Water Transfer in Context – A New Zealand Case Study

eal use out of it in the future”. Information on the number and type of transfers that have taken place isunavailable but there is strong anecdotal evidence that people have transferred water. Comparison of statisticalinformation on transfers with information on the hydrology and climatic conditions of the transfer period will beuseful for future research and decision-making.Interviews with farmers and an iwi representative took place in and around Fairlie and Timaru, Canterburybetween May and October 2006. These farmers were from various parts of the catchment – above the dam,below the dam and those with no direct supply, as it appeared that these farmers had differential access to watereven though all held shares (from an initial interview with the chair of SCFIS). Background to the Opuha Damscheme and the methods for water transfer were obtained from a director of the scheme, the accounting firmresponsible for the administration of the scheme (Hubbard Churcher and Co), and staff from EnvironmentCanterbury. The aim of the research was to gain a greater understanding of some of the key issues involved withwater transfer in the Opuha scheme through discussions with people from a variety of stakeholder positions.2 FACTORS IMPACTING ON WATER TRANSFER2.1 FACTORS THAT ENABLED THE SCHEME TO GET UP AND RUNNINGThe Opuha Dam scheme has, as mentioned above, been hailed as a success, with farmers and the communityreceiving benefits. “It’s a win-win situation because there were no losers – everyone gained. It is affordable tofarmers” (farmer below dam). “Storage was our community’s solution to achieve sustainable management of ourlocal resources while simultaneously increasing farm productivity and processing opportunities on a reliablebasis” (Chair of SCFIS). There are various process, technical and economic factors that enabled the Opuhascheme to work well:2.1.1 PROCESSESThe success of the scheme has, in part, been made feasible by the partnerships established between irrigationcompanies, the power company Alpine Energy, and the Timaru and MacKenzie District Councils. Alpine Energyprovided the Opuha Dam Company with 50% of the finance, and generates about 10% of South Canterbury’senergy requirements as a consequence of releases for irrigation (Chair of SCFIS). The Timaru and MacKenzieDistrict Councils are also involved as owners of equity interest in Alpine Energy Ltd. Timaru city is providedwith a guaranteed industrial and residential water supply.A variety of opinions were expressed about the processes involved in setting up the Opuha Dam scheme. Somefarmers stated that they were happy with the process used to inform and update them of developments andprogress. There were many public meetings and much discussion, and the directors put a lot of effort intodiscussing the scheme with farmers. The directors of the scheme believe they were aware that there would be arange of issues and of the importance of involving the community. “It was a South Canterbury thing, and wecertainly were mindful of and had to respect the real concerns of the community” (Chair of SCFIS). However,there are also those who were unhappy with the process. “Not many ask your opinions, most are usingjustifications as to why it [water] needs to go there” (farmer above dam). Another farmer (below dam) explainedthat he felt ‘black-mailed’ into buying shares in the scheme. One of the directors spoke of the importance ofconvincing everybody of the benefits of the scheme. Overall, it seems that the processes used were satisfactoryand acceptable to most shareholders.2.1.2 TECHNICAL AND CONSENT ISSUESA key enabling factor has been the fact that the Opuha scheme has been able to enhance river flows as well asuse water for irrigation. The scheme utilises a minimum flow regime in an attempt to limit negativeenvironmental impacts. Minimum flows for surface water are set to protect environmental factors such as fishhabitats and natural character and to ensure adequate provision of water for recreational activities (Counsell &Evans, 2005). “So we’re not there to flog the whole thing, we’re there to look at environmental and recreationalbenefits too” (Chair of SCFIS).2.1.3 ECONOMIC OUTCOMESReliability of supply is a key issue for farmers. The scheme has provided a greater reliability of supply of waterfor farmers, some of whom have experienced up to 50% increases in yield as a result of irrigation (farmer

interviews). The scheme provides water to irrigate 16,000 ha (25 ml/ha/week) for the irrigation period betweenSeptember-April. Increased reliability of supply for farmers in turn provides more certainty for farmingindustries. “Economic activity in South Canterbury has never been greater, and all the players and the variousindustries are absolutely happy to know that we’ll get production every year” (Chair of SCFIS). A recent report(Harris et al., 2006) shows that there is $7.7 million per year per thousand hectares of irrigation in extraproductivity on farms and that irrigation associated with the Opuha has generated an additional 145 on-farm fulltimejobs. These economic outcomes can help to facilitate acceptability of the scheme amongst the community,and provide clear benefits for the farming sector.SUMMARYAll of these factors have contributed to the development and success of the Opuha scheme. The potential abilityfor farmers to transfer water is one important component of the scheme. The following section describes some ofthe drivers and barriers to water transfer (see Table 1) and