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Pan-African Political and Economic Visions ofDevelopmentFrom the OAU to the AU:From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the NewPartnership for African Development (NEPAD)Abdalla BujraDPMF Occasional Paper, No. 13Development PolicyManagement ForumAddis Ababa

© 2004 by Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF)All rights reserved. Published 2004Printed in EthiopiaDevelopment Policy Management Forum (DPMF)C/O United Nations Economic Commission for AfricaP.O. Box 3001Addis Ababa, EthiopiaTel. : 251-1-515410/ (DL) 443197Fax : 251-1-515410Email : dpmf@uneca.orgWebsite: http://www.dpmf.orgAll views expressed in the Occasional Papers are thoseof the authors and not necessarily those of DPMF.

Pan-African Political and Economic Visions ofDevelopmentFrom the OAU to the AU:From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the NewPartnership for African Development (NEPAD)Abdalla Bujra *1. IntroductionA vision is a mental picture of a desired future that an individual, acountry/nation or a continent has. It is often articulated in a few sentences,for example, as a preamble to a document. Sometimes the future vision iscaptured in a short simple and catchy slogan. In general, however, a visionis often accompanied by a long-term strategic plan on how to achieve thedesired future.The theme of this paper is on the various visions on Africa’s developmentpropounded during the last forty years, by both Africans and Externals.Externals vary depending on the specific period and context – from thecolonial powers to the former Soviet Union, the Americans, the UN andBretton Woods Institutions, Donors, the G8 and now those described bythe much overused and meaningless term the International Community. Inthis paper, externals will be identified in the context of the discussion.I will argue briefly that: (a) in the past, there were important differencesbetween Africans’ visions of their future development and the visions ofdevelopment externals had for Africa, (b) the visions of both Africans andExternals have emanated from governments and not from the people,African people generally having very little knowledge of the visionspromulgated by their leaders on their behalf, (c) while in the past, therewere substantive differences between internal and external visionsregarding the nature of development and ways of achieving it, recently thedevelopment vision of the externals has won the day.* The author is the Executive Director of the DPMF, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

2 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) which articulates thelatest African Vision has, in essence, internalised the external vision andarticulates it as a consensus African vision hailed by the externals - asrepresented by the G8 countries. The development vision of NEPAD is,essentially, the same vision of the type of development propounded by theexternals in different languages, since the time of independence. NEPADnow articulates an approach to development which is accepted by mostAfrican leaders, as well as leaders of the G8 countries.2. A History of African Visions2.1 The Pan-African Congress and its African VisionSince the last century African leaders – both in the Diaspora and in theContinent - began to view the continent as a whole instead of asfragmented pieces. They also began to discuss continental development, asopposed to piecemeal development, in specific countries or regions of thecontinent. These views of the continent were slowly incorporated into thenationalist struggle and received their clearest articulation during thestruggle for independence.The Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, in 1945, brought togetherAfrican nationalist leaders, as well as leaders from the Diaspora andexpressed Africa’s vision in the following terms: (a) to achieveindependence from colonial rule throughout the continent, so that Africanscan rule themselves democratically, (b) to achieve continental unity so thatAfrica can (i) experience faster economic growth and catch up with theindustrialised countries, and (ii) assume a strong position within theinternational system.This Pan-African vision was popularised at the sub-regional level asnationalist movements mobilised peasants and workers for the struggleagainst colonial rule. And the nationalist movements achieved theirindependence with this vision in mind.2.2 The First OAU VisionWhen the OAU was created in Addis Ababa, in 1963, the Pan-Africanvision was incorporated in its Charter. Indeed this vision became thesubject of a heated debate at the 1963 meeting. The famous debate centredon a crucial element of the African vision namely, should the political

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 3unity of the continent (a) be realised immediately, or (b) be a long termobjective to be achieved through the creation and consolidation ofindependent nation states first, and then built up through sub-regionalbuilding blocks.In this debate, Nkrumah of Ghana argued for immediate continental unity,while Nyerere of Tanzania argued for consolidating nation states first.Nyerere won the day and since then, nation building and economicdevelopment at country level have been given priority throughout thecontinent.Nevertheless, the goal of continental unity continued to be a powerfulforce in the OAU, in the Pan-African Movement and amongst aprogressive section of intellectuals. Henceforth, it remained a centralelement of all continent-wide visions and was restated in all Africaninitiatives for continental development - including NEPAD.Independent African countries added to the above vision several otherelements, such as the eradication of poverty and disease, self-reliance andequity. Overall, it is fair to say that in the 1960s, most African countriesproclaimed and propounded this vision.Yet, within the decade of the 1960s, there appeared a major division ofAfrican countries into two blocks i.e. the Monrovia and Casablancablocks. The Monrovia block adopted a radical vision of the future,emphasising faster continental political unity, self-reliance and equity, andadhering to socialism as its main path to development. The Casablancablock, on the other hand, had a less radical vision of the future that ignoredissues of equity and self-reliance, but emphasised nation building and alaissez faire and open market path.During the 1970s decade, the fierce Cold War going on in the worldseriously affected African countries, many of which were forced to takesides in the ideological battle. While in the 1970s, African countries werenot organised into or associated with the Monrovia and Casablanca blocksas in the 1960s, they were nevertheless, deeply divided between those thatwere Socialist, Marxist or Capitalist. The Socialist countries, such asTanzania, were heavily influenced by the Social Democratic vision ofScandinavian countries while the Marxist and Capitalist countries wereeffectively influenced by the Soviet and Western American-led visions ofdevelopment respectively.

