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Mercedes Botto Andrea Carla Bianculli - Flacso

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Brazil’s total exports, in the case of Argentina this stood at 80%. In qualitative terms, this increase<br />

also benefited Argentina through the diversification of its export supply.<br />

Nevertheless, this was a short-term process and one of limited scope. Different analyses emphasize<br />

that even if the CGP led to an increase in productivity and a better use of installed capacity in both<br />

countries, there were neither significant investments nor important transformations in the structure<br />

of the national supply. In effect, difficulties in the availability and conditions of credit to acquire<br />

capital goods and the perception that this was not definitive hindered the decision-making of<br />

Argentine producers in the medium-term. In addition, the increase in bilateral trade – by 40%<br />

between 1985 and 1988 – was circumscribed to certain sectors, particularly capital goods and wheat,<br />

products of relative importance in macroeconomic terms. Most of the relevant productive sectors<br />

had only a marginal or symbolical participation in the impact of the integration initiative. Moreover,<br />

they did not seem to be interested in assuming a more active role in the near future. These included<br />

the steel and iron industry, different branches of the food sector, and the automotive complex.<br />

For many of those who took part in the narrated events, the PICE was the only experience where<br />

academic results were the source, and, moreover, the unique source of knowledge and advice in the<br />

trade policy decision-making process. This leads us to both the facilitating and inhibiting factors in<br />

this particular research-policy relationship.<br />

A first factor refers to the novelty. This issue was new not only for public officials but for the<br />

private sector involved in the decision-making as well. It should be noted that these were the first<br />

steps promoted by a democratic government after years of military dictatorship. Even if there had<br />

been previous trade liberalization processes – the negotiation of tariff preferences within LAIA<br />

during the 1970s – the military coup would then disarticulate these networks by breaking the<br />

constitutional order and replacing public officials and cabinets. The only sectors that were involved<br />

in this learning process were those related to the most concentrated sectors of the economy and<br />

which also experienced a large economic growth during the military coup – such as the steel and<br />

iron industry, or the automotive and petrochemical industries. However, these sectors did not<br />

participate in the formulation or implementation of the CGP, which was limited to smaller sectors<br />

and industries.<br />

The second element that accounts for the influence academics had vis-à-vis other actors involved in<br />

the decisional process refers to the relative poor capacity or ability of the sector to respond or<br />

produce alternative strategies. In effect, the capital goods industry is not a concentrated sector in<br />

Argentina. Unlike other sectors showing great political leverage – such as the steel and iron<br />

industry, or the automotive and petrochemical industries – it is highly disarticulated and does not<br />

have a strong and clear labour organization. This allowed the executive to design and implement<br />

the sectoral opening without consulting with the actors involved.<br />

Finally, a third element that can help us explain the leading role academia played in the formulation<br />

and implementation of the liberalization process that was launched from 1986 to 1991 refers to the<br />

integration model adopted. A selective, gradual and complementary approach to trade liberalization<br />

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