New Majorities and Minorities in the Changing Balkans - Project on ...

PROJECT ON ETHNIC RELATIONSR e p o r tThe <strong>Project</strong> on Ethnic Relations (PER) wasfounded <strong>in</strong> 1991 <strong>in</strong> anticipation of <strong>the</strong> serious<strong>in</strong>terethnic conflicts that were to erupt follow<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> collapse of Communism <strong>in</strong> Central<strong>and</strong> Eastern Europe <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> former SovietUnion. PER conducts programs of high-level<strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>and</strong> dialogue <strong>and</strong> serves as aneutral mediator <strong>in</strong> several major disputes <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> region. PER also conducts programs oftra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, education, <strong>and</strong> research at <strong>in</strong>ternational,national, <strong>and</strong> community levels.PER is supported by United States Agency forInternational Development, <strong>the</strong> Charles StewartMott Foundation, <strong>the</strong> Rockefeller Bro<strong>the</strong>rs Fund,<strong>the</strong> Government of Switzerl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Governmentof Romania, <strong>the</strong> Government of Great Brita<strong>in</strong>,<strong>the</strong> Balkan Trust for Democracy, <strong>the</strong> CarnegieCorporation of <strong>New</strong> York, NCH Capital, Inc.,<strong>the</strong> Alfred <strong>and</strong> Carol Moses Family Fund, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>People Technology Foundation, Inc.BUDAPEST, HUNGARY DEC. 2-3, 2006NEW MAJORITIES ANDMINORITIES IN THECHANGING BALKANSIndividuals <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions wish<strong>in</strong>g to receivePER publications should write to:15 Chambers StreetPr<strong>in</strong>ceton, <strong>New</strong> Jersey 08542-3707, USATelephone: (609) 683-5666Fax: (609) 683-5888E-mail: per@per-usa.orgWeb Site: www.per-usa.org

NEW MAJORITIES ANDMINORITIES IN THECHANGING BALKANSBUDAPEST, HUNGARYDECEMBER 2-3, 2006© Copyright 2007 by <strong>Project</strong> on Ethnic Relations

TABLE OF CONTENTSPreface 1Note on Term<strong>in</strong>ology 4Introduction 5Build<strong>in</strong>g Democratic Interethnic Government 6Build<strong>in</strong>g a Democratic <strong>and</strong> Multiethnic Kosovo 15“Mo<strong>the</strong>r Countries” <strong>in</strong> Interethnic Relations 18Conclusions 21List of Participants 22O<strong>the</strong>r PER Publications 25

PREFACEDur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> last decade <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Balkans</strong> new <strong>in</strong>terethnic dynamics havebeen created by various regional settlements. Many of <strong>the</strong>se settlementsnot only changed <strong>the</strong> dynamics but created new ethnic majorities <strong>and</strong>m<strong>in</strong>orities. Overnight former ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities became majorities. Thisnew set of circumstances requires changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong>se societies aregoverned. This is especially true for Kosovo, <strong>the</strong> status of which <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>ternational community is determ<strong>in</strong>ed to resolve <strong>in</strong> 2007.These factors <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> tim<strong>in</strong>g prompted <strong>the</strong> <strong>Project</strong> on Ethnic Relations(PER) to organize <strong>in</strong> cooperation with <strong>the</strong> Hungarian M<strong>in</strong>istry ofForeign Affairs <strong>and</strong> with <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> U.S. State Department througha USAID grant, <strong>in</strong> Budapest on December 2-3, 2006, a regional roundtableof political leaders from Sou<strong>the</strong>astern Europe. This regional roundtablediscussion, <strong>the</strong> eighth such endeavor organized by PER between2000-2006 was titled <strong>New</strong> <strong>Majorities</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chang<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Balkans</strong>. The meet<strong>in</strong>g brought toge<strong>the</strong>r political leaders, decision-makers<strong>and</strong> officials from <strong>the</strong> region, <strong>the</strong> U.S. State Department, <strong>the</strong> EuropeanUnion, <strong>the</strong> Council of Europe, <strong>and</strong> OSCE to discuss <strong>the</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g dynamicsof <strong>in</strong>terethnic relations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> area as <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational communityprepares to resolve <strong>the</strong> issue of Kosovo’s status.One of <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> purposes of <strong>the</strong> roundtable was to encourage <strong>the</strong>region’s policy makers to th<strong>in</strong>k constructively about <strong>the</strong> new reality thatis be<strong>in</strong>g created <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> last decade by various <strong>Balkans</strong>ettlements <strong>and</strong> about changes <strong>in</strong> policies that this new reality requires.The participants shared <strong>the</strong>ir experiences on <strong>in</strong>terethnic governance <strong>and</strong>debated whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>terethnic models are applicable across borders orParticipants <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> roundtable.From left to right: Imer Selmani, Jozef<strong>in</strong>aTopalli, K<strong>in</strong>ga Goncz, Livia Plaks, GabrielaKonevska Trajkovska, <strong>and</strong> Zoran Loncar.1

whe<strong>the</strong>r each country ought to develop its own model: Hungary,Macedonia, Montenegro <strong>and</strong> Romania as well as o<strong>the</strong>r countries <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>region have found <strong>the</strong>ir own answers for <strong>in</strong>terethnic accommodation.The participants from <strong>the</strong>se countries shared <strong>the</strong>se “models” with <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r participants. Could <strong>the</strong>re be a lesson <strong>in</strong> it for o<strong>the</strong>r countries <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> region? There was a strong consensus among <strong>the</strong> participants that<strong>the</strong> multiethnic character of <strong>the</strong> population must be reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>stitutions, policies <strong>and</strong> practices of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states.Two issues dom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>the</strong> discussion: Kosovo’s future status <strong>and</strong> relationsbetween so-called mo<strong>the</strong>r countries <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir ethnic k<strong>in</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>neighbor<strong>in</strong>g states. Not surpris<strong>in</strong>gly, <strong>the</strong>re were disagreements aboutwhat <strong>the</strong> future status of Kosovo should look like but <strong>the</strong>re was generalagreement that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration of m<strong>in</strong>orities would be of paramountimportance under any status outcome. The <strong>in</strong>tegration of <strong>the</strong> Serbs, <strong>the</strong>Roma, <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs <strong>in</strong>to Kosovo’s life was considered as one of <strong>the</strong> biggestchallenges of post-status Kosovo. On <strong>the</strong> subject of mo<strong>the</strong>r countries <strong>the</strong>participants debated <strong>the</strong> issue of limitations to <strong>the</strong> responsibilities ofsuch countries for <strong>the</strong>ir ethnic k<strong>in</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g outside <strong>the</strong>ir borders <strong>and</strong> howmuch loyalty, if any, do <strong>the</strong>se ethnic k<strong>in</strong> have to exhibit to <strong>the</strong>ir mo<strong>the</strong>rcountries <strong>and</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r loyalty to one’s native country is more important.The participants also discussed how to help ethnic moderates to implement<strong>the</strong>ir programs <strong>and</strong> to stay <strong>in</strong> power.We would like to thank <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Dr.K<strong>in</strong>ga Goncz, for her <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>and</strong> participation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> roundtable. Wealso would like to show deep appreciation for <strong>the</strong> assistance given to PER<strong>in</strong> organiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> roundtable by diplomats from <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of ForeignAffairs of Hungary, particularly by Oszkar Nikowitz, Andor David, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> staff of <strong>the</strong> Hungarian consular offices <strong>in</strong> Serbia, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo,<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> Macedonia.I would also like to thank PER staff <strong>in</strong> Pr<strong>in</strong>ceton <strong>and</strong> our representatives<strong>in</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>astern Europe for <strong>the</strong>ir hard work <strong>in</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> organiz<strong>in</strong>gthis roundtable. Special thanks go to <strong>the</strong> U.S. State Department <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>U.S. Agency for International Development for mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> project possible.Professor Steven Burg of Br<strong>and</strong>eis University, a member of <strong>the</strong> PERCouncil for Ethnic Accord, is <strong>the</strong> author of this report with additionalcomments from PER staff.In order to encourage frank <strong>and</strong> open dialogue, it is PER’s practice topublish remarks by participants without attribution. This report has notbeen reviewed by <strong>the</strong> participants, <strong>and</strong> PER assumes full responsibilityfor its contents.Livia B. Plaks, PresidentPr<strong>in</strong>ceton, <strong>New</strong> JerseyJanuary 2007From left to right: Jozef<strong>in</strong>a Topalli, K<strong>in</strong>ga Goncz, Livia Plaks, <strong>and</strong>Gabriela Konevska Trajkovska.23