4 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13Africa’s Economic Performance: 1960 – 1975In 1975, the ECA undertook a four year detailed study of Africa’seconomic performance during the 1960-1975 period. Although Africa’sperformance during this period did not meet the targets set by the UNSecond Development Decade, Africa as a whole performed well andcertainly better than in the subsequent 25 years from 1975 to 2000.During the 1960-75 period, Africa’s GDP growth rate averaged 4.5%, itsexport growth rate 2.8%, its agricultural growth rate 1.6%, and itsmanufacturing growth rate 6%. 1 According to Adedeji (2002, p.6): “Inretrospect, the period 1960-75 has, tragically, turned out to be Africa’sgolden era!”.By the end of the 1970s and despite reasonable economic performancefrom 1960 to 1975, there were clear signs that Africa was facing a seriouseconomic crisis. “What is clear to most observers, however, is that thestrong optimism of the 60s concerning economic development, slowly gaveway, first to hesitation, then to pessimism and by the end of the 70s, to aconsensus of gloom” (Bujra, A. 1982, P.II). 2Late in the 1970s, Adedeji (1978) had begun to make his gloomypredictions about Africa’s economic prospects – predictions that haveproved to be very accurate. “Africa, more than other Third WorldRegions, is thus faced with a development crisis of great portent. If pasttrends were to persist… the African region as a whole will be worse offrelative to the rest of the world at the end of this century than it was in1960”. 3And three years later, the World Bank (1981) was making similarpredictions. Africa, the WB stated, was facing dim economic prospects inthe 1980s – virtually no growth in per capita income, if you are anoptimist, and a negative rate of growth (-1.0% per year) if you are not. 41 Adedeji, A. 2002. From the Lagos Plan of Action to NEPAD and from the Final Act ofLagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither Africa? Keynote Address, African Forum forEnvisioning Africa. Nairobi, April 26-29.2 Bujra, A. 1982. Editorial Note, p. ii. Africa Development, v. vii, no.1/2.3 Adedeji, A. 1978. Africa and the Development Crises. In: Africa Guide, p.25.4 World Bank. 1981. World Development Report (NY OUP). Table I.I

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 5It was under these circumstances that Africa came up with its second andvery important initiative for an alternative vision of development.2.3 The Second OAU VisionAccording to the ECA, African Governments had three options for facingthe anticipated crises. First, to increase self reliance and self-sustainmentand more effective measures for intra-African cooperation and mutualhelp. These measures “would require vision and statesmanship quite outof the ordinary. Another option would take the form of a surreptitioussurrender of the economy in return for substantial foreign aid, atemptation which might be impossible to resist. A third option would be towait and see and hope whilst continuing with conventional measureswhich avoid creating antagonism” (ECA 1979-1980, p.6). 5The OAU, in collaboration with the UNECA, mobilised Africanintellectual and political resources to discuss the crisis and availableoptions and came up with a vision and a plan of action for getting Africaout of the crises. This serious effort led to the now famous MonroviaDeclaration (1979) which articulated Africa’s vision of its future, thestrategies of which were incorporated in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)and the Final Act of Lagos (1980). These three documents contained: (a)the most clearly articulated vision of Africa’s future, (b) a practical plan ofaction on how to achieve faster development in line with that vision, and(c) political decisions supporting the vision and plan of action, as well asstrategies for achieving effective economic cooperation and integration.The Monrovia Declaration (1979)It provided the vision and scenario of Africa’s future. The Africa of2000/2020 was to “have a high degree of self sufficiency, a democraticnational development which will distribute the fruits of our efforts moreequitably, will have a strong African solidarity and that Africa will carrymore weight in world affairs” (OAU 1979, p.30) 6 .5 ECA, 1981. Biannual Report of the Executive Secretary, 1979-1980.6 OAU 1979. What Kind of Africa in the Year 2002? Addis Ababa

6 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13The Lagos Plan of Action (1980)The LPA provided the framework and strategies for implementingdevelopment programmes. It based its strategies on some importantprinciples to lead to an alternative form of development and to take Africaout of its crises. These principles relied on:1. Self reliance as the basis of development – at the national, subregionaland regional levels;2. Equity in the distribution of wealth at the national level as afundamental objective of development;3. Expansion of the public sector as an essential element ofdevelopment;4. Direction of external capital (viewed as an unavoidable necessity) tothose areas where African capital was most lacking or inadequate –such as mining, energy and large scale projects;5. Inter-African economic cooperation and integration to be effected assoon as possible;6. Africa’s continued fight for a NIEO (New International EconomicOrder) since change in the international economic order to favourAfrican and Third World countries was essential.Based on these principles, the LPA gave primacy to the development ofAgriculture (first for food and then for export), Industrialisation (to satisfybasic needs), Mining Industries (to recover total and permanentsovereignty over national resources and establish mineral basedindustries), Human Resources, Science and Technology.These principles and the detailed programme of the LPA were discussedextensively by African Governments and Intellectuals. The latter weregenerally critical of the details in the plan, but strongly supported the basicprinciples behind the LPA. 7The Final Act of Lagos (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1991)The Heads of States and Governments of the OAU passed the specialFinal Act of Lagos, aimed at achieving an African Common Market by theyear 2000. The issue of economic cooperation and integration was so7 Bujra, A (ed.). Editorial P.I to VI. Africa Development, A Quarterly Journal ofCODESRIA, Vol. VII, No. 1/2, 1982. A Special Number on the LPA.

