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highlighted the shortage of experienced specialists the Vietnamese nuclear regulator isfacing. 27VARANS—previously the Vietnam Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Authority(VRPA)—has authority over much of the operational aspects of nuclear security. Itreports to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). Due to this structure,VARANS is not a truly independent regulatory body. 28 VARANS recognizes the need toconsider a different framework for regulating nuclear development in Vietnam andofficials from the agency say that various options are being studied as part of the work onthe new nuclear energy law, which could replace the existing one in 2013. However,officials are concerned that restructuring could mean a loss of political influence,especially since the current VARANS director also holds the influential office of deputyscience and technology minister. 29Relevant to its security-related efforts, VARANS has established a Technical SupportCenter for Radiation Protection and Emergency Response. When discussing the center,VARANS officials highlighted that the institution received over US$1 million ingovernment funding, of which a certain portion was allocated to measures designed tocounter illicit trafficking. 30The Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC), also under direction of MOST,assists VARANS on performing technical radiation protection services such ascalibration. More generally, VAEC’s activities relate mainly to the research anddevelopment side of Vietnam’s nuclear energy development, whereas VARANS hasmore of a regulatory responsibility.Reflecting the steady advancement of Vietnam’s nuclear energy development, VARANShas expanded its staff from 8 in 2005 to 45 in 2006 and to more than 90 in 2011(comprised of 11 PhDs, 13 MSc’s, and 66 engineers). VARANS continues to recruitscientists and technical specialists. 31 However, senior officials with VARANS expressconcern about the limited availability of personnel with multiple years of technicalexperience. Most of VARANS’s staff members have only recently graduated fromengineering/technical programs, and specialists with in-depth experience are scarce. Theaverage VARANS staff member is less than 30 years old 32 . Competition from the privatesector in recruiting skilled personnel is compounding this problem. Of more systemicconcern, as voiced by one VARANS official, is the limited number of professors atVietnam’s technical universities with expertise in nuclear engineering; and most have nothad any recent experience at nuclear facilities.27 Project researcher’s interview with VARANS officials in Hanoi, December 2011.28 Project researcher’s interviews in Hanoi, March 2011.29 Project researcher’s interview with VARANS officials in Hanoi, December 2011.30 Project researcher’s interview with VARANS officials in Hanoi, March 201131 Project researcher’s interview with VARANS officials in Hanoi, March 2011.32 Project researcher’s interview with VARANS officials in Hanoi, December 2011.Page 28
In the near–term, Vietnamese authorities are expected to emphasize attention on rapidlytraining large numbers of specialists abroad, especially in Russia and Japan, the twocountries set to supply reactor technology to Vietnam. Later, Vietnam will developtraining programs domestically, based, among other things, on IAEA standards andrecommendations. It will be important to train an indigenous cadre of instructors, equipthe laboratories and develop the technological base for domestic nuclear trainingprograms. 33An additional complication for the Vietnamese specialists training program is that thecountry has decided to diversify its reactor technology imports. VARANS will have toassign 30 specialists to oversee the operation of one nuclear energy reactor; 40 specialistswill be required for two reactors of the same type. But if the two reactors are differentdesigns, i.e. one Russian and one Japanese, some 60 specialists will be needed. The sameprinciple applies to developing nuclear regulation. 341540 ReportingVietnam has been diligent in submitting reports to the UNSCR1540 Committee, withNational Implementation Reports sent in 2004, 2005 and 2008. The reports documentwhat was an active period in the country’s legal and regulatory framework development.In drafting the reports, Vietnamese authorities took care to update progress on ongoingmeasures. For example, while the 2004 report asserted that Vietnam “established arelatively adequate legal framework,” the 2006 report observed that: “the related laws,regulations and measures … are resulting in positive outcomes and effects.” 35Illustrating its interest in improving its 1540 implementation, Hanoi’s 2005 report notedthat Vietnam’s General Department of Customs (GDC) required assistance withacquiring advanced equipment, such as cameras and detectors “to strengthen activities ofcontrolling and overseeing goods; and special training for detecting, identifying andcontrolling weapons of mass destruction.” Three years later, in the 2008 report, thisrequest evolved into a list of five areas in which Vietnam’s GDC sought assistance:“(i) A database system to keep track of those who exchange and sell weapons, andof terrorists; establish an up-to-date information technology system within andoutside the Customs sector for compliance management, risk management andexchange of electronic data, so as to control most effectively the transport ofWMD;(ii) Information on nonproliferation and terrorism prevention in general, and ontransborder smuggling and transport of banned goods, and state crimes inparticular;33 Project researcher’s interview with VARANS officials in Hanoi, December 2011.34 Project researcher’s interview with VARANS officials in Hanoi, December 2011.35 Annex to the note verbale dated 26 October 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Vietnam to the UnitedNations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, Vietnam’s first country report on the implementationof Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2004/(02)/39.Page 29
Page 1: PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR SECURITYPARTN
Page 6 and 7: Much of the early nuclear developme
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Page 11 and 12: stated clearly that Indonesia will
Page 13 and 14: TABLE 1. NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE PRO
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Page 19 and 20: CountryPhilippinesSingaporeThailand
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Page 24 and 25: in the region as well as a potentia
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Page 32 and 33: (iii) Opportunities to participate
Page 34 and 35: eports, and has contributed to the
Page 36 and 37: Myanmar has established eight Borde
Page 38 and 39: Vietnamestablished controls for dom
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Page 58 and 59: Sources/Notes: See the Model Additi
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Page 70 and 71: infrastructure and culture. Encoura
Page 72: secure trade issues on the ASEAN an

Prospects for Nuclear Security Partnership in Southeast Asia - CNS

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