Mercedes Botto Andrea Carla Bianculli - Flacso

THE IMPACT OF RESEARCH IN TRADE POLICY IN THE SOUTHERN CONE
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CAPITAL GOODS PROTOCOL AND
THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF WITHIN MERCOSUR
Mercedes Botto
Senior Researcher
Programa de Estudios sobre Instituciones Económicas Internacionales
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO-Argentina)
Andrea Carla Bianculli
PhD Candidate
Programme in Political and Social Sciences
Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF, Barcelona)
Paper prepared for the Call for Papers
“The Role of Research on Trade Policy in the Developing World”
launched by the Latin American Trade Network (LATN)
and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
October 2006

INDEX
Introduction
1. Literature review and concept definition
2. Setting the context
2.1. A first move towards trade liberalization: Alfonsín and the Integration and Economic
Program (PICE) (1987-1989)
2.2. Acceleration of the liberalization program: Menem and the Common External Tariff
(CET) (1991-1995)
3. Characterization of the research-policy relationship
3.1. The Capital Goods Protocol (CGP)
3.1.1. Academic production
3.1.2. Research-policy articulation
3.1.3. Utilization in decisions
3.2. The Common External Tariff (CET)
3.2.1. Academic production
3.2.2. Research–policy articulation
3.2.3. Utilization in decisions
4. Impact evaluation: an initial comparative analysis
5. Some final remarks
Bibliography
List of interviewees
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INTRODUCTION
By the mid-1980s, the Argentine government launched a process of trade liberalization that would
not be reversed in the future. This decision was framed within the political guidelines –
conditionalities – that the World Bank demanded in order to release the loans the country needed
to solve its foreign debt difficulties. However, within these broad guidelines, Argentina, as was the
case with borrowing countries in general, still had ample freedom of action in terms of both
strategic and contingency decisions, as when deciding to opt for either a unilateral liberalization
process or a negotiated one; when deciding either to privilege a project involving deep integration
or mere trade initiatives, or when choosing to establish bilateral agreements with border countries,
or with Northern countries. In sum, options were not limited.
The novelty1 and complexity of each of these definitions opened a window of opportunity for the
influence of knowledge and academic research. Through their participation in the decisional
process, academics could bridge the gap in terms of the uncertainty these new challenges posed,
and also contribute to prevent or avoid the unwanted costs of the reforms, such as those brought
about by trade liberalization.
Political and academic literature has strongly debated about the impact ideas have on the decisional
process since the early days of the Post-war. Two paradigms emerge within this debate. The first of
these approaches argues that social researchers play a crucial role in the rationalization of the
decision-making process. The second approach, which assumes a rather sceptical vision of this
relationship, portrays the decisional process as chaotic and decisions as being the result of mutual
adjustments among the different actors and arenas involved. Based on this second paradigm, this
paper claims that researchers are only one of the agents involved in the decision-making process,
endowed with a specific type of knowledge – namely, scientific knowledge – and their influence
depends on their rivalry or imbrications with the knowledge of other local actors.
The paper is thus aimed at analyzing and evaluating to what extent social research has influenced
the trade policy-making process since the reestablishment of democracy until nowadays. In
addition, we intend to identify which factors promote its influence in Argentina. Hence, this
research emphasizes those least known or publicized aspects of the trade policy. This does not
entail analyzing neither the scope nor the content of the trade liberalization process. Instead, we
will focus on the processes, actors, and capabilities that have an impact on the decision-making
process.
Building on the current debate about the nexus between knowledge and politics, within this paper
we analyze two processes of influence. The first, which can be characterized as a successful case,
refers to the establishment of the Capital Goods Protocol (CGP), signed with Brazil during the
1 Even if these countries had participated in the negotiations within the Latin America Integration
Association (LAIA) during the 1970s and/or implemented neoliberal policies before, the novelty and main
implication of the new global context was given by the existence of multilateral mechanisms of control –
namely, the World Trade Organization (WTO) – which keeps governments from reversing the path initiated
and from establishing measures of unilateral protection as they used to apply.
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initial period of tariff preferences negotiation – 1985 to 1988 – and which was part of the
Integration and Economic Program (PICE). The second episode, instead, is portrayed as a failed
case: the negotiation of the Common External Tariff (CET) between 1991 and 1994, where in spite
of the technical complexity of the issue at stake, research and knowledge did not have a prominent
role in this particular decision-making process.
The analysis of both episodes is intended to identify the type of knowledge produced, the
articulation established with policymakers, and the factors that either promoted or hindered its use
in the policy process. The information and data presented are based on secondary resources and the
analysis of 18 interviews conducted with policymakers and researchers in the field of foreign trade,
representing both private and public research centres, and who were directly involved in the
process under Raúl Alfonsín’s (1983-1989) and/or Carlos Menem’s (1989-1999) administrations.
This paper is structured into four parts. In the first one, we identify and analyze the literature
contributions in terms of the conceptual and methodological definitions. The second section
describes the spatial and temporal context in which the nexus between research and decisionmaking
effectively occurred. In the third part, we delve into the analysis of both episodes of policy
change and focus on the research-policy relationship. The fourth section offers a comparative
analysis of the field research, and an initial impact evaluation – assessment. Finally, the conclusion
presents the main lessons derived from both case studies, and proposes some policy
recommendations regarding the enhancement of the utilization of empirical research by
policymakers in the region in the years to come.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPT DEFINITION
Interest in the role of ideas and academics on the decision-making process is not new. During the
Post-war, interest arose as a consequence of the increasing complexity of decisions, the expansion
of public intervention into new areas, and the greater significance of social sciences in the planning
and evaluation phases of policies. Later on, other phenomena contributed to this
acknowledgement, namely, the role of ideas in terms of the structuring and affirmation of
paradigms of reference, and the development of the so-called public-private networks where expert
knowledge is attributed a privileged role. In sum, the impact of ideas over the decision-making
process has been strongly debated in the political and academic literature since the Post-war period
till today.
In terms of the impact or influence of research on public policy, two main paradigms can be
identified regarding the role social researchers – taken as knowledge producers – play in the public
decision-making processes [Brunner et al., 1993]. The first of these paradigms is part of the policymaking
theory developed during the 1950s in the United States. This approach promotes a
favourable attitude towards social and political engineering, and argues that researchers play a
fundamental role within the decision-making process since they provide the necessary knowledge
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and instruments for the rationalization of the decision-making and coordination processes. In other
words, they provide the empirical evidence that clarifies doubts and reduces the uncertainty
brought about by policy reform.
Based on the assumption that the decisional process is linear and incremental, four phases are
identified within this model. In each of these phases, there is one main actor that is responsible and
who stamps his activity specificities and own particular characteristics on the process. Thus, for
example, the decision to include the problem on the public agenda is an activity which corresponds
to the government leaders – the executives – who arbitrate between the conflicting visions and
opinions on the issue, while during the formulation – and/or design – phase of the policy,
academics and experts are the ones who propose alternatives and solutions. During the
implementation phase, and mainly motivated by the distribution costs of the policy, interest groups
or lobbies may press on the government or different public offices to have their interests
contemplated. Finally, during the evaluation or monitoring phase, responsibility is shared among
external experts and the population in general. In turn, this entails a synergetic dynamic [Cobb,
Ross, and Ross, 1976].
While this first approach argues that social researchers play a key role in the rationalization of the
decision-making process, the second paradigm assumes a rather sceptical vision and characterizes
the decisional process as mainly chaotic. From this perspective, decisions are the result of mutual
adjustments among the different players and the diverse arenas where they interact. Within this
“building blocks” game, researchers are just another player, endowed with a very specific type of
knowledge – namely, scientific knowledge – and their influence depends on their interaction with
the knowledge of other local actors.
The “engineering model of information use”, which argues that the produced information would fit
into the decision to be made, was thus superseded by an approach based on the idea that there are
multiple decision-making arenas and that various actors are involved in this game, being endowed
with only partial information and local knowledge. These actors include social researchers and
academics, whose knowledge – based on scientific rules – is only one of the many competing
sources of knowledge and information. However, arguments were put forward in the sense that
only in exceptional cases does empirical research produce a direct, instrumental, and clearly
identifiable impact on the decision-making process. On the contrary, in most cases, the decisional
process is diffuse and lacks a concrete order of stages; it is routine that governs. Hence, if research
and information do have an impact, this is only an indirect process. This is what has been
catalogued as “the enlightenment function of research” [Weiss, 1979], which illustrates the idea that
knowledge gained by means of research provides a diffuse “enlightenment” function and broadens the
existing knowledge base of policymakers. Thus, as long as it offers an understanding and
interpretation of the data and the situation that is critical to the policy decision, research may lead
to a gradual shift in concepts and paradigms. In other words, Weiss’ enlightenment model
highlights the role of research as clarifying, accelerating, and legitimizing changes in conceptual
thinking, and therefore, in policies.
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When social research influences the decisional process, this is based on the fact that it is just
another knowledge or area of expertise. Moreover, this influence takes place in decision-making
arenas already informed by other kinds of previous local knowledge – such as partial information,
anecdotes, and accumulated experiences and practices, among others – used by the wide range of
players involved in the process as soon as they implement their own strategies. Within this context,
social scientific knowledge can have some limited influence or impact in the decision-making
process only by establishing a competition with previously provided local knowledge and
information. In most cases, the influence of research may lead to the construction of a framework
consisting of empirical generalizations and ideas that can then be absorbed by policymakers in a
rather unconscious manner.
As opposed to the first approach, this second paradigm appears to be more realistic. Based on the
idea that knowledge and academia diversify rapidly, it argues that it is difficult to identify “social
researchers” as a clear and homogeneous social and professional group. Their specificity is not
given by their belonging to a particular institution – such as university. Instead, it is their experience
and technical knowledge on certain issues that determines their specific character2. In terms of the scope of this research, the definition of three concepts – academia, policy change,
and research influence – turns out to be of importance. First, we will focus on the influence that
local academia exercise on trade policy decisions. Our analysis will revolve around the production –
knowledge – of local academia, rather than on the ideas and findings produced by epistemic
communities as defined by Haas [1992]. Even if “academia” may be a rather elusive concept to
define, within this paper we will assume academia as an actor, whose peculiarity is the production
of knowledge according to rules, evidence, and positive – empirical – and scientific criteria – based on
measuring and contrasting.
Our general working definition is based on a broad characterization of academia, rather than on the
idea that academia belongs or is circumscribed to a specific ambit or production place, such as
university, since we are aware that this type of knowledge is currently quite dispersed across diverse
ambits, and academics are increasingly being appointed as service providers by other actors and
institutions. Thus, we acknowledge the fact that in order to apprehend the concept of academia we
must explicit the main changes in terms of its area of action and activities. As far as the area of
action is concerned, and in the context of trade policies, academics can now be found within the
so-called think-tanks and as consultants and experts in the broader social and political community:
Ministries of Economy and Foreign Affairs and different public agencies, parliament, business
sectors, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international
organizations, among others. In terms of their activities, the traditional characterization of social
research seems inadequate in face of the new challenges policy-making imposes today. In this sense,
Reich’s concept of “symbolic-analytical services” [1991] turns out to be of great utility given that
this includes a whole set of activities regarding the identification, solution, and arbitration of
material problems and disputes by means of the manipulation of knowledge.
2 This is based on the expression that the expert only exists when placed in an “expertise” situation [Restier-
Melleray, 1990: 546].
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In sum, we assume a vast idea of academia, which mainly revolves around the notion of
“actorness”, both in the private and public fields. However, within the realm of academics and
scientific production, we are interested in the information and knowledge that is produced to
influence on public policies. Our focus is on policy-oriented intellectual and academic production.
This leads us to a second key concept in our analysis: policy change.
Discussions around policies fall into two broad areas or categories: process and product. While the
former refers to the interaction, relationships, and dynamics related to the process of negotiation
and influence, the latter entails taking policy as “a choice (or a series of interrelated choices) made to
undertake some course of action (or inaction)” [Tussie, 2006: 10]. Our episodes of policy change refer to
the trade liberalization process launched in Argentina by the end of the 1980s. However, within this
long process and assuming policy to be a product or outcome of certain decisions and choices, our
focus will be on two particular moments in order to apprehend the role academia had in each of
these instances of policy change.
Policy change refers thus to the particular ambit or context where we will specifically measure the
impact of academic research. Here we will mainly rely on the categorization put forward by
different authors, who basically distinguish between instrumental and conceptual changes in policy
[Davies et al., 2005; Neilson, 2001; Weiss, 1991; Caplan, 1979]. Thus, academic research impact may
be either instrumental by promoting small and incremental transformations in policy issues and
practices, or conceptual by leading to more gradual shifts in terms of policy-makers’ knowledge and
understanding towards certain issues. Following Caplan, instrumental changes are associated to
“micro-level decisions” since these are limited to the day-to-day policy issues, which are mainly
concerned with “bureaucratic management and efficiency rather than substantive policy issues” [1979: 462]. On
the contrary, conceptual changes and transformations are related to “macro-level decisions” that
involve key policy matters.
This distinction must be taken as an ideal type since reality is often far more complex and changes
to policies may fall somewhere on this spectrum [Tussie, 2006]. Moreover, and as we have already
argued, in most cases, the impact of research and information on the policy process is only an
indirect process, and here then, the diffuse enlightenment function of research turns out to be of
interest in order to overcome the idea that policy-makers only turn to research and academia in an
instrumental manner – to apply data, statistics, and facts to their policy decisions – and to highlight
that knowledge/research utilization is built on a gradual shift in conceptual thinking over time.
Nevertheless, this broad double categorization turns out to be an interesting departure line for the
examination of episodes of policy change.
Related to the episodes of policy change, we will see how research has worked in both cases. Our
analysis will be based on the three models identified by Weiss [1991, 1979]: research as data,
research as ideas, and research as argumentation. In the first case, research is intended to provide
answers to the real and concrete questions and issues that policy-makers face. In a way, this
characterization assumes a rather technocratic and mechanical relation between academia and
policy-makers. The second group, research as ideas, is perceived to be more diffuse and general in
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nature; in this case, research is used to face complex policy issues in a context of high uncertainty.
Finally, research as argumentation, is used by either policy-makers and/or interest groups may draw
on this research to assume an advocacy position. Once again we are dealing with ideal types [Tussie,
2006], but in order to apprehend the concrete academic-policy relationship, it is worth
decomposing these three categories and see how research has contributed to these episodes of
policy change.
Assuming that research is only one of the many competing sources of information policy-makers
can make use of, and one of the various factors that affect the final policy decision [Tussie, 2006;
Garrett and Islam, 1998], our paper argues that the availability of research and ideas does not
directly translate into policy change. In other words, the research-policy link is not a direct one, and
ideas only influence policy decisions under certain circumstances. Under what circumstances does
availability of knowledge lead to policy change? Following this line of argumentation, we define
policy influence as the result of a process along which three conditions must be present. To the
