JP 3-26, Counterterrorism - Defense Technical Information Center

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Executive Summaryintegration of all instruments of national power to the CTmission.Commander, US SpecialOperations Command.Geographic CombatantCommanders (GCCs).The GCCs have the bestregional focus andknowledge of theoperational environment intheir areas of responsibility.Joint Task Force.Multinational CT commandstructures follow the samepremise as for othermultinational operations.Interagency Coordination.Commander, US Special Operations Command(CDRUSSOCOM) is responsible for synchronizingplanning for global operations against terrorist networks,and will do so in coordination with other combatantcommands, the Services, and, as directed, appropriateUSG agencies.For global operations against terrorist networks, typicallya geographic combatant commander (GCC) is thesupported combatant commander (CCDR) with theCDRUSSOCOM supporting. However, for specificmissions as may be directed by the President or SecDef,CDRUSSOCOM may be the supported CCDR with theGCC(s) supporting in their area(s) of responsibility(AOR)(s). To provide the necessary unity of command,GCCs are normally authorized a theater specialoperations command (TSOC) — a subunified commandwhich serves as the primary organization by which theGCC exercises command and control (C2) over SOF. TheTSOC also serves as a joint force special operationscomponent command equivalent to a Service componentcommand under the GCC.The C2 requirements for a joint task force (JTF) for CToperations are largely dependent upon its size,composition, organization, mission, the situation, and thesize of the joint operations area. CT operations may bepart of a larger IW-type situation (e.g., insurgency) forwhich the JFC is responsible. The GCC will designate asubordinate JFC and establish the JTF on a functional orgeographic basis. When integrating CF and SOF for jointoperations, the JFC will typically establish supportrelationships, often with mission-type orders, oralternatively, some operations may require tactical controlas the command relationship.In working with multinational partners, the success of CToperations hinges on the US ability to work within eachpartner’s political restraints, traditional structures, policies,and procedures. This requirement includes a multinationalpartner’s willingness to not only coordinate and operatewith the US military but with OGAs as well.Success in the war against terrorism requires interagencyxvii
Executive Summarycoordination to maximize the effectiveness of allinstruments of national power. US Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM), as the integrating command forglobal CT planning efforts, supports a growing network ofrelationships through continuous liaison partnerships, asupporting technical infrastructure, and using informationsharing policies.Joint InteragencyCoordination Groups.US Special OperationsCommand InteragencyTask Force.To enhance interagency coordination at the strategic andoperational levels, joint interagency coordinationgroups (JIACGs) have been established at the GCCs. ACT planning effort and subsequent operations may requirea combatant command to request additional CT expertisefrom various agencies and organizations to staff its JIACGand optimize interagency effectiveness and efficiency.USSOCOM Interagency Task Force is a dedicatedoperations and intelligence planning team comprised ofinteragency intelligence and operations planningspecialists and a robust information collection capability.The interagency task force searches for and identifies new,developing, and emerging CT opportunities to attackterrorist organizations and networks worldwide. It furtherdevelops actionable intelligence into operational coursesof action and plans against the emerging targets.Combatant commands’ JIACGs should coordinate theirCT planning with the USSOCOM interagency task forceas appropriate.Significant Enabling Functions for CounterterrorismEnabling functionsrequiring special emphasisfor CT.In the aftermath of theSeptember 11, 2001 terroristattacks, the USG enhancedCT intelligence architectureand interagencycollaboration by settingclear national priorities andtransforming theorganizational structure ofThere are enabling functions that are essential to all jointoperations, but require special emphasis for CT operations.These significant enabling functions for CT are:intelligence; intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR); logistics; legal; SC; and IO.The intelligence community (IC) has been reorganized andthe DNI now oversees the IC to better integrate its effortsinto a more unified, coordinated, and effective body. ThePresident established a mission manager organization, theNCTC, dedicated solely to planning and conductingintelligence operations against terrorist networks.The USSOCOM Center for Special Operations is thefusion point for DOD synchronization of CT plans andxviii JP 3-26
Page 1: Joint Publication 3-26Counterterror
Page 4 and 5: TABLE OF CONTENTSPAGEEXECUTIVE SUMM
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Page 10 and 11: Executive Summaryextremists who adv
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Page 22 and 23: CHAPTER IOVERVIEW“. . . We will n
Page 24 and 25: Overviewc. This chapter outlines th
Page 26 and 27: OverviewNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBA
Page 28 and 29: Overviewon Terrorism Campaign Plan,
Page 30 and 31: Overview(2) Enable Partner Nations
Page 32 and 33: Overview6. Irregular Warfarea. IW i
Page 34 and 35: Overviewjoint doctrine already exis
Page 36 and 37: CHAPTER IITERRORIST THREATSThe Natu
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Page 40 and 41: Terrorist Threatsview commonly perc
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Page 44 and 45: Terrorist ThreatsSTRUCTURE PYRAMID
Page 46 and 47: Terrorist ThreatsTYPICAL TERRORIST
Page 48 and 49: Terrorist Threatsbe more understand
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Page 62 and 63: CHAPTER IIIOPERATIONAL APPROACHES
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Operational Approachesseaports, and
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Operational Approaches(2) It is the
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Operational ApproachesINTEGRATION O
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Operational Approachesd. Integratin
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Operational Approacheswill CT PNs.
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CHAPTER IVCOMMAND AND CONTROL“Nev
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Command and Control3. United States
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Command and Control(3) Integrated S
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Command and Control(1) Overview. Na
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Command and Controlplanning efforts
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CHAPTER VSIGNIFICANT ENABLING FUNCT
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Significant Enabling Functions for
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3. Intelligence, Surveillance, and
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APPENDIX AREFERENCESThe development
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References3. Service DocumentsUS Ar
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Referencesv. Terrorism (Herzilya, I
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APPENDIX BADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIO
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GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AN
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GlossaryNCTCNGONISPNMSP-WOTNORADNSC
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Glossaryorganizations, intergovernm
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Glossaryhomeland security. A concer
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Glossaryplanned withdrawal upon com
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