NOTE ON TERMINOLOGYIn this report, <strong>the</strong> spell<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> name “Kosovo” is used (ra<strong>the</strong>r than“Kosova,” <strong>the</strong> spell<strong>in</strong>g preferred by Albanians, or “Kosovo <strong>and</strong> Metohija”or “Kosmet” preferred by Serbs) because that is <strong>the</strong> spell<strong>in</strong>g most commonlyused <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> English-speak<strong>in</strong>g world. For <strong>the</strong> same reason, Serbiannames of places are used, for example, Prist<strong>in</strong>a <strong>and</strong> not Prisht<strong>in</strong>a. However,<strong>the</strong> spell<strong>in</strong>g “Kosova” is used <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> names of Kosovo Albanian politicalparties <strong>and</strong> organizations. The term “Kosovo” is used as an adjective forKosovo’s <strong>in</strong>habitants, whe<strong>the</strong>r Albanians, Serbs, Roma, Turks, or o<strong>the</strong>rs.“Serb” is used as an ethnic term, whereas “Serbian” is employed whenreferr<strong>in</strong>g to Serbia.From left to right: Stefan Lehne, Agron Buxhaku, Ali Ahmeti, <strong>and</strong> Veton Surroi.INTRODUCTIONThe President of PER opened <strong>the</strong> roundtable by stat<strong>in</strong>g that this is <strong>the</strong>eighth time this k<strong>in</strong>d of discourse is organized by PER with previousones hav<strong>in</strong>g taken place <strong>in</strong> Budapest, A<strong>the</strong>ns, Lucerne, <strong>and</strong> Bucharest.This new effort <strong>in</strong> Budapest is organized with <strong>the</strong> sponsorship of <strong>the</strong>U.S. government through a USAID grant <strong>and</strong> with <strong>the</strong> cooperation of<strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary.She stated that we are at a def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g moment <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> history of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Balkans</strong>with <strong>the</strong> last of <strong>the</strong> puzzles to be solved, <strong>the</strong> status of Kosovo which willhave a last<strong>in</strong>g impact on life <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region. The neighborssitt<strong>in</strong>g around <strong>the</strong> table will also feel <strong>the</strong> consequences of <strong>the</strong> events thatwill unfold <strong>in</strong> Prist<strong>in</strong>a <strong>and</strong> Belgrade<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g months <strong>and</strong> thushave a stake <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process <strong>and</strong> areentitled to have <strong>the</strong>ir op<strong>in</strong>ions heard.Overnight formerethnic m<strong>in</strong>oritiesbecame majorities.Many of <strong>the</strong> participants at <strong>the</strong>roundtable have been deal<strong>in</strong>g withmajority-m<strong>in</strong>ority issues of <strong>the</strong>irown, she said, some with greater success than o<strong>the</strong>rs. PER has organized<strong>the</strong> Budapest meet<strong>in</strong>g so that participants could share <strong>the</strong>ir differ<strong>in</strong>gexperiences <strong>in</strong> this area, identify those <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> practices thatappear to offer <strong>the</strong> best prospect of success, <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> conditionsthat make success possible. Success, of course at this po<strong>in</strong>t would mean<strong>the</strong> establishment of stable <strong>and</strong> democratic governments which allgroups, majorities <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities, view as legitimate <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own.The Hungarian Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister welcomed participants, rem<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong>m that Hungary knows <strong>the</strong> question of majorities <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>oritiesquite well from its own history. There are large ethnic Hungarianm<strong>in</strong>ority communities beyond Hungary’s borders, <strong>and</strong> Hungary knows<strong>the</strong> sensitivity of <strong>the</strong>se questions. Speak<strong>in</strong>g about borders <strong>and</strong> territoriesis always very pa<strong>in</strong>ful, she acknowledged. Ethnic identity is like familyidentity, <strong>and</strong> speak<strong>in</strong>g about it is also very pa<strong>in</strong>ful. She suggested that ifparticipants can develop personal relationships across borders <strong>and</strong> ethnicidentities, it will facilitate talk<strong>in</strong>g about <strong>the</strong>se issues.From left to right: Michael Christides, Hashim Thaci, Skender Hyseni, <strong>and</strong>Nagip Arifi.45

BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INTERETHNICGOVERNMENTA participant from Macedonia opened <strong>the</strong> discussion of democratic governance<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terethnic relations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region by acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g thatMacedonia is often referred to as a “success story” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Balkans</strong>. Butthis participant po<strong>in</strong>ted out that Macedonia still has a long way to gobefore it reaches its goal, which is membership <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU. “C<strong>and</strong>idacymeans more responsibilities than rights,” this participant suggested, <strong>and</strong>Macedonia must demonstrate capability <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong>mean<strong>in</strong>g of EU membership. “Macedonia is a multiethnic state. Werespect <strong>the</strong> rights of persons <strong>in</strong> our country.” At <strong>the</strong> same time, this participantacknowledged that it is always difficult to achieve consensusbetween government <strong>and</strong> opposition. None<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>re is “mutualconsensus on <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple that rule of law is above all <strong>in</strong>terests.”Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this participant, “cont<strong>in</strong>uity” with <strong>the</strong> policies of <strong>the</strong> previousgovernment is <strong>the</strong> “basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciple” of <strong>the</strong> new government.“Everyth<strong>in</strong>g done by <strong>the</strong> previous government [to meet <strong>the</strong> requirementsof EU accession] must be accepted, <strong>and</strong> unf<strong>in</strong>ished tasks must be completed.We are not play<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>the</strong> fate of our citizens. We are not do<strong>in</strong>gthis for Brussels, but for our citizens. We are always will<strong>in</strong>g to work with<strong>the</strong> opposition to reach consensus.” This participant recognized that, <strong>in</strong>order to reach consensus, <strong>the</strong> government must be open to dialogue.Such dialogue offered <strong>the</strong> government an opportunity to make use of <strong>the</strong>“knowledge <strong>and</strong> experience” of <strong>the</strong> opposition.This participant s<strong>in</strong>gled out two areas of policy <strong>in</strong> which <strong>in</strong>ternationalcooperation <strong>and</strong> domestic political consensus were particularly important:<strong>the</strong> fight aga<strong>in</strong>st corruption <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> fight aga<strong>in</strong>st crime. “Fight<strong>in</strong>gcorruption <strong>and</strong> crime is a po<strong>in</strong>t of global <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g,”this participant argued. “Although <strong>the</strong>re must be an effort to achieveconsensus through dialogue among <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>and</strong> groups, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end <strong>the</strong>national <strong>in</strong>terest must be achieved.” For this, “it is <strong>the</strong> government <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> majority party that has responsibility.” This participant dist<strong>in</strong>guishedbetween “consensus” <strong>and</strong> “common underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g” on policy matters,po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out that “<strong>the</strong>re will always be some groups who are not satisfied.”In order to achieve a common underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g, “drafts of laws must bediscussed <strong>in</strong> advance with all parties <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests; <strong>the</strong> government mustlisten, <strong>and</strong> share its concepts or ideas; <strong>and</strong> political <strong>and</strong> economic factors,as well as <strong>the</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> acquis communautaire must be considered.”Ano<strong>the</strong>r official from Macedonia emphasized <strong>the</strong> importance of implement<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). This participant summarized<strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g of Ohrid as “neutraliz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> personal <strong>and</strong> materialconsequences of (<strong>the</strong>) 2001 (conflict).”Although <strong>the</strong> constitution hasbeen amended <strong>in</strong> accordance with <strong>the</strong> OFA, <strong>and</strong> numerous laws havebeen passed implement<strong>in</strong>g specific elements of <strong>the</strong> Agreement, work onimplementation rema<strong>in</strong>s to be done. Achiev<strong>in</strong>g “adequate representation”of m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> government adm<strong>in</strong>istration is a key goal of <strong>the</strong> newgovernment. Three months ago,“<strong>the</strong> government adopted an actionplan for ensur<strong>in</strong>g adequate proportionsof m<strong>in</strong>orities on <strong>the</strong> basis of<strong>the</strong> 2002 census, <strong>and</strong> tripled <strong>the</strong>resources allocated for m<strong>in</strong>orityemployment <strong>and</strong> representation <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> government.” This participantreported that <strong>the</strong> government iswork<strong>in</strong>g on this issue with advisorsThe multiethnic characterof <strong>the</strong> population mustbe reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>stitutions, policies<strong>and</strong> practices of <strong>the</strong>Balkan states.familiar with <strong>the</strong> experience of o<strong>the</strong>r democratic countries. “Full implementationof <strong>the</strong> OFA will benefit not only <strong>the</strong> ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities,” thisparticipant argued, “but all <strong>the</strong> people of Macedonia, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>majority Macedonians, because it will br<strong>in</strong>g Macedonia closer to membership<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU.”Ano<strong>the</strong>r politician from Macedonia agreed that <strong>the</strong>re was full consensus<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country on such issues as organized crime, NATO, <strong>and</strong> EU accession.In his view, “<strong>the</strong>se are not achievements of any political parties, butof <strong>the</strong> state.” He cautioned aga<strong>in</strong>st any sense of “satisfaction,” <strong>and</strong> suggestedthat more must be done with respect to <strong>the</strong> status of <strong>the</strong> Albanianlanguage <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> provision of benefits to former members of <strong>the</strong> ethnicAlbanian National Liberation Army (NLA), as provided for <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> agreementthat ended <strong>the</strong> fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 2001. Not<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> fact that moreAlbanians <strong>in</strong> Macedonia voted for <strong>the</strong> Albanian party presently <strong>in</strong> oppositionthan for <strong>the</strong> Albanian party presently <strong>in</strong> government, he questioned<strong>the</strong> legitimacy of <strong>the</strong> latter <strong>in</strong> government <strong>and</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, of <strong>the</strong>government as a whole. This participant warned aga<strong>in</strong>st any effort to“forget <strong>the</strong> past,” as this might lead to “repetition of a pa<strong>in</strong>ful past.”Ano<strong>the</strong>r Macedonian participant was prompted by <strong>the</strong>se remarks todefend <strong>the</strong> previous government. This participant po<strong>in</strong>ted out that “great67

