Response in Opposition to the Commonwealth's Motion to Vacate

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v. Beard, No. 05-3486, Response to Penalty-Phase Claims in the Petition/or Writ o/Habeas Corpus,at 81 (E.D. Pa., filed Oct. 20, 2006) (questioning Mr. Williams' account "that there had been somesexual component to his relationship with Norwood," because "there was no contemporaneousevidence," but "only recent statements at the PCRA from petitioner and his affiants."). In fact,however, the Commonwealth itself had "contemporaneous evidence" from Mr. Draper about thehomosexual "relationship" between Mr. Williams and Mr. Norwood, and additional evidenceconfirming Mr. Norwood's preference for teenage boys like Mr. Williams. The Commonwealthnever disclosed that evidence and/alsely asserted it did not exist. In these circumstances, it is quiteironic that the Commonwealth would assert "previous litigation" as a defense.MATERIAL EVIDENCE WAS SUPPRESSED BY THE COMMONWEALTH,RENDERING TERRANCE WILLIAMS' DEATH SENTENCEUNCONSTITUTIONALLY UNRELIABLEJudge Sarmina correctly concluded that Mr. Williams is entitled to relief under Brady v.Marvland and its progeny because the Commonwealth suppressed exculpatory and materialevidence. The Commonwealth did not dispute that the evidence uncovered in these proceedings hadnever been turned over to the defense. Relying on the testimony of trial prosecutor Foulkes andCommonwealth trial witness Draper, as well as on the contents of the District Attorney and policefiles, Judge Sarmina found that "evidence has plainly been suppressed." NT 9/28/2012 at 36. JudgeSarmina went on to find:Id. at 36-37.Furthermore, the evidence borne out over the course of the evidentiary hearing aboutformer ADA Foulkes' sometimes playing a little fast and loose suggests that the scale- which you will hear shortly also additional factors - tip[ s] toward a finding that thesuppression was closer to wilful than to inadvertent.22
Judge Sarmina appropriately found thatthe Commonwealth's suppression of evidence in thiscase was material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).She also found that thegovernment's suppression of evidence "resulted in painting an incomplete and misleading picturefor defense counsel." NT 9/28112 at 28. Simply put, the Commonwealth knowingly created a falseimpression for the jury on facts material to the capital sentencing determination. While this requiresrelief under the more defendant-friendly standard ofNapue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), JudgeSarmina assessed the claims under the higher prejudice standard for Brady cases and determined thatMr. Williams was entitled to relief even under the Brady materiality standard. 5Judge Sarmina's finding of materiality under Brady is amply supported by the facts and lawapplicable to this case. The Commonwealth suppressed evidence of the victim's "homosexualephebophilia," as well as evidence regarding the true motive and circumstances of the offense in thiscase. Under Brady, evidence is "material" where "the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken"to put the case "in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Banks v.Dretke, 540 U.S. at 698. We note that the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence can be materialat capital sentencing, requiring relief on a death sentence, aside from the question whether it ismaterial at the guilt/innocence phase of trial. This concept is clear from Brady itself, which held thatgovernmental suppression of evidence violated due process "where the evidence is material eitherto guilt or to punishment," Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, and affirmed the ruling of the lower court that the5Especially in light of Judge Sarmina's materiality finding under Brady, there can be no doubtthat Mr. Williams established, under Napue, 360 U.S. at 271, that there is any reasonable likelihoodthat the false testimony and impressions created by the Commonwealth (about the true motive andcircumstances of the offense) could have affected the judgment of the jury. See also Alcorta v. Stateof Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1957) (due process violated where the state created a false impressionabout the circumstances and motive in the crime).23
Page 1: IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANI
Page 4 and 5: testimony, the parties' written sub
Page 6 and 7: alia, the original trial and capita
Page 8 and 9: inappropriate in any case, but it i
Page 10 and 11: that Mr. Draper told the prosecutin
Page 12 and 13: The Commonwealth, citing Commonweal
Page 14 and 15: 1. Government interference.Mr. Will
Page 16 and 17: knowledge ofMr. Draper's statements
Page 18 and 19: of assault with intent to murder, a
Page 20: As a prosecution witness ... , [Dra
Page 25 and 26: Norwood files Ms. Foulkes stated, "
Page 27 and 28: A. Yes.Q. How Mr. Norwood was kille
Page 29 and 30: There was additional undisclosed ev
Page 31 and 32: connect all of the dots." NT 9/2811
Page 33 and 34: e afforded relief as to the penalty
Page 35 and 36: himself would necessarily know that
Page 37 and 38: One, that all the requirements of t
Page 39 and 40: their findings and recommendations.
Page 41 and 42: Sexual Assault Resource and Counsel
Page 43 and 44: CONCLUSIONThe Commonwealth's motion
Page 45 and 46: ATTACHMENT A
Page 47 and 48: ATTACHMENT B
Page 49 and 50: 3. Chief Justice Castille was the D
Page 51 and 52: INQUIRER (Oct. 21, 1993) (available
Page 53 and 54: allegation"); Beasley. 937 A.2d at
Page 55 and 56: was the District Attorney responsib
Page 57 and 58: Ripe for Disqualification. 52 Ariz.
Page 59 and 60: 1130,1134 (6th Cir.1969) (applying
Page 61 and 62: objective standards that govern rec
Page 63: Court's adoption of the following "

Response in Opposition to the Commonwealth's Motion to Vacate

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