

called Trilliant with a view to Trilliant purchasing the shares of Bozel. Wind of 

this got out in the course, as I understand it, of the Luxembourg proceedings, albeit 

of a slightly different transaction. On 11 th September 2009 the claimants wrote to 

Trilliant recording the fact that it was understood that Trilliant were going to buy 

the shares of the Bozel subsidiaries, and complaining that despite the fact that 

Trilliant purported to be acting with the cooperation of the claimant, it had in fact 

never contacted them. More importantly perhaps even than that, it was pointed out 

that Trilliant had never approached the claimants in order to ensure that the 

recovery of their loan was protected by payment of all or part of the proceeds of 



sale into an escrow account for their benefit. Not surprisingly, they sounded a 

warning as to that plan. 

34 The response from American lawyers acting for Trilliant explained that they were 

proceeding on the basis of concern on the part of their clients that the claimants had 

interfered with or frustrated an earlier deal involving Jessop & Lamont, and had 

decided to move forward without the participation of the claimants. It was 

announced that after careful deliberation, as it was put, they had decided to change 

tack and had embarked on the negotiation, as I understand it, with Welgate for an 

acquisition of the Bozel shares, the claimants being sent by copy of that letter. 

Attention was drawn to the fact that following the sale of the shares it was intended 

that £20 million of the sums involved should be used to repay the outstanding 

Bozel debts to Trafalgar on the one hand and the claimants on the other. 

35 Again, not surprisingly, this provoked a somewhat brusque response from the 

claimants, drawing attention to the fact that the shares of Bozel, which were 

purportedly to be sold by Welgate to Trilliant, had been seized in Luxembourg as a 

result of the default judgment against Welgate, and that the claimants were seeking 

to obtain a court decision for the sale of those shares on a public sale, and that 

interference with a court sale was not legally proper, and suggesting that the 

transaction that Trilliant and Welgate were embarking on was not permissible. 

36 In my judgment, there is nothing in that material which could be regarded as 

improper or in breach of any obligation to be of reasonable assistance to the 

defendants in meeting their obligations. All that is happening is that the claimants 

were exercising their legitimate legal rights to recover the sums due to them, and to 

do so, amongst other things, by exercising the security they had over the pledged 

shares. 

37 Lastly, if that was not enough, there is no material that I have seen which persuades 

me that it is arguable that the steps taken by the claimants to protect its interests 

actually led to any breakdown of the negotiations with Trilliant, which in fact 

continued for a considerable time thereafter. 

38 It follows that even if I were not satisfied that the set-off clauses did not bar the 

counterclaim, the counterclaim itself has no realistic prospect of success. For all 

those reasons, I grant the claimants the relief they seek. 

MR. POLLEY: My Lord, I am very grateful. You have seen the draft order already. 

So far as I know there is no contention about it. I know my learned friend has 

calculated it, although I do not know how helpful it will be to finalise the 



schedules. Those instructing me have been beavering away to get those right. The 

order I seek is before your Lordship. I would ask for costs. 

My Lord, in relation to costs there is a clause in the contract which is set out in the 

particulars of claim which provides, as many of these agreements do, for 

contractual costs on the indemnity basis. Your Lordship will know the ordinary 

rule is in those circumstances they are supposed to be fair and reasonable. Of 

course, your Lordship’s discretion is not ousted, if your Lordship wants to order 

costs on a different basis. In my submission, this is a proper case for indemnity 

costs given the contractual clause. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: Does the contractual clause have the effect that it is not 

open to the defendants to assert that any part of the claim for costs is unreasonable? 

MR. POLLEY: My Lord, no, absolutely, they can take those points. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: Just an ordinary indemnity order. 

MR. POLLEY: What it does, my Lord, is shift the presumption effectively, so that the 

court will ordinarily assume. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: What I was wanting to know is what is the implication 

of the contractual provision that costs will be on an indemnity basis? Simply that 

an indemnity basis in so far as a detailed assessment, if undertaken? 

MR. POLLEY: Yes, my Lord, or a summary assessment. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: Or a summary assessment. Let us try to deal with 

those three points first. Is there any issue about the terms of the order in respect of 

the sums claimed, or are you unable to help me on that? 

MR. MAJUMDAR: As my learned friend says, I have a calculator, but even if I had 

access to the relevant libel figure it would take quite a long time. The answer is I 

do not know. It is plausible. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: I will not sign an order today. I will give the parties 

until Tuesday close of play to reach an agreement on what sums are due and to 

include such in an agreed form of order. 