Success, of course atthis po<strong>in</strong>t would mean<strong>the</strong> establishment ofstable <strong>and</strong> democraticgovernments whichall groups, majorities<strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities view aslegitimate <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir own.progress has been achieved <strong>in</strong> Macedonia, not just by this government,but by <strong>the</strong> previous government, as well. This period was a great testfor <strong>the</strong> country <strong>and</strong> all citizens are grateful for <strong>the</strong> progress thathas been achieved. There was participation<strong>and</strong> support from <strong>the</strong><strong>in</strong>ternational community for thisprogress, but Macedonian politiciansshowed real consensus on <strong>the</strong>basics.” This participant argued that“noth<strong>in</strong>g done by <strong>the</strong> governmenthas been <strong>in</strong> violation of <strong>the</strong> constitution,”<strong>and</strong> questioned “why aresome parties still question<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>legitimacy of <strong>the</strong> government?” Thecreation of <strong>the</strong> government coalition was achieved <strong>in</strong> a manner entirelyconsistent with constitutional <strong>and</strong> parliamentary procedure. This participantacknowledged that “<strong>the</strong> big issues will be driven by <strong>the</strong> EU <strong>and</strong>NATO, not by <strong>the</strong> parties of government or <strong>the</strong> opposition. They arenot a question of political will, only implementation of what <strong>the</strong> EU <strong>and</strong>NATO dem<strong>and</strong>.”With respect to <strong>the</strong> use of Albanian <strong>in</strong> Macedonia, this participant notedthat language use is governed by a pre-exist<strong>in</strong>g law, not by any newaction or policy on <strong>the</strong> part of <strong>the</strong> government. “Macedonia is a civicstate, not a national state,” this participant argued. “The pr<strong>in</strong>ciple oftrust requires open m<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>and</strong> an effort to take a civic perspective onshared <strong>in</strong>terests.”A participant from Romania suggested that <strong>the</strong> Romanian “approach” —“not model” — might be <strong>in</strong>structive for o<strong>the</strong>r countries. This approachwas developed <strong>in</strong> cooperation with PER <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council of Europe, <strong>the</strong>most important organizational guardian of human rights <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orityrights <strong>in</strong> Europe.The Romanian approach <strong>in</strong>volved, first, a debate over <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong>state; over what <strong>the</strong> term “national state” means today. This participantsuggested that <strong>the</strong> word “nation” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> first article of <strong>the</strong> Romanianconstitution does not mean ethnic nation, but civic nation. “Even <strong>in</strong>order to streng<strong>the</strong>n national security, <strong>the</strong> state must be civic <strong>and</strong> multicultural.There is no room <strong>in</strong> Europe today for a state <strong>in</strong> which onegroup dom<strong>in</strong>ates o<strong>the</strong>rs. No state is homogeneous, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> modernera dom<strong>in</strong>ation is impossible.” This participant went even fur<strong>the</strong>r,argu<strong>in</strong>g that even <strong>the</strong> term “multi-national” no longer makes sense. Thisterm suggests some groups are recognized, he suggested, while o<strong>the</strong>rs arenot. “The term civic, or multi-cultural, captures <strong>the</strong> notion of diversityof <strong>the</strong> state, <strong>the</strong> idea of <strong>the</strong> state as a legal personality.”The second element of <strong>the</strong> Romanian approach, this participant reported,was a debate over <strong>the</strong> character of <strong>the</strong> national m<strong>in</strong>orities as communities.“The status of groups changes over time, with majorities becom<strong>in</strong>gm<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>orities becom<strong>in</strong>g majorities. The psychologicallegacies of chang<strong>in</strong>g statuses create sensitivities that must be addressed.Only <strong>the</strong> strategy of a common project offers an opportunity to overcomepsychological issues.”Third, <strong>the</strong> Romanian approach <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>the</strong> shar<strong>in</strong>g of political power.Rights are not predeterm<strong>in</strong>ed, this participant suggested, <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>the</strong>result of political dialogue, which itself is a form <strong>and</strong> a consequence ofpower shar<strong>in</strong>g. “Are rights social, political, or economic?” This participantargued <strong>the</strong>y are not economic; economic rights are determ<strong>in</strong>ed bymarkets. They are cultural, identity rights. “Cultural, identity, <strong>and</strong>spiritual rights should not be conceived on a territorial basis. The territorialissue should be put aside.” Dispersed groups, this participantargued, have <strong>the</strong> same rights as those concentrated <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> territories.The fourth debate <strong>in</strong> Romania concerned<strong>the</strong> scope of m<strong>in</strong>ority rights.“Harmonization <strong>and</strong> stabilization”of <strong>in</strong>terethnic relations contributedto consolidation of <strong>the</strong> democraticstate <strong>in</strong> Romania, he argued.“There should be no contradictionbetween respect for <strong>and</strong> recognitionIf you don’t grantrights, you will have togrant territory.of diversity, <strong>and</strong> cohesion of <strong>the</strong> state.” Ultimately, <strong>the</strong> limit on scope ofrights is def<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> requirements of cohesion of <strong>the</strong> state. “If youdon’t grant rights, you will have to grant territory. <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> must feelsecure, <strong>and</strong> feel a sense of dignity.” Security <strong>and</strong> dignity, this participantwent on to conclude, require “equality;” between <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>and</strong>between communities, but not between groups <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> state. Thereare two approaches to security <strong>and</strong> dignity. One may be labeled “protection,”<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r “association.” The “protection” approach def<strong>in</strong>es onegroup as protected, <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r a protector. It is asymmetric. “Association”89

