The Mahdi and His Helpers - Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi Society

35is because analogy (involves) extending a (hypothetical) "reason" (underlying a particularjudgment to all other "analogous" cases). 100 But what makes you know?--perhaps (Kor.80:3) 101 God does not want to extend that reason; for if He had wanted to do that Hewould have clearly stated it through the voice of His Messenger and would have orderedthis extension, if indeed the (underlying) "reason" were among what was specificallyordained by the divinely prescribed Law (Shar') in a particular (legal) case. So what doyou suppose (is the validity) of the "reason" that the jurist extracts (from an action orsaying of the Prophet) all by himself and through his own reasoning, without its havingbeen mention by the prescribed Law in any specific textual stipulation concerning that?(Or about the jurist who) then, having deduced this "reason," extends it generally (to whathe arbitrarily assumes to be the "analogous" cases)? Indeed this is one arbitrary judgmenttranslation here) and in his K. al-Isra' (see the translation and commentary in our article cited at n. 98above.).100 The technical terms here are taken from the traditional discipline of usul al-fiqh ("principles ofjurisprudence": see the articles "usul" in SEI and "fiqh" in EI2) which, from the third century (A.H)onward, gradually elaborated the theoretical rationales underlying the practice of the earlier Islamic jurists(fuqaha'). In the practice of qiyas--upon which most of the influential historical forms of Islamic lawwere largely dependent--the hypothetical "reason" ('illa) seen as underlying a particular commandment ordecision (hukm) derived from the Koran or more commonly from the many reported actions and sayingsof the Prophet was "extracted" or "deduced" from that particular precedent and then "extended" to a widerrange of supposedly analogous cases.Ibn 'Arabi's personal criticisms of qiyas, here and elsewhere, specifically presuppose thecontinued presence of the Prophet (i.e., of His spiritual Reality) as realized among the accomplished Sufis(the ahl al-kashf or "People of Unveiling"), as he explained in secion II-7 above (= III, 335). Hisconception of the proper modalities and conditions of a "living" and truly authoritative understanding andtransmission of hadith (by the saints), based on the same types of spiritual insight discussed here withregard to the Mahdi, is more fully summarized in chapter 29 (O.Y. III, 240-241), on the "Ahl al-Bayt" andSalman. As stressed by M. Chodkiewicz, "Ibn 'Arabi, la lettre et la loi," pp. 29-30 (in Actes du colloque'Mystique, culture et societe', ed. M. Meslin, Paris, 1983), Ibn 'Arabi--while rejecting qiyas (and taqlid,for reasons detailed at II, 165) for himself--does not necessarily reject the usage of qiyas by those who donot fulfill these (admittedly rather rare) conditions; thus his position should not be confused with theuniversal (if problematic) condemnation of qiyas typical of the Zahiri legal school. See the morecomplete discussion of these problems in our article cited at n. 3 above.101 The Koranic passage (Kor. 80:1-10) alluded to here is a particularly striking illustration of Ibn'Arabi's argument that man--at least in his ordinary, "uninspired" state--should not pretend to decipher theessential "reasons" underlying God's specifically stated commands and prohibitions, much less attempt toextend those principles beyond their explicitly prescribed areas of application. In these verses the Prophetis reproached for having distractedly turned away a poor blind man who came asking about faith while hewas talking with an important notable--i.e., for judging on the basis of outward appearances--andreminded that "perhaps (the blind man) will grow in purity or come to remember (God)...."