Is there a dispute that the claimants are entitled to their costs? 

MR. MAJUMDAR: My Lord, no. 



MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: Is there a dispute that they are entitled to them on an 

indemnity basis? 

MR. MAJUMDAR: My Lord, no. That seems to be standard. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: Let me see the schedule now. 

MR. POLLEY: I have it here. I do not if your Lordship has seen it. (Handed) I have 

not looked at it in great detail myself. I also have not seen my learned friend’s 

costs schedule to the extent that may be relevant. Your Lordship sees the grand 

total is just shy of £40,000. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: Is there any particular point that you wanted to draw to 

my attention? 

MR. POLLEY: I do not think so, my Lord. This is a £14 million claim. This is a 

substantial piece of litigation. My learned friend’s client raised a number of issues 

which had to be dealt with as factual issues. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: Mr. Majumdar, any comments on this? 

MR. MAJUMDAR: My Lord, I have seen it only a few seconds ago, and that is not just 

because it has just been supplied by the other side but because I had not been given 

it. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: I cannot resist asking you what your costs are. 

MR. MAJUMDAR: I do not know. I have not seen our schedule. 

MR. POLLEY: So we are both in the dark as to that, my Lord! 

MR. MAJUMDAR: My Lord, I am just going to comment on the scribbled notes that 

have been made by those sitting behind me. Starting at the bottom, attention is 

drawn to the photocopying and binding costs. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: £860, yes. I thought that was how solicitors made 

most of their money! 

MR. MAJUMDAR: I am objecting to that! My Lord, looking further up the page, 

attendances on documents, the figures claimed for Grade B and C fee earners. That 

comes to something like 35 hours which again struck us as being quite a lot. 

Attendances on others and not even on the client. Again, that seems to be quite a 

lot of time spent. 



MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: Yes. Attendances on colleagues is a rather strange 

concept. It may be popping round next door and saying: what do you think? 

MR. MAJUMDAR: Yes. Cumulatively that seems like quite a lot of time under that 

category. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: What is your offer, around two bases, either all in or 

alternatively by way of payment on account? 

MR. MAJUMDAR: The figure of 18 all in is suggested from behind. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: Thank you. Mr. Polley, attendance on colleagues is an 

unusual item. 

MR. POLLEY: My Lord, may I just take instructions very briefly. (Pause) My Lord, 

what I can say about that is your Lordship will see that category includes a number 

of things. Attendances on the court includes, for instance, being at this hearing 

which was, at one stage, scheduled to take an entire day. So there are a couple of 

hours in that respect. Attendances on colleagues involves internal discussions 

within my instructing solicitors, Nabarro, about the case. It is impossible at this 

stage to get a detailed breakdown. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: Between the people named. 

MR. POLLEY: Yes, for instance Mr. Warne speaking to Mr. Taplin or whatever. My 

Lord, I think that is all I can helpfully say on the material in front of me. In 

relation to attendances on documents, very briefly, without seeing my learned 

friend’s costs schedule it is very difficult to know what the sensible comparator 

would be. In relation to photocopying and binding, I am told that is what it cost us, 

my Lord, as simple as that. The suggestion that £18,000 which is less than half, is 

the appropriate measure on an indemnity basis in a claim of this magnitude is -- 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: An option: £35,000 all in or £25,000 on account? 

MR. POLLEY: My Lord, I will just take instructions. (Pause) 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: A good example of a discussion between colleagues. 

MR. POLLEY: My Lord, this is a discussion with a client in fact; this is attendances on 

clients! 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: I see. (Pause) 



MR. POLLEY: My Lord, the instructions are £35,000 all in would be acceptable to us. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: £35,000 payable within 14 days. Thank you very 

much. 

MR. MAJUMDAR: My Lord, one more matter. My clients are not here, but may I ask, 

so that I can say that I asked, for permission to appeal? 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: On all of it or which part? 

MR. MAJUMDAR: On all of it. 

MR. JUSTICE DAVID STEEL: I do not think it is appropriate for me to grant leave. I 

have concluded that there is no realistic prospect of defending the claim. It must 

follow therefore that there is no realistic prospect on an appeal and leave is refused. 

Thank you both very much. 

__________

Crastvell Trading Limited v Bozel SA - Radcliffe Chambers

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