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expanding sealift, airlift, and the infrastructure that complemented them.These initiatives were soon followed by the establishment of stockpileslocated in selected areas, called pre-positioned stockpiles, close to likelytrouble spots overseas. Over time, these initiatives also included effortsto change the nature, in particular the weight, of the forces being moved.Improved strategic mobility would be the product of strategic lift, prepositioning,and transformed forces.As effective of a deployment as Desert Shield had been over thecourse of the four-and-a-half months before major combat operationsbegan, it retrospectively seemed frenzied and ad hoc to those who hadparticipated in it. Convenient roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) shipping was notsufficiently available to accommodate the huge mass of vehicles beingmoved. Break-bulk shipping, requiring cranes and heavy equipment tooffload, was more plentiful but required considerably more time in port.It took extraordinary efforts to keep track of supplies and equipmentin international shipping containers, and maddening delays resultedwhen recordkeeping broke down. Units in Saudi Arabia too often foundthemselves piecing together their hardware first from one ship and thenfrom another, rummaging through hundreds of containers to find itemsthey had lost track of, or pursuing supplies and equipment that hadbeen unloaded from the ships but then wheeled past them to the “ironmountains” of supplies building up in the desert. The hasty preparationsfor war in a distant theater were a far cry from the methodical long-termpreparations that characterized major Cold War plans.An obvious first step to solve some of the issues of rapid deploymentwas to procure more shipping, particularly roll-on/roll-off shippingcapable of accommodating battalions or brigades at a time. Sealift in theMaritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Fleet expanded from 17 RO/RO ships in 1990 through 29 in 1994 to 36 in 1996. Expanding sealift wasaccompanied by corresponding improvements in infrastructure and training.During Desert Shield, many divisions deployed through seaportsthey had not contemplated for that purpose and others did so throughfacilities that were antiquated or in poor condition. By 1994, a massive$506 million deployment infrastructure refurbishment plan was underway, investing heavily in port facilities, railheads, and airfields to speeddeparting units on their way. The lion’s share of this expenditure wentto such high-profile troop establishments as Fort Bragg, North Carolina,for airborne forces; Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for aviation; Fort Stewart,Georgia, and Fort Hood, Texas, for heavy forces; and Fort Bliss, Texas,for air defense. Training budgets adapted as well to ensure that unitswere proficient with respect to deployment processes. In 1994 alone,68