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13. Acting under Uncertainty Maximizing Expected Utility

13. Acting under Uncertainty Maximizing Expected Utility

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The Axioms of <strong>Utility</strong> Theory (1)The Axioms of <strong>Utility</strong> Theory (2)Justification of the MEU principle, i.e., maximization of the average utility.Scenario = Lottery LPossible outcomes = possible prizesThe outcome is determined by chanceL = [p 1 , C 1 ; p 2 , C 2 ; . . . ; p n , C n ]Example:Lottery L with two outcomes, C 1 and C 2 :L = [p, C 1 ; 1 − p, C 2 ]Preference between lotteries:L 1 ≻ L 2 The agent prefers L 1 over L 2L 1 ∼ L 2 The agent is indifferent between L 1 and L 2L 1 L 2 The agent prefers L 1 or is indifferent between L 1 and L 2Given lotteries A, B, COrderability(A ≻ B) ∨ (B ≻ A) ∨ (A ∼ B)An agent should know what it wants: it must either prefer one of the 2lotteries or be indifferent to both.Transitivity(A ≻ B) ∧ (B ≻ C) ⇒ (A ≻ C)Violating transitivity causes irrational behavior: A ≻ B ≻ C ≻ A. Theagent has A and would pay to exchange it for C. C would do the samefor A.→ The agent loses money this way.(University of Freiburg) Foundations of AI July 18, 2012 5 / 32(University of Freiburg) Foundations of AI July 18, 2012 6 / 32The Axioms of <strong>Utility</strong> Theory (3)The Axioms of <strong>Utility</strong> Theory (4)ContinuityA ≻ B ≻ C ⇒ ∃p[p, A; 1 − p, C] ∼ BIf some lottery B is between A and C in preference, then there is someprobability p for which the agent is indifferent between getting B forsure and the lottery that yields A with probability p and C withprobability 1 − p.SubstitutabilityA ∼ B ⇒ [p, A; 1 − p, C] ∼ [p, B; 1 − p, C]If an agent is indifferent between two lotteries A and B, then the agentis indifferent beteween two more complex lotteries that are the sameexcept that B is substituted for A in one of them.MonotonicityA ≻ B ⇒ (p ≥ q ⇔ [p, A; 1 − p, B] [q, A; 1 − q, B])If an agent prefers the outcome A, then it must also prefer the lotterythat has a higher probability for A.Decomposability[p, A; 1 − p, [q, B; 1 − q, C]] ∼ [p, A; (1 − p)q, B; (1 − p)(1 − q), C]Compound lotteries can be reduced to simpler ones using the laws ofprobability. This has been called the “no fun in gambling”-rule: twoconsecutive gambles can be reduced to a single equivalent lottery.(University of Freiburg) Foundations of AI July 18, 2012 7 / 32(University of Freiburg) Foundations of AI July 18, 2012 8 / 32

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