availability of research or the “production of knowledge”, we must add two other conditions: its
articulation with the stakeholders and mainly with decision makers, and finally, its edition and the
political will of decision makers to make use of it. In other words, in order to capture under what
circumstances research influences the trade policy-making process, understanding how the
production of research and the policy process interact in a particular context turns out to be of
salience.
Building on the current debate regarding the nexus between research and policy-making, and the
factors that contribute to this relationship, we will analyze two key moments within the Mercado
Común del Sur (Mercosur) and the integration process initially launched by Argentina and Brazil:
the CGP, signed within the PICE in 1987, and the CET established in 1994.
2. SETTING THE CONTEXT
After decades of protectionism and of import-substitution policies, most Latin American countries
(LACs) began to open up to the rest of the world in the late 1980s. Different factors converge to
explain this situation: the debt crisis of 1982, dissatisfaction with the results of import-substitution
strategies, and the acknowledgement that the effects on resource allocation of trade policies
characterized by high and dispersed import tariffs, widespread use of quantitative restrictions and
other non-tariff barriers and granting multiple exemptions to import restrictions were no longer
clear. By 1987-1988, it was patent that a fundamental change was needed and that the long-standing
protectionist trade policy could no longer be sustained. A process of trade reform and of reduction
of the levels of protection would then be launched across the region, and gain an accelerating pace.
The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s marked a turning point in the nature of trade
policies for all LACs3. 3 Except for Chile, the only country which had launched a continuous process of trade liberalization since
1973, when the military coup led by Augusto Pinochet took over.
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The process of reform and liberalization of trade policies started in isolated cases by the end of the
1980s, but became generalized in the early 1990s. The countries that form Mercosur were not an
exception. In the case of Argentina, trade liberalization was, together with other policies – namely,
privatization, state reform and deregulation – at the core of the structural reforms implemented in
the 1990s. However, in the mid-1980s, and after having remained close for more than 50 years,
Argentina initiates a slow but steady move towards the opening of the economy to international
trade through the promotion of multiple strategies which combined unilateral opening and trade
negotiations both at the regional and multilateral levels.
After providing a brief analytical discussion of the process of trade reform in Argentina, this section
describes two episodes of policy change: the CGP and the CET. The choice of these cases is based
on the importance both decisions had within the broader process of trade liberalization initiated by
Argentina in the mid-1980s. While the CGP stands out as the first step toward trade liberalization
between Argentina and Brazil – though it remains as a negotiated and highly controlled opening
intended to constitute an agreement of economic complementarity – the negotiation of the CET
implies a crucial move toward the establishment of the customs union within Mercosur. In
addition, the CET constitutes a fundamental decision. On the one hand, it would work as a lock-indevice,
limiting the governments’ autonomy in terms of their trade policies. On the other hand, it
complemented internal trade liberalization while, at the same time, moving towards the reduction
of Mercosur external barriers. Finally, both decisions were undertaken by two different
governments: whereas the first democratic government led by Raúl Alfonsín signed the PICE, the
CET was established by the following administration, headed by Carlos Menem.
The analysis focuses on the political context – that is, the political strategies and power relations –
together with the wider historical, geopolitical, economic and social contexts regarding the decisionmaking
process of each of these policies. In addition, we look into the type of decision at stake, and
its place within the previous liberalization process, together with the challenges these entailed for
the actors involved – both public and private. This turns out to be a key element because it allows
us to see to what extent these policy options constituted a window of opportunity for the
production and utilization of academic research.
2.1. A FIRST MOVE TOWARDS TRADE LIBERALIZATION: ALFONSÍN AND THE PICE (1987-
1989)
Since the 1940s until 1976 Argentine trade policies had been marked by a strong protectionism,
based on quantitative restrictions and high tariffs. The military regime that took power in 1976
initially appeared to be committed to market reform and trade liberalization, but the reform process
became stalled and ultimately collapsed during the economic crisis of the early 1980s. Radical
reform would not get going under for another decade. However, and in spite of the stiff resistance,
this thirteen-year period would lead up to reform since it was one in which the basis for important
changes to come would be laid [Teichman, 2001].
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Between 1976 and 1979, the program of José Martínez de Hoz, the military-appointed civilian
Minister of Economy, was a heterodox and often contradictory mix of price and exchange controls,
selective tariff reduction, privatization, and state expansion. In terms of the trade policy, the reform
program was uneven: while between 1976 and 1982, the average tariff rate on imports declined
from 55 to 22%, a nucleus of branches producing intermediate goods considered to be “strategic”
retained high tariff protection: steel, aluminium, pharmaceutical, petroleum and derivatives,
transport material, and cement4. In any case, this uneven reform process was abandoned after the
crisis that hit Argentina in 1979, which led to a sharp deterioration in the current account and the
balance of payments, and the subsequent debt crisis of 1982. Quantitative restrictions would be
then re-established in order to reduce imports and in turn, the commercial deficit.
The first constitutional government would leave these measures in place, and by the end of 1983 it
would also introduce a system by which products were classified according to whether they could
be imported or not. Moreover, tariffs were increased since 1982, and by 1987 they would range
from 0 to 105%, though the average tariff was 37% and the mode, 38%. In sum, between 1985 and
1987, the predominant tariff was 53% 5.
The newly elected president Raúl Alfonsín resisted strict austerity and market liberalizing measures.
However, the designation of Juan Sourrouille and a new technical team of economists in the
Ministry of Economy would entail an important change in 1985. This new economic team,
although far from orthodox, agreed that a new economic program, including trade policy reform
was needed, and that same year the Austral Plan would put trade liberalization on the agenda, which
became an issue of debate between government and business. In spite of these changes, the process
of trade liberalization as a unilateral policy would not start until 1988 with the so-called “Canitrot
Reform” 6. While on the tariff side there was a reduction in nominal protection – the average import
tax was reduced from a level of 45% in 1987 to 29% at the end of 1988 – in terms of non-tariff
measures, there was an important reduction of tariff positions that were subject to quantitative
restrictions: the number of products subject to prohibition or quantitative restrictions was reduced
from 4.000 to 3.000, and the average tariff rate was reduced from 51 to 36% [de la Balze, 1995].
Hence, by the late 1988, there was progress in the trade liberalization agenda. In addition, by 1988,
attitudes within Argentine public officials toward far-reaching reform were already changing in
substantial ways.
Nevertheless, the decisive and final implementation of the trade liberalization reform would come
hand in hand with the closer relationship between Argentina and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank, which would play a more definitive role in shaping the reform policy in
Argentina, particularly in terms of trade policy, public sector reform, and privatization. Moreover,
4 It is noteworthy that some of these industries were in the sectors controlled by the military.
5 When looking at the multilateral level, we find that since World War II, trade negotiations had reduced
average tariffs on manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from 40% in 1947 to less than 10% by the
mid-1970s. By 1986, a new set of trade talks – the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations – had
already begun, and this would lead to a tariff figure of approximately 5% in the early 1990s.
6 Adolfo Canitrot was then Under Secretary of Planning, Ministry of Economy.
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the discussions with the World Bank gave the economic team and policymakers, in general, a solid
argument to convince the private sector of the need to move towards trade liberalization and to
overcome their opposition.
It is within this context that the PICE was established in 1986. In fact, and as one respondent
clearly argued, Adolfo Canitrot can be taken as “the father of the PICE”, which together with the
Integration Treaty of 1988 – both signed by the presidents of Argentina and Brazil, Raúl Alfonsín
and José Sarney – can be seen as the birth of the future Mercosur agreement7. As in any attempt at analyzing cause and effect or the linkages between variables and the net effect,
it is difficult to pinpoint precisely the driving forces that impelled both countries to come into these
agreements. Nevertheless, three factors appear to have converged in the mid-1980s to produce a
major change in the political and economic environment, which in turn favoured this early
integration and cooperation initiative. In the first place, the processes of political transition and
return to democratic rule, with institutional reorganization in Argentina (1983) and Brazil (1985)
created new incentives to redress the bilateral relations. Second, the macroeconomic and regulatory
crisis of Argentina and Brazil clearly showed that the development model based on high protection
and state intervention was already exhausted. In the third place, there was a perceived need to put
an end to the traditional hypothesis of conflict cultivated between both countries over time. Finally,
and assuming a wider perspective, another element refers to the expansion of the forces of
globalization and the deepening of the multilateral system since the 1980s. Within this general
context, regionalism initiatives received an enormous boost: they appeared to be useful instruments
in order to avoid marginalization and at the same time, enhance their voice in the international
arena [Bouzas et al., 2002; Grugel and Hout, 1999]. In sum, these initial initiatives sought mutual
economic cooperation as a means to improve bilateral relationships, foster economic growth in the
region, and promote a new positioning of the two countries in the international arena.
In order to fulfil these objectives, the PICE was based on four principles: graduality, flexibility,
equilibrium, and sectoralism [Garnelo, 1998; Laredo, 1991]. In other words, the program was based on
gradual mechanisms that would be implemented in successive stages, allowing thus for adjustments,
in order to promote intra-industry trade between Argentina and Brazil and the overall expansion of
bilateral trade, without inducing specialization. Sectoralism, the fourth principle guiding this
initiative, entailed the negotiation of sectoral agreements, whose scope was limited to three basic
goals: to stimulate bilateral trade on the grounds of complementarity and political symmetry, to
foster changes in the efficiency of production in key economic sectors through the expansion of
bilateral investment flows, and to promote cooperation in areas of critical importance for joint
economic development such as capital goods, energy, transports, and technology. This was the
spirit underlying the signature of the CGP, which came into effect in 1987. Therefore, apart from
7 However, the PICE was not the first agreement between the Mercosur countries leading to preferential
trade among the partners. In fact, since the 1980s and within LAIA – whose members also included Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela – these four partners signed different bilateral
agreements basically structured as positive lists of products that obtained tariff preferences as well as
exceptions from non-tariff barriers. Besides, several products received LAIA’s Regional Tariff Preference,
with rates that depended on the country of origin and the country giving the preference. Nevertheless, this
preferential trade was rather limited.
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allowing for the recovery of the trade flows that existed before the debt crisis, the PICE was
intended to reduce the trade disequilibria through, among other means, trade liberalization, greater
economic complementation, and technological cooperation [INTAL, 1998].
The idea of sectoral integration addressed thus two fundamental questions. On the one hand, it
reflected a concern with planning and consolidating the industrial process, and, on the other, the
emphasis on achieving balanced trade through sectoral agreements was intended to attenuate the
fears of Argentine and Brazilian businesses regarding possible losses and diffuse political opposition
to deeper integration [Valls Pereira, 1999]. In terms of the motivations underlying business sectors’
interest in participating within this process, it is clear that those sectors that feared possible losses,
assumed their participation as a way of ensuring their own exclusion from the final lists of
products.
The decision-making process on regional integration remained largely top-down, state-led, and
highly dependent on presidential initiatives: the PICE was the result of the deliberations carried out
mainly within the Ministry of Economy, with limited or no input from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Certainly, this change in the liberalization process, which would be now carried out on a
regional integration basis, entailed a new challenge for the government. What role, if any, was
ascribed to research and academia?
Technical expertise was provided by certain research centres, but these would only become
involved once the PICE was already negotiated and settled: given that their participation would be
circumscribed to the implementation phase, technicians and experts did not play an influencing role
on the design and negotiation of this founding agreement. This same pattern could be applied to
the participation of business sectors.
Even if the text of the PICE contained interesting provisions on the role of the private sector in the
integration process, this was mainly circumscribed to the implementation phase as well [Gardini,
2006]. The negotiation of the sectoral agreements between Brazil and Argentina was structured as a
process of negotiated liberalization, while clearly avoiding a divergence in the terms of interchange.
Government officials decided which sectors would be included in the PICE, and then, asked
business associations in these sectors to work out agreements with their counterparts in Brazil
[Schneider, 2004].
Overall, however, the PICE remained reminiscent of old regionalism, mainly in terms of the
participation scheme, which assumed the same pattern as that of the LAIA: interchange of
concessions on products with limited domestic production, and the emergence of difficulties or
conflicts when advancing on sensitive products [Bouzas and Soltz, 2005].
This integration pattern presents thus two main characteristics. First, it was a cautious approach to
liberalization by means of regional integration, which responded to an ideology of industrial
promotion and protection, and to a state-led trade liberalization process. Secondly, it clearly
reflected the prevailing rhetoric of democracy, which claimed that civil society participation was
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fundamental to energize and legitimize democratic institutions [Gardini, 2006]. This means that, in
principle, political leaders perceived the need to involve business sectors in their integration plans if
these were to succeed and promote an effectively democratized society. However, in practice,
governments made it clear that strategic decisions would still rely on the executives, who were to
design the integration scheme and only, later, during the implementation phase would business
actors be called in.
This first phase of integration (1986-1989) was marked by sectoral negotiations in which trade
instruments predominated8. These were intended to establish tariff reduction mechanisms, the
timetable and scope of liberalization, and norms on unfair practices and undesired triangulations.
Macroeconomic policy harmonization was not necessary since the deals were only partial and
limited, and their aims flexible or undefined. Moreover, the high level of protection that both
Argentina and Brazil had in terms of third countries also favoured this lack of “detailed”
cooperation in their respective trade policies [Chudnovsky and Erber, 1999]. However, after an
initial period of intra-regional liberalization and rapid trade growth9 – that restored trade flows to
the levels recorded prior to the external debt crisis – the exchange of concessions slowed down and
trade flows reached a plateau. In other words, this sector-by-sector integration moved slowly and
finally stalled by the end of the 1980s, precisely because it was so dependent on presidential
initiatives [Schneider, 2004]. The sectoral approach guiding the PICE would then be replaced by a
universal approach to regional trade liberalization with the Acta de Buenos Aires (1990).
2.2. ACCELERATION OF THE LIBERALIZATION PROGRAM: MENEM AND THE CET (1991-
1995)
The new administration, headed by Carlos Menem, continued with the trade liberalization process.
At first, the government’s attitude towards trade liberalization reflected continuity in the agenda
imposed during 1987-198810: even if there was a rapid move toward market reform, trade
liberalization would be kept in a secondary and discreet place. The economic team established a
policy aimed at reducing tariffs, which moved forward progressively, but which mainly stemmed, as
in the case of the previous administration, from the requirements and demands of both the IMF and
8 In addition, it is noteworthy that in terms of the domestic context, important transformations would be put
in place following Argentina’s worst episode of hyperinflation in 1989. Both extended recession and
hyperinflation eroded confidence in Alfonsín’s government, who had to face a major political crisis as well.
Elections, originally scheduled for December, were moved forward and in July 1989 the new government of
President Menem assumed office, with the announcement of a new economic program and a broad reform
agenda, which included privatization, inflation-reduction measures and fiscal reform – all of which would be
later on packaged as the “Convertibility Plan”.
9 In general terms, the outcome of this phase shows a positive result for bilateral trade. During most of the
1980s, bilateral trade averaged around US$ 1.3 billion, and by 1989 it reached almost US$ 2 billion. Bilateral
trade also showed certain balance given that it mainly consisted of Brazilian exports of industrial
manufactures and Argentine exports of unprocessed or semi-processed foodstuffs. The PICE led to
important transformations in the relationship between the two economies, even if certain domestic
macroeconomic factors also account for these results [Chudnovsky et al., 2000].
10 During this first stage, the Ministry of Economy would be in the hands of three different policymakers:
Miguel Ángel Roig, Néstor Rapanelli, and Erman González.
13

