New Majorities and Minorities in the Changing Balkans - Project on ...

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed.” He po<strong>in</strong>ted out that “<strong>the</strong> expectations of Albanians havebeen raised by all outside actions” <strong>and</strong> must be fulfilled. The resistanceof “Serb leaders north of <strong>the</strong> Ibar does not reflect <strong>the</strong> will of <strong>the</strong> population,”he <strong>in</strong>sisted. His discussions with local Serb residents, thisparticipant reported, lead him to believe “<strong>the</strong>y will not leave Kosovo.”A participant from <strong>the</strong> EU took a somewhat different position, assert<strong>in</strong>gthat “not all <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>gredients to take a f<strong>in</strong>al decision are <strong>in</strong> place yet.”But he also acknowledged that it is “<strong>the</strong> key capitals that will make <strong>the</strong>real decisions.” He warned that “it is extremely important for leaders<strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> people to keep <strong>the</strong>ir nerves. Violence would be extremelycounter-productive.”A participant from Kosovo argued that <strong>the</strong> proposals put forward by<strong>the</strong> Albanian side <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vienna talks “redistribute power <strong>and</strong> redrawboundaries so that 92-95 percent of Kosovo Serbs will be <strong>in</strong> selfadm<strong>in</strong>ister<strong>in</strong>gterritories.” This is evidence, he <strong>in</strong>sisted, that <strong>the</strong>Kosovo Albanians “have crossed <strong>the</strong>ir own redl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> order toaccommodate <strong>the</strong> Serbs.” He argued that “for Kosovo to become ademocratic <strong>and</strong> stable state, it must be a functional state with contractualcapacity to enter <strong>in</strong>to agreementsAfter Kosovo, <strong>the</strong>territorial organizationof <strong>the</strong> whole regionwill be set, <strong>and</strong> allgovernments will berequired to endorse this.with <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>and</strong> mult<strong>in</strong>ational<strong>in</strong>stitutions.” Any “partition” ofKosovo “would feed non-democraticforces <strong>in</strong> Kosovo.” And, f<strong>in</strong>ally,“absent <strong>in</strong>tegration, Kosovo will bea stagnant society.”Ano<strong>the</strong>r participant from Kosovoemphasized that <strong>the</strong> proposals putforward by <strong>the</strong> Albanian side <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Vienna talks reflected a full consensusamong “all political forces <strong>in</strong> Kosovo.” “We hope <strong>the</strong> Ahtisaari reportwill <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>the</strong> proposals of our side,” he declared, “because ours exceedeven <strong>the</strong> national st<strong>and</strong>ards applied elsewhere <strong>in</strong> Europe.”Ano<strong>the</strong>r participant from Kosovo argued that “an <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo<strong>in</strong> its current borders is a compromise <strong>in</strong> comparison to o<strong>the</strong>r options.”He characterized <strong>the</strong>se o<strong>the</strong>r options as “return<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo to Serbia;partition<strong>in</strong>g Kosovo between Albanians <strong>and</strong> Serbs; <strong>and</strong> creation of aGreater Albania.” He argued that “<strong>the</strong> countries that are function<strong>in</strong>g wellare those <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>re is agreement on ‘stateness.’ Those <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong>question of ‘stateness’ is still alive are not function<strong>in</strong>g well.” He concludedthat <strong>the</strong>re must not be any question about <strong>the</strong> “stateness” of Kosovo.A participant from Albania asserted that “<strong>in</strong>dependence is very close tobecom<strong>in</strong>g a reality no matter how people perceive it. Independence is <strong>the</strong>solution that promises regional stability.”“Multiethnicity looks different to Serbs <strong>and</strong> Albanians <strong>in</strong> Kosovo,”cautioned ano<strong>the</strong>r participant from Kosovo. “For Serbs, it means real<strong>in</strong>fluence, not necessarily a ‘veto’ power. For Albanians, it means simplyhav<strong>in</strong>g Serbs <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>and</strong> organizations.” He po<strong>in</strong>ted out that <strong>the</strong>language law was <strong>in</strong> fact first rejected by <strong>the</strong> Kosovo Assembly over <strong>the</strong>objections of Serbs, <strong>and</strong> later adopted only under <strong>in</strong>ternational pressure.He asked “what are <strong>the</strong> guarantees that must be <strong>in</strong> place after <strong>in</strong>dependence<strong>in</strong> order to secure <strong>the</strong> Serb role <strong>in</strong> Kosovo?” He answered his ownquestion by assert<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> need to establish a “double majority” pr<strong>in</strong>ciple.“Why are Kosovo Serbs not participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>in</strong>stitutions?” askeda participant from Serbia. He argued “after political changes <strong>in</strong> 2000,Serbs did participate until March 2004. But, if you want to be part of adialogue, you have to build trust <strong>and</strong> confidence. After March 2004Kosovo Serbs no longer had trust <strong>in</strong> Kosovo <strong>in</strong>stitutions.” He suggestedthat Kosovo Serbs did not have even <strong>the</strong> most basic of human rights,freedom of movement, or even basic security. He argued that “<strong>the</strong>recannot be an <strong>in</strong>dependent Kosovo. No document of <strong>in</strong>ternational lawmakes this possible. Even one exception will open o<strong>the</strong>r problems, suchas <strong>the</strong> RS.” He rejected any l<strong>in</strong>kage between Kosovo <strong>and</strong> Montenegro,however, po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out “Kosovo never had <strong>in</strong>dependent statehood prior tobecom<strong>in</strong>g part of Serbia,” while Montenegro did. The latter po<strong>in</strong>t wassupported <strong>in</strong> remarks by a Montenegr<strong>in</strong> participant who, <strong>in</strong> seek<strong>in</strong>g tolegitimate Montenegr<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence, did so by assert<strong>in</strong>g “Montenegrowas never part of Serbia.”A participant from Hungary, <strong>in</strong> clos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> discussion on Kosovo,rem<strong>in</strong>ded participants of <strong>the</strong> assertion of a dist<strong>in</strong>guished Hungarianhistorian, who attributed <strong>the</strong> tragedy of Eastern Europe, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gHungary, to <strong>the</strong> fact that borders had historically “been mov<strong>in</strong>g back <strong>and</strong>forth.” All nations, this historian added, “identify with that period ofhistory <strong>in</strong> which its territory was <strong>the</strong> largest.“ But, this participant noted,this moment came at a different moment for each nation, with <strong>the</strong> resultthat those large territories overlap. “All <strong>the</strong> countries of <strong>the</strong> region are1617