the subsequent discussion evaluates these barriers anddrivers in relation to key issues identified in the literature, highlighting areas that may be useful for policydevelopment and for building regional and local government understanding and expertise. We have attempted toseparate the drivers and barriers in order to provide a clear picture of some of the difficulties and/or successfulfactors. It should be noted that these may change with time and to some extent may be both drivers and barriersfor different stakeholders at different times.Table 1: Drivers and Barriers to Water Transfer in the Opuha SchemeDrivers to Water Transfer in the Opuha Scheme- Access to stored water, and knowing howmuch water has been used- Knowing the economic value of water- Return on investment- Enhanced economic activity- Changes to river management regimes- A simple administration system- A self-policing systemBarriers to Water Transfer in the Opuha Scheme- Transfer could result in loss of access to water- Geographical restrictions- Regional government regulations- Belief that water transfer is unacceptable- Complex transfer system- Equity issues – not all have access to shares orto water3 DRIVERS FOR WATER TRANSFER IN THE OPUHA SCHEMEDiscussion of the drivers for water transfer involves an examination of the motives for transferring waterpermits. There are a variety of reasons why farmers might choose to sell, lease or trade water within the Opuhascheme;

3.1 ACCESS TO STORED WATER, AND KNOWING HOW MUCH WATER HAS BEENUSEDOne of the key factors that enables water transfer to take place is access to stored water. This provides a degreeof certainty for farmers. “Why we can do this [transfer water] is because we’ve got an actual supply to negotiatewith. We can trade because we know what we’ve got and we know its there” (Chair of SCFIS). One condition ofthe Opuha scheme consent is that every shareholder’s abstractions must be continuously monitored. Eachshareholder has a flow meter with a data logger to continuously record the flow rate against time of use, therebydetermining the volume of water used. Access to this information (the data is supplied by Hubbard Churcher andCo on a daily basis) shows shareholders exactly how much water they have used and how much of theirallocation is left. This enables farmers to decide whether they have water available for trade or lease, or whetherthey require access to more water. This information provides real incentives to trade or lease shares in the Opuhascheme. As noted above, one SCFIS share irrigates four hectares, providing 1000 cubic metres per week for theirrigation season. The total volume per irrigation season is 22,500 cubic metres per share. The flow rate is 1.6534litres/second for 1 SCFIS share.3.2 KNOWING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATERWater users need to know the value of their water rights in order to make trading decisions. Ascribing economicvalues to water is a difficult and contentious issue, and numerous approaches exist for valuing a water right,including, as listed by Counsell and Evans (2005), the sales comparison approach (where the value of a waterright is determined by the price that similar water rights sell at), the land differentials approach (based on acomparison of land sales with and without water rights attached), and the income capitalisation approach (whichcalculates the present value of the stream of net benefits that the water right generates over time). In the Opuhascheme, shareholders are able to informally use a variety of these methods to gain an understanding of theeconomic value of water. For example, they have experienced an increase in the market value of their shares,they have seen the increase in land values in the district for properties with access to water, they are aware of theprices other shareholders are buying and selling at, and their net benefits in terms of on-farm production canclearly be seen. Having an understanding of the economic value of water enables shareholders in the scheme toclearly see the use value of water; the benefit received from direct or indirect use of water. This information canprovide an incentive to trade or transfer water.3.3 RETURN ON INVESTMENTThe construction of the water storage facility has involved considerable investment by shareholders in thescheme. This investment provides a monetary value for water, and trading or transferring water a farmer does notneed clearly provides a return on this investment. “Now there wouldn’t be people who would want to be withouttheir shares. They have become a very valuable resource. I don’t think anyone will regret they have shares. It’s agood investment. If I had the opportunity again, I’d most likely buy a few more shares” (farmer with no directsupply).3.4 ENHANCED ECONOMIC ACTIVITYMany farmers in the scheme have achieved significant increases in yield with the availability of a more reliablesource of water for irrigation. Being able to transfer water means that those who require greater access to waterat certain times of the year for example, are more likely to be able to obtain this water. On the Levels Plain forexample, one farmer explained that they would not have been able to grow potatoes and onions in the areawithout irrigation. “We couldn’t grow potatoes here without the Opuha Dam. Just straight as” (Farmer belowdam). Spin-offs from enhanced production of these crops include processing factories in Timaru and continuingcontracts for farmers, further increasing reliability of investment. Other industries to benefit from the schemeinclude dairy, lamb, grain and seed industries (Chair of SCFIS).3.5 CHANGES TO RIVER MANAGEMENT REGIMESA potential cause for problems or feelings of unfairness amongst shareholders has been the fact that some of the‘rules’ have changed since the scheme was set up. For example, there were no minimum flow levels in theTengawai River when the dam was built. Since minimum flows have been implemented, farmers that haveshares to take water from that river are sometimes unable to irrigate with their shares because the flows are toolow. These farmers consider this unfair. Water transfer has the potential to be used as a way to compensate these