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 7important to the Governments that they felt the need to pass a special andseparate Act. It was argued that without economic cooperation andeventual integration of the generally small national economies of Africa, itwould be impossible to achieve any meaningful alternative developmentas a way out of the crises. More importantly, without such cooperation andintegration, Africa will not be strong enough to bring about any change,however small, in the existing international economic order. And such achange was crucial if Africa was to have any meaningful space to embarkon an alternative form of development and overcome its crises.The importance given to economic cooperation and integration led Africanleaders to transform, within ten years, the Final Act of Lagos to the AbujaTreaty establishing the African Economic Community in 1991. The treatylaid down in detail the process of achieving the Economic Community insuccessive stages over a period of 34 years. The Treaty clearly states thatit takes into consideration the Monrovia Declaration, the LPA and theFinal Act of Lagos. More importantly, in conducting inter-state relations,it affirmed adherence to the earlier principles enshrined in the LPA, someof which were listed as:-‣ Equality and inter-dependence of Member States‣ Solidarity and collective self-reliance‣ Inter-state cooperation‣ Peaceful settlement of disputes‣ Recognition, promotion and protection of human and people’s rights‣ Accountability, economic justice and popular participation indevelopment. 8Clearly, the LPA provided the inspiration of all future African visions andinitiatives, until NEPAD.2.4 The Third OAU VisionThe 1980s decade has been described as the lost decade because Africawas going through very serious economic and political crises – negativegrowth, dismal economies, civil wars, collapsing states and state structuresetc. And, as we will see below, the International Community became veryconcerned with the unending crises that led to a belief that came to be8 OAU 1991. Treaty Establishing The African Economic Community, Abuja, Nigeria, June1991.

8 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13called Afro-Pessimism. Implicit in Afro-Pessimism was the core idea thatthe African people – their societies, cultures, mindsets and structures –were incapable of running their states and their economies and, therefore,were doomed to remain in a permanent state of crisis – stagnation anddecline.Afro-Pessimism was born outside Africa and was propagated both outsideand inside Africa, by those with vested interests in Africa remaining weakand disorganised for a long time. The Africans, however, generally had adifferent view of their crisis – its causes, its continuation and the way outof it. While most Africans acknowledged that there were internal factorsthat had contributed to their crisis and even its maintenance, theynevertheless put more emphasis on the external origin of their crisis andparticularly their inability to get out of it. They argued that:(a) Colonialism had created the basic conditions of the crises –dependent economies, distorted structures, artificialboundaries/countries, divided people, undeveloped human resourcesweak and undemocratic state structures.(b) International commodity markets, financial systems, the dominantrole of the Western TNCs (Trans-National Corporations) and thefive monopolies enjoyed by the West (Amin, S. 1995, p.47) 9 were,and still are, extremely formidable barriers which weak Africangovernments – individually or collectively – were and are unable toovercome.(c) Given these conditions, the international system continuouslyreinforced African countries’ economic dependence by maintainingtheir distorted structures and encouraging the chaotic politicalsystems inherited from the colonial states. As a result, Africancountries found it very difficult to economically develop, createnation states and use their human and natural resources.(d) The direct intervention of the Bretton Woods institutions andDonors in African economies through SAPs, ostensibly to helpAfricans overcome their crises, simply perpetuated the unequal andexploitative relationship between Africa and the global system.9 Amin, S. 1995. Africa and the Global System. In: Bujra, Abdalla (Guest Editor) AfricanDevelopment Review (ADB), A Special Number on Africa and the Future, December 1995.

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 9Given this general African perspective of their crises, they invariablycame up with initiatives, which started with basic strategies and appealedto change this unequal and harmful relationship. And the new approach toan alternative form of development was clearly enunciated in the LPA’sbasic principles of development (see above).Thus, since 1980, all African initiatives (from the OAU up to 1990),accepted the vision, framework, strategies and principles enshrined in theLPA. And to repeat, the vision behind the LPA and the Final Act, wasarticulated in the Monrovia Declaration (see above).OAU: Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990(Addis Ababa, July 1985)When in 1985, the OAU came up with its Africa’s Priority Programmefor Economic Recovery, 1986-1990, it clearly stated that “Whilereiterating our full commitment to the principles and objectives of theLagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos which are more validtoday than ever, we have focussed… on a five year programme whichconsisted of:‣ Measures for an accelerated implementation of the LPA and theFinal Act of Lagos;‣ Special action for improvement of the food situation andrehabilitation of agriculture were emphasis to be an overcomingdrought;‣ Measures to alleviate Africa’s external debt;‣ Measures for a common platform for action at sub-regional,regional, continental and international levels; and measures foraction against the effects of the destabilisation policy of SouthAfrica on the economies of Southern African States”.It is to be noted that there is no mention of FDI (Foreign DirectInvestment) at all in the above document although the issue of aid isclearly discussed and gratitude expressed to Donors and the UN System.This document, which was passed by the Assembly of Heads of States andGovernments of the OAU in July 1985, clearly blames the externalenvironment in the shape of the debt burden and the apartheid governmentof South Africa for the crises in Africa, as evidenced in the followingquote:

10 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13The dramatic increase in the volume of Africa’s external debt andthe heavy debt burden is another source of our profoundconcern….We are aware of the fact that shortcomings in development policieshave contributed to the present debt crises. However, it is evidentthat the major causes of our country’s debt servicing problems areexternal ones and such causes are unfortunately beyond ourcontrol. These include, inter alia, the deteriorating terms of tradeand the consequent reduction in export earnings for debt servicing,the unprecedented rise in interest rates, sharp exchange ratefluctuations, deteriorating terms of borrowing and the reduction inthe flow of concessional resources, the combined effects of whichresulted in net capital outflow from most of our Member States. Inthis regard the 26 African LDCs have been most seriously affected(OAU, 1985.p.5). 10Incidentally, Africa’s Priority Programme of 1985 was discussed andapproved by the UN General Assembly in 1986 and was renamed the UN-PAAERD (United Nations Programme of Action for African EconomicRecovery and Development, 1986-1990).The African Alternative Framework to Structural AdjustmentProgramme for Socio-Economic Transformation (AAF-SAP) – UNECA(Addis Ababa, 1989)The lost decade of the 1980s was marked with two fundamentalcharacteristics. Firstly, widespread economic and political crises in almostall African countries. Secondly, strong intervention by the Bretton Woodsinstitutions with the now discredited Structural Adjustment Programmes(SAPs). These SAPs were forced on African governments, with the aim ofrestructuring Africa’s economies. Strong armed tactics were used by theWB/IMF to force African governments to accept the SAPs. The Africanpeople were, of course, not consulted and the implementation of SAPsinflicted serious economic disruptions and caused extensive immiserationof the African people. There was considerable opposition to SAPs from10 OAU Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990. Published byFAO, 1985.

