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i.F ..nll..i - US Watch

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Page 3<br />

Amencas and South Paufic<br />

Home Nolh Amei'cii ' Urilr-:l Sialcg<br />

<strong>US</strong> election cycle highlights key analytical pitfalls<br />

Obtaining strong qualitative anaiysis of politics in developed countries. particularly the<br />

United States, should be relatively easy. Interest in politics and election outcomes is<br />

high, the market for good information is enormous and lucrative, and the political<br />

System is awash in money. In addition, the Unibd States has both a saturated media<br />

industry and the largest professional polling market in the world Yet last November, a<br />

substantial segment of the public and professional political observers were genuineiy<br />

surprised by the election ou!come --though it was not remoteiy surprising. Examining<br />

how. and why, political analysts have made poor predictions even in very favourable<br />

conditions can help highlight relatively simpie means of improving analyttcal outcomes.<br />

and of avoiding common mistakes.<br />

What next<br />

Election prediction in most heavily polled federai races is not particularly difficuit - if<br />

several key qualitative analytical principles are followed. Even on poiicy questions<br />

where polling metrics are less relevant and outcomes more uncertain, maintaining<br />

discipline in assimilating new information, ignoring dublous narratives, and attempting to<br />

account for uncertainty can usually provide strong insight into likely outcomes.<br />

Analysis<br />

The Republican establishment has spent the past five inonths excoriating itself for not<br />

identifying, relatively early on: that the 2012 election cycle was unlikely to be favourable<br />

for the party. Yet Republican leaders do not have a monopoly on bad analysis of <strong>US</strong><br />

politics. Despite devoting huge sums to political analysis, much of the output de!ivered<br />

to both parties and the public is poor. By keeping a few key principles in mind. it is<br />

possible to draw useful lessons on how to improve political trend analysis -- and<br />

qualitative analysis more broadly.<br />

Causes of analytical failure<br />

Impact<br />

. Political poiarisation has<br />

generally made identifying<br />

<strong>US</strong> political and election<br />

trends easier, not harder.<br />

. An early inference that the<br />

2014 midlerm election cycle<br />

is iikeiy to be a relatively<br />

strong one for Republicans<br />

is supportable.<br />

. However, absent a<br />

significant change in<br />

strategy and meaningful<br />

platform rev!sions, long-term<br />

trends look unfavourable for<br />

Repubilcans<br />

Broadly speaking, there are three primary contributors to bad <strong>US</strong> political analysis<br />

Ideological factors<br />

The most obvious factor is ideology - but not in the sense that political analysts<br />

ConscioiIsIy distort their views to favour one party's interest. (While this sometimes<br />

occurs, knowledgeable, skiiled analysts -such as George Wil and Michael Barone --<br />

would not have risked severe professional embarrassment by deliberately skewing their<br />

pre-election assessments.) Rather. many analysts are unable to separate their view of<br />

the world from polling and political trends that are not always congruent with it^<br />

This is a variation on the problem created by strong 'analyticai frameworks' (see<br />

INTERNATIONAL: Research shows why strategic plans fail -May 4, 2012) analysts<br />

can become accustomed to relying on a framework for viewing a particular problem and<br />

unconscioitsly discount new information that does not 'fit the framework'.<br />

'Horse race' narratives<br />

O Oxford Analytic8 2013. All rights reserved<br />

NO duplication or transmission of this doci!me!it is permitted without the written consent of Oxford Analyllca<br />

C ~ ~ . i.F l ~ ..<strong>nll</strong>..i ~ l rnml.l\nlilir~nt.ir+r roll -Ad ISEF. If < Gnn nr ;& hlnith 7 Uiln OEF; 71iP


Page 4<br />

Amedcxsand SoUth PaMc<br />

The <strong>US</strong> media oflen contributes to these false narratives because its prtmaly objective<br />

