Peacekeeping without Accountability - Yale Law School

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Top:The MINUSTAH base in Méyè.Below:MINUSTAH peacekeepersentering the base.U.N. peacekeeping troops from Nepal as thesource of the outbreak. 58 Outbreak investigations,environmental surveys, molecular epidemiologicalstudies, and journalistic accounts all demonstratethat the troops were exposed to cholera in Nepaland introduced V. cholerae bacterium into Haiti.These investigations highlight five key factsabout the epidemic. First, there was no activetransmission of cholera in Haiti prior to October2010. Second, the epidemic began at a single pointin an area that encompassed the MINUSTAHbase where Nepalese peacekeeping troops werestationed. Third, these troops had been exposedto cholera in Nepal, and fourth, their fecescontaminated the local water supply in Haiti.Finally, the Haitian outbreak involved a singlestrain of Nepalese origin.Historical records show no reported cases ofsymptomatic cholera in Haiti before the arrivalof MINUSTAH troops in October 2010. 59 Expertshave identified three major cholera outbreaks inthe Caribbean: in 1833–1834, 1850–1856, and 1865-13 minustah and the cholera outbreak in haiti
1872. 60 None of these three outbreaks affected Haiti,even though cholera cases were reported in theneighboring Dominican Republic in 1867. 61 As earlyas 1850, Haitian historians commented on thestriking absence of cholera cases in the country.Additionally, no symptomatic cases of cholera werereported in the Caribbean during the 20th century. 62The 2010 Haitian outbreak began in a regionencompassing the MINUSTAH base in Méyè,a small town in the Artibonite administrativedepartment of central Haiti. Following the firststool samples from patients in this area sent fortesting on October 19 and 20, 2010, 63 the LNSPconfirmed the presence of V. cholerae on October22. 64 Initial cases of cholera were clustered in anarea surrounding the MINUSTAH base. The base issituated on the Méyè Tributary, which flows pastthe town of Mirebalais and into the ArtiboniteRiver. The initial cases of confirmed choleraoccurred downstream from the base. 65Nepalese troops stationed at the Méyè basehad been recently exposed to cholera in Nepal, andtheir feces contaminated the drinking water oflocal Haitians. As part of MINUSTAH’s 2010 troopincrease, a battalion of Nepalese soldiers arrivedin Haiti between October 8–24, 2010. 66 The soldierscame from regions of Nepal recently afflicted byoutbreaks of cholera. 67 The MINUSTAH base hadpoor sanitation conditions. The camp’s wasteinfrastructure was haphazardly constructed,allowing for waste from the camp’s drainage canaland an open drainage ditch to flow directly intothe nearby Méyè Tributary. 68 The drainage siteswere also susceptible to flooding and overflow intothe tributary during rainfall. 69 Direct evidencethat sewage from the base contaminated theMéyè Tributary of the Artibonite River exists. 70 OnOctober 27, journalists caught MINUSTAH troopson tape trying to contain what appeared to be asewage spill at the MINUSTAH base. Families inthe area also confirmed that waste from the campfrequently flowed into the river. 71 Most of the initialcholera patients reported drinking water from theArtibonite River.The close relationship between the Haitiancholera strain and the Nepalese strain furthersupports the conclusion that Nepalese troopsbrought cholera into Haiti. 72 Although there hasbeen no medical documentation of the MINUSTAHtroops carrying cholera, researchers have identifieda common strain of V. cholerae causing cholera inHaiti. 73 Experts have compared this strain with anumber of known cholera strains from around theworld. 74 Genetic evidence shows that the Haitianstrain is descended from a V. cholerae strain ofNepalese origin. In other words, the cholera thatcaused Haiti’s epidemic originated in Nepal. 75D. National and International EffortsHave Been Unsuccessful inEliminating Cholera.A combination of Haitian national agencies,multilateral agencies, other countries, andinternational NGOs have responded to thecholera outbreak. Unfortunately for Haitians, thispatchwork of services, training, and surveillancehas proven inadequate. Much of the choleraresponse effort is not adequately funded andineffective for either the short or longterm.1. Short-term ResponseIn the immediate aftermath of the earthquake,national, international, and NGOs anticipatedthat the massive damage done to Haiti’s fragileinfrastructure would render the countryvulnerable to disease and began to prepareaccordingly. None of these organizations, however,expected an outbreak of cholera, given the disease’slong absence from the country. As a result, localhealth workers had little more than basic trainingon cholera treatment. National health staff had anexisting knowledge of cholera, how it was spread,its treatment, and proper modes of prevention,but few were trained in handling an emergencyoutbreak of the disease.Because of this, during the first phase ofthe epidemic, an international NGO, MédecinSans Frontières (MSF), was the lead provider oftreatment. International humanitarian NGOslike MSF have provided medical services in Haitithroughout the cholera crisis. MSF establishedsome of the first cholera treatment programs,rapidly expanding services in the months of thespiraling outbreak by deploying health workers tothe country and opening cholera treatment centers14 minustah and the cholera outbreak in haiti
Page 1 and 2: PeacekeepingwithoutAccountabilityTh
Page 3 and 4: ContentsIIIAcknowledgementsGlossary
Page 5 and 6: Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviati
Page 7 and 8: in October 2012. In the spring of 2
Page 9 and 10: violated widely accepted principles
Page 11 and 12: MethodologyThe findings in this rep
Page 13 and 14: Chapter IMINUSTAH and the Cholera O
Page 15 and 16: the Government of Haiti in post-dis
Page 17: B. The Outbreak of Cholera Has HadD
Page 21 and 22: E. The United Nations Has Failed to
Page 23 and 24: Chapter IIScientific Investigations
Page 25 and 26: keeping became difficult. 107 At St
Page 27 and 28: peacekeeping troops were training i
Page 29 and 30: y human activity from a distant geo
Page 31 and 32: Chapter IIIThe Requirementof a Clai
Page 33 and 34: immunity, if immunity has not been
Page 35 and 36: oard.” Unlike a claims commission
Page 37 and 38: personal injury or death, they are
Page 39 and 40: Chapter IVThe U.N. Has Failed toRes
Page 41 and 42: A. The U.N. Can Have Duties and Lia
Page 43 and 44: issued a resolution acknowledging t
Page 45 and 46: 4. The U.N. Failed to Respect the R
Page 47 and 48: ConclusionMINUSTAH’s introduction
Page 49 and 50: chapter VThe U.N.’s Actions Viola
Page 51 and 52: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum St
Page 53 and 54: must be observed in facilities for
Page 55 and 56: Chapter VIRemedies andRecommendatio
Page 57 and 58: cholera epidemic. Thus far, despite
Page 59 and 60: cholera patients in its clinics thi
Page 61 and 62: C. Dignitary JusticeThe U.N. must w
Page 63 and 64: missions. Either type of commission
Page 65 and 66: 2010 Report].24 MINUSTAH Apr. 2010
Page 67 and 68: commission has ever been establishe
Page 69 and 70:
epidemic caused by UN, say experts,
Page 71 and 72:
sion shall determine its own proced
Page 73 and 74:
the United Nations as, “a consequ
Page 75 and 76:
ICESCR, the UN Committee on Economi
Page 77 and 78:
mental obligations of protection. T
Page 79:
this commission more open-ended tha
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