farmers - those who cannot access water at certain times of the year can lease or trade their shares to farmersfurther down the catchment who are not subjected to the same restrictions (Chair of SCFIS).3.6 A SIMPLE ADMINISTRATION SYSTEMThe review of literature on water transfer (Lange et al., 2006) identified that an extremely important aspect ofany transfer regime is the requirement for transparent and readily available information, including where waterrights are available to buy or sell, the characteristics of a traded water right, hydrological information andsecurity of supply. The information and administration system, administered by Hubbard Churcher and Co inTimaru provides shareholders with a list of those wanting to sell, lease or trade water, and those wanting accessto water. Several interviewees stated that the administration system for the Opuha scheme is easy to use.Shareholders are required to register their intent to buy or sell either by fax or e-mail. It is noted that there maybe potential for the simplicity of the administration scheme to hinder trade in the future when farmers mightrequire more information, for example access to a transparent system for sale, lease or trade prices.There is a seasonal newsletter, a website currently being developed that provides access to personal daily wateruse information, and an information booklet detailing essential information. Farmers also have daily access to acontact person; “Who they can contact is a big thing, so they know who they can ring if they do need anything”(Hubbard Churcher and Co). The fact that the administration is done centrally by one organisation has enabled arelatively simple and inexpensive system to be developed. “It’s far better to have it all in one, and I wouldn’trecommend that the administration is fragmented for any new system” (Chair of SCFIS).Another crucial aspect is the availability of information on the resource being managed. Uncertainty and changeis inevitable, and yet a consistent system of capturing and recording meaningful data on ground and surfacewater resources is required (Doak, 2005; Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1997). A key condition of theresource consent for the Opuha scheme was the requirement that every irrigator use a water meter in order todetermine how much water is being used (Chair of SCFIS). This is the first time in New Zealand that such arequirement has been implemented. The water monitoring data are sent to Environment Canterbury annually.Environment Canterbury is currently working on data management systems to deal with this information, and isworking through instances where water meters have failed or not worked properly. This information will allowcomparisons of water takes, water orders, and changes to shareholdings, allowing Environment Canterbury toidentify where shareholders may have breached the conditions of their consent (Environment Canterbury staffmember).3.7 A SELF-POLICING SYSTEMA common concern raised in both Australia and New Zealand regarding water transfer focuses on the potentialfor a single party to buy up a sufficiently large share of permits in a catchment, reducing or preventing others’access to water, or charging monopoly prices for access (CS First Boston New Zealand, 1995). This can preventshareholders from being willing to transfer their shares. The Opuha scheme avoids this problem to some extentbecause shareholders have to pay 80% of the water charges regardless of whether they use the water or not. Thisdiscourages those who cannot use the water from buying up large numbers of shares. “When you buy the shares,you have the obligation to pay the water charges, so if you’re not using the water and you’re paying the watercharges, you very soon get sick of it” (farmer below dam). Initial investment costs, running costs, and risk woulddeter most potential non-water user shareholders, despite the current value of the shares. Farmers are able torealise a revenue stream by improving productivity and reducing uncertainty. It is yet to be seen whether havingto pay for water regardless of use may hinder future transfer.The scheme does not prevent those who can use the water from buying up large amounts of shares providingthey can find people willing to sell. According to the chair of SCFIS though, no one is choosing to sell theirwater instead of using it on their farms because they’re farmers and want to be farming. Additionally, the valueof their land is substantially enhanced because it has access to water. Any permanent sales of shares requireapproval by the SCFIS Directors, providing a further control on the way the scheme works.4 BARRIERS TO WATER TRANSFER IN THE OPUHA SCHEMEDespite the factors described above that encourage transfer within the scheme, there also seem to be somereasons for farmers choosing to exercise caution in trading or transferring water or not to transfer water at all.