the World Bank11. Thus, between 1989 and the beginning of 1991, nominal tariffs were lowered
reaching a level of 10% at the latter date, and the remaining import licenses were eliminated.
Certainly, the arrival of Domingo Cavallo12 at the Ministry of Economy implied the deepening of
the reform process started in 1989, and since then, trade liberalization was pushed even further. By
mid-1991, the average tariff fell to an unprecedented level of 12.2%, an impulse that was partially
reversed in October 1992, when the government established an extraordinary and temporary nontariff
duty of 10% to almost all tariff items. Two years later, this extraordinary levy was reduced to
3%. In addition, the government adopted a series of measures intended to promote exports and
reduce the manufacturing costs: the reduction and elimination of different taxes and the
establishment of credit facilities and measures aimed at stimulating exports.
However, this reduction was not homogeneous across sectors. In fact, it was structured around
groups of tariffs in order to give greater protection to goods locally produced and those used in the
production process vis-à-vis those that were not produced at home together with consumption
goods. Therefore, for instance, in 1992 the tariff structure established 20% for consumption goods,
10% for intermediate products, and 0% for capital and intermediate goods not locally produced,
while the automobile sector and electronic products remained as the two big exceptions to this
scheme with a tariff of 35% [Viguera, 1998: 14].
In terms of the regional integration process that had already been initiated with Brazil, in 1990 the
Act of Buenos Aires implied a key transformation by establishing an approach to trade
liberalization based on an automatic, linear and universal mechanism of tariff elimination. A year
later, the Treaty of Asunción extended these commitments to Paraguay and Uruguay, and created
the Mercosur13. The final aim was to achieve “the free circulation of goods, services and productive factors
among the member countries, through the elimination of the tariff and non tariff restrictions to the circulation of
merchandises and of any other equivalent measure”.
Four mechanisms were included in the founding treaty in order to move towards a common
market: 1. a trade liberalization program, being the final aim the establishment of a zero-tariff state
by December 31st, 1994; 2. the adoption of a CET and a common commercial policy with third
countries or groupings of countries as of January 1st, 1995; 3. the coordination of macroeconomic
and sector policies: foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal, monetary, foreign exchange, capitals,
11 Unilateral trade liberalization was one of the requirements and conditionalities imposed by the IMF and the
World Bank, especially in terms of the elimination of administrative restrictions and especial regimes.
Nevertheless, the tariff reduction would be even larger than that proposed by these institutions; for example,
the World Bank only suggested an average tariff of 25% and a maximum tariff of 40%.
12 Based on the Fundación Mediterránea think-tank, Domingo Cavallo was Minister of Foreign Affairs
between 1989 and 1991, and was then instrumental in the realignment of Argentina with the United States.
13 During the 1990s, Argentina became increasingly interested in regional agreements, which include not only
Mercosur, but other initiatives such as the trade negotiations under the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), and those aimed at establishing an agreement between Mercosur and the European Union (UE), on
one hand, and with the Andean Community, on the other. Nevertheless, the most important initiative was the
formation of the Mercosur together with Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
14

services, customs, transport and communications, among others; 4. sector agreements to deepen
and speed up the liberalization of intra-regional trade flows [Bouzas et al., 2002].
The Treaty of Asunción led thus to a process of internal liberalization, which overlapped with the
later stages of unilateral trade policy reforms initiated earlier. The reduction and elimination of trade
barriers among Mercosur countries were carried by means of progressive, linear and automatic
reductions in import taxes, being 1995 the final deadline for the full implementation of free trade
between the four partners and the establishment of the CET.
The year 1991 marked an inflexion point in the process towards the establishment of the CET.
After a process of unilateral liberalization and the creation of an intra-regional free trade area, the
four countries engaged in negotiations for a CET with majority intra-market liberalization. This
approach to intra-regional trade liberalization was shaped not only by the structural asymmetries
among the partners, but also by the domestic conditions: the imperative of structural reform and
the reluctance to resign autonomy in domestic policy-making. In this sense, and even if the CET
worked as a lock-in-device for trade liberalization, it allowed for certain flexibility and capacity of
manoeuvre, which was required by the two major partners given that they are frequently subject to
internal pressures and demands calling for a partial modification of the established rules.
The trade liberalization program started in 1991 with a minimum preference over most favoured
nation (MFN) tariffs of 40%, which Argentina and Brazil has already reached by means of previous
treaties. After this initial drop in the rates applied by each country to the imports coming from
other members, successive reduction took place every six months in order to arrive at a zero tariff
at the beginning of 1995. Nevertheless, exceptions were granted to this process of internal
liberalization: each country had lists of products excluded from the liberalization program, and
could maintain, transitorily and for a limited number of products, tariffs on imports from other
Mercosur partners14. The trade liberalization program advanced as scheduled, but by the end of
1994, these exemptions would be incorporated in the denominated “Adaptation Regime”, which
implied a progressive and automatic reduction of tariffs in order to attain the complete elimination
of these import taxes by January 1, 1999, in the case of Argentina15 and Brazil, and one year later,
January 1, 2000, for Paraguay and Uruguay.
14 The list and number of goods excluded from the liberalization program was as follows: Brazil had only 29
such items, including wool products, peaches in can, rubber factories and wines; Argentina had 223 tariff line
items on this list, where 57% of the items were steel products, 19% were textiles, and 11% were paper and
6% footwear; Paraguay had 272 such tariff items, with the majority in textiles, some agricultural products,
wood and steel, and finally, Uruguay had an extensive list with 953 items, including textiles (22%), chemical
products and pharmaceuticals (16%), and steel and electric machinery (8%) [Bouzas, 1996]. In addition, the
exchange of these “sensitive” products was subject to a very complex set of rules and restrictions. Thus,
Argentine, for example, maintained quotas and prohibitions on sugar imports from its Mercosur partners.
15 When analyzing the Argentine case, we find that this country’s tariff structure did not undergo significant
changes until January 1st, 1995, when there was a global modification in order to adjust it to the CET. Even if
this did not modify the bases of the tariff scaling, it meant the elimination of the statistical index that was
then of 10%.
15