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 11the African people and intellectuals, as is aptly described in the followingECA’s AAF-SAP quote:Of course, as we look back at the 1980s, very few of us can doubtthat we were, in one way or another, affected by SAPs that many ofour countries have been pursuing. In some cases, the impact ofsuch programmes has led to riots because of the tremendoussuffering they imposed on the people: loss of jobs, reduction insocial services, impossible increases in prices, generalised povertyand the constant threat of destabilising society as a whole. Indeed,these programmes continue to be formulated and implemented as ifpeople do not matter. (ECA, AAF-SAP, p.v).The UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa), underprofessor Adedeji and acting more like an economic commission of theOAU rather than of the UN, reacted to the generalised African crises andthe very widespread criticism and attack on SAPs, by producing a detaileddocument arguing for an Alternative Framework for Development. Thisalternative to SAPs took the Bretton Woods programme point by point,countering these with alternative policies, which, it was argued, wouldtake Africa out of its present crisis. The central issue in this document,was not only that the Alternative Framework and policies were to be veryrelevant to the African situation, but that SAPs were essentiallyperpetuating the African crisis by forcing a linkage of weak crisis riddenAfrican countries to the powerful global system, on terms which gave totaladvantage and dominance to the global system and nothing to Africancountries.Needless to say that the AAF-SAP was strongly opposed, and oftenroundly condemned, by experts of the WB/IMF, as well as the donorcommunity in general. A popular version of the AAF-SAP was produced(first printing was 20,000 copies). Despite this effort and the strongsupport the document received from both African governments andintellectuals, the AAF-SAP was marginalized and eventually followed thefate of previous African initiatives.The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development andTransformation (Arusha 1990)As the Title of the Charter implies, its basic objective is thedemocratisation of the development process in order to enable people’s

12 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13participation in the production process. The Charter came out of anInternational Conference organised by the ECA and was later adopted bythe OAU.The Charter calls for the emergence of a new era in Africa – anAfrica in which democracy, accountability, economic justice anddevelopment for transformation become internalised and theempowerment of the people, initiative, enterprise and thedemocratisation of the development process are the order of theday in every country. It delineates the actions that are required byall concerned – the people and their organisations, governments,African and non-African NGOs and the international community –to achieve the aforesaid objectives and also proposes national andregional mechanisms to monitor and report on the progress madein the implementation of the Charter. (Charter, Arusha 1990, p.1and 2). 11The core objective of the Charter was to inject a different approach indevelopment thinking revolving around the idea that the actualparticipation of the people in the development and production processes,would bring about quicker economic growth, economic justice and generaldevelopment. However, this could only be done and actualised if therewas genuine democracy at all levels – at the grass roots, at the level ofvarious organisations, enterprises and governments.The Charter (the conference of which was organised by Adedeji, thenExecutive Secretary of the ECA and the driving force behind the AAF-SAP) continued the fight started by AAF-SAP against the Bretton Woodsapproach to development through SAPs. The Charter was taking up apolitical issue with the WB/IMF and their SAPs, the argument of theCharter being firstly, that the economic framework being forced onAfrican governments was undemocratic and did not allow people toparticipate in the economic and development processes. In fact, underSAPs and their conditionalities, organised labour and professionalassociations were being systematically destroyed, so that labour would nothave the power to negotiate with owners of enterprises. This was anessential demand and condition of foreign investors.11 African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation:Arusha, 1990.

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 13Secondly, the manner in which the economic reforms were forced onAfrican governments was extremely undemocratic. Hence, the Charterinsisted on the democratisation of the development and productionprocesses by enabling the people to participate, a direction contrary to theBretton Woods philosophy of development and its programme ofeconomic reform. The Charter, therefore, logically argued that thedemocratisation of development and production processes was analternative approach, more likely to take African countries out of theirpresent crisis than SAPs.2.5 The Fourth OAU VisionThe OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation inAfrica and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (AddisAbaba, 1990)This was an important Declaration that also reacted to the continuouscrises facing African countries. The Declaration clearly articulated OAU’sviews on the changing nature of the international environment and theposition of Africa in this environment. The OAU Heads of States andgovernments were seriously concerned with the negative impact of theinternational system on African countries. Like previous OAUDeclarations and Initiatives, this 1990 Declaration argued that the maincause of the deepening African crisis lay in the way Africa related to theinternational system – a relationship totally detrimental to Africa. Theconcerns of the OAU were about two related aspects of the African crisis:(a) deteriorating African economies,(b) the increasing number of internal conflicts – particularly armedconflicts and civil wars.The declaration pointed out that “throughout the decade of the1980s, most of our productive and infrastructural facilitiescontinued to deteriorate. The per capita income of our people felldrastically…. There has been a sharp decline in the quality of lifein our countries ... And this contrasted sharply with the alarmingrise in Africa’s external debt…which shot up from about US$50billion in 1980 to about US$257 billion by the end of 1989”.

