Lexical Pragmatics - Journal of Semantics

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156 Lexical Pragmaticson the way how the restriction problem of polysemy may be solved byconsidering the probabilistic nature of conceptual knowledge.5 CONCLUSIONOne aim of this paper was to collect some general problems that have aprima facie claim on the attention of linguists interested in LexicalSemantics. These problems had to do with the utterance of words withinconcrete conceptual and contextual settings and went beyond the aspects ofmeaning typically investigated by a contrastive analysis of lexemes withinthe Katz-Fodor tradition. Three groups of problems were considered: (i)pragmatic compositionality, (ii) blocking, and (iii) pragmatic anomaly. Theproblems came to the fore in connection with the pragmatics of adjectivesand the phenomenon of systematic polysemy. The same points can be madewith regard to word formation in general (e.g. Aronoff 1976; Bauer 1983)and the interpretation of compounds in particular (e.g. Meyer 1993; Wu1990). Moreover, the investigation of kinds of polysemy other than thosefound with institute-tyipe. words may be helpful in order to see the uniquityof these problems (cf., for instance, Lakoff's (1987) study on Englishprepositions and Sweetser's (1990) investigation of English perceptionverbs). Furthermore, Fabricius-Hansen's (1993) research on how theinterpretation of noun-noun compounds is affected by a genitive attributemay raise the same problems in a more complex area.The second aim of this paper was to sketch a new approach called LexicalPragmatics that deals with these problems in an explanatory way and tries togive a systematic account of the phenomena under discussion. Theparadigm is based on two simple principles: (i) an adequate representationof lexical items has to be given in a semantically underspecified format, and(ii) their actual interpretation has to be derived by a pragmatic strengtheningmechanism. The basic pragmatic mechanism rests on conditions ofupdating the common ground and allows to give a precise explication ofnotions such as generalized conversational implicature and pragmaticanomaly. The fruitfulness of the basic account was initially established byits application to a variety of recalcitrant phenomena, among which itsprecise treatment of Atlas & Levinson's Q- and I-principles and theformalization of the balance between informativeness and efficiency innatural language processing (Horn's division of pragmatic labour) deserveparticular mention. The basic mechanism was subsequently extended by anabductive reasoning system that is guided by subjective probability. Theextended mechanism turned out to be capable of giving a principledaccount of lexical blocking, the pragmatics of adjectives, and certain typesof systematic polysemy.Downloaded from http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on September 12, 2014
Reinhard Blutner i$7I find it important to apply the ideas to other possibly more complex andmore realistic examples than those considered here. Moreover, methods areneeded that allow one to measure the values of the probabilistic parametersthat control and organize conceptual knowledge.Seen from a moderately distant viewpoint, the standard accounts ofLexical Semantics may appear as an incoherent research field which is atodds with itself. As an endeavour that has to access Grammar, Semantics,and aspects of utterance interpretation at the same time it multiplies thediversion of. these disciplines. Overstretched by the task of theoryformation, it either combines theoretical rigour with descriptive poverty,or, more predominantly, it leads to linguistic anecdotalism, collecting prettyand curious observations without theoretic control. I sense that it is theinadequacy or the lack of a genuine pragmatic component that has led tothis situation. In so far as Lexical Pragmatics tries to take pragmaticsseriously—especially the conception of conversational implicature—and inso far as it is explicit about this component, it may substantiate a division oflabour between grammatical and pragmatic aspects of the lexicon. This maybroaden the way for overcoming the unfortunate situation just mentioned.Perhaps most details concerning the main ideas of the present account inconcrete terms may prove false in the future. This may concern, first at all,the Economy principles and their interaction. In order really to justify thedetails of these principles we need more empirical evidence and studies. Butit is also crucial to discover the reasons that explain why the principles arejust as they are. This brings us to a reductionist programme as is currentlypursued in the domain of Integrative Connectionism (e.g. Smolensky 1995). Afirst attempt at achieving a full reduction of Speaker's economy (I-principle)and Hearer's economy (Q-principle) to connectionist principles is currentlyunder way.AcknowledgementsI am grateful to Manfred Bierwisch, Paul David Doherty, Bart Geurts, Gerhard Jager,Thomas Jiingling, Annette Lefimdllmann, Chris Pirion, and Rob van der Sandt for usefulcomments on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks go to an anonymous referee ofthe JS. I do not, however, intend to imply by this that they endorse my approach. Inparticular, Thomas and Manfred don't believe a word of it.Downloaded from http://jos.oxfordjournals.org/ by guest on September 12, 2014REINHARD BLUTNER Received: 18.10.97Humboldt University, Berlin Final version received: 05.04.98Jagerstrasse 10-1110117 BerlinGermanye-mail: blutner@german.hu-berHn.de
Page 7 and 8: Reinhard Blutner 121(c) a fast book
Page 9: Reinhard Blutner 123not necessarily
Page 12: 126 Lexical Pragmaticsmeaning that
Page 15 and 16: Reinhard Blutner 129grasp intuitive
Page 18 and 19: 132 Lexical Pragmaticspr(m|sem(a))
Page 20 and 21: 134 Lexical Pragmaticsthe propositi
Page 22 and 23: 136 Lexical Pragmaticsprocesses and
Page 24 and 25: 138 Lexical Pragmaticsand a! that a
Page 26 and 27: 140 Lexical PragmaticsI have tried
Page 28 and 29: 142 Lexical Pragmaticsagainst the c
Page 30 and 31: 144 Lexical Pragmatics4.1 Cost-base
Page 32 and 33: 146 Lexical PragmaticsSince we have
Page 34 and 35: 148 Lexical Pragmaticsproposition B
Page 36 and 37: 150 Lexical Pragmatics(3$) (a) The
Page 38 and 39: 152 Lexical PragmaticsThis utteranc
Page 40 and 41: 154 Lexical Pragmatics(45) (a) 3e[S
Page 44 and 45: 158 Lexical PragmaticsNOTES1 I have
Page 46 and 47: i6o Lexical PragmaticsREFERENCESAls
Page 48: 162 Lexical PragmaticsPustejovsky,

Lexical Pragmatics - Journal of Semantics

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