the ‘bigger picture’ fits together. As the chair of SCFIS suggests, “there are a lot of variations within the onescheme, but the objective and game plan is the same for everyone”. It seems that it is not necessary for eachfarmer to know how the scheme works, as long as they “understand what they need to know and the conditionsof their consent” (Hubbard Churcher and Co). The complexity of the system appears to be necessary in order forit to be simple for users. On the other hand, the passing of time may reveal that such a complex system masksdifficult and unclear rights that require further clarification and legal assessment.4.6 EQUITY ISSUES – NOT ALL HAVE ACCESS TO SHARES OR TO WATERChanging the nature of a good with property rights inevitably excludes or includes new people and this involveschanging power, influence and relationships. Farmers were only given one chance to buy shares in the schemewhen it was originally developed. New farmers to the area, or those who chose not to buy shares can only do sonow if someone is selling their shares (and apparently very few are selling – Chair of SCFIS) or if they buy landand the shares are sold with the land. This system excludes some members of the community. Those who didbuy shares are of the opinion that farmers who did not buy shares now regret that they did not or could not buyshares in the scheme. It seems that some of those who were unable to buy shares at the time feel that thissituation is unfair. Further research aims to examine these issues further.These barriers and drivers raise a range of key issues that illustrate lessons to be learned from the articulatedsuccesses and/or difficulties of the scheme. Highlighting these issues provides knowledge useful for policydevelopment, for building regional and local government understanding and expertise that can feed intocommunity consultation practices, and for identifying areas where further information or research may beneeded.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONSThe Opuha scheme provides a good example of a developing water transfer system. Discussions with keystakeholders and an analysis of key issues identified in the literature show that there are some success stories andadvantages for farmers and the community. At the same time, there are factors that make trading and transferdifficult, and some issues that may require further consideration. As can be expected, there are a range of viewsregarding drivers and barriers to water transfer in the Opuha scheme.The processes used to tell the community about the issues involved positively affected initial set-up of thescheme. While there remain those who felt ‘blackmailed’ or that they had little choice but to participate,feedback from farmers and other stakeholders reveals that the extensive community consultation processesgreatly enhanced acceptability for the scheme. Fenemor and Sinner note that “norms and values can be anobstacle to adoption of market-based instruments, especially where they help to protect the interests of keystakeholders, but value-based opposition can be overcome if stakeholders are involved early and their practicalconcerns are addressed” (2005).Other important process issues that have enabled transfer include the fact that the administration system is aneasy and familiar system for farmers to use, with the provision of information easily available for those wantingto transfer water. That regulations have changed since the scheme was implemented (for example introduction ofminimum flows above the dam, and regional council rules on water application to land) shows the importance ofdeveloping a flexible framework that can account for the uncertainty and change inherent with water resourcemanagement and demographic, climatic and economic conditions. The Ministry for the Environment (MfE) andMinistry of Agriculture and Forestry emphasise the need “to provide flexibility to enable adaptive management,given the incomplete understanding of the impact of abstraction/use on environmental in-stream values and thedynamic and unstable nature of freshwater ecosystems” (2004). As the MfE (2004) points out, “a flexibleallocation and use system may encourage higher environmental, social, cultural and economic values to becatered for, and thereby make progress towards achieving the difficult balance of maximising economic wealthwhilst ensuring a quality environment for all New Zealanders to enjoy”.The Sustainable Water Programme of Action (Ministry for the Environment and Ministry of Agriculture andForestry, 2005), found that some of the most important aspects of water management for irrigators are reliabilityand security of supply, certainty of volumes, certainty of investment, adequate quality, straightforward consentrequirements, and minimal compliance costs. Farmers with shares in the Opuha scheme have seen some benefits,