14 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13The intervention of the WB/IMF with their SAPs raised alarm bellswith the OAU. “Most of our countries have entered into SAPs withthe international financial and monetary institutions, mostly atheavy political and social costs..We are very much concerned.there is an increasing tendency to impose conditionalities of apolitical nature for assistance to Africa” (OAU Declaration 1990,p.2) 12 .The Declaration stated clearly the determination of Africangovernments to pursue development on the basis of “self-reliant,human-centered and sustainable approaches based on socialjustice and collective self reliance to achieve acceleratedstructural transformation of our economies”.Furthermore, the governments were “determined to rationalise theexisting economic groupings in our Continent in order to increasetheir effectiveness in promoting economic integration andestablishing an African Economic Community... These wereobjectives set in the LPA in 1980. We reaffirm their continuedvalidity, as well as the fundamental principles of the LPA andAfrica’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER),including the sectoral priorities contained in them, in particular,the urgent need to attain self-sufficiency in food production, topromote science and technology for development and to establish aviable industrial base on the Continent. In this connection, wecommit ourselves to the pursuit of sound population andenvironmental policies conducive to economic growth anddevelopment of our Continent”(Declaration, 1990, p.3).It is important to note here that both the objectives and sectoral prioritiesof the Declaration were very different from those of SAPs.In addition to these strong statements on the nature of the Africaneconomic crisis and the role of the Bretton Woods institutions in theperpetuation of the crisis, the OAU’s Heads of States made two importantdecisions on internal political issues, which were of great concern in the12 OAU. 1990. Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of theOAU on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the FundamentalChanges Taking Place in the World, Addis Ababa, July 1990.

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 15Continent – namely, resolving all types of conflicts and supportingdemocracy. These decisions were stated as follows: -1. We …renew our determination to work together towards thepeaceful and speedy resolutions of all the conflicts in ourcontinent.2. We…assert that democracy and development should gotogether and should be mutually reinforcing. It is necessary topromote popular participation of our people in the process ofgovernment and development.Thus, without changing the OAU Charter, the Heads of States andGovernments, for the first time, extended the scope of the OAU tointervene in internal conflicts of member states.Secondly, the OAU declared a commitment to democracy, thereby makingfor the first time, a choice on the type of political system preferred by itssovereign member states.The importance of this Declaration lies in the assertion that the OAUneeds to deal with political problems of conflict and democracy as anecessary precondition to progress in economic development. It was afterthis Declaration that the OAU established in 1993, the OAU Mechanismfor Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Almost all theconflicts that the OAU came to deal with were internal conflicts withinmember states – a departure from previous practice of dealing only withinter-state conflicts.Despite this Declaration and the establishment of the Mechanism toresolve conflicts, conflicts continued to spring and the economies of mostAfrican countries continued to deteriorate in the 1990s. Hence, the OAUcame up with another Initiative.2.6 The Fifth OAU VisionThe OAU’s Relaunching of Africa’s Economic and Social Development:The Cairo Agenda for Action (OAU 1995)In 1995, the OAU Heads of States and Governments met in Cairo in anExtraordinary Session, to seriously review, analyse and reassess the root

16 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13causes of economic and social problems in Africa. This was with a view torecommending remedial measures and lasting solutions to be taken byAfrican governments and peoples, with the support of the internationalcommunity.The Meeting, however, noted that for many years, the OAU had adoptedmany plans, strategies and programmes for the development of thecountries, individually and collectively. “Unfortunately these plans werenot adequately implemented by the majority of the countries…”.The Meeting, therefore, called on African countries to rectify this situationby acting on three fronts. Firstly, considering the people as the centre andobject of development. Secondly, by governments ensuring theinvolvement of the people in the conception, implementation andmonitoring of development plans, programmes and projects. Thirdly, bypaying special attention to the full involvement of women in the social andeconomic development efforts.Overall, there was a general feeling that these actions would lift Africa outof its crises, as is suggested in the following quote:“Africa is a resilientcontinent and is a continent in transition. It has immense human resources.With a strong will, more determination, planning and vision, we can makeAfrica the economic power that it ought to be”.And while the Meeting reaffirmed OAU’s commitment to the LPA, itadopted the Cairo Agenda for Action for Relaunching Africa’s Economicand Social Development which recommended:(a) The achievement of democracy, governance, peace, security,stability and sustainable development through promotion ofnational unity, good governance, a policy of regionalisation anddecentralisation, clarification of the role of government and theprivate sector in development, eradication of the causes ofdisplacement of persons, and maximum political and financialsupport of the OAU Mechanism for conflict Resolution;(b) Food Security;(c) Capacity Building and Human Resources Development;(d) Structural Transformation of African Economies – once againreaffirming very different strategies and policies from SAPs;

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 17(e) Effective Mobilisation and Efficient Utilisation of Resources;(f) Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration.Each of these areas was dealt with in greater detail with importantsuggestions on policy options. Most of the recommended actions and thepolicy options were, with slight variation, similar to those in the 1985Africa Priority Programme and the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980.However, the ECA’s AAF-SAP differed from the other initiatives in that itdiscussed specific policies and their implications as realistic alternatives topolicies then being implemented by SAPs.2.7 The Sixth OAU VisionThe African Union (Sirti 1999, Lusaka 2001) and NEPAD (Lusaka andAbuja 2001)The creation of the African Union in Sirte (Libya) in 1999 and theadoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union in Lome (July2000) 13 was an important milestone in the process of creating politicalcontinental unity and the African Economic Community. It was a majorachievement of the African leaders and a triumph for Pan-Africanism.Amongst the new principles of the African Union (AU) were: the right ofthe Union to intervene in matters relating to democratic principles, humanrights and good governance, promotion of social justice and genderequality in member states. The development focus of the AU were similarto those of the LPA.NEPAD was a merger of the Millennium Partnership for Africa’sRecovery Programme (MPA) and the Omega Plan which gave birth to theNew Africa Initiative (NAI). The NAI was approved by the OAU Summitof Heads of States and Governments in Lusaka, in July 2001 and was thenedited so that its policy framework was finalised by the Heads of StateImplementation Committee became NEPAD.NEPAD’s goals are to promote accelerated development, eradicatepoverty and halt the marginalisation of Africa in the global process.NEPAD claims to be:13 OAU, Constitutive Act of the African Union, Addis Ababa, July 2001.