When president Menem announced Mercosur and a rapid acceleration in the integration schedule –
tariff reductions in five years instead of ten – he did not consult with business [Schneider, 2004].
However, and given the lack of “local” studies and expertise, informal consultations were carried
out with Chilean experts, who provided technical assistance in terms of the tariff policy and the two
main options that were then on the agenda: the implementation of either a plain tariff or a tariff
escalation scheme. Finally, the government opted for the tariff escalation, and its implementation
would be done with the technical assistance of foreign experts as well. Apart from the technical
challenge imposed by this decision, this also implied a political challenge both in terms of the
participation of Argentina in the region and in the multilateral arena as well.
During those years, regionalism and regional integration appeared as effective tools in order to
facilitate entrance into a much more developed multilateral trading system. However, once again,
two options were then on the agenda: the creation of either a free trade zone or a customs union.
While the first option was clearly promoted by the Ministry of Economy on the basis that a free
trade zone would allow for more manoeuvres in the negotiation of the foreign trade policy – a
vision shared as well by certain business think-tanks such as Fundación Mediterránea and Centro de
Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (CEMA), the opposing option was the establishment of a
customs union, an idea mainly promoted by public universities and the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Business participation in the negotiations for the establishment of the CET was mostly precluded
given the opposition they would present to the proposed escalation tariff scheme16. The
implementation of the trade liberalization program, which was intended to be universal and
automatic, together with the creation of Mercosur led to a participation pattern mostly based on the
pressure of groups seeking protection. At several times, business actors let government officials
know of the necessity of establishing side payments and other compensatory mechanisms to restore
balance and maintain the incentives for all parties to participate in free trade. On the one hand,
these voices were never powerful enough to convince government officials to put the issue on the
agenda. However, on the other hand, it is noteworthy that the Argentine government maintained
the schedule to which it had committed, ignoring thus the claims and petitions put forward by the
business sectors and lobbies who called either for specific exceptions or for a delay in the agreed
schedule. Certainly, this is based on the fact that the CET provides a shield against domestic
pressures for increased protection. Thus, no group can seek greater protection since the
government cannot grant it without violating the CET, an instrument which is beyond domestic
control.
A tariff escalation scheme as the one proposed with the Mercosur CET appeared to be the most
viable from a technical point of view, though its political significance was even greater. In spite of
some delay on the original deadlines, the bloc finally achieved free trade amongst the member
countries by 1999, when the CET would finally start to rule. The adoption of the CET would entail
the commitment to a long-term political project with Brazil, which in turn would allow for a better
16 The presence of tariff escalation means that processing industries benefit from higher levels of protection
on their value added than is evident from the nominal tariffs alone.
16

insertion within the multilateral trade arena. Both the Argentine and Brazilian Ministries of Foreign
Affairs strictly opposed any formal weakening of the CET, based on the argument that this was an
effective policy tool aimed at opening up the economy to the rest of the world, and crucial to
negotiate as a block the incorporation of Mercosur to free trade agreements both with the Western
Hemisphere and Europe.
Certainly, the idea of establishing a single instrument – the automatic and linear lowering of internal
tariffs and the establishment of the CET – was based on efficiency and static profits, rather than on
dynamic profits. Even if this vision of the integration process promoted an increase in trade and
external direct investment, this would have a negative impact on the long-term growth rates, and
instruments of economic policy would not be available to face the economic crisis of 1991.
In sum, and after analyzing the context in which both initiatives – the CGP and the CET emerged
– it is clear that two different visions of the integration process were at play. During the first years,
those of the PICE, Mercosur was considered as a strategic project intended to achieve “intrasectoral
integration”. This should be based on the modernization and joint development of the existing
sectors that showed a loss of competitiveness. Thus agreements were established for capital goods,
auto industries, and food and steel sectors, among others. In addition, these protocols included
relatively new sectors with greater technological content: aeronautic industry and new materials,
biotechnology, communications and telecommunications, and nuclear development, among others.
Certainly inspired in the European model of integration, the core of the project was made of
sectoral agreements and policy instruments that were accompanied by a general, progressive and
automatic lowering of the intra-zone tariffs in order to develop joint ventures and a credit policy,
which, in turn, would lead to the establishment of a single currency. What was the specific role
assigned to researchers and academia in both moments? The following section is aimed at
discussing this question, and the variables that either promoted or inhibited the linkage between
academia and policymakers.
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE RESEARCH-POLICY RELATIONSHIP
This section explores the research-policy relationship regarding the design and implementation of
the CGP and the CET, taking into account three conditions. These refer in the first place, to the
existence of research: “production”. Secondly, this research must reach policymakers:
“articulation”. Finally, there must be either political will or at least the possibility of putting this
research into practice: “utilization”. Following this framework, each case study will be characterized
according to these three elements in order to evaluate the research-policy relationship in the two
episodes of policy change under study.
Based on the assumption that the research-policy relationship is neither linear nor automatic, and
that it entails a highly complex and dynamic two-way process [Tussie, 2006], our case studies focus
on two particular instances of policy change and are intended to deepen our understanding of the
17

dynamics of the political process, and assess the importance of the different factors that have
contributed to these instances of policy change.
3.1. THE CGP
3.1.1. ACADEMIC PRODUCTION
The initiative to sign a program of strategic cooperation and commercial integration was basically
of a political nature.
When the newly elected president, Raúl Alfonsín, asked both Dante Caputo – Minister of Foreign
Affairs – and Oscar Romero – Undersecretary of International Economic Relations, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs – to elaborate an integration project, his aim was to put an end to the old conflict
hypothesis between Argentina and Brazil. Certainly, regional integration initiatives were not new.
However, and being motivated by political and not commercial reasons, Mercosur was intended to
go beyond previous experiences such as the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and
LAIA. The underlying purpose of re-establishing democracy and diminishing the relative
importance of military factors mainly guided it. Finally, this is how the process advanced. There are
macro-decisions, which imply a change of paradigm, and there are also micro-decisions, which can
either be considered as being strategic or instrumental. Certainly, the agreement between Raúl
Alfonsín and José Sarney falls within the first category given that it would initiate the move towards
the common market within both countries17. During this first commercial integration initiative, the debt crisis of 1982 played a key role: it
promoted closeness not only within the national governments, but mainly between Argentina and
Brazil as well. Even if the debt crisis and the international financial institutions – the IMF and the
World Bank – clearly demanded the initiation of a process of trade liberalization and the reform of
the highly distorted tariff systems, the government opted for a process of deep integration, which,
in terms of trade liberalization, entailed a minimum and negotiated opening with Brazil. The aim
was to privilege the development of a productive project.
According to the main actors involved in the process, this option was inspired by the European
experience, which appeared as a successful case of regional integration, and by the lessons derived
from the failure of LAIA. This is clearly expressed by Bruno, as cited in Campbell [1999: 74], who
argues that “if we try to develop a model of multilateral integration – such as that of LAIA – we will just develop
the minimum common denominator of what we can build together… if – on the contrary – we choose those countries
we consider to be the most dynamic ones – Argentina and Brazil – and we attemtp to design a model of integration
based on certain sectors of their economies, we will develop a model with a great degree of internal dynamism, and this
is the key difference in terms of the traditional model”.
Both the origin and evolution of this first approach to an integration project with Brazil were
surrounded by worries. These had to do mainly with the damages the association will bring about in
Argentina given the existing structural asymmetries between the new partners, and which derived
17 Interview with public official.
18

from the long process of sustained industrialization carried out in Brazil during the 1960s and
1970s. In order to face these fears, the process would be guided by the idea of gradual integration,
through selective and joint projects, advancing at different speeds. Thus, it was expected to
promote industrial and trade complementation within each of the productive sectors, minimizing
the negative effects on both economies, and inducing specialization in certain lines of production
[Lavagna, 2001]. In terms of the negotiation procedures, the consensus was to adopt a selective
scheme, by means of “positive lists” that specified where commitments were being made, rather
than making broad commitments and listing exceptions. In addition, an integration process based
on gradual schedules and flexible negotiation mechanisms was initiated.
The basic components of the PICE included 24 sectoral protocols, signed between 1985 and 1990,
and which specified the customs categories to which the agreement was to be progressively applied.
Annexes to each protocol established the list of specific items subject to the tariff reduction regime.
The 24 protocols were targeted to expand trade, encourage bilateral investment flows, foster
cooperation in areas such as nuclear energy and biotechnology, and facilitate transportation.
Within this model of deep integration, the capital goods sector was chosen as the “star” of the
PICE18. Just as in the European integration process, where the Coal and Steel Community – those
sectors producing basic inputs – represented the first major step towards integration, within the
PICE and taking into account the economic situation of the mid-1980s and the existing structural
asymmetries between both economies, the capital goods industry presented some comparative
advantages. In the first place, this was the most dynamic sector of the global industry and trade.
Secondly, it could have a multiplying effect over the productive structure. Finally, the capital goods
industry employed a highly qualified labour force. In addition, both countries evidenced a high
deficit in this sector, especially Brazil who was then compelled to import from third countries. This
represented a unique opportunity for Argentina since these sectoral agreements would entail the
initiation of a process of rapid industrialization, after the deindustrialization led by the former
Minister of Economy, José Martínez de Hoz. In sum, within these national and regional contexts,
the capital goods sector was seen as strategic since in the long term imports of capital goods would
prompt an increase on the productivity of the economy, expanding exports and fostering growth.
From an intellectual point of view and in terms of the debate that led to a profound liberalization
process of capital goods and the elimination of non-tariff barriers, the ECLAC19 played a key role.
18 The PICE consisted of 12 initial protocols. Ten of these protocols covered economic sectors, such as
capital goods, food, wheat, and the iron, steel, and auto industries. Two other protocols had to do with the
nuclear industry and aeronautics cooperation. While seven of these protocols sought to boost bilateral trade
in specific sectors – capital goods, wheat, iron and steel, automotive industry, foodstuff industry – two more
general protocols were intended to promote trade expansion and the complementarity of the food supply. In
1988, there would be 22 protocols in all, and in 1989, these would finally be 24, including issues regarding
trade and trade facilitating measures, scientific and technological development, and infrastructure
development, among others.
19 The ECLAC was established in 1948, as one of the five regional commissions of the United Nations.
Aimed at contributing to the economic development of the region, reinforcing economic relationships
among the countries, and promoting social development as well, the ECLAC had a leading role during
the 1960s and 1970s, when the region experienced a profound and diverse move toward regionalism. This
19

Two main reasons account for this. In the first place, and given that most of the members of the
economic team had been trained in the ECLAC, they shared many of the assumptions and
paradigmatic guidelines promoted by this regional organization. Secondly, and especially regarding
the country office in Buenos Aires, ECLAC’s experts had undertaken industrial policy as an
important area of research20. This clearly explains the active role ECLAC had in the definition
and design of the CGP21. The private sector was also involved in the design of the macro proposal, but it did not present any
concrete written document regarding the final text of the CGP. Business participation was induced
by the government as a way of preventing conflicts and technical difficulties within both
administrations. The summoning was immediate and once Argentina and Brazil had already given
the first step towards regional integration by the end of 1985.
At the presidential meeting that took place in Foz de Iguazú in November 1985, Argentina and
Brazil agreed to establish a high-level bilateral commission. Comprised of government and private
sector representatives, this commission was intended to discuss and launch bilateral integration.
Oscar Romero recalls that this decision was based on the fact that “the integration process design and the
design of the concrete solidarity scheme between both countries, should not be developed at the grey desk of a bureaucrat
or political official; instead this should result from the participation of real actors or economic agents. Both presidents
decided to include the most representative private agents, businessmen and business groups from both countries, so that
they would not protect the apples, the rice or the meat, but instead would be the individuals capable of helping in the
design of the bilateral relationship that we so much needed ” [Romero, as cited in Campell, 1999: 65].
Once the CGP had been signed, governments embarked in the difficult task of composing the
positive lists of the products and items to be liberalized. This implementation phase involved the
direct participation of an external expert, especially appointed by the Argentine government given
the lack of technical knowledge and expertise in this particular area. Only a reduced number of
companies, from some highly concentrated sectors and oligopolies – namely, the iron and steel, and
the petrochemical industries – counted with this extremely specialized information and expertise
given that they had also been part of the negotiations carried out within both LAFTA and LAIA.
However, these sectors were not included in the agreement22. Daniel Chudnovsky, an academic with no previous experience in public administration, was then
appointed for the implementation of the CGP. Apart from drawing numbers and comparative
statistics regarding the situation of the capital goods sector in Argentina and its potential
complementarity with Brazil, Chudnovsky’s designation was intended to fulfil two crucial
was mainly influenced by the ECLAC philosophy, and the ideas of its first Secretary-General, the economist
Raúl Prebisch.
20 The report presented by ECLAC was the basis for the Integration Act signed by Argentina and Brazil in
July 1986, which would be the juridical departure line for the PICE.
21 Interview with public official.
22 Interview with academic.
20

objectives. First, he had to advice policymakers during the negotiations, and secondly, he had to
persuade producers in the machines tools industries about the feasibility of a productive
complementarity agreement with Brazil23. Persuading business groups was not an easy assignment
since the positive lists prompted serious fears among Argentine manufactures, who were concerned
at the larger size and greater competitiveness of Brazilian producers [Chudnovsky and Erber, 1999].
In fact, it demanded an active role and effort to put across these groups the differences between
this new integration scheme and the unilateral liberalization implemented during the 1970s, which
had had a terrible and devastating impact on these industries.
Financed with the aid of the World Bank, the project developed by Chudnovsky entailed the
elaboration of positive lists of those items and products that Argentina would offer Brazil during
the final round of negotiations. These products would be marketed with a zero tariff and would be
free of any non-tariff barriers by January 1987, after the entry into force of the CGP. The final
composition of these positive or common lists was determined by the participation of different
national manufacturers, and the acceptation and/or refusal of each partner’s proposal.
3.1.2. RESEARCH-POLICY ARTICULATION
As we have already mentioned, both the idea of promoting a closer relationship with Brazil and the
actual first negotiations were articulated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During this initial
stage, negotiations and discussions were mainly political in nature, and were handled by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. Capitalizing on the presidential political discourse and mandate, which urged for
close ties with Brazil and the elimination of the old conflict hypothesis, policymakers within this
Ministry – namely, Oscar Romero and Carlos Bruno – decided to promote a trade agreement
between both countries. When asked about the initiation of this process, one of the academic
respondents commented that public officials “got together as if they were spies organizing a command
attack, away from the noise; the idea was so awkward that they could not get together in a meeting room as it
happens today… the whole process remained as highly informal. During this first stage, the Ministry of Economy
knew nothing about this project; it was mainly focused on the debt and inflation problems”.
However, in 1985, during the definition of the final design and implementation of the initiative, the
Ministry of Economy was assigned the whole responsibility for this. Two reasons explain this
decision: the articulation with the private sector, and the technical issues at stake. In effect, the
Secretary of Industry, Daniel Chudnovsky, and his political counterpart, Jorge Campbell,
Undersecretary of Foreign Trade, launched a round of meetings with different sectoral chambers,
especially with the Metallurgical Industrialists Association of the Argentine Republic (ADIMRA),
and different individual industries.
Hence, the Ministry of Economy would gradually acquire an increasingly leading role in the
initiative. Nevertheless, this new situation did not generate the mistrust of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and did not give way to a duplication of efforts. In fact, the heads of both Ministries were
deeply involved in the process – Juan Sourrouille and Dante Caputo, respectively. They worked on
23 Interview with academic.
21

