25stakeholders will be almostnonexistent. Absent a response tonegative climate effects, the problemsof insecurity or perceived injusticethat trigger or amplify grievancesleading to conflict are likely toworsen <strong>and</strong> perhaps be joined by newones. The difficulty of conflictresolution in conflict zones also mayincrease with the disruptions of morefrequent extreme weather events.The cycle of violence may intensify<strong>and</strong> prove even more difficult to end.According to International Alert, “ifnothing is done, the relationshipbetween the two parts of the[conflict-climate] problem will bemutually <strong>and</strong> negativelyrein<strong>for</strong>cing” (Sida 2008). By way ofanalogy, this cycle of violence can becompared to the feedback loop thatmany climate scientists believe to bespeeding Arctic glacier melt. Meltingice exposes darker water <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong>surfaces, which trap more heat <strong>and</strong>then accelerate the further melting ofice. Similarly, conflict precludeseffective responses to climate changeeffects, maximizing their impact,which in turn is likely to accelerate oraggravate conflict itself.25
26CONCLUSION“More granularity in theunderst<strong>and</strong>ing of theclimate-conflictrelationship in specificcountries or regions willnot only helpdevelopment agenciesdetermine where theyshould focus their ef<strong>for</strong>tsbut also will contributeto a betterunderst<strong>and</strong>ing of howthey might devote theirresources to conflictprevention ormitigation.”GAPS IN KNOWLEDGEGaps in knowledge about linkagesbetween conflict <strong>and</strong> climate changederive in part from uncertaintiessurrounding each of these two issueareas.While there is generalagreement that conflict results from aseries of events that can be capturedthrough such concepts as greed,grievances, groupness, mobilization,governance, institutional weakness,<strong>and</strong> windows of opportunity, each ofthese concepts is subject to varyinginterpretations <strong>and</strong> considerabledebate. Moreover, although violentconflict is often connected to weak,fragile, failed or failing states, scholars<strong>and</strong> analysts do not agree fully on thecauses of weak, fragile, failed or failingstates. There<strong>for</strong>e, as Monty Marshall(2008) points out, there is a lack ofconsensus on which states shouldreceive priority attention <strong>and</strong>assistance.<strong>Climate</strong> science has advanced to thestage that there is a consensus thatfuture temperature increases overl<strong>and</strong> are considered virtually certain,<strong>and</strong> it is very likely (greater than 90percent probability) that most of theobserved increase in globallyaveraged temperatures since the mid-20th century is due to the observedincrease in human-caused greenhousegas concentrations (IPCC 2007c).However, the timing, extent, <strong>and</strong>exact distribution of futuretemperature increases <strong>and</strong> intenseprecipitation are not known. Whilesome very preliminary projectionsexist <strong>for</strong> regions or select countries,subnational data or projections arestill speculative. Cross-cutting earlywarning systems, such as the USAIDsponsoredFamine Early WarningSystems Network (FEWS NET),which brings together bothmeteorological data <strong>and</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mationabout crop conditions, are verylimited in number <strong>and</strong> need to befurther developed <strong>and</strong> strengthened.As a consequence, given theuncertainties about which countriesare most conflict-prone <strong>and</strong> whichcountries or zones are mostvulnerable to threats from climatechange, a major gap in knowledge is amore precise underst<strong>and</strong>ing of wheredevelopment agencies should focustheir limited resources to preventnegative conflict-climate changesynergies. Some broad areas alreadyvery likely to be acutely vulnerablecan be identified (e.g., Horn of Africa,Central Africa, Central Asia, theAndes), but much more work needsto be done. In part, the challenge isto keep fully abreast of what is a large<strong>and</strong> fast-moving research agenda <strong>for</strong>both conflict studies <strong>and</strong> climatescience.A wide array of governments,international organizations, researchinstitutes, <strong>and</strong> NGOs are generatingassessment tools that variouslyprovide in<strong>for</strong>mation on climatevariables <strong>and</strong> projections, climate26
- Page 1 and 2: CONTENTClimate Change, Adaptation,
- Page 3: Climate Change, Adaptation, and Con
- Page 6 and 7: EXECUTIVE SUMMARYTHREATS TO STABILI
- Page 8 and 9: 3evidence that they are meeting the
- Page 10 and 11: 55increasing global temperatures ma
- Page 12 and 13: 7mass migrations and more frequentc
- Page 14 and 15: 9incidence of conflict. Both rainfe
- Page 16 and 17: 11governments to respond to othercr
- Page 18 and 19: 13sea level rise, severe weather ev
- Page 20 and 21: 15weak institutional capacities.Imp
- Page 22 and 23: 17contribute to instability, andpot
- Page 24 and 25: 19ideologies” (CNA Corporation200
- Page 26 and 27: 21developing countries as a problem
- Page 28 and 29: 23economic indicators (Sida 2008).
- Page 32 and 33: 27impacts, climate-related and nonc
- Page 34 and 35: 29disseminate information, increase
- Page 36 and 37: 31Future Conditions. In Climate Cha
- Page 38 and 39: 33Podesta, John and Peter Ogden. 20
- Page 40 and 41: 35for use on adaptation projects,al
- Page 42 and 43: 37and International Security and Ce
- Page 44 and 45: 3939
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