cmh_70-117-1

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KUWAITPREPARING FOR THE GROUND WARJanuary–February 1991h˛madīMSRTAALogbaseMain Supply RouteTactical Assembly AreaAl WafrahRa’s al KhafjīFAAForward Assembly AreaUnit positions approximateE L E V A T I O N I N F E E TP E R S I AAl Mish’āb00 1000 2000 3000 and AboveI R A N50 100MilesN GP SAn Nu’ayrīyahU L FBASTOGNEAl JubaylM S R A U D IM S RM E R C E D E SX V I I I A B N C O R P ST A AAd DammāmDhahranMANAMA17 JanG u l fB A H R A I No fB a h r a i nM S R T O Y O T AAl HufūfDOHAQ A T A R
Reserve 14th Quartermaster Detachment from Greensburg, Pennsylvania.Perhaps as troubling, Scuds launched at Israel in January threatenedto bring that embattled nation into the war, thus wrecking carefullyconstructed alliances with Arab nations hostile to or suspicious ofIsrael. Patriot air-defense missiles hastily deployed to Saudi Arabia andIsrael at the time were reported to have destroyed a number of incomingScuds; but this certainly did not deter the Iraqis from employingthe missiles. By 24 January, 40 percent of all coalition air sorties weredirected against the Scuds—as were significant intelligence, electronicwarfare,and special-operations resources. A vast cat-and-mouse gamedeveloped throughout the western Iraqi desert as American intelligenceand reconnaissance assets attempted to find Scuds for fighter-bombers toengage while Iraqis attempted to fire their mobile missiles quickly andthen scoot out of harm’s way. Planes hunting Scuds were not, of course,pursuing other previously agreed-upon targets whose destruction hadbeen preconditions for the ground assault.The Desert Storm ground operational scheme consisted of a demonstration,a feint, three supporting attacks, an economy-of-force measureto isolate—guard, if you will—the battlefield, and a main attack thatfeatured a penetration early on and in itself was an envelopment. The U.S.Navy demonstrated with the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)in the Persian Gulf to create the impression that an amphibious assaultwas imminent. Like many, the Iraqis had been exposed to Marine Corpspublicity concerning its ability to wreak havoc across the shore and hadbelieved what they heard. Conscious exposure of the 5th MEB and itspreparatory activities on Cable News Network (CNN) and through othermedia heightened the Iraqi sense of anxiety, as did the visible presence ofnaval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The Iraqis dug four divisions in alongtheir seaward flank specifically for the purpose of defending againstamphibious assault, and as many more divisions were postured in such amanner that they might quickly intercede when the marines came acrossthe beaches. Instead, once the ground war was well under way, the 5thMEB landed behind friendly lines and became an operational reservefor the supporting attack.The 1st Cavalry Division began its ground war by feinting up theWadi al Batin, ultimately drawing the attention of five Iraqi divisions.After exchanging shots and doing some damage, the 1st Cavalry backedout of the wadi and swung west to catch up with the VII Corps and serveas its operational reserve.Demonstrations and feints work best if the deception they are intended topromulgate is plausible and one the enemy is inclined to believe. The Iraqis32
Page 1 and 2: War in the Persian GulfOperations D
Page 3 and 4: Cover: On Guard at Sunset by Peter
Page 5 and 6: No.Page5. Ground War: Situation 25
Page 7 and 8: enjoy this short account of a confl
Page 9 and 10: BAGHDADDESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORMAR
Page 11 and 12: and withdrawal of Soviet armies int
Page 13 and 14: over 120,000 troops, 700 tanks,1,40
Page 15 and 16: had assumed command of thecorps in
Page 17 and 18: a Patriot missile battery of the 11
Page 19 and 20: demands quickly took a physicaltoll
Page 21 and 22: formal contracting process. “We w
Page 23 and 24: RafḩāI R A QW ā d ī a l B ā
Page 25 and 26: Tapline RoadDespite the confusion e
Page 27 and 28: established, the Army could conside
Page 29 and 30: In the only change made to the reco
Page 31 and 32: VII Corps assembly area in Saudi Ar
Page 33 and 34: supported the Persian Gulf operatio
Page 35 and 36: with a twelve-day continuous exerci
Page 37 and 38: Troops training in trenchesturning
Page 39: RafḩāXVIII ABN CORPSFAAI R A QW
Page 43 and 44: y the M1 tank-equipped Tiger Brigad
Page 45 and 46: Euphrates RiverAs SamāwahAsh Shaba
Page 47 and 48: coalition air attacks and psycholog
Page 49 and 50: M1A1 Abrams tankIn their movement a
Page 51 and 52: On 24 February, the 1st Cavalry Div
Page 53 and 54: epositioned to continue the advance
Page 55 and 56: 1 CAs SamāwahEuphrates RiverX3 101
Page 57 and 58: coordinated close air support strik
Page 59 and 60: windstorm) in the objective area ki
Page 61 and 62: As SamāwahX3 101Ash ShabakahTALLIL
Page 63 and 64: Armoured Division, with over seven
Page 65 and 66: The brigade advanced at 1200 with t
Page 67 and 68: As SamāwahX3 101197Ash ShabakahTAL
Page 69 and 70: The 1st Brigade took the division l
Page 71 and 72: destruction of the Republican Guard
Page 73 and 74: the U.S. military and its allies ha
Page 75 and 76: noncommissioned officers. These wer
Page 77 and 78: expanding sealift, airlift, and the
Page 79 and 80: the active and reserve components w
Page 82: Map SymbolsX XI I IXX XX XXAirborne
Page 87: PIN : 909253-000

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