the project on a team basis, and shared the same vision and idea regarding the integration process
with Brazil24. This personal relation and connection would also be strengthened by the
interministerial coordination achieved after the parliamentarian elections of 1985, which reinforced
Alfonsín’s leadership. In turn, this would lead to the incorporation of an important number of
officials and technical experts in the Secretary of Industry and Foreign Trade (SICE), who were
deeply committed to the integration process with Brazil. This project was regarded as a possible
motor of the trade liberalization scheme, or even as a means of positive adjustment. In sum, by the
end of 1985, an interministerial taskforce was already in place. This relied on direct access to the
highest political officials and policymakers, and its main objective was to promote the technical
issues on the negotiating agenda. This taskforce was assisted and complemented by the private
sector, which was acting in the shadows and was led by the so-called “captains of industry” 25.
Nevertheless, this idyllic relationship would not last long and would finally come to an end in 1987,
when Roberto Lavagna and his team left the SICE, and was replaced by Beatriz Nofal, after the
defeat of the Radical Party in the 1987 legislative elections.
Based on the suggestions and proposals presented by the different chambers and industrial sectors,
Daniel Chudnovsky elaborated the final positive lists regarding national capital goods. In those
cases where consensus could not be built among two or more chambers producing the same
product or item, the government would directly eliminate it from the final common lists given that
there were no adequate instruments to perform a technical evaluation of the competitive situation
of the different products; what in turn revealed the government’s lack of capability to avoid
conflictive situations [Chudnovsky, 1987].
This would result in a dynamic quite different from the one proclaimed in the PICE: the promotion
of intra-industry restructuring and specialization. On the contrary, the common lists that had been
agreed upon at the national level would only allow for the promotion of trade in terms of the lines
of production in which each country had already specialized, and did not include or affect those
sub-sectors or branches of activity that showed greater reticence about this market opening26. 3.1.3. UTILIZATION IN DECISIONS
24 Interview with academic.
25 At the same time, though showing greater confidentiality, an informal working and advice group was
created with these “captains of industry” in order to gather their political endorsement to the initiatives. Later
on, this same group will form part of the mixed commission. The “captains of industry” was the name given
to the economic groups that grew as state suppliers, and which, as detailed in Campbell [1999: 110], included
the following business representatives: Jorge Haieck (SOCMA), Eduardo Braun (ASTARSA), Ricardo Zinn
(SEVEL), Guillermo Livio Kühl (SAAB – Scania), Jaime Núñez (BAGLEY), Vittorio Orsi (SADE), Miguel
Roig (Bunge y Born), Carlos Bulgheroni (BRIDAS), Carlos Tramutola (Propulsora), Alberto Hojman (BGH),
and Sebastian Bagó (Laboratorios Bagó).
26 In effect, as far as Argentina was concerned, the proposal focused on a certain type of machines tool
industry of specific use, and in whose production costs smelting pieces impinged much more than sheet,
aluminium, and metallic profiles. In the case of Brazil, on the contrary, capital goods intensive in iron and
steel or of serial production predominated [Porta and Fontanals, 1989].
22

The list elaborated by the SICE was part of the negotiation with Brazil. The agreement – the
protocol on goods – entered into force at the beginning of 1987. The initial list included 224 items,
a list that would go on enlarging in the subsequent years by means of successive rounds of
negotiations and following the same initial dynamic. The sectors included in the voluntary tariff
reduction referred to most of the electric and non-electric equipment and machinery and their
components and pieces, together with automobile components. Electrical equipments and parts,
and transport vehicles were excluded from the common lists, and they were subject to a separate
sectoral negotiation [Porta and Fontanals, 1989].
Negotiations regarding trade in wheat and food supply – Protocols 2 and 3 – were as successful as
the previous one. Given that Protocol 2 was intended to promote a balanced exchange for
Argentina and to make up for existing asymmetries, it established annual commitments for the
purchase of this product by Brazil and other technical issues – such as the prices calculation, ports
and schedules for loading. As far as Protocol 3 is concerned, its main objective was different from
the others since it was not aimed at promoting trade liberalization or elaborating lists; instead, it
defined a common list of fruits, vegetables and dairy products that would be mutually provided in
case of undersupply.
The remaining protocols – steel and iron industry, automotive and food sectors – had to face
numerous difficulties in their implementation, and had a relatively small commercial impact during
this first phase of the integration process. In this sense, for example, the steel and iron agreement
had only a limited scope, leaving aside the main products. The automotive protocol, on the
contrary, was successively postponed since there was no agreement regarding the small print.
Actually, according to those that took direct part in the negotiations, an important element was
missing: the support of the private actors involved in the process. This was clearly expressed by one
of the interviewed academics: “Opening the final sectors without ensuring the previous liberalization of the
intermediate sectors and/or the elimination of the subsidies granted to sheet entailed higher costs for the Argentine
manufacturer, who was thus obliged to buy sheet at a higher price than the one paid by his competitor, the Brazilian
manufacturer, and consequently his production was not competitive”. A similar evaluation was provided by
another interviewee in terms of the automotive sector: “The automotive sector offered several advantages to
be liberalized first: in the first place, consensus building within the sector was easy to achieve since only five companies
comprised 90% of the total market; and, secondly, the sector allowed for a specialization criterion. We proposed this
scheme to Brazil, but companies would only accept it in 1991, when Mercosur ensured universal, automatic, and
linear reductions” 27.
Out of the six protocols dealing with production integration, the CGP was the only one to promote
liberalization, generating in turn quite important results in terms of the broader integration project,
which was certainly complex as well. The implementation of this agreement led to a large increase
in trade: between 1986 and 1990, regional trade in those products included in Protocol 1 grew from
U$S16.7 to U$S 95.5 millions and this accounted for a notable 472% growth. These benefits were
even greater for Argentina than for Brazil. While trade in capital goods represented just 50% of
27 Interview with public official.
23

Brazil’s total exports, in the case of Argentina this stood at 80%. In qualitative terms, this increase
also benefited Argentina through the diversification of its export supply.
Nevertheless, this was a short-term process and one of limited scope. Different analyses emphasize
that even if the CGP led to an increase in productivity and a better use of installed capacity in both
countries, there were neither significant investments nor important transformations in the structure
of the national supply. In effect, difficulties in the availability and conditions of credit to acquire
capital goods and the perception that this was not definitive hindered the decision-making of
Argentine producers in the medium-term. In addition, the increase in bilateral trade – by 40%
between 1985 and 1988 – was circumscribed to certain sectors, particularly capital goods and wheat,
products of relative importance in macroeconomic terms. Most of the relevant productive sectors
had only a marginal or symbolical participation in the impact of the integration initiative. Moreover,
they did not seem to be interested in assuming a more active role in the near future. These included
the steel and iron industry, different branches of the food sector, and the automotive complex.
For many of those who took part in the narrated events, the PICE was the only experience where
academic results were the source, and, moreover, the unique source of knowledge and advice in the
trade policy decision-making process. This leads us to both the facilitating and inhibiting factors in
this particular research-policy relationship.
A first factor refers to the novelty. This issue was new not only for public officials but for the
private sector involved in the decision-making as well. It should be noted that these were the first
steps promoted by a democratic government after years of military dictatorship. Even if there had
been previous trade liberalization processes – the negotiation of tariff preferences within LAIA
during the 1970s – the military coup would then disarticulate these networks by breaking the
constitutional order and replacing public officials and cabinets. The only sectors that were involved
in this learning process were those related to the most concentrated sectors of the economy and
which also experienced a large economic growth during the military coup – such as the steel and
iron industry, or the automotive and petrochemical industries. However, these sectors did not
participate in the formulation or implementation of the CGP, which was limited to smaller sectors
and industries.
The second element that accounts for the influence academics had vis-à-vis other actors involved in
the decisional process refers to the relative poor capacity or ability of the sector to respond or
produce alternative strategies. In effect, the capital goods industry is not a concentrated sector in
Argentina. Unlike other sectors showing great political leverage – such as the steel and iron
industry, or the automotive and petrochemical industries – it is highly disarticulated and does not
have a strong and clear labour organization. This allowed the executive to design and implement
the sectoral opening without consulting with the actors involved.
Finally, a third element that can help us explain the leading role academia played in the formulation
and implementation of the liberalization process that was launched from 1986 to 1991 refers to the
integration model adopted. A selective, gradual and complementary approach to trade liberalization
24

hindered all pressure or lobby activities that the private sector would have developed in the case of
a generalized, automatic and horizontal strategy. The trade liberalization process implemented later
on by Carlos Menem would lead to this pattern of business pressure. During this first phase,
however, by offering a space for academic influence, the PICE also limited its own effectiveness to
achieve a deep and sustainable integration process.
3.2. THE CET
3.2.1. ACADEMIC PRODUCTION
The Treaty of Asunción, signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991 replaced the
strategic project aimed at achieving intra-sectoral integration, and gave way to Mercosur. This initial
vision was now substituted by another conception of the integration process based on a single
instrument: a trade liberalization program that emphasized an automatic, linear and universal
mechanism of tariff elimination within the zone [Lavagna, 2001]. This founding treaty also
established, among other issues, the design and implementation of a CET, which would compel the
member states to subordinate their trade policies towards third countries, to the one settled within
the bloc.
In operative terms, the definition of the CET was an extremely complex assignment given the
structural asymmetries among the partners, which in turn reflected in their divergent tariff systems.
Those countries which exhibited less diversified productive structures – such as Paraguay and
Uruguay – objected the idea of granting tariff preferences to the larger partners, while Argentina
and Brazil showed differences in terms of the most competitive sectors, an element that added
more complexity to the process and the possibility of building consensus [Giorgi et al., 2003].
Mercosur governments assigned the design of the CET to the Common Market Group (GMC,
from Grupo Mercado Común), and within this, the then SGT 10 – which dealt with issues related to
macroeconomic policy coordination – would be in charge of examining and analyzing the CET28. During the first two years, national delegations focused on the exchange of their own harmonized
national systems of nomenclature, and the elaboration of consensual rules and basic criteria for the
creation of the CET. Given the existing diversity between tariff systems, consensus was easily
achieved for the establishment of an escalated external tariff system, which would include at least
three positions. However, difficulties emerged in terms of which tariff level each sector would be
attributed. In order to overcome these important differences, it was agreed that the negotiation
would be carried out on the basis of the different proposals taken to the negotiating table. These
were to be presented by May 1992.
Faced with this schedule, national governments required different academic studies and analyses.
The elaboration of these proposals entailed big challenges for the governments in terms of the
complexity of the issue: each country had diverse nomenclatures and tariff systems, and there were
28 Later on, the Treaty of Ouro Preto (1994) would introduce important transformations within the
institutional structure of Mercosur, such as the reorganization of the different SGT within the GMC. Thus,
for example, the SGT 10, which had up to then focused on macroeconomic policy coordination, would now
deal with related social and labour issues.
25