including major increases in yield and returns on their investment. These benefits have filtered through tofarming industries (Harris et al., 2006) and provided a substantial number of jobs.The Opuha scheme does provide ways for shareholders to cooperate and share the resource, using it for differentuses at different times. Belonging to such a scheme provides enhanced flexibility for shareholders in terms ofwater use, and may use water more efficiently as there is an incentive for farmers with ‘spare’ water to leasewater to someone who could use it. “I get an update on my account every month to say what percentage of waterI’ve still got to use and that I analyse in my own mind whether I’m going to be using it all, or whether I’ve gotspare water, and if somebody down here has got a crop, a specialist crop that he wants to irrigate, he can ring meup…and we’ll get together, and do a deal and say, righto, for three weeks you can have my allocation” (Chair ofSCFIS).There appears to be a degree of trust in Hubbard Churcher and Co for running the administration aspects of thescheme. Hubbard Churcher and Co are a well established and respected firm in South Canterbury, and severalinterviewees noted that the administration system is well organised and run. It would be interesting to explorethis issue further, as there may more important lessons to learn for future schemes. For example, how much of aninfluence does the trust in Hubbard and Churcher have on comfort with the transfer system, and perhaps comfortin having an independent group to address issues that may arise with Environment Canterbury?Incentives to transfer shares reveal important lessons for those involved in setting up transfer schemes; theyhighlight the importance of having a scheme that discourages a single party from buying a large share of permitsespecially if they are not going to use the water, they demonstrate the importance of access to information aboutthe quantity of water used and information that gives an idea of the value of water, and they show that althoughsome regulation is inevitable, there are advantages to farmers in having the flexibility to share the resourcebetween them.While the benefits from trading and transfer within the Opuha scheme can clearly be seen, there have also beensome issues raised that may hinder transfer. A key concern is that of equity. Natural resource issues ofteninvolve limited resources but multiple constituencies, creating a situation in which it is impossible for everyoneto get what they desire. Focusing on fairness may help to alleviate some resource-based conflicts (Smith &McDonough, 2001). Fairness has been defined as an overall heuristic which incorporates both procedural justice(justice in the decision making process) and distributive justice (how the water resource is apportioned) at bothsituational (local) levels and universal (regional or national) levels (Syme & Nancarrow, 2006). Communityperceptions of justice can directly influence acceptance of policies and decisions (Hillman, 2005), andstakeholders may base their evaluation of the sufficiency of water allocation processes in terms of how muchthey personally are going to benefit, whether those allocated water are using it efficiently and whether theallocation process was seen to be fair (Syme & Nancarrow, 2006).Consideration of fairness and equity issues in resource allocation is not an easy task. It is inevitable that somewill be excluded, or feel that some aspects of the scheme are unfair. The processes discussed above are one wayto address these issues – if people perceive the decision-making processes to be fair and inclusive, they may bemore accepting. Those involved with the start-up of the Opuha scheme made a commendable effort to include arange of views and “respect the real concerns of the community” (Chair of SCFIS). “Publicity for the damincluded meetings and people going out and about to explain it all. Tom Henderson and others provided anenormous amount of their own time” (farmer below dam).Another factor emphasised in the literature includes time for learning to take place among stakeholders about theimperatives and implications of change for individual and group circumstances (Connor & Dovers, 2002). It hasbeen more than ten years since the Opuha scheme was set up, and it appears that there is increasing support forand take-up of water transfer amongst shareholders. Facilitating trust and acceptance are also extremelyimportant for establishing equitable processes and outcomes. The needs, opinions, and values of a range ofgroups need to be taken into consideration and incorporated into water transfer schemes (McKay & Björnlund,2001). As one farmer mentioned (below dam), “the people advocating for the scheme need to know how to treatpeople. When asking people to take a shift in attitude, it takes time. It’s the hardest to change attitude”. An issuethat has been raised, and one that may require further research, is that of the comparison between those thatbelong to the scheme and those that do not. Some interviewees mentioned that their neighbours who are not onthe scheme are envious, and regret that they did not buy shares.