calls for decentralization or devolution as a means for achiev<strong>in</strong>gsecurity <strong>and</strong> dignity.A participant from Hungary disagreed with some of <strong>the</strong>se po<strong>in</strong>ts. Hesuggested that <strong>the</strong>re is no “golden rule” with respect to whe<strong>the</strong>r m<strong>in</strong>orityrights should be based on territory. He po<strong>in</strong>ted out that <strong>the</strong>re are someexamples of territorial rights that are “good <strong>and</strong> viable <strong>and</strong> work<strong>in</strong>g,” <strong>and</strong>some examples of cases that are not “work<strong>in</strong>g.” “We should not say thatthis pr<strong>in</strong>ciple is right or wrong. We should simply <strong>in</strong>sist that every solutionmust be based on <strong>the</strong> agreement of <strong>the</strong> concerned parties, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>majority <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority. I do agree that no solution can be expected tolast forever, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re is no solution that can be applied to everycountry.” He noted a tendency <strong>in</strong> Europe toward decentralization <strong>and</strong>devolution <strong>in</strong> governance, “processes which sometimes result <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>creation of ethnic entities, <strong>and</strong> sometimes not.” This participant alsonoted <strong>the</strong> longst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g debate between advocates of <strong>in</strong>dividual rights<strong>and</strong> advocates of collective rights. He acknowledged <strong>the</strong> validity of arguments<strong>in</strong> favor of <strong>in</strong>dividual rights, but wished to argue <strong>in</strong> support ofcollective rights. He also noted that <strong>the</strong>re are many labels for collectiverights, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g community rights <strong>and</strong> even <strong>in</strong>dividual rights that canbe exercised only <strong>in</strong> collectivities, but wished to focus on <strong>the</strong> substanceof <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple. “There are many rights that are very substantial <strong>and</strong>important for m<strong>in</strong>orities, <strong>and</strong> cannot be exercised by <strong>in</strong>dividuals alone.These are mostly l<strong>in</strong>guistic rights. And <strong>the</strong>se cannot be attached to every<strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong> society. These can be attached to some of <strong>the</strong> groups [<strong>in</strong> asociety]. In Hungary, <strong>the</strong>re are 13 national communities that enjoy collectiverights to self-government, school<strong>in</strong>g, etc. There are many o<strong>the</strong>rs,such as immigrants, who do not have such rights. Only <strong>the</strong> old, traditional,groups <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> major ethnic m<strong>in</strong>ority, <strong>the</strong> Roma, have <strong>the</strong>se rights.”F<strong>in</strong>ally, this participant questioned <strong>the</strong> wisdom of adopt<strong>in</strong>g a new constitution<strong>in</strong> Serbia at this particular moment, especially a constitution conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gprovisions on Kosovo that, <strong>in</strong> his view, complicated <strong>the</strong> issue.On <strong>the</strong> question of territorialization of rights, <strong>the</strong> prior participant noted <strong>in</strong>response that <strong>the</strong> Parliamentary Assembly of <strong>the</strong> Council of Europe hadrecently asked member governments to avoid <strong>the</strong> organization/adm<strong>in</strong>istrationof <strong>the</strong>ir territories on an ethnic basis. Decentralization <strong>and</strong> devolutionshould, <strong>the</strong>refore, be conceived <strong>in</strong> civic, not ethnic terms. And, f<strong>in</strong>ally,he offered a legal nuance to <strong>the</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ition of collective rights. He po<strong>in</strong>tedout that “<strong>the</strong> subjects enjoy<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> rights are collective, not <strong>the</strong> rights.”A participant from Serbia viewed <strong>in</strong>terethnic relations as <strong>the</strong> key to fullsecurity for all states <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region. “Serbia, like o<strong>the</strong>r states <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>region,” he declared, “views its future <strong>in</strong> terms of membership <strong>in</strong>Europe.” He affirmed that ethnic diversity <strong>in</strong> Serbia is a nationalresource; “it enriches <strong>the</strong> country.” But he also acknowledged it is an area<strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> quality of democracy <strong>in</strong> Serbia will be measured. This participantpo<strong>in</strong>ted out that <strong>the</strong> law on national m<strong>in</strong>orities adopted <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia <strong>in</strong> 2001 (this law is still valid <strong>in</strong> Serbia)gave all ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>the</strong> opportunity to establish <strong>the</strong>ir own nationalcouncils as representative organizations, <strong>and</strong> arenas for debate over community<strong>in</strong>terests. The presidents of <strong>the</strong>se councils constitute an advisorybody on policy for <strong>the</strong> government through <strong>the</strong>ir membership on <strong>the</strong> statecouncil for national m<strong>in</strong>orities, established two years ago. It is chaired by<strong>the</strong> Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cludes o<strong>the</strong>r key m<strong>in</strong>isters among its members.The new constitution adopted recently <strong>in</strong> Serbia, this participant reported,was supported by <strong>the</strong> full consensus of all political parties, <strong>and</strong> by <strong>the</strong>people of Serbia, <strong>in</strong> a referendum. “It <strong>the</strong>refore enjoys a high level ofpolitical legitimacy <strong>and</strong> consensus <strong>in</strong> Serbia.” The new constitution, heargued, embodies <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of full protection for all ethnic identities.He reported that it recognizes not just <strong>in</strong>dividual rights, but collectiverights, as well. These <strong>in</strong>clude protectionsaga<strong>in</strong>st discrim<strong>in</strong>ation orforced assimilation, <strong>the</strong> right ofassociation for members of ethniccommunities, <strong>the</strong> right to equality<strong>in</strong> public services, <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r provisions.A new constitutional mechanismhas been established, <strong>the</strong>There is no room <strong>in</strong>Europe today for a state<strong>in</strong> which one groupdom<strong>in</strong>ates o<strong>the</strong>rs.“constitutional appeal.” The office of an ombudsman has also beenestablished, <strong>and</strong> enjoys a m<strong>and</strong>ate to protect m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. Beyond<strong>the</strong>se legal provisions, he argued, <strong>the</strong> new constitution also affirms <strong>the</strong>responsibility of <strong>the</strong> state to ensure equal economic opportunities, equaldevelopment, for all citizens, regardless of ethnic identity. The constitutionalso calls for decentralization of <strong>the</strong> Serbian state, which <strong>the</strong> governmentviews as a precondition for achiev<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> development of Serbia as awhole. A council on national m<strong>in</strong>orities is about to be established <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>multiethnic prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a, which represents <strong>the</strong> application ofconstitutional pr<strong>in</strong>ciples at <strong>the</strong> level of <strong>the</strong> prov<strong>in</strong>ce. This participant1011