no comparative statistical analyses. Apart from this basic survey, another important task had to do
with the evaluation of the different possible scenarios and their expected impact on each of the
national productive sectors.
At the regional level, similar surveys were carried out. In 1993, the GMC appointed an expert, who
was part of a research centre associated to the Brazilian government, the Instituto de Pesquisa
Econômica Aplicada (IPEA). Financed with the technical aid provided by the EU and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB), Honorio Kume was designated to perform this survey, and
to assist national governments in the meetings of the GMC, where he turned out to be an active
participant.
In Argentina, the need to come up with a proposal for the CET gave way to a superposition of
studies and the appointment of different working groups. In all, three special studies can be
identified.
A first group was composed of technical experts from the Ministry of Economy, who were to fulfil
certain tasks regarding Mercosur, and academics from the Faculty of Economy at the Universidad
de Buenos Aires (UBA) 29. This group was coordinated and financed through the Ministry’s budget
and its main objective was to collect all the existing information about the tariff positions in the
four member countries in order to build a comparative matrix. This survey was guided by the
demands and particular requirements of the officials of this public agency, who were also part of
the different working groups within Mercosur. In addition, these technical experts elaborated
proposals and reports that were raised to the negotiators30. A second survey was appointed by the Ministry of Economy: financed through loans from the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the survey was commissioned to a group of
academics selected on a personal basis. The fees of these appointed experts tripled those of the
Ministry officials who were responsible for the negotiation process, a situation that was thus
regarded with suspicion. Even if the aims of this consultancy group were to provide advice and
contribute to the design of the CET, the directives and parameters of the research were settled by
the Undersecretary, and did not necessarily respond to the requirements of the actual negotiators.
Instead, this group relied heavily on the information that they already had and on a matrix showing
input data that was outdated.
29 The tasks were divided between the UBA academics and the technical experts: while the latter focused on
the development of the parameters – since there was a perceived need for this information during the
negotiations – and the coordination of the different activities within this joint group, the former worked on
the comparative study and elaborated diverse statistical measures given that this data was of great utility
during the negotiations [Interview with public official].
30 As one public official stated: “However, one asks for instructions, but we also make proposals and suggest, for instance,
that all goods produced in the region should be protected, while those produced in third countries could be applied a tariff between
0 and 2%. Nevertheless, the final decision – the exact level of the tariffs to be applied – lay in the hands of the Ministers.
Therefore, they would just agree and decide that the maximum tariff level would be of 20% and that, then, this should be
escalated by 2 in 2. These were the guidelines they gave for the elaboration of the CET proposals”.
26

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs developed some documents and reports on this issue as well. Julio
Berlinski, an economist from Universidad Di Tella, was appointed for this survey. He was an
external advisor, a specialist in tariffs, and someone who had already had some experience working
for previous administrations. Berlinski had been working on the tariff issue and was asked to define
the criteria for the CET. Unlike public experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlinski had a
global vision of the whole situation that allowed him to develop a more comprehensive analysis,
different from that of a public expert who would have just taken the Argentina tariff system and
consult with the private sector on the basis of the demands put forward by Brazil31. While the private sector had only a limited role during the negotiation of the CGP, during the
design of the CET business groups played an active role in the process. Some documents and
reports were elaborated by these groups as well: some of them had an operative nature and were
intended to contribute to the survey and harmonization process of the regional tariffs, others were
rather theoretical, and by proposing hypothetical scenarios were intended to promote the public
debate. In the first case, the most successful example was the report presented by the chamber of
chemical and petrochemical industries, which was able to harmonize the different interests and
present a joint proposal to Mercosur governments. As soon as the initiative was launched, chamber
members reacted immediately: they decided to anticipate to the governments and presented a
sectoral proposal. This was expressed by one of the leaders of this chamber, who recalled that only
the petrochemical sector would elaborate a proposal regarding a future nomenclator: “… we held
meetings during four months; every 15 days, 20 people per country got together. Moreover, this nomenclator is still
valid today since it has barely undergone any changes. Governments signed it… (…) We were the only sector that
carried out such a task, but in fact we were the only ones that would need to do so since the steel and iron sector
includes 14 chapters of the nomenclator while the chemical sector includes 2.849 tariff lines, and stands for 30% of
the total number of lines… (…). We finished this report… (…) and then said that that would be the tariff system
to be applied; because it had been said that it would be proportional to the added value. So we determined what the
added value should be and proposed our own tariff scale. We ended up presenting a proposal, which was also a joint
proposal – only with Brazil, for the time being – from 2 to 16. The government accepted it and made a slight
modification: from 2 to 14, but they did respect the escalated scheme”. It is worth mentioning that the chamber
of chemical and petrochemical industries had been deeply involved within the negotiations of
LAIA. Certainly, this previous experience had led to a learning process and these business actors
were then much better prepared to face the bargaining process within Mercosur.
In the second case, we refer to the study published by Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas
Latinoamericanas (FIEL), whose pro-market philosophy had become well-known with the
publication of the book “El comercio administrado de los '90: Argentina y sus socios. The book, which had
been written between 1992 and 1993, had been financed by a United States foundation and focused
on the consequences that a pro-Free Trade Area of the Americas strategy, or one towards
Mercosur, would entail for Argentina32. 31 Interview with academic.
32 Interview with academic.
27

3.2.2. RESEARCH–POLICY ARTICULATION
Most of the documents and studies we have just detailed were the result of either an appointment
or a special request made by the governments to those academics involved in the in-house thinktanks.
One could affirm that the articulation between policymakers and researchers was therefore
guaranteed. However, this did not completely apply to the real situation. In the first place, only one
of these different reports did get to the Argentina negotiators in due time and proper form. This
was the report elaborated by the experts and academics of the Ministry of Economy and the UBA,
respectively. Unlike the others, this study was the result of a teamwork, which certainly fulfilled the
demands and requirements of the negotiators in due time. Moreover, negotiators were also actively
involved in its elaboration. In turn, these meant that the working group could have access not only
to information, but to the own instructions of the negotiating group as well.
A second group of studies, which include the reports by Kume and Berlinksi, were also produced in
proper form and in response to the demands and urgencies specified by the negotiators. In effect,
both studies were intended to fulfil the same demand: the identification of the criteria to harmonize
the nomenclators of the countries in order to attain a common denominator. In the case of Kume,
the report arrived too late to the desk of the Argentine negotiators: “By the time Kume had finished this
study, it was already too late; the decision-making process was already over; the delay was terrible… We did have a
close relationship with him; in fact, he attended the meetings held between the four governments, and was a keen
supporter of Mercosur; he provided negotiators with regular reports. Nevertheless, the final document he elaborated
could not be taken as input for the final policy decision since it arrived once this had already been agreed on. I then
took it to the library, and I think this turned out to be useful to me, but only later on” 33.
On the other hand, the usefulness of the report by Kume was only relative, at least regarding the
elaboration of the positions of the national negotiators since it mainly focused on the distributive
struggle in which each country would try his best to assure the survival of the most sensitive
sectors. As one academic expressed it, “these surveys and reports were helpful not for making decisions, but
rather in terms of the advice they provided governments, for instance, during the CET negotiations, which entailed
settling a common tariff for over 9.000 positions for the more than 90 chapters of the nomenclator… Some reports
were elaborated, and then we analyzed which products could be raised or lowered… In addition, when we had to
negotiate within the SGT 1 [the SGT on Trade Issues] we really needed to know what they were asking for, but
at the same time we had to move towards the dismantling of the tariff barriers, so we needed to be informed of what we
should ask for, what we should not demand; where we could push further, where we could yield our positions; and
what problems could then come up…” 34.
As far as the report by Berlinski is concerned, its utility was limited to the provision of arguments
to the negotiators of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs given that the technical issue was still
centralized in the hands of the Ministry of Economy officials. The great difficulty was that this
academic did not have the chance to work with the negotiators, who had then the latest and most
accurate information. Instead, his study was only a laboratory experiment. Another problem this
33 Interview with public official.
34 Interview with academic.
28

work had to face referred to the lack of continuity in time, which would limit its utility to an
exclusive issue of political legitimacy: “I think negotiations are a process, along which papers are irrelevant.
Papers and documents can provide ideas and advice, but the consultant should somehow participate along this whole
negotiating process. However, this is never the case; or at least this was not my experience. I may be partly guilty for
this since I find politicians boring. I believe that they are not interested in showing all what they know to us [the
academics]. Assuring continuity is what really matters. But in real terms, nobody is interested in establishing a
certain amount of tariffs because this is a quite complicated task, so a particular case is just taken, and in the end, it
turns out to be useless” 35.
The other studies and reports, together with the consultancy jobs that were appointed by the
government between 1991 and 1994, were not intended to contribute to the definition of the
Mercosur CET, but to promote the public debate in favour of a process of deep integration with
Brazil. The initiative came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and mainly from Alieto Guadagni,
who relied on international research centres, think-tanks and the financing provided by the UNDP
and the IADB, either to appoint or to put positions in the Ministry out to tender. Different
research centres, representing a wide variety of ideological assumptions, were chosen for these
appointments, according to their expertise in the different negotiating issues: CEMA, FIEL,
Universidad Di Tella, and Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO-Argentina).
There was thus a clear division of labour: “Schenone, from Fundación Mediterránea, was appointed to work
on the establishment of a regional market of capital goods; academics from FIEL were asked to analyze labour
asymmetries and the tariff system of public services, while ECLAC specialists would have to focus on issues of
macroeconomic coordination” 36.
Guadagni intended to summon political will to promote Mercosur, and constitute a solid critique in
terms of the confrontation he had with the Ministry of Economy, headed by Domingo Cavallo and
who had been Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1989 to 1991. This was expressed by one of the
public officials involved in the process: “There was certain inertia – especially in terms of the proposed opening
within Mercosur – in some sectors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who were suspicious of Brazil and clearly
preferred an agreement with the United States. What we did was to take the agreement signed by Alfonsín and
Sarney, and extend it. There were conflicts, and quite important ones (within the Cabinet itself), that were never
made public. I would now like to tell you an anecdote. Before the ratification of the Treaty of Ouro Preto, Cardoso –
who had just been elected President of Brazil – made his first official visit to Argentina. During this visit, a meeting
was organized in Olivos [Olivos Presidential Residence]. The then Minister of Economy, who was also late for
this bilateral meeting, proposed an integration arrangement different from that of Mercosur. Those present made no
comments on this proposal until the following reunion where Cardoso was told that such a scheme was not valid at
all”.
The Minister of Economy, Domingo Cavallo, was not interested at all in deepening Mercosur.
Instead he veered towards the establishment of a free trade zone with Brazil. The underlying reason
for this was that the entrance of Argentina into a customs union would entail loosing autonomy in
35 Interview with academic.
36 Interview with public official.
29

the handling of the trade policy given that the final aim was to establish a common tariff. In turn,
this limitation would also affect the external trade policy, which in the context of the Convertibility
Plan was the only area where economic policy could be implemented. In this sense, the pressure
exercised by the Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA/Argentine Industrial Union) turned out to be
quite functional to the Minister’s interests. On the other hand, the increasing power Cavallo had
over national politics, which was based on his successful Convertibility Plan, turned out to be quite
a positive signal for private sectors about the fact that the Treaty of Ouro Preto was not mature
enough and that it would not be signed.
Certainly, the struggle between both Ministries – Economy and Foreign Affairs – facilitated the
joint and effective work done by academics and negotiators from 1991 to 1993. Unlike what had
been the experience in trade policy formulation in Argentina, the private sector was not involved in
the elaboration of the CET, which in turn allowed for this to be the result of technical studies based
on empirical evidence, at least in terms of the Argentine negotiating team.
3.2.3. UTILIZATION IN DECISIONS
During the negotiation among the four governments for the establishment of the common
nomenclator, other issues were brought which demanded consensus building: the agricultural, the
capital goods, and the computer and telecommunications sectors. Argentina and Brazil had
different and opposing positions in terms of these sectors, and these were certainly difficult to
solve37. During these discussions, the studies and analyses that most helped the Argentine
delegation were those produced by the joint team of experts from the Ministry of Economy and the
UBA. Nevertheless, when negotiating, the national delegation showed both lack of internal
coordination and political will. Negotiations come to a halt when Cavallo decided to promote a
closer relationship with the United States, and the subsequent signature of a free trade agreement.
Thus, the position of the Argentina negotiators and experts within the GMC became blurred.
By the mid-1993, it was quite evident that the schedule settled by the Treaty of Asunción regarding
the establishment of the CET – January 1, 1995 – could not be fulfilled. Even if the process of
harmonization had already reached 95% of the whole tariff universe, there were still crucial debates
to be solved [Berlinski et al., 2005]. It is then that Brazil decides to assume the leadership in the
debate both in political and operative terms.
At the operative level, Brazil managed to impose its own tariff scheme since there was no major
resistance from Paraguay and Uruguay. Thus, the structure of the CET would be established
37 In terms of the agriculture sector, Brazil intended to establish low nominal aliquots, an idea that Argentina
refused since it feared that the establishment of lower tariffs for products such as powder milk, wheat, meat
or rice, would hinder the entrance of Argentine products to the Brazilian market when competing with the
subsidized prices of third countries. In the case of capital goods, Argentina wanted to place this sector in one
of the lowest levels of protection since this would allow upgrading equipment and processing and product
technologies, through the acquisition of cheaper equipments and technologies in the international market.
However, Brazil rejected the proposal. Finally, and as far as the computer and telecommunications goods
were concerned, Brazil was determined to establish high tariffs, remaining thus as the exclusive supplier in the
region [Giorgi et al., 2003].
30