18 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13‣ A holistic integrated strategic framework for the socio-economicdevelopment of Africa;‣ A plan conceived and developed by African leaders;‣ A commitment that African leaders are making to the Africanpeople;‣ A commitment that African leaders are making to accelerate theintegration of the African continent into the global economy;‣ A call to the rest of the world to partner Africa in its owndevelopment.Spokesmen for NEPAD are far from being modest as the followingstatement testifies:Before NEPAD, the African landscape had been littered withfailed initiatives, development plans and programmes of action.Of note were the regional initiatives of the Lagos Plan of Action(early 80s) and the Abuja Treaty establishing the AfricanEconomic Community (early 90s). For a variety of reasons,including lack of capacity, lack of political will, outsideinterference and lack of resources, these past initiatives wereunsuccessful. However, fortuitous convergence of circumstances,both within and outside the continent, has created theopportunity for the latest initiative 14 .Given the fact that the document of this quotation aimed at explainingNEPAD to a large and distinguished African gathering at the AfricanDevelopment Forum in Addis Ababa on March 7, 2002, it was ratheroverstating the possibility of NEPAD succeeding where others had failed.And this, without so much as explaining what the fortuitous convergenceof circumstances was which was to make NEPAD succeed where othershad failed. It is then not surprising that NEPAD is drawing criticisms,especially from Civil Society Groups.Adedeji points out that NEPAD does not make any mention of the AUConstitutive Act, just as the AU Act makes no mention of NEPAD. Yet,both the Act and NEPAD have similar development focus.14 Aluko-Olokun, I. (Amb.). 2002. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development. Head,Nigeria NEPAD Team, Addis Ababa, March 2002.

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 19Are both intended to work along parallel lines? Theimpression is given, perhaps inadvertently, that although theAU is the supreme body – having replaced the OAU – NEPADis special and is not to be integrated into the AU. It has its ownorgans which are quite different from those of the AU…. Howwill the NEPAD Implementation Committee of Heads of Statesrelate to the AU Executive Council? Will the NEPADSecretariat now being set up, not in Addis Ababa but inPretoria, remain a separate and independent entity? Will it beabsorbed by the Commission of the Union? There are indeedmany substantive issues where reconciliation and clarity isneeded in the relationship between the AU and NEPAD(Adedeji, Nairobi, April 2002) 15 .Apart from its status vis-à-vis the AU and Constitute Act, NEPAD hasbeen criticised on more substantial grounds. African scholars meeting inAccra in April 2002, stated the following in their Declaration:The most fundamental flaws of NEPAD which reproduces thecentral elements of the World Bank’s Can Africa Claim the 21 stCentury? and the ECA’s Compact for African Recovery include:(a) The neo-liberal policy framework at the heart of the plan, whichrepeats the structural adjustment policy packages of the precedingtwo decades and overlooks the disastrous effects of those policies;(b) The fact that, in spite of its proclaimed recognition of the centralrole of the African people to the plan, the African people have notplayed any part in the conception, design and formulation of theNEPAD;(c) Notwithstanding its stated concerns for social and gender equity,it adopts social and economic measures that have contributed tothe marginalisation of women;(d) That, in spite of claims of African origin, its main targets areforeign donors, particularly in the G8;15 Adedeji, A. 2002. From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for AfricanDevelopment and from the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Whither Africa?Keynote Address to the Conference on African Forum for Envisioning Africa ‘Focus onNEPAD’, Nairobi, April 2002.

20 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13(e) Its vision of democracy is defined by the needs of creating afunctional market;(f) It under-emphasises the external conditions fundamental toAfrica’s development crisis, thereby not offering any meaningfulmeasure to manage and restrict the effects of this environment onAfrica’s development efforts. On the contrary, the engagementthat it seeks with institutions and processes like the World Bank,the IMF, the WTO, the United States’ Africa Growth andOpportunity Act (AGOA) and the Cotonou Agreement will furtherlock African economies disadvantageously into this environment;(g) The means for mobilisation of resources will further thedisintegration of African economies witnessed as a result ofstructural adjustment and WTO rules.And the African scholars having made such a substantive critique ofNEPAD, proceed to list strategies and policies which need to be pursuedby African Governments in place of those suggested by NEPAD. Whatthese scholars are calling for is essentially contrary to the fundamentalphilosophy and assumption behind NEPAD, and includes, for example:(i)With regard to the external environment, stabilisation ofcommodity prices, reform of the international financial system(to prevent debt, exchange rate instability and capital flowvolatility), as well as of the WB and IMF, an end to IMF/WBstructural adjustment, fundamental changes in the existingagreements of the WTO regime, etc.(ii) At the local, national and sub-regional levels, developmentpolicy must promote, protect and support agriculture, industryand services, including health and public education – throughtrade, investment and macro-economic policy measures. Afinancing strategy must seek to mobilise and build on internaland intra-African resources through imaginative savingsmeasures, reallocation of expenditures away from wasteful andunproductive areas such as military expenditure and corruption.(iii) These measures require, above all, the reconstitution of thedevelopmental state: a state for which social equity, social

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 21inclusion, national unity and respect for human rights form thebasis of economic policy 16 .It is clear that the African scholars were not only critical of NEPAD buthad definite alternative ideas (such as those mentioned above and otherswhich have not been listed). And these ideas are a repeat of those in theLPA, some twenty years after its first articulation and by a youngergeneration of African scholars. Ironically, many of the younger scholarswho attended the Accra Conference and came up with the abovedeclaration may not even have seen the Lagos Plan of Action!3. The External Visions3.1. Colonial Visions at IndependenceSince the colonisation of the continent, externals have had the upper handin all matters to do with the economies of African countries. In the firstplace, the colonial powers laid down the modern economic structures ofAfrican countries. At the beginning, half way and towards the end of thecolonial period, African economies were specifically designed to benefitmetropolitan countries. This was irrespective of whether the resource baseof a given African country was mineral resources, agriculture, land to bepopulated by colonial settlers or a combination of any of these resources.The result was the same i.e. an African economy that was outwardoriented to suit the needs of metropolitan countries.At independence, politically independent African countries foundthemselves tied to the metropolitan economies and the internationaleconomic system which former colonial powers and their allies – westernEuropean countries and North America (USA and Canada) – dominated.This, essentially meant that almost all technologies and industrial productsof all kinds were produced in the Western countries that had a monopolyover these and set prices for African buyers.In addition, the West controlled most of the small industries they hadstarted in African countries, including companies engaged in theexploitation of mineral resources. They controlled commodity markets and16 CODESRIA-TWN Africa Declaration on the Challenges facing Africa, Accra, April2002.