Further questions of equity are raised by the exclusion of some farmers from the scheme. Although in the Opuhascheme everyone was given the option of buying shares, some chose not to do so, often for financial reasons asthe costs of establishing the necessary infrastructure are high. In some transfer schemes, such issues may beaccentuated by the fact that there are more groups wanting access to water than the shares available. Methods forinitial allocation of shares may need careful consideration. Various options exist for allocating shares, includingtransformation of existing permits into tradeable permits, buy-out of existing permits, the use of a ballot system,historical and potential beneficial use, or auctioning to the highest bidder (CS First Boston New Zealand, 1995;Doak, 2005; Ministry for the Environment and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2004). It appears that noone system could provide a totally equitable process but there needs to be discussion to enable stakeholders toagree on approved processes for allocation.Inevitably there will be a wide range of views regarding water transfer. Many farmers are of the opinion thateverybody was and is happy with the way the scheme is set up. These assumptions appear to be based on visibleoutcomes such as increased production and ability to capitalise on shares as well as the processes used to informthe community. As described, these were positive and well carried out processes that included the wholecommunity, and it may have seemed as though all groups were supportive of the scheme. “Fish and Game weresupportive of it. The community as a whole were supportive of it… there was no issue from Maori’s perspective.They were supportive of it. And there were no environmental concerns I don’t think” (farmer below dam). Asdiscussed above however, tangata whenua are one group that do not support water transfer in the Opuha scheme.There are a variety of factors involved in these differences in opinion, including the extent to which variousgroups can and do express their views. The important point is to be wary of making assumptions about the extentto which there is support for trading and transfer, and understand what factors are implicated in changing views,attitudes and practices.An important aspect that requires further research is that of shareholder and non-shareholder attitudes to andperceptions of how the system is working and will continue to work. For example, perceptions of the risk ofchanging rules relating to use of water, impacts of other regional (eg the Natural Resources Regional Plan) ornational (eg the Sustainable Water Programme of Action) planning approaches, and recent approaches byEnvironment Canterbury for reviewing consents. As discussed throughout this paper, many of these issuesshould become clearer once further transfer takes place and more time has passed. Initial experience andpredictions indicate that the drivers and barriers discussed above will be relevant. It remains to be seen whetherthese will change, and whether some of the drivers may in future be barriers or vice versa. It will be importantfor the administrators of the scheme to record data on the number and location of transfers and how thesecorrespond to hydrological conditions. Other areas for further research are the interactions and relationshipsbetween the transfer scheme and regulatory frameworks. It appears that there may be differing opinions on howthe scheme does and should work and issues require further discussion.There are a variety of economic, institutional, regulatory, environmental, social and attitudinal drivers andbarriers to water transfer. The Opuha Dam scheme has been hailed as successful by many, and with good reason.The ability to trade, lease or sell shares is an important component of the Opuha scheme. Our research has shownthat there is potential for real benefits from transferring water for farmers, shareholders and the widercommunity. The research has also revealed a range of factors that may inhibit transfer or that may create barriersto acceptance by all. Having an understandable, flexible and adaptable scheme that accounts for uncertaintiesand regulatory change will go some way towards achieving a system that works well. Open debate on thediversity of views and methods for including the range of views will also help to facilitate acceptance, as will theuse of processes that are inclusive and participatory. Principles of equity and fairness are increasingly beingrecognised, but further research will be required in order to establish methods for including such principles inboth policy and action. This will be important for any resource allocation mechanisms. Property rights issues areanother area that will require further discussion in New Zealand, particularly as more trading and transfer takesplace.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe authors are grateful to the SCFIS shareholders and chair, staff of Hubbard Churcher and Co, and otherinterviewees for their time and assistance with this research. Thanks also to Murray Doak (MAF) and Jeff Foote(ESR) for reviewing the paper. This research has been carried out as part of ESR’s capability funding for waterallocation research.REFERENCES

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