around the lowest tariffs – from 5 to 10% – for those inputs of diffused utilization – steel and iron
products, chemical and petrochemical products, cellulose and paper – and the highest tariffs stood
for final goods, both durable and non-durable, which where settled at the top of the list with an
average tariff of 18%-19%. Alimentary goods, especially the elaborated ones, remained at an
intermediate level with an average tariff of 14%. Tariffs for fuel reached an almost zero-tariff state.
In political terms, Brazil held meetings with the highest Argentina officials, and explicitly rejected
the latter’s proposal to call off the establishment of a customs union and limit the integration
process to a free trade area. Moreover, Brazil posed a serious threat: the removal of Argentina’s
preferential access to the Brazilian market, especially for wheat and cars, the only sectors where
exports were then growing. Faced with this threat, and given that United States no longer seemed
to be interested in the idea of signing a free trade agreement, the Argentine president – Carlos
Menem – expressed his firm decision, that of keeping the commitments previously assumed in
Asunción and creating a customs union within Mercosur.
Argentina’s repositioning through the acceptance of the customs union led to a reversal in the
domestic scenario, and the business sectors, which until then had only had a marginal role regarding
the meetings and negotiations of the CET, suddenly moved to action.
With the only exception of the sectoral chamber of chemical and petrochemical industries that had
been actively and enthusiastically participating in the meetings held by the SGT 3 – group mainly
dealing with technical norms and regulations – since the signature of the Treaty of Asunción, other
private sectors clearly believed that the customs union would not be established. In fact, “most of the
chambers and sectors in general did not participate; neither did they come to know about it. What is commonly being
said, that business actors came to know about this project through the newspaper, is quite true. We [the
negotiators] did not receive any proposals from the business sectors. Therefore, as we had no proposals, we had no
instructions either; we worked in a very theoretical manner – our job was mainly based upon calculations done at the
desk. We analyzed how far we could go in terms of the productive chain and its maximization, and we struggled for
this as much as we could” 38.
Faced with the fear that the launching of the CET would lead to the disappearance of the sector or
the loss of the acquired preferences during the previous phase, private actors resorted to traditional
lobby practices demanding protection from the government. By the mid-1994, these pressures
became even stronger. However, not all business sectors were involved in these lobby activities.
Only those who knew this dynamic because of previous negotiations or those representing the
most powerful economic sectors, given either their veto power – as in the case of the iron and steel,
and automotive sectors – or lobby power – as in the case of the textiles, sugar, and paper sectors –
became involved in this process. Finally, they all managed to obtain some kind of exemptions or
preferences.
Negotiations for the definition of exceptions were carried out bilaterally in the province of Buenos
Aires in July 1994. In exchange for the signature of the Treaty of Ouro Preto, Argentina obtained
38 Interview with public official.
31

what was called the Final Regime towards a Common Customs Union (RAFUA/Régimen Final
hacia la Unión Aduanera), which established an extra period – a unique and maximum closing date
of four years – for certain sectors and products. These were given some extra time to restructure
themselves. This meant that they could keep the national tariffs within the intra-zone trade, but
these would have to disappear gradually and automatically until 199939. Argentina included 221
products under this regime, basically those regarding the steel and iron sectors, textiles, footwear,
and paper, all of which still continue to be exempted.
The textile sector constitutes a paradoxical case40. Apart from including this sector in the RAFUA
and creating a special committee aimed at elaborating a proposal for an intra-zone regulatory policy,
the member states agreed on exempting it from the customs union as well. Hence, the current
national schemes would be applied to the textile sector, which in Argentina reached the
consolidated schedules of the WTO. Thus, in practice, Argentina maintained its policy of charging
specific duties to those textile products coming from third countries, and exempted Mercosur
countries, even when these were included in the RAFUA. It is noteworthy that all Mercosur
partners adhered to the textile and clothing agreement established within the WTO in order to
allow for the application of safeguards clauses to these products imports.
In sum, the four countries got to Ouro Preto with a CET and four exception lists, each of which
had a particular mechanism for its future elimination. The first of these lists contained the exclusion
of the CET for those products already under the RAFUA, while the second list included the
national lists of specific exceptions to the customs union – such as textiles and sugar. Both the third
and fourth lists were sectoral lists regarding capital, and computer and telecommunications goods,
where Brazil, under the request of Argentina, committed itself to the reduction of the aliquota
before 200641. 39 Some of the products included under this regime – namely, the steel sector – were also subject to quotas,
while others – such as sugar and automotive – were not included in the intra-Mercosur trade liberalization
scheme. This was due to the considerable divergences member countries exhibited, especially Argentina and
Brazil, in terms of their national policies towards these sectors. A so called Grupo Ad Hoc was commissioned
the definition of a regime that should adequate the sugar sector to the customs union – the CET and the free
trade zone – while an Ad Hoc Technical Committee was requested to elaborate before June 1, 1995, a proposal
for a Common Car Regime that should come into force on January 1, 2000.
40 When discussing this tariff, Argentine negotiators found that the sector relied on very specific and high
rights, and protection regimes quite different from those of other countries. In June 1994, after different
analyses and studies had been carried out, the government established a maximum tariff of 20% for the
confection, 16 to 18% for fabrics, and 12 to 14% for spun. In December 1994, and given the great pressure
exercised by the textile sector, a final decision was made: the sector would be excluded from the CET and
each country would keep its own tariff policy for textiles.
41 While the average level of the CET was fixed at approximately 11%, tariff levels were allowed to vary
between 0 and 20% across industries: the lowest tariffs were allocated to input and materials, intermediate
tariffs were charged on semi-finished industrial goods, and the highest tariffs were assigned to final
manufactures. Following the pattern of intra-Mercosur tariffs, exceptions were also granted. Thus, certain
imports would enjoy tariff rates different from the CET. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the import taxes for
these exempt products would converge linearly and automatically toward the CET by the year 2001, and by
the year 2006 for those exempt products coming from Paraguay. In addition, exceptions to the CET were
granted for capital goods imports – namely, machines and equipment – computers, and telecommunications.
A CET was also established for textiles, but the four partners agreed that this would not be put into practice
immediately. However, and in spite of these exceptions, in 1996 on average countries were quite close to the
32

In terms of the factors that either facilitated or inhibited the research-policy relationship, the
negotiation and implementation of the CET provides quite an opposite result when compared to
the CGP. It could even be characterized as a failed experience taking into account the influence
research finally had on the implementation of the CET. In this case, unlike the previous one, we
cannot base our argument on the existence of a unique source of knowledge or information given
that the final elaboration of the tariff matrix was the result of various types of knowledge, which
included not only previous experiences but sectoral interests as well, among others.
When analysing the factors that account for the multiplicity and superposition of studies and
analysis developed in terms of the CET, these refer, among others, to the active role private sectors
and think-tanks had given that they feared the process could be a menace to their own interests and
views. However, a rather more powerful reason is the absence of a clear leadership and
coordination among ministries and public agencies. This mainly refers to the relationship between
the Ministries of Economy and Foreign Affairs. During the period 1991-1999 they both promoted
opposing integration models: subordination to the United States by the establishment of a free
trade area, or the promotion of a deep integration scheme with Brazil. In order to legitimate their
own positions, each ministry and public officials in charge would appoint the elaboration of
research works and surveys in an ad hoc manner.
In terms of the reasons and factors that inhibited the utilization of this academic production in the
decision-making process, out of the great diversity of works regarding the final pattern of the CET,
the one that offered the greatest utility was the one performed by the experts and academics from
the Ministry of Economy and the UBA, respectively. This team, unlike the others, relied on an
interesting virtue: its capacity to respond to the demands and requirements of the national
negotiators in due time and proper form.
However, these proposals and reports were based on the technical conception of the experts and
economists who did not have access to the medium and long term priorities established by those
politically responsible for the negotiation process. When the need to achieve a political definition
was finally imposed at the domestic level, mainly as a result of increasing external pressures, the
main private sectors resorted to their traditional lobby strategies to demand protection measures.
Within this context, the proposal written by experts and negotiators was dismissed. After the
bilateral renegotiation that took place between Brazil and Argentina, the Mercosur CET was finally
approved on the date that had been established by the Treaty of Asunción. Its content benefited
Brazil’s productive scheme, and included only four exception lists, but once again this was intended
to protect Brazil’s interests, together with those of some national private groups, which in the case
of Argentina were the ones that had activated their lobby mechanisms.
liberalization objective: while the external tariff in Argentina and Brazil converged from above to the CET,
those of Paraguay and Uruguay did it from below, reflecting the relative lower level of protection that those
countries had compared to the big patterns in Mercosur [Sanguinetti et al., 2002].
33

4. IMPACT EVALUATION: AN INITIAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Along this section we will present a brief comparative analysis of both episodes in order to identify
their similarities and differences in terms of the agenda-setting process, the production of
knowledge, and its articulation with the policy-making process and utilization.
When thinking in terms of the agenda-setting process, both episodes share a similar paradigm,
which is clearly based on the idea promoted by international financial institutions – especially the
World Bank – that portray trade liberalization policies undertaken as a change of paradigm, as being
the unique possible solution to financial and economic crisis, and to growth problems as well.
Promoted by the global epistemic community, this vision would find support at the domestic level:
the economic and political elites were deeply convinced of the need of reform. However, the
strategies designed and implemented by the first two democratic governments – the Radical
administration, and the one led by the Peronist Party – would show important differences.
The administration headed by Raúl Alfonsín followed the reform path proposed by the World
Bank, but only partially. This government’s innovation was evident in the promotion of a trade
liberalization process based on bilateral negotiations and tariff preferences, precisely when at the
global level unilateral liberalization was actively promoted in order to deepen multilateralism. Thus,
the negotiations initiated with Brazil would be structured around a set of sectoral agreements,
which followed a clear logic of productive complementarity.
On the contrary, the following administration strictly and unquestionably followed the policy
recommendations of the so-called Washington Consensus, which mainly consisted of an
indiscriminate opening of the economy at all levels – unilateral, regional, and multilateral – together
with the establishment of high exchange rates. At the regional level, the logic of the integration
process with Brazil changed dramatically. Negotiations with Brazil, and with Paraguay and Uruguay
in order to create Mercosur, were only aimed at attaining a free trade zone and a zero tariff within a
period of five years. The proposal of creating a customs union would be brought about by the
larger partners – Argentina and Brazil – that clearly needed to establish a lock-in mechanism for the
trade liberalization already achieved, and to resist the pressures of protectionist sectors interested in
reversing the process.
When analyzing the academic production that influenced on the design of these strategies, both
experiences exhibit great similarities. In both cases, governments were faced with new challenges,
but they also lacked the basic expertise and information required to effectively implement these
transformations. This would not be the case with the private sector, where a reduced group
comprising the most concentrated industries that were in need of wider markets, had undergone a
“regional” learning process since the negotiations within LAIA. Unlike governments, these
companies had constructed continuity in time and had developed an increasing professionalization
of their staff members.
34