22 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13set the prices for all commodities produced by African economies. Theyfurther controlled the financial system and set interest rates and otherconditions for African borrowing. Finally, the west controlled services e.g.insurance companies, and at the same time, provided the expertise andpersonnel to help African countries with highly underdeveloped humanresources.Needless to say, they advised African governments not to disturb thisestablished economic structure and to continue with the inheritedrelationship with the international economic system. After all, this was the“natural” division of labour in the world and any attempt by Africangovernments to change their economic strategies and policies to reorientthe relationship to their advantage was quickly stopped by variousinstruments Western countries wielded, and still wield.These instruments varied from the manipulation of the financial systemand of commodity prices against African countries to withdrawal oftechnical assistance and investment, and occasionally, direct sanctionsagainst non-conforming countries. In the face of this formidable power,most African countries continued to pursue economic policies anddevelopment in the way established by colonial powers. As noted earlier,by the end of the 1960s, the rapid economic growth initially observed inAfrican countries began to slow down and foreign currency reservesstarted to be exhausted.As the Cold War intensified and the ideological war of converting Africancountries heated up in the 1970s, externals increased in number beyondthe number of former colonial powers. Externals came to include theAmericans (representing the West), the Soviet Union (representing theCommunist East), Scandinavian countries (representing European socialdemocracy) and China (representing Third World Communism). All thesepowers played their parts in trying to influence political and economicdevelopment of African countries. And the story of the internal struggleamongst externals for control of African countries, though important, isknown only superficially.What is of interest here is that this serious political and military strugglefor African countries was accompanied by a heated ideological debateover alternative paths to development. The debate was not just confined toCapitalism and Marxism, but included several new ideas on possibilitiesof development in Third World countries. These different developmentpaths included those advocated by the Dependency School of Latin

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 23America and those based on the Scandinavian Social Democraticexperience, on the Chinese and Cuban experiences, and even on some ofthe woolly ideas behind the UN Development Decades assessments.Added to this mixed pot were calls by African and Arab political leadersfor African and Arab Socialism. In the end, what filtered to the rarefiedatmosphere of the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Governmentswere Declarations, which contained a mild form of socialist ideas and astrong dose of nationalism. These ideas found expression in the support ofstrong public sector role, side by side with the private sector’s; some basicsocial welfare system; self reliance and economic cooperation in order toreduce African countries’ excessive dependence and to strengthen theirbargaining power. These principles were to provide the framework for thestrategies and policies to develop African economies in different sectors,including agriculture, industry, development of human and mineralresources, and science and technology.Thus, by the end of the 1970s, when most African countries were goingthrough serious economic crises, the well-trodden path of economicpolicies intensified after independence became the obvious target of blamebecause it had failed to bring about any development. And when Africangovernments began to seriously think about what to do with the crises, astrong temptation was to (a) reject inherited economic policies and (b)welcome and accept as an alternative, the mixture of mild socialist andnationalist ideas which had a strong presence in intellectual circles andamong some influential political leaders.Hence, the 1979-1980 period saw the mobilisation of African intellectualand political resources to produce three landmark declarations: theMonrovia Declaration (1979), the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and theFinal Act of Lagos (1980). As pointed out earlier, all new initiativesfollowing these critical declarations were made within their framework,except that these simply added details about the nature and causes of theeconomic crises facing Africa and policies to be pursued in order toovercome the crises.3.2 The World Bank’s Berg Report (1981)Externals – mainly Western countries – were rather alarmed by the antiwesternlanguage of the LPA and the radical ideas it proposed. In October1981, the World Bank came out with a report called Accelerated

24 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action 17 which, itclaimed, was prepared at the request of the Bank’s African Governors.This report was clearly meant to bring about an improvement in thepolicies advocated by Western countries in Africa. According to theWorld Bank, if African countries followed the development strategy laidout for them in the Report, they would be able to pull out from the crisesthey had sank into and experience accelerated development. The Report’score strategy for accelerated economic development was for Africangovernments to adopt an export-led growth strategy and to liberaliseforeign trade.The Berg Report, as it came to be known, was definitely a response to theLPA and its aim was to provide an intellectual basis for WB interventionsand the initiation of adjustment programmes for African economies,ostensibly to bring them out of crises and lead them to accelerateddevelopment.According to Bujra (1982), the Berg Report (a) does not address the mostcrucial issues spelt out in the LPA, (b) advocates for increased (foreignand local) investment and a reduced public sector role, this being in directcontrast to the LPA which argues for an expansion of the public sector, (c)it gives scant and peripheral attention to important areas of developmentsuch as industrialisation, control and use of mineral resources, economiccooperation and integration. In fact, the issue of economic co-operation, acentral concern of the LPA, is not mentioned at all in the Berg Report.Despite these shortcomings of the Berg Report, the WB/IMF immediatelywent on with the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes(SAPs) recommended in the Berg Report in many African countries. Itneeds to be pointed out here that the World Bank and IMF were informed,in no uncertain terms, about the inappropriate assumptions lying behindSAPs and their probable negative effects. In 1987 and 1988, the EconomicDevelopment Institute (EDI) of the World Bank organised five seniorpolicy seminars on structural adjustment in Africa which were attended byministers, governors, permanent secretaries, senior advisors and a largenumber of senior technical staff of central banks and core ministries offinance and planning, as well as ministries of agriculture and industry.17 Berg, E. 1981. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, the World Bank:Washington, D.C.