expressed <strong>the</strong> hope that representatives of <strong>the</strong> Albanian population ofSouth Serbia would soon choose to participate <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions of<strong>the</strong> Republic.This Serbian participant declared <strong>the</strong> upcom<strong>in</strong>g elections <strong>in</strong> Serbia(scheduled for January 21, 2007) will ensure <strong>the</strong> au<strong>the</strong>ntic representationof ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Serbian parliament. He reported that <strong>the</strong>number of signatures required on petitions nom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>and</strong>idates forethnic m<strong>in</strong>ority parties has been reduced to make it easier for c<strong>and</strong>idatesof ethnic parties to ga<strong>in</strong> a place on <strong>the</strong> ballot, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> electoral thresholdfor m<strong>in</strong>ority representation has been lowered so as to guarantee <strong>the</strong> presenceof m<strong>in</strong>ority representatives <strong>in</strong> parliament.F<strong>in</strong>ally, this participant called for settlement of <strong>the</strong> status of Kosovo on<strong>the</strong> basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of <strong>the</strong>territorial <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>and</strong> sovereignty of Serbia. Such a settlement wouldrequire compromise. But, any solution that did not take <strong>the</strong>se pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<strong>in</strong>to account would not be acceptable to <strong>the</strong> government of Serbia.A politician from Republika Srpska (RS) <strong>in</strong> Bosnia-Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a reportedthat right-w<strong>in</strong>g forces were defeated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> last round of elections, <strong>and</strong>this has “calmed down radical elements” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>fluential SerbianOrthodox Church. Yet, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> view of this participant, basic questions ofequality between <strong>the</strong> nations of Bosnia have not been resolved. “We triedto revise <strong>the</strong> constitution, under strong <strong>in</strong>ternational pressure, <strong>and</strong>agreed on a compromise. But that compromise could not w<strong>in</strong> a twothirdsmajority <strong>in</strong> parliament.” This participant argued “<strong>the</strong> House ofPeoples should control vital national <strong>in</strong>terests under <strong>the</strong> new constitution,but this was not adopted.” Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this participant, “<strong>the</strong> Bosnjaksdon’t want entities. They want a highly centralized state. Serbs want topreserve <strong>the</strong> RS. Croats are dissatisfied with <strong>the</strong>ir representation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>Federation <strong>and</strong> on <strong>the</strong> national level.” In argu<strong>in</strong>g for preservation of <strong>the</strong>RS, this participant suggested “<strong>the</strong>re is proportional representation ofethnic groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> state adm<strong>in</strong>istration. The government [of RS] isnot exclusively Serb.” The ma<strong>in</strong> problem <strong>in</strong> Bosnia, accord<strong>in</strong>g to thisparticipant, is that “confidence <strong>and</strong> trust between ethnic groups has stillnot been restored.” Many people hold “negative images of <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r’ asthose who were ‘on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side of <strong>the</strong> front l<strong>in</strong>es’.” This participantsuggested that <strong>the</strong> solution to <strong>the</strong>se <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r problems <strong>in</strong> Bosnia was<strong>in</strong>tegration of Bosnia Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> EU.This participant suggested that determ<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>the</strong> future status ofKosovo would have important consequences for Bosnia. “Politicians <strong>in</strong><strong>the</strong> RS are frequently asked not to mention Kosovo at all,” he reported.“But people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> RS are follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> dialogue on Kosovo more closelythan <strong>the</strong>y are follow<strong>in</strong>g what is go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong>side Bosnia. People seeKosovo as a vital issue,” <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>y view it “emotionally.” He warned that“without <strong>the</strong> consent, or consensus of people <strong>in</strong> Serbia <strong>and</strong> Kosovo, <strong>the</strong>recannot be a stable solution.” He contrasted “imposed partition <strong>in</strong>Kosovo” to “imposed unity <strong>in</strong> Bosnia,” <strong>and</strong> cautioned “an imposed solutionwill cause problems. People will ask how is it possible to have <strong>in</strong>dependencefor Kosovo <strong>and</strong> not have <strong>in</strong>dependence for <strong>the</strong> RS?” He stated that“no one will take up weapons,” but he warned “<strong>the</strong>re will be widespreadfeel<strong>in</strong>gs of frustration if <strong>the</strong>re is imposed <strong>in</strong>dependence for Kosovo.”Ano<strong>the</strong>r participant from Bosnia began his remarks by stipulat<strong>in</strong>g thathis was not “ano<strong>the</strong>r’ or “different” voice from Bosnia, not an oppos<strong>in</strong>gvoice. He wanted to be heard as only “one more” voice. He firstaddressed <strong>the</strong> issue of territorialization of ethnic identity, reject<strong>in</strong>g it as alast<strong>in</strong>g solution to <strong>in</strong>terethnic relations. He agreed <strong>the</strong> only solution for<strong>the</strong> Balkan region is <strong>in</strong>tegration of <strong>the</strong> whole region <strong>in</strong>to <strong>the</strong> EuropeanUnion. He reported <strong>the</strong> number of “serious” central state <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong>Bosnia has <strong>in</strong>creased considerably s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> Dayton Accord. This developmentof common state <strong>in</strong>stitutions, he declared, was accomplishedwith <strong>the</strong> full agreement of both entities <strong>and</strong> all three nations. “The viewof Bosnia as a state <strong>in</strong> which <strong>in</strong>ternal differences mean noth<strong>in</strong>g gets donewithout direct <strong>in</strong>tervention by <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational community is no longercorrect,” he argued. He reported <strong>the</strong> requirements of EU accession haveled Bosnia to adopt 45 new laws <strong>and</strong> to establish 27 new common<strong>in</strong>stitutions. But <strong>the</strong>se actions, he <strong>in</strong>sisted, were not undertaken solelybecause of EU pressure. They were undertaken because <strong>the</strong>y servedBosnian self-<strong>in</strong>terest. “The capacity of <strong>the</strong> Bosnian state to act has notreceived appropriate recognition,” he declared. He anticipated that byJune significant progress toward accession will be achieved, <strong>the</strong> office of<strong>the</strong> High Commissioner will have been elim<strong>in</strong>ated, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> “Daytonphase” of Bosnian development will give way to a “Brussels phase.”A participant from Montenegro suggested his country was a good exampleof a multiethnic state that had conformed to European dem<strong>and</strong>s. Heattributed at least part of <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal opposition to <strong>in</strong>dependence to“xenophobic, conservative, <strong>and</strong> nationalistic” attitudes among some people.1213

None<strong>the</strong>less, he affirmed that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent state of Montenegrowould cont<strong>in</strong>ue to pursue <strong>in</strong>terethnic harmony. He cited <strong>the</strong> support ofethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities for <strong>in</strong>dependence <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> recent referendum, criticizedby <strong>the</strong> nationalistic opposition who suggest <strong>in</strong>dependence was won by“m<strong>in</strong>orities” <strong>and</strong> not <strong>the</strong> “majority,” as evidence of <strong>the</strong> good <strong>in</strong>terethnicrelations already established <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> country.A participant from Albania emphasized <strong>the</strong> importance of fulfill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>requirements of her country’s stabilization/association agreement with<strong>the</strong> EU as a precondition for accession. In connection with this, sheunderscored her government’s “zero tolerance” for organized crime, asthis is a major obstacle not only to accession, but to establishment of <strong>the</strong>rule of law. The most important issue for citizens, however, is improv<strong>in</strong>g<strong>the</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ard of liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Albania, which ultimately requires cont<strong>in</strong>uedeconomic development.A politician from South Serbia suggested that <strong>the</strong> implementation of <strong>the</strong>agreement end<strong>in</strong>g conflict <strong>in</strong> that region had, <strong>in</strong> his view, produced nopositive results. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, he argued, “<strong>the</strong>re is cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g pressurefrom <strong>the</strong> Serbian police.” He supported <strong>the</strong> view that m<strong>in</strong>orities shouldenjoy collective rights, <strong>and</strong> called for <strong>the</strong> regionalization of Serbia, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> establishment of regions that respect ethnic identities. He cited<strong>in</strong>terethnic agreements <strong>in</strong> Montenegro as a model for resolv<strong>in</strong>g problems<strong>in</strong> Serbia. But he added “<strong>the</strong> Presevo valley must have special status,special treatment <strong>in</strong>side of Serbia.”Ano<strong>the</strong>r participant from Serbia argued that significant progress hasbeen achieved <strong>in</strong> South Serbia. But he suggested that for <strong>the</strong> past threeyears <strong>the</strong> Albanian m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>the</strong>re has not been will<strong>in</strong>g to make use of all<strong>the</strong> rights it enjoys under Serbian law. Serbian law “gives sufficientroom,” he argued, <strong>in</strong> such areas as culture, education, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> media. Itwas not until very recently that <strong>the</strong> Albanian m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> region waswill<strong>in</strong>g to set up a national council of its own, as 14 o<strong>the</strong>r m<strong>in</strong>oritieshave already done <strong>in</strong> Serbia, which would enable <strong>the</strong> Albanian nationalm<strong>in</strong>ority to exercise such rights.An <strong>in</strong>ternational participant asked “what have been <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>centives forthose m<strong>in</strong>ority representatives who have cooperated <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> effort to builddemocratic <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir countries?” And, he asked “why havethose who cooperated with majorities, <strong>and</strong> won concessions for <strong>the</strong>irpeople, still lost political power?” This region-wide pattern might leadsome to conclude that exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>centives to cooperate are <strong>in</strong>sufficient if<strong>the</strong>se politicians risk <strong>the</strong> loss of power. “Is <strong>the</strong> hope of membership <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>EU still a strong enough <strong>in</strong>centive,” he asked, especially <strong>in</strong> light of recentchanges <strong>in</strong> public op<strong>in</strong>ion <strong>and</strong> official rhetoric <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU? These questionsrema<strong>in</strong>ed unanswered.Ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>in</strong>ternational participant noted that “<strong>the</strong>re is noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> acquiscommunautaire about ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities.” EU <strong>in</strong>sistence on resolutionof <strong>in</strong>terethnic issues is “part of conditionality for accession. The EU willnot import problems,” he warned. He suggested that “<strong>the</strong> promise ofliv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tegrated region without obstacles to travel, movement,or employment should be especially significant for groups dividedamong several states.” He later declared “after Kosovo, <strong>the</strong> territorialorganization of <strong>the</strong> whole region will be set, <strong>and</strong> all governments will berequired to endorse this.”BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC ANDMULTIETHNIC KOSOVOA politician from Kosovo opened <strong>the</strong> discussion of <strong>the</strong> challenges of build<strong>in</strong>ga democratic <strong>and</strong> multiethnic Kosovo by po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>the</strong> elections<strong>in</strong> Serbia scheduled for January 2007 as an important opportunity for“potential partners” <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> process of def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> future status of Kosovoto come to power. He <strong>in</strong>sisted that “it is time for <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternationalcommunity to resolve <strong>the</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al status after <strong>the</strong> elections <strong>in</strong> Serbia, via anew resolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> UN Security Council.” He warned that <strong>the</strong>decision on status must come soon after <strong>the</strong> elections, “it cannot bemonths.” He argued that “for now, <strong>the</strong>re is an opposition moratorium <strong>in</strong>Kosovo <strong>in</strong> order to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> consensus over <strong>the</strong> process of ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>dependence.” But “<strong>the</strong> future of Kosovo must not be held hostage; thatwould be very dangerous.” He also rejected draw<strong>in</strong>g any parallel betweenKosovo <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> RS. “The RS was created through violence, whileKosovo was created by peaceful means,” he <strong>in</strong>sisted. A participant fromAlbania also rejected any comparison between Kosovo <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r cases.“It is a special case,” she <strong>in</strong>sisted. “Fur<strong>the</strong>r delay is unacceptable. Even if<strong>the</strong>re are elections or events elsewhere, <strong>the</strong>y are unrelated to Kosovo.”Ano<strong>the</strong>r participant from Kosovo characterized Kosovo as “a sui generis case.”An American participant argued that “Kosovo has passed all lawsdem<strong>and</strong>ed by <strong>the</strong> EU.” He argued that “<strong>the</strong> current situation cannot be1415

