Committee method understates the revaluation sensitivity to <strong>in</strong>terest rate <strong>in</strong>creases. 29 Aga<strong>in</strong>st the flatrate <strong>and</strong> Nelson-Siegel models, the Basel Committee method is prudent for maturities up to 30 years,<strong>in</strong> that it overstates the loan price sensitivity to <strong>in</strong>terest rate <strong>in</strong>creases. 30 This is comfort<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce wewould expect the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g maturity of most loan contracts to be less than 30 years. However, whencompared to the Svensson model, the Basel Committee method is only prudent for loan contracts ofup to 10 year maturity, beyond which it understates the loan price sensitivity to <strong>in</strong>terest rate <strong>in</strong>creases.For banks with a substantial proportion of loans <strong>in</strong> the 10-30 year maturity category, we might expectthe Basel Committee method to understate the loan price sensitivity to <strong>in</strong>terest rate <strong>in</strong>creases.While prudential regulators presumably favour the conservativeness of a method, <strong>in</strong>vestors wouldlike an accurate assessment of the risk, with overstatements <strong>and</strong> understatements be<strong>in</strong>g equally harmful.Relative to the alternative loan models, the Basel Committee method overstates the revaluation ga<strong>in</strong>sfrom <strong>in</strong>terest rate decreases at shorter maturities <strong>and</strong> understates these revaluation ga<strong>in</strong>s at longermaturities. The Basel Committee method for <strong>in</strong>terest rate revaluation sensitivity is therefore generallyconservative for shorter-maturity loans, <strong>and</strong> understates risk for longer-maturity loans.4.2.2 Effect of current yield curveThe Basel Committee guidel<strong>in</strong>e method for assess<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest rate revaluation sensitivity does not accountfor the prevail<strong>in</strong>g yield curve at the time of the sensitivity estimate. For example, we might<strong>in</strong>tuitively expect a 2% change <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest rates to be more serious when <strong>in</strong>terest rates are low; conversely,we might expect a 2% shock not to be very serious <strong>in</strong> a high <strong>in</strong>terest rate environment. We<strong>in</strong>vestigate this by compar<strong>in</strong>g the sensitivities from the Basel Committee guidel<strong>in</strong>e method to the sensitivitiesfrom our simplest flat rate loan model of Section 3.2, not<strong>in</strong>g that the latter does depend ona reference or prevail<strong>in</strong>g rate of <strong>in</strong>terest. We present a graphical summary <strong>in</strong> Figure 10.From the figure, we see that the Basel Committee method overstates the risk of a 2% parallelupward shift <strong>in</strong> the yield curve for loan maturities up to 27 years, relative to the simplest loan model.This observation agrees with those of the preced<strong>in</strong>g section: although the Basel Committee methoddoes not take <strong>in</strong>to account the specific form of the loan contract, it gives a conservative assessmentof the <strong>in</strong>terest rate risk for loans with rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g maturity up to 27 years. However, we note that theprevail<strong>in</strong>g level of the yield curve does noticeably affect the sensitivity of the price of a loan contract.When forward rates are flat <strong>and</strong> high, say 5%, the Basel Committee method conservatively assessesthe risk of a 2% parallel upward shift <strong>in</strong> yield curves (forward rates) for loans with rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g maturityup to 40 years. When yield curves are flat <strong>and</strong> low, say .1% or 1%, the Basel Committee methodunderstates the risk associated with 30-year loans.From the preced<strong>in</strong>g section, we know that the Basel Committee guidel<strong>in</strong>e method is generallyconservative for shorter-maturity loans, <strong>and</strong> understated for longer-maturity loans. In addition tothese stylised facts, we also observe for <strong>in</strong>terest rate <strong>in</strong>creases that the Basel Committee guidel<strong>in</strong>emethod is less conservative, or more understated, when <strong>in</strong>terest rates are low than when <strong>in</strong>terest ratesare high. The Basel Committee method, which does not allow for the prevail<strong>in</strong>g level of <strong>in</strong>terest rates,is less appropriate for supervision <strong>in</strong> low <strong>in</strong>terest rate environments.4.2.3 Effect of portfolio aggregationRegardless of the type of security <strong>and</strong> the current level of the yield curve, the Basel Committeeguidel<strong>in</strong>e method for <strong>in</strong>terest rate revaluation sensitivity does not provide a unique method for portfolioaggregation. Suppose that a bank holds two loans of different rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g maturties, one with 1 year <strong>and</strong>the other with 10 years. The Basel Committee method provides senstivities for each of these contracts<strong>in</strong>dividually, but not uniquely for a portfolio of both. Two natural methods suggest themselves forcomput<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terest rate revaluation sensitivity of the portfolio with the Basel Committee method.29 We note <strong>in</strong> Section 4.1 that <strong>European</strong> banks’ on-balance-sheet positions <strong>in</strong> 2011 are net positive at long maturities<strong>and</strong> net negative at short maturities. This f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g is very typical of banks’ role as maturity-transformers. However,it exposes them to <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest rates, s<strong>in</strong>ce such <strong>in</strong>creases would cause the value of (long-term) assets to dropby more than the offsett<strong>in</strong>g rise <strong>in</strong> the value of (short-term) liabilities. Off course, the regulator might anticipate thatrational market participants should rationally compensate for overstatements/understatements <strong>in</strong> the Basel Committeeguidel<strong>in</strong>e method, <strong>and</strong> if there are no <strong>in</strong>formational obstacles to the market participants do<strong>in</strong>g so, such a regulator mightbe equally averse to both over- <strong>and</strong> understatements of <strong>in</strong>terest rate sensitivity.30 This statement should be qualified by the specific parameter assumptions that have been made here on δ, β 0 , β 1 , β 2 , τ 1 .See the discussion of Figure 10.22
0Percentage change <strong>in</strong> price givena 2% parallel upward shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest rates−10percentage−20−30MethodBasel guidel<strong>in</strong>eloan model 0.1%loan model 1%loan model 3%loan model 5%loan model 7%loan model 9%−400 10 20 30 40 50rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g loan maturityFigure 10: The effect of a 2% <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest rates at all maturities on the price of a loan contractwith rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g maturity between 1 <strong>and</strong> 50 years, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Basel Committee guidel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>and</strong> thesimple formula log p(δ + .02, τ) − log p(δ, τ) based on the present value function p(δ, τ) = (1 − e −δτ )/δ,where τ ∈ [1 : 50] is the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g loan maturity <strong>and</strong> δ ∈ {.001, .01, .03, .05, .07, .09} is the level of theflat yield curve before the shock.23