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 25Twenty-seven countries participated in these WB policy seminars, but thestrong criticisms voiced by the African participants of these seminars wereplayed down and expressed in the polite and diplomatic language of theBank in one of its reports (EDI Policy Seminar Report No.18,Washington, D.C. 1989).The quoted report referred to the critique of African participants of theseminars as main observations and lessons emerging from the seminarsand expressed this critique in the following terms: -1. Most participants perceived adjustment programs as imposed fromoutside;2. Adjustment must be seen in a broader context, as involvingmedium and longer –term policies, in addition to immediate(stabilization) measures;3. Basic Social services must be protected;4. Current adjustment programs have yet to successfully reconciledemand management with supply-enhancing measures;5. The promotion of sub-regional or regional trade and thecoordination of development plans and strategies – a mainobjective of the LPA – have not received the attention theydeserve;6. Significant social costs are involved in adjustment programmes;7. To be sustainable, adjustment programmes must be nationallydesigned and/or be designed to fit local conditions;8. For many reasons, including the weak bargaining powers ofAfrican governments and their lack of indigenous capacity forpolicy formulation, international organizations have stepped in tocurrently set the agenda for policy reforms in Africa, withunfortunate consequences;9. A long-term strategy based on export-led growth and theliberalization of foreign trade as advocated in the Berg Report hasfew adherents 18 in Africa;10. The current African crisis has, to a considerable degree, its originsin the prevailing international economic environment;18 That the strategy ‘has few adherents’ is acknowledged in the World Bank’s Report byCadman Atta Mills entitled Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa. EDI SeminarReport, Number 18, Washington, D.C. 1989.

26 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 1311. Negotiations can be better handled to reduce tension betweenconditionality and national sovereignty;12. Multilateral institutions should accept greater responsibility forfailed programs 19 .The African critique of SAPs was loud and clear from the beginning i.e.since SAPs were introduced in the early 1980s. That the WB came outwith these criticisms openly by 1988 meant it had known about themmuch earlier. Yet, despite such prior knowledge, the WB/IMF proceededwith the implementation of SAPs, with only slight technicalmodifications.The adverse and negative impacts of SAPs are now well known, as are thestrong reactions of African officials and intellectuals against SAPs. Themost important formal reaction to SAPs was the ECA’s 1989 AfricanAlternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAPs), already discussed in the context of African Initiatives. Amongstother sharp and serious critiques levelled against SAPs by Africanintellectuals (starting with SAPs genesis in the Berg Report) is ThandikaMkandawire’s book “Our Continent, our Future” (1999).By the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, externals’ perspectivefor African development had become the dominant, if not the onlydirecting principle of development in almost all African countries. Indeedthe practical power of the WB/IMF and the Donor community, oftencollectively referred to as the international community, to intervene anddirect plans, programmes, projects and actual decision making by Africangovernments has become established and accepted in government circlestoday.In the meantime in 1989, the WB came out with another report labelledLong Term Perspective Studies (LTPS) that proposed a global coalition ofDonors and Africans to effectively direct the intellectual framework andstrategies of long-term development in Africa. The Global Coalition forAfrica was thus established and remains an institution that is stilloperating today. In the 1990s, however, the international communitybegan to intensify its coordination at different levels, without theparticipation of Africans. The WB/IMF, the EU, the DAC, individualdonor countries, the Paris and London Clubs etc. started to coordinate and19 Ibid, p. vii and viii.

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 27standardize their strategies and policies with regard to loans, debt, aid,trade, technical assistance etc. They insisted on African governmentsaccepting conditionalities, which turned out to be the revised andelaborated conditionalities of SAPs, with the added political conditionalityof Good Governance, later adopted by the UN System as a whole, butmore particularly by the UNDP.Thus, during the 1990s and the new millennium, African economic andpolitical developments were being diplomatically but firmly guided by the“international community”. At the more formal level of treaties, the EUcontinued with its Lome (now Cotonou) Convention (renewed andrenegotiated every several years) in guiding unequal trade relationsbetween African and EU countries. More recently, the Americans havecome up with their own programme i.e. the Africa Growth andOpportunity Act (AGOA). Interestingly, the British and French (the twolargest and most powerful former colonial powers) have also recentlydecided to synchronise and coordinate their African policies, to the extentthat their African Ambassadors hold joint meetings annually orbiannually.And once again, in the year 2000, the WB in association withinternational community partners, has come up with yet another document– this time appearing in the form of a book – entitled Can Africa Reclaimthe 21 st Century? 20 . This book essentially articulates long-term strategiesof African development, from the perspective of the WB and the rest ofthe Donor community. It is expected to provide the intellectual inspirationfor African policy makers to formulate their development strategies.And indeed, according to the recent CODESRIA-TWN Africa ConferenceDeclaration 21 , NEPAD, the latest African vision and initiative for AfricanDevelopment, derives its intellectual inspiration and strategies from thisrecently published WB book. Similar arguments and statements, as thoseof the CODESRIA-TWN Africa Conference, were made at anotherconference of African scholars held in Nairobi at about the same time (26-29 April, 2002) 22 .20 World Bank. 2000. Can Africa Reclaim the 21 st Century? Washington, D.C.21 CODESRIA-TWN Africa Conference Declaration on Africa’s Development Challenges,Accra, 26 April 2002.22 African Forum for Envisioning Africa ‘Focus on NEPAD’. Conference Organised by theMazingira