(telling an exciting political story) differs from that of professional analysts (gauging the<br />

likely outcome of the election). Thus, in relatively static elections such as the 2012<br />

presidential contest: the media has a strong iiicentive to over-interpret small, frequently<br />

insignificant, polling movements as indicative of a major shifl in trend.<br />

Misuse of history<br />

Finally, it is tempting to misuse historical 'precedent' In analysis of <strong>US</strong> elect~ons In the<br />

history of modern polling there have been just 20 presidential election cycles. Seeking<br />

to draw conclusions utilising a dataset with so few data points should be undertaken<br />

with considerable caution.<br />

However, political analysts often 'cherry pick' this iimited historical data to support<br />

sometimes dubious conclusions. For exampie. during the 2012 cycle some analysts<br />

emphasised the fact that no tncumbent president had won re-election since 1940 when<br />

the official unemployment rate exceeded 7.3%. Yet given the iimited dataset and the<br />

fact that Franklin Roosevelt won re-election (1836 and 1940) twice when unemployment<br />

was at least double that rate (16.6% and 14.6% respectively). the usefulness of this<br />

historical correlation was certainly over-emphasised (see UNITED STATES: Romney<br />

faces uphill campaign fight - August 27. 2012) and see UNITED STATES: Ohama<br />

retains edge over challengers - December 16, 2011).<br />

Improving analysis<br />

VVith a little effort to contain these negative tendencies. the accuracy of politicai trend<br />

analysis can be improved.<br />

Information assimilation<br />

As statistician and polling analyst Nate Silver explained in his 2012 book. 'The Signal<br />

and the Noise', good qualitative anaiysts adjust their assessments in response to<br />

additional data. In contrast, poor analysts have a tendency to stlck to their previous<br />

conclusions regardless of new data -- or, even worse: interpret all new data in a manner<br />

that simply reinforces their previous conclusions (behaviourai economists call this<br />

'confirmation bias').<br />

One of the best qualitative anaiysts of <strong>US</strong> politics. Charlie Cook of the Cook Political<br />

Report, has since 1984 been correct approximately 92.95% of the time in competitive<br />

congressional and presidential races. In early 2011, he suggested that 2012 couid be a<br />

good year for Repubiicans. Yet, critically. as more polling atid other data becanie<br />

available, his assessment shifted completely -- and ended up being very accurate<br />

several weeks before 2012 eleclions<br />

Weighing data<br />

Not all data is equally significant. While <strong>US</strong> pollsters hardly have a perfect record. they<br />

are both the single most reliable barometer of publlc opinion and an accurate guide to<br />

nationai election outcomes - when their resuits are assessed a few days ahead of an<br />

election and aggregated. (On the other hand. cherry pick~ng individual polls -- some of<br />

which will necessarily be highiy inaccurate outliers - freqiiently leads to serious<br />

failures.) There have been a few cases when polling has, for various reasons, been<br />

systematically wrong: but if an analyst believes this is happen~ng it is incumbent ilpon<br />

them to explain why.<br />

@Oxford Analvlica 2013. All rights reserved


O Oxford Analytica 2013. All rights reserved<br />

No duplication or tra!rsmission of this document is perlnitted without the written consent oiOxford Analytica<br />

Cnntnd iua. www oran cornlaholrtlcontartn or rnil +44 lilt35 261 ROO oi in Norllr America 1 800 965 766<br />

Page 5<br />

Arnerlcasand South Pauflc<br />

In the current, highly polarised, political environment, demographic data is also a useful<br />

analytical guide. since the behaviour of particular voting blocs is increasingly consistent.<br />

However, the media teiids to downplay polling and demographic data in favour of a focus<br />

on campaign strategy and tactics. In local campaigns, these strategies can be highlight<br />

significant to the outcome, but in presidential contests there is relatively little polling<br />

data to support the notion that campaign tactics had a decisive impact on the general<br />

election outcome since the late 1980s.<br />

Accounting for uncertainty<br />

Finally. in is incumbent upon an analyst to gauge, and be clear about, the uncertainty<br />

inherent in any political trend assessment. Such uncertainty is, of course. much greater<br />

the further into the future the projection: more than two months before the polls, any<br />

projection should be treated as highly speculative. However, as Election Day<br />

approaches, the risk of disruptive contingencies subsides and polling data has far more<br />

predictive power. At that point, if the aggregate polling data indicates a clear leader. it<br />

becomes disingenuous and potentially unsupportable to maintain that the race is 'too<br />

close to call'.<br />

Outlook<br />

Media fragmentatlon, a changing business model for pollsters, and an increasingly<br />

poiarised and ideologically entrenched electorate means that the overall quality of <strong>US</strong><br />

political analysis is likely to remain poor. Nevenheless there are a small number of<br />

exceptionally high quality analysts at work in this discipline; all tend to alter the~r<br />

conclusions when confronted with new data, assimilate information effectively, and have<br />

a solid grasp of how to measure uncertainty<br />

Word Counf (approx): 1203

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