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed.” He po<strong>in</strong>ted out that “<strong>the</strong> expectations of Albanians havebeen raised by all outside actions” <strong>and</strong> must be fulfilled. The resistanceof “Serb leaders north of <strong>the</strong> Ibar does not reflect <strong>the</strong> will of <strong>the</strong> population,”he <strong>in</strong>sisted. His discussions with local Serb residents, thisparticipant reported, lead him to believe “<strong>the</strong>y will not leave Kosovo.”A participant from <strong>the</strong> EU took a somewhat different position, assert<strong>in</strong>gthat “not all <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>gredients to take a f<strong>in</strong>al decision are <strong>in</strong> place yet.”But he also acknowledged that it is “<strong>the</strong> key capitals that will make <strong>the</strong>real decisions.” He warned that “it is extremely important for leaders<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> people to keep <strong>the</strong>ir nerves. Violence would be extremelycounter-productive.”A participant from Kosovo argued that <strong>the</strong> proposals put forward by<strong>the</strong> Albanian side <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vienna talks “redistribute power <strong>and</strong> redrawboundaries so that 92-95 percent of Kosovo Serbs will be <strong>in</strong> selfadm<strong>in</strong>ister<strong>in</strong>gterritories.” This is evidence, he <strong>in</strong>sisted, that <strong>the</strong>Kosovo Albanians “have crossed <strong>the</strong>ir own redl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> order toaccommodate <strong>the</strong> Serbs.” He argued that “for Kosovo to become ademocratic <strong>and</strong> stable state, it must be a functional state with contractualcapacity to enter <strong>in</strong>to agreementsAfter Kosovo, <strong>the</strong>territorial organizationof <strong>the</strong> whole regionwill be set, <strong>and</strong> allgovernments will berequired to endorse this.with <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>and</strong> mult<strong>in</strong>ational<strong>in</strong>stitutions.” Any “partition” ofKosovo “would feed non-democraticforces <strong>in</strong> Kosovo.” And, f<strong>in</strong>ally,“absent <strong>in</strong>tegration, Kosovo will bea stagnant society.”Ano<strong>the</strong>r participant from Kosovoemphasized that <strong>the</strong> proposals putforward by <strong>the</strong> Albanian side <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vienna talks reflected a full consensusamong “all political forces <strong>in</strong> Kosovo.” “We hope <strong>the</strong> Ahtisaari reportwill <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> proposals of our side,” he declared, “because ours exceedeven <strong>the</strong> national st<strong>and</strong>ards applied elsewhere <strong>in</strong> Europe.”Ano<strong>the</strong>r participant from Kosovo argued that “an <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo<strong>in</strong> its current borders is a compromise <strong>in</strong> comparison to o<strong>the</strong>r options.”He characterized <strong>the</strong>se o<strong>the</strong>r options as “return<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo to Serbia;partition<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo between Albanians <strong>and</strong> Serbs; <strong>and</strong> creation of aGreater Albania.” He argued that “<strong>the</strong> countries that are function<strong>in</strong>g wellare those <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>re is agreement on ‘stateness.’ Those <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>question of ‘stateness’ is still alive are not function<strong>in</strong>g well.” He concludedthat <strong>the</strong>re must not be any question about <strong>the</strong> “stateness” of Kosovo.A participant from Albania asserted that “<strong>in</strong>dependence is very close tobecom<strong>in</strong>g a reality no matter how people perceive it. Independence is <strong>the</strong>solution that promises regional stability.”“Multiethnicity looks different to Serbs <strong>and</strong> Albanians <strong>in</strong> Kosovo,”cautioned ano<strong>the</strong>r participant from Kosovo. “For Serbs, it means real<strong>in</strong>fluence, not necessarily a ‘veto’ power. For Albanians, it means simplyhav<strong>in</strong>g Serbs <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> organizations.” He po<strong>in</strong>ted out that <strong>the</strong>language law was <strong>in</strong> fact first rejected by <strong>the</strong> Kosovo Assembly over <strong>the</strong>objections of Serbs, <strong>and</strong> later adopted only under <strong>in</strong>ternational pressure.He asked “what are <strong>the</strong> guarantees that must be <strong>in</strong> place after <strong>in</strong>dependence<strong>in</strong> order to secure <strong>the</strong> Serb role <strong>in</strong> Kosovo?” He answered his ownquestion by assert<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> need to establish a “double majority” pr<strong>in</strong>ciple.“Why are Kosovo Serbs not participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>in</strong>stitutions?” askeda participant from Serbia. He argued “after political changes <strong>in</strong> 2000,Serbs did participate until March 2004. But, if you want to be part of adialogue, you have to build trust <strong>and</strong> confidence. After March 2004Kosovo Serbs no longer had trust <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>in</strong>stitutions.” He suggestedthat Kosovo Serbs did not have even <strong>the</strong> most basic of human rights,freedom of movement, or even basic security. He argued that “<strong>the</strong>recannot be an <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo. No document of <strong>in</strong>ternational lawmakes this possible. Even one exception will open o<strong>the</strong>r problems, suchas <strong>the</strong> RS.” He rejected any l<strong>in</strong>kage between Kosovo <strong>and</strong> Montenegro,however, po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out “Kosovo never had <strong>in</strong>dependent statehood prior tobecom<strong>in</strong>g part of Serbia,” while Montenegro did. The latter po<strong>in</strong>t wassupported <strong>in</strong> remarks by a Montenegr<strong>in</strong> participant who, <strong>in</strong> seek<strong>in</strong>g tolegitimate Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence, did so by assert<strong>in</strong>g “Montenegrowas never part of Serbia.”A participant from Hungary, <strong>in</strong> clos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> discussion on Kosovo,rem<strong>in</strong>ded participants of <strong>the</strong> assertion of a dist<strong>in</strong>guished Hungarianhistorian, who attributed <strong>the</strong> tragedy of Eastern Europe, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gHungary, to <strong>the</strong> fact that borders had historically “been mov<strong>in</strong>g back <strong>and</strong>forth.” All nations, this historian added, “identify with that period ofhistory <strong>in</strong> which its territory was <strong>the</strong> largest.“ But, this participant noted,this moment came at a different moment for each nation, with <strong>the</strong> resultthat those large territories overlap. “All <strong>the</strong> countries of <strong>the</strong> region are1617