In both episodes of policy change, governments resorted to academic knowledge in order to gather
further information and data regarding the policy change, and its instrumentation. As far as the
CGP is concerned, the academia played a leading role in two different stages of the process. During
the definition phase, when the strategy aimed at promoting sectoral integration was to be defined
and designed, previous knowledge provided by decision makers, outside the political parties, both
in the Ministries of Economy and Foreign Affairs was fundamental. Later on, the government
appointed an academic as an ad hoc working group for the implementation of the strategy, basically
for the collection of basic statistical data regarding the sectors under negotiation, and for the
elaboration of the final lists the Argentine government would present to its partner.
On the contrary, during the negotiation of the CET, academic production was circumscribed to the
design of the instrument. Even it the Treaty of Asunción made no reference to the CET or to the
sectoral policies that should be coordinated between the partners, the governments’ decision left
little margin of manoeuvre. In fact, the trade liberalization process had already been established and
this was already out of the agenda under discussion. Thus, the only window of opportunity for the
participation of academia was given by the design and definition of the final instrument to be
implemented: the CET. Nevertheless, in this case, academic production was vaster in terms of the
studies, reports, and documents finally produced. Academics, who had been appointed either by the
government or by private actors, devoted themselves to the elaboration of two different kinds of
research.
A first group included technical reports, produced by public officials and in-house technicians,
and/or by specialists especially appointed by the government, who were to collect the basic
statistical data needed for the construction of the tariff nomenclator and to define the tariff levels.
In addition, some business sectors, such as the petrochemical, advanced with the production of
their own reports. A second group of documents and studies, which would mainly focus on the
argumentation and legitimization of the national positions before the public opinion, would
propose different and more convenient negotiating scenarios for Argentina. These documents and
studies were required by the government, and carried out by private think-tanks through
international funding.
Differences emerge when analyzing the articulation between researchers and policymakers. The
CGP was the result of the joint work of researchers and policymakers, who shared and intertwined
different types of knowledge, and made political decisions. Thus, the final list including the capital
industries and sectors to be liberalized could be easily implemented regarding both the technical
aspects but also the political support at stake. In addition, this group managed to present its final
report before the deadline established by Argentina and Brazil. In the case of the CET, research
results were finally communicated once the negotiations were over, and in a language that was not
only inaccessible to negotiators but also of slight utility. Most of these documents and studies had
been commissioned to academics who had no liaison with the national negotiators, and who
therefore ignored their day-to-day requirements. Only one of the reports was the exception to the
rule: the document prepared by the negotiators within the different SGT, who also relied on the
technical and professional assistance provided by the UBA academics. This turned out to be an
35

extremely technical research, where the negotiators would define their needs and requirements
while academics would concentrate on the statistical data collection. Nevertheless, unlike the
negotiation of the PICE, those in charge of the elaboration of this report did not receive the
necessary social and political support in order to use the data and information that had been
collected.
Finally, we come to the last of the preconditions that can determine the influence of academic
knowledge on the decision-making process: the political will of the decision makers and their
determination to make use of it. There are very sharp contrasts in this respect between both
episodes. In terms of the CGP, the final list elaborated by the appointed researcher was the unique
element or input the Argentine government took to the negotiating table with Brazil. Sectoral
accords would thus advance only in those industries or sectors where there was reliable information
regarding the benefits that integration would bring about, while those sectors where there was no
empirical evidence and consensus building among the stakeholders did not work, were removed
from the final list. During the final negotiation of the CET, the policy recommendations put
forward through the empirical analyses that had been previously developed were not taken to the
discussions with Brazil. Certainly, this turned out to be a rather atypical negotiation, whose results
were highly determined by the timing and pressure exercised by the main commercial partner –
Brazil – given the lack of definition and of interagency coordination Argentina showed. Out of the
three proposals that were specifically commissioned at the national level, the only one that would
finally exercise some influence in the bilateral negotiations was the joint document prepared by the
chambers of chemical and petrochemical industries of Argentina and Brazil, and which would be
then presented to both national governments, and to the regional authorities as well. Finally,
Mercosur authorities would accept its inclusion in the final agreement, with only some slight
modifications.
Having compared both episodes in terms of the production of academic knowledge, its articulation
within the decision-making process, and its use, we will now delve into the factors that promoted
the production of knowledge in both cases, its articulation and use in the case of the CGP, and the
CET proposal by the chemical and petrochemical sector.
In terms of the academic production, the existence of new problematic issues or questions
regarding which the decision maker has no experience while the available information fails to
present adequate answers to these new challenges, constitute an incentive for the participation and
appointment of the academia. This was precisely the case in terms of the paradigmatic change
within the development model experienced in Argentina since the mid-1980s. Later on, the CET
negotiations would make this knowledge demand even more pressing in the face of the lack of
interministerial coordination and the different approaches to integration promoted by the Ministries
of Economy and Foreign Affairs. The main question under debate had to do with the construction
of a customs union with Brazil. In turn, this knowledge demand would extend to business actors,
such as the chemical and petrochemical sector, which assessed the need for elaborating its own
sectoral proposal.
36

When analyzing the second dimension, that of articulation, we find that this three successful cases –
the CGP and the CET proposal presented by the public officials within the Ministry of Economy –
and the document elaborated by the private sector – namely, the chamber of chemical and
petrochemical industries – clearly demonstrate that the ex ante articulation between decision makers
and academics constitutes a key factor to guarantee that the information produced will be presented
in due time and form.
Finally, both the experience of the CGP and the proposal of the chamber of chemical and
petrochemical industries show that the use of knowledge depends on two conditions: interagency
coordination and a common and unified vision, and the inclusion of non-governmental sectors,
basically private actors. The policy-research articulation was possible in both cases because the
proposed solutions, though for different reasons, left uncovered deep distributive struggles between
the sectors involved: in the first case, because the CGP was established on the base of positive lists,
and in the second experience, because losers and winners had been previously decided upon within
the sector itself.
The above comparative analysis on the nature of the policy-research relationship in both episodes
of policy change brings to the forefront three initial conclusions. In the first place, and in temporal
terms, the relative weight and incidence of the academia diminished as the novelty of the issue wore
off and negotiating experience accumulated both in the public and private sectors. In effect, while
academic knowledge was the only source in the elaboration of the CGP, 10 years later, other types
of knowledge and information were added to the negotiations of the CET, which were provided
not only by the Ministry of Economy but by think-tanks and different productive sectors as well.
Secondly, in both cases, academic contributions to the decisional processes played a legitimizing
role. The final aim of the research-policy relationship established was to legitimize the
government’s negotiation position and discourse. Finally, and regarding the issues at stake, the
incidence of academic knowledge had more possibilities of achieving success – use – in those areas
where the distributional impact of the policies were almost inexistent – voice – or where those
sectors whose interests would be seriously damaged by the implementation of a specific policy did
not have veto power – exit42. In the opposite case, the voice of academia and the role played by
studies based on empirical evidence were neutralized by sectoral lobbies, which relied either on
their traditional veto power or on technical expertise to defend their sectoral interests. This contrast
became evident during the negotiation of the CET. While the project of establishing a customs
union remained as a utopia rather than a concrete policy, experts and academics worked in isolation.
However, when the political will to promote a customs union was clearly defined, the strength and
influence of private lobbies would obscure all empirical evidence.
42 The concepts of “voice” and “exit” are being used in terms of Hirschman [1974, 1970].
37

5. SOME FINAL REMARKS
The case selection focused on two key moments in the process of trade liberalization launched by
Argentina in the mid-1980s. The first episode, which took place in 1988, was a process of gradual
change, where trade liberalization would be promoted through a strategy of selective integration
with Brazil. The second episode refers to the negotiation initiated in 1991, and which was intended
to attain an indiscriminate and abrupt liberalization by means of the integration process within
Mercosur. This would finally lead to the establishment of a customs union. Comparison between
these two episodes of policy change turns out to be of interest since they both show contrasting
results in terms of the academic influence on the decision-making process. While in the first case
study, academy had a rather important impact on the definition of the strategy and the final
mechanism that would promote sectoral integration, in the second case, academic production, even
if larger in number, had no impact on the final negotiation.
Five main conclusions emerge from this comparative analysis. In the first place, the window of
opportunity opened for the influence of local academia was relatively small. During the
liberalization process initiated in the 1980s, the influence of academia has been only relative and has
remained circumscribed to the implementation of the new policy paradigm. As the trade
liberalization process advanced, the episodes and window of opportunities for the participation of
academia tend to reduce and diminish. In this sense, the comparative analysis shows a larger
participation of the academia in terms of the definition of the strategy and the mechanisms in the
first episode, than in the second one, where academic production regarding trade policy issues was
largely limited to the design of the CET. Certainly, this is not an unimportant aspect since it would
contribute to the definition of which sectors or companies would be the losers and winners within
this new phase of the integration process.
Secondly, the analysis of these two episodes provides strong evidence regarding the different roles
academia and empirical research can play in terms of the trade policy decision-making process. The
most well-known role refers to providing information and proposing alternative solutions to the
given problems, either by means of academic or technical knowledge, or through argumentation.
Academia can also contribute with its ability to favour dialogue between the different stakeholders
by providing a neutral arena for the debate of conflictive interests – being the CGP a good example
of this. A third contribution refers to the fact that empirical research can give voice or amplify the
demands of those sectors traditionally disregarded, and bring to light the darkest and most secret
aspects of trade negotiations. This role is found – though still at an embryonic stage – in the CET
debate and negotiation, where academic production legitimized the participation of new public and
private actors – namely, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the chamber of chemical and
petrochemical industries, respectively – in a process that until then had remained circumscribed to
the Ministry of Economy. Closely related to this, the two cases under examination portray the
different ways in which research can turn out be of use to policy-makers, and influence thus their
decisions.
38

During the negotiation of the PICE, research did not only provide support for the initial regional
integration initiative with Brazil in a context characterized by high uncertainty and by years of
mutual mistrust – research as ideas – but it also offered concrete answers to those in charge of
elaborating the final lists of products that would be bilaterally exchanged – research as data. This
second use of research would also be present in the case of the CET when the trade liberalization
model was no longer under discussion, and experts were mainly asked to define the choice of the
instrument. Finally, the active role played by the chamber of chemical and petrochemical industries
illustrates two uses of research: research as advocacy and research as data. It is interesting to note that this
business sector did not only rely on research to take an advocacy position once the final decision
had been made. In fact, and bearing on their previous experience, the chambers of chemical and
petrochemical industries in Argentina and Brazil elaborated a joint document that would provide
governments with a useful instrument when negotiating the final sector lists. Moreover, and despite
some slight changes that have been later introduced, the document prepared by both chambers is
still in force.
In the third place, this paper contributes to a better understanding of influence as a complex
process where the influence of knowledge on decisions can assume variegated forms and whose
scope can also show differences. Moreover, it is clear now that the mere existence of knowledge
regarding a certain issue does not constitute a necessary condition for its efficacy. In fact, the
articulation between the different stakeholders and the political will to make use of it by the
decision makers constitutes a key element. In this sense, expectations of academic incidence on
trade policy should be cautious. Unlike other issues, trade policy is still strongly determined by two
types of actors: external actors and private domestic actors.
A fourth contribution refers to the differing impact that the time and urgency factor may exert on
the research-policy relationship. This worked negatively and turned out to be an inhibiting factor in
the negotiation of the Mercosur CET. Even if in the case of the PICE, the World Bank clearly put
pressure on the government to promote the sectoral agreement, demands were not as pressing as
those exerted in relation to the adoption of the structural reform program, which was explicitly
involved with trade liberalization.
Finally, there has been a dynamic learning process, though different according to the actors
involved. When analyzing the definition of the Mercosur integration process and the establishment
of the CET, it is clear that even if there was no previous debate or analysis regarding the decision of
emulating the European integration experience, after having negotiated the PICE public officials
had already undergone a learning process: they knew by then which instruments would be best
suited for undertaking a successful regional liberalization initiative. In terms of the non-state actors
involved, the chamber of chemical and petrochemical industries offers an interesting example: their
learning process dates back to the 1970s, when they were deeply involved in the regional
negotiations within LAIA. Therefore, as soon as governments launched their integration project in
the 1980s, this sector would get together and elaborate its own proposal, which would be accepted
both at the national and regional levels.
39

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41

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
1. Berlinski, Julio. Professor, Universidad Di Tella; consultant at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(1991-1994)
2. Bruno, Carlos. Under-Secretary of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1988-
1989)
3. Chudnovsky, Daniel. Professor, Universidad de San Andrés; consultant at the Ministry of
Economy and Industry (1985-1988)
4. Cristini, Marcela. Senior Economist, FIEL (business think-tank)
5. de Luca, Celia. Advisor, Undersecretary of Political Economy, Ministry of Economy
6. Etchegaray, Ricardo. Director of Industry, Ministry of Economy (1993-1999)
7. Feldman, Guillermo. Undersecretary of Trade Policy and Management, Ministry of Economy
(2002-Present)
8. Fumagalli, Jose María. Director, Chamber of Chemical and Petrochemical Industries
9. Guadagni, Alieto. Under-Secretary of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(1991-1996); Secretary of Industry, Ministry of Economy (1996-98)
10. Herrera Vegas, Jorge Hugo. Ambassador, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
11. Kosacoff, Bernardo. Chief of ECLAC-United Nations Office in Buenos Aires
12. Lucángeli, Jorge. Researcher, Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI), Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (1991-1998)
13. Palacios, Graciela. Negotiator GMC, Comisión Nacional de Comercio Exterior (CNCE)
14. Porta, Fernando. Professor, Universidad de Quilmes; consultant at ECLAC
15. Rozemberg, Ricardo. Researcher, CEI (1991-1996); Director, Centro de Estudios para la
Producción, Ministry of Economy (1996-Present)
16. Soltz, Hernán. Assistant Researcher, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO-
Argentina)
17. Vaillant, Marcel. Academic, Universidad de la República Oriental del Uruguay; Mercosur´s
technical advisor (2004-Present)
18. Sánchez, Carlos (h.). Director, Fundación Mediterránea
42