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England's dreaming equity, trust and conscience - alastairhudson.com

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Alastair Hudson, The Law on Homelessness (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997)Pulhofer v. Hillingdon BC [1986] AC 484, Lord BrightmanAwua v. Brent LBC [1995] 3 All ER 493, Lord HoffmannR v. Kensington <strong>and</strong> Chelsea RLBC, ex p. Ben-el-Mabrouk (1995) 27 HLR 564R v. Purbeck DC ex p. Cadney [1986] 2 FLR 158Law as our servant not our masterCo-operatives <strong>and</strong> the use of lawAs Roger Cotterrell told us, Durkheim favoured contract law over property lawbecause contract law enables organic <strong>com</strong>binations between people so that they canwork together, whereas property law enforces separation by hiving off different piecesof property to be owned by some people <strong>and</strong> not others.Co-operatives are an example of how this distinction is not always useful. In a cooperative- an industrial <strong>and</strong> provident society – the members share all of the rights inthe society’s property but no individual member owns any property rightsindividually. It is a co-operative equivalent of a joint tenancy, a perfect <strong>com</strong>munistallocation of property rights. Together we own everything. Separately we ownnothing.By contrast, contracts typically privatise areas of our social relations. A good exampleis an arbitration agreement. An arbitration agreement is an agreement to keep disputesout of the courts, <strong>and</strong> so out of the sight of the ordinary legal system. They are<strong>com</strong>pacts between <strong>com</strong>mercial people that they will keep their activities separate fromthe rest of the world. Each contract is about concealment <strong>and</strong> a hidden locus of powerrelations.Durkheim was evidently writing about a world two centuries old.Judges as public servantsAccess to law <strong>and</strong> access to justice are key – this is only possible if we have a seismicshift in our thinking about law: we must acknowledge that the law belongs to thepeople <strong>and</strong> that it is not simply something which is made by judges <strong>and</strong> which then insome way belongs to judges. The principal short<strong>com</strong>ing in the positivist account isseeing the law as a sovereign giving <strong>com</strong>m<strong>and</strong>s which then are imposed on themasses, as a usurpation of the decrees of a human sovereign / monarch who gave<strong>com</strong>m<strong>and</strong>s: what we have not done is go the final yard <strong>and</strong> accept that law must <strong>com</strong>efrom the people <strong>and</strong> so be geared up to serve those people, as opposed to ruling overthem <strong>and</strong> looking down as a benign dictator (benign in terms perhaps of human rightsor a benevolent judiciary) – so judges must be thought of a public servants.For Aristotle, <strong>equity</strong> existed to rectify short<strong>com</strong>ings in the law so as to achieve a pureform of justice. Now <strong>equity</strong> is limited to procedural devices like interim injunctions orspecific performance, or to allocation of rights in bourgeois homes or <strong>com</strong>mercialproperty. This is the dream, in this underst<strong>and</strong>ing of <strong>equity</strong> as a bourgeois property35www.<strong>alastairhudson</strong>.<strong>com</strong> | © professor alastair hudson

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