he argued, “when it comes to m<strong>in</strong>orities we must be realistic <strong>and</strong> cannotapply double st<strong>and</strong>ards. There can be cooperation at many levels, but itmust always be transparent <strong>and</strong> based on common <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>and</strong> accord<strong>in</strong>gto common st<strong>and</strong>ards.” He declared that <strong>the</strong> Kosovo government “hasrespected <strong>the</strong> rights of m<strong>in</strong>orities at <strong>the</strong> highest level, <strong>in</strong> all our documents.We want <strong>the</strong>m to participate at all levels, even <strong>in</strong> government, but<strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>tegrative manner, with<strong>in</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stitutions, <strong>and</strong> not to createparallel or alternative, autonomous <strong>in</strong>stitutions.”A participant from an EU country declared “it would be better for <strong>the</strong><strong>Balkans</strong> if <strong>the</strong> concept of ‘mo<strong>the</strong>r county’ lost some of <strong>the</strong> politicalweight it now carries, as ‘mo<strong>the</strong>r countries’ have not played entirelyconstructive roles. There are, <strong>and</strong> should be, limits on <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>and</strong>responsibilities of ‘mo<strong>the</strong>r countries’.” Ano<strong>the</strong>r participant declared “itis <strong>the</strong> collective responsibility of European states to protect m<strong>in</strong>orityrights through political <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r means. But this must be done withgreat care.”An <strong>in</strong>ternational participant responded to <strong>the</strong> vigorous discussion bydeclar<strong>in</strong>g “This is a complex issue <strong>and</strong> it is an emotional issue, soemotional that I doubt that even most of <strong>the</strong> researchers would beable to discuss it without emotions.” He expressed concern that “<strong>the</strong>exist<strong>in</strong>g European framework is not sufficient <strong>in</strong> regard to <strong>the</strong>se issues”<strong>and</strong> called for “creat<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>ternational framework on this issue. If weare creat<strong>in</strong>g a European cosmopolitan society, where all rules <strong>and</strong> lawsare universal, <strong>the</strong>re is no need for a mo<strong>the</strong>r state <strong>in</strong> a classic sense as weknew it today, a mo<strong>the</strong>r state that is tak<strong>in</strong>g care of its co-ethnics if <strong>the</strong>irrights are violated. There would be no such need if an overall Europeanconcept is <strong>in</strong> charge. The European Union would become <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>rcountry for all. Europe would be <strong>the</strong> mo<strong>the</strong>r for Kosovo, for Albania,for Serbia, <strong>and</strong> for Montenegro. Under <strong>the</strong>se circumstances <strong>the</strong> only rolefor so-called mo<strong>the</strong>r states is <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> cultural sphere. In fact, I am not sosure if <strong>the</strong> concept of a mo<strong>the</strong>r state is not dangerous <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 21st century.Because, if taken out of cultural sphere <strong>and</strong> cultural relations, it couldbr<strong>in</strong>g dangerous consequences; as it did <strong>in</strong> Yugoslavia <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1990s, <strong>and</strong>even earlier, <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Sudetenl<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1930s.CONCLUSIONSParticipants <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> roundtable shared a strong consensus that <strong>the</strong> multiethniccharacter of <strong>the</strong> population must be reflected <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions,policies, <strong>and</strong> practices of <strong>the</strong> Balkan states. The participants agreed thatm<strong>in</strong>orities should enjoy <strong>the</strong> same human rights as all o<strong>the</strong>r citizens,as well as extensive cultural rights required to preserve <strong>the</strong>ir identities,however <strong>the</strong>y differed <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir views on <strong>the</strong> territorialization of m<strong>in</strong>orityrights. Political equality, reflected <strong>in</strong> equitable representation of ethniccommunities <strong>in</strong> state <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>gful <strong>in</strong>fluence of <strong>the</strong>secommunities over state policies, was seen as a key component <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> establishmentof stable democracies <strong>in</strong> countries with multiethnic populations.Accession to <strong>the</strong> EU was viewed both as a highly desirable goal, <strong>and</strong> as astrong <strong>in</strong>centive for Balkan governments <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir oppositions to cooperate<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> establishment of European norms of democratic governance<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g respect for human <strong>and</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority rights. The role of so-called‘mo<strong>the</strong>r countries’ <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terethnic relations was <strong>the</strong> subject of a vigorousdiscussion that ended without a clear consensus.From left to right: Steven Burg, Alex Grigor’ev, Adrian Sever<strong>in</strong>, Nenad Djurdjevic,<strong>and</strong> Osman Topcagic.2021

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS *(English alphabetical order)Republic of AlbaniaArta Dade, Secretary for International Relations, Socialist Party; Vice President,Foreign Relations Committee, Parliament of AlbaniaJozef<strong>in</strong>a Topalli, President, Parliament of Albania; Vice President,Democratic PartyBosnia <strong>and</strong> Herzegov<strong>in</strong>aMilorad Dodik, Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Republika Srpska; President, Alliance ofIndependent Social DemocratsOsman Topcagic, Director, Directorate for European Integration, Governmentof Bosnia <strong>and</strong> Herzegov<strong>in</strong>aHellenic RepublicMichael Christides, Director, Directorate for Sou<strong>the</strong>astern European Countries,M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign AffairsRepublic of HungaryK<strong>in</strong>ga Goncz, M<strong>in</strong>ister of Foreign Affairs of HungaryLaszlo Szoke, State Secretary, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign Affairs of HungaryIstvan Szent-Ivanyi, Member, European Parliament (Alliance of Free Democrats)Oszkar Nikowitz, Senior Adviser, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign Affairs of HungaryAndor David, Adviser, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign Affairs of HungaryIvan Gyurcsik, Adviser, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign Affairs of HungaryAttila Pok, Director, Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences;Member, PER Council for Ethnic AccordRepublic of MacedoniaAli Ahmeti, President, Democratic Union for Integration; Member, Parliamentof MacedoniaAgron Buxhaku, Secretary for Foreign Affairs <strong>and</strong> Integration, DemocraticUnion for Integration; Member, Parliament of MacedoniaGabriela Konevska Trajkovska, Deputy Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of MacedoniaImer Selmani, Deputy Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister of Macedonia; Vice President,Democratic Party of AlbaniansRepublic of MontenegroFerhat D<strong>in</strong>osha, President, Democratic Union of Albanians; Member,Parliament of MontenegroMiodrag Vukovic, President, Committee of Foreign Relations <strong>and</strong> EuropeanIntegration, Parliament of Montenegro (DPS)RomaniaAdrian Sever<strong>in</strong>, Member, Parliament of Romania (Social Democratic Party);Member, PER Council for Ethnic AccordRepublic of SerbiaNagip Arifi, Mayor of BujanovacMiroslav Boz<strong>in</strong>ovic, Ambassador, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign Affairs of SerbiaPetar Ladjevic, Director, Service for Human <strong>and</strong> M<strong>in</strong>ority Rights,Government of SerbiaZoran Loncar, M<strong>in</strong>ister for Public Adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>and</strong> Local Self-Governmentof Serbia; Head, Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a Board, Democratic Party of SerbiaKosovoArdian Gj<strong>in</strong>i, M<strong>in</strong>ister for Environmental Protection <strong>and</strong> Spatial Plann<strong>in</strong>gof KosovoSkender Hyseni, Pr<strong>in</strong>cipal Political Adviser to <strong>the</strong> President of KosovoOliver Ivanovic, Head, Serb List for Kosovo <strong>and</strong> Metohija, Member, KosovoAssembly; Presidency Member, Social Democratic PartyVeton Surroi, President, ORA Movement; Member, Kosovo AssemblyHashim Thaci, President, Democratic Party of Kosova; Member, Kosovo AssemblySwiss ConfederationThomas Grem<strong>in</strong>ger, Ambassador; Head, Political Division IV, FederalDepartment of Foreign AffairsRol<strong>and</strong> Salvisberg, Programme Officer for South East Europe, Political AffairsDivision IV, Human Security, Federal Department of Foreign AffairsUnited States of AmericaCraig Lang, Kosovo Office, Office of South Central European Affairs,Department of StateJan Paul Emmert, Director, Democracy <strong>and</strong> Community Development Program<strong>in</strong> Serbia, Agency for International DevelopmentMeg Gaydosik, Senior Media Development/Rights <strong>and</strong> Tolerance Advisor,Bureau for Europe <strong>and</strong> Eurasia, Agency for International Development2223

Council of EuropeMarc Scheuer, Director of Political Advice <strong>and</strong> Cooperation, Directorate Generalof Political AffairsEuropean UnionStefan Lehne, Special Envoy of <strong>the</strong> High Representative for Common Foreign<strong>and</strong> Defense PolicyOffice of <strong>the</strong> High Representative <strong>and</strong> EU SpecialRepresentative <strong>in</strong> Bosnia <strong>and</strong> Herzegov<strong>in</strong>aClarisse Pasztory, Deputy High Representative; Head, OHR Banja LukaOrganization for Security <strong>and</strong> Cooperation <strong>in</strong> EuropeAndrzej Mirga, Senior Adviser on Roma <strong>and</strong> S<strong>in</strong>ti Issues, Office forDemocratic Institutions <strong>and</strong> Human Rights<strong>Project</strong> on Ethnic RelationsSteven Burg, Member, Council for Ethnic Accord; Professor, Br<strong>and</strong>eis UniversityNenad Djurdjevic, Representative <strong>in</strong> SerbiaAlex Grigor’ev, Director, Western <strong>Balkans</strong>Leon Malazogu, Representative <strong>in</strong> KosovoAlan Moseley, Program OfficerLivia Plaks, PresidentUnited NationsBernd F<strong>in</strong>ke, Director, Office of Political Affairs, United Nations InterimAdm<strong>in</strong>istration Mission <strong>in</strong> KosovoSteven Schook, Pr<strong>in</strong>cipal Deputy Special Representative of <strong>the</strong> SecretaryGeneral <strong>in</strong> KosovoFrom left to right: Arta Dade, Ardian Gj<strong>in</strong>i,Gordan Milosevic, <strong>and</strong> Milorad Dodik.OTHER PER PUBLICATIONS Romanian-American Symposium on Interethnic Relations (1991) The Romanies <strong>in</strong> Central <strong>and</strong> Eastern Europe: Illusions <strong>and</strong> Reality (1992) Nationality Policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Russian Federation (1992) Interethnic Relations <strong>in</strong> Serbia/Yugoslavia: Alternatives for <strong>the</strong> Future (1993) The Media of Eastern Europe <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Former Soviet Union: Report<strong>in</strong>g onInterethnic Relations (1994) Manag<strong>in</strong>g Ethnic Conflict: The Kona Statement (1994) Counter<strong>in</strong>g Anti-Roma Violence <strong>in</strong> Eastern Europe: The Snagov Conference<strong>and</strong> Related Efforts (1994) Ethnonationalism: Fears, Dangers, <strong>and</strong> Policies <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>Post-Communist World (1995) Slovakia Roundtable <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States (1995) Democratic Processes <strong>and</strong> Ethnic Relations <strong>in</strong> Yugoslavia (1995) Russia <strong>and</strong> Eastern <strong>and</strong> Central Europe: Old Divisions <strong>and</strong> <strong>New</strong> Bridges (1996) Second Slovakia Roundtable (1996) Ethnic Relations: A Selected Bibliography (1996) Report<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a Post-Conflict Environment: Bosnian <strong>and</strong>Croat Journalists Meet (1996) The Media <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Roma <strong>in</strong> Contemporary Europe: Facts <strong>and</strong> Fictions (1996) The Roma <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Twenty-First Century: A Policy Paper (1997) Prevention of Violence <strong>and</strong> Discrim<strong>in</strong>ation Aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> Roma <strong>in</strong>Central <strong>and</strong> Eastern Europe (1997) Enhanc<strong>in</strong>g Regional Security: Russian <strong>and</strong> Central European Perspectives (1997) The <strong>New</strong> York Roundtable: Toward Peaceful Accommodation <strong>in</strong> Kosovo (1997) Images <strong>and</strong> Issues: Coverage of <strong>the</strong> Roma <strong>in</strong> The Mass Media <strong>in</strong> Romania (1997) Self-Government <strong>in</strong> Hungary: The Gypsy/Romani Experience <strong>and</strong>Prospects for <strong>the</strong> Future (1997) Political Leaders on Interethnic Relations <strong>and</strong> Regional Security <strong>in</strong>Central Europe: A Roundtable (1998) Interethnic Relations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Balkans</strong>: <strong>New</strong> Generation, <strong>New</strong> Politics (1998) Schools, Language, <strong>and</strong> Interethnic Relations <strong>in</strong> Romania:The Debate Cont<strong>in</strong>ues (1998) The Roma <strong>in</strong> Bulgaria: Collaborative Efforts Between Local Authorities <strong>and</strong>Nongovernmental Organizations (1998)2425

Baltic-Russian Relations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>New</strong> Geopolitical Framework (1998) Political Participation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Roma <strong>in</strong> Hungary <strong>and</strong> Slovakia (1999) Build<strong>in</strong>g Romanian Democracy: The Police <strong>and</strong> Ethnic <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> (1999) Catastrophe <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Balkans</strong>: Serbia’s Neighbors <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Kosovo Conflict (1999) State Policies Toward Romani Communities <strong>in</strong> C<strong>and</strong>idate Countries to <strong>the</strong> EU:Government <strong>and</strong> Romani Participation <strong>in</strong> Policy-Mak<strong>in</strong>g (1999) Montenegro on <strong>the</strong> Br<strong>in</strong>k: Avoid<strong>in</strong>g Ano<strong>the</strong>r Yugoslav War (2000) Roma <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Law: Demythologiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> “Gypsy Crim<strong>in</strong>ality” Stereotype (2000) Vojvod<strong>in</strong>a: The Politics of Interethnic Accommodation (2000) The Year 2000 Elections <strong>in</strong> Romania: Interethnic Relations <strong>and</strong>European Integration (2000) The Roma <strong>in</strong> Hungary: Government Policies, M<strong>in</strong>ority Expectations, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>International Community (2000) Toward Community Polic<strong>in</strong>g: The Police <strong>and</strong> Ethnic <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hungary (2000) Albanians <strong>and</strong> Their Neighbors: Unf<strong>in</strong>ished Bus<strong>in</strong>ess (2000) Roma <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Government <strong>in</strong> Slovakia: The Debate Over Migration (2000) Roma <strong>and</strong> Statistics (2001) Albanians as <strong>Majorities</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong>: A Regional Dialogue (2001) State Policies Toward <strong>the</strong> Roma <strong>in</strong> Macedonia (2001) Parliamentary Representation of <strong>M<strong>in</strong>orities</strong> <strong>in</strong> Hungary: Legal <strong>and</strong>Political Issues (2001) Political Will: Romania’s Path to Ethnic Accommodation (2001) Yugoslav Roma Face <strong>the</strong> Future (2001) Leadership, Representation <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Status of <strong>the</strong> Roma (2002) Yugoslavia at <strong>the</strong> Crossroads (2002) The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience (2002) Political Extremism <strong>and</strong> Interethnic Relations <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>New</strong> Millennium (2002) Roma <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Question of Self-Determ<strong>in</strong>ation: Fiction <strong>and</strong> Reality (2003) Roma <strong>in</strong> Multiethnic Communities <strong>in</strong> Serbia (2003) The Romani “Mahalas” (Neighborhoods) of Sou<strong>the</strong>astern Europe: Politics, Poverty<strong>and</strong> Ethnic Unrest (2003) Albanians <strong>and</strong> Their Neighbors: Is <strong>the</strong> Status Quo Acceptable? (2003) Macedonia’s Interethnic Coalition: The First Six Months (2003) Macedonia’s Interethnic Coalition: The First Year (2004) Albanians <strong>and</strong> Their Neighbors: Mov<strong>in</strong>g Toward Real Communication (2004) Women <strong>in</strong> Governance <strong>and</strong> Interethnic Relations (2004) Macedonia’s Interethnic Coalition: Solidify<strong>in</strong>g Ga<strong>in</strong>s (2004) Roma <strong>and</strong> EU Accession: Elected <strong>and</strong> Appo<strong>in</strong>ted Romani Representatives<strong>in</strong> an Enlarged Europe (2004) Kosovo 2005: Assur<strong>in</strong>g Security for <strong>the</strong> Neighborhood (2005) Macedonia: The Next Stage (2005) Central <strong>and</strong> East European Governments <strong>and</strong> Cooperation with <strong>the</strong>Hungarian Communities: Efforts, Accomplishments, Failures (2005) Macedonia: On <strong>the</strong> Road to Brussels (2005) Kosovo <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Region Prepare for Change: Relations, Responsible Governance, <strong>and</strong>Regional Security (2005) The Political Uses of Anti-Semitism (2006) The <strong>Balkans</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> EU: Challenges on <strong>the</strong> Road to Accession (2006) Macedonia: Agenda 2006 (2006) Romani Politics Present <strong>and</strong> Future (2006) Serbs <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Twenty-First Century (2006) Kosovo Roundtables (2006) Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic Integration: Advanc<strong>in</strong>g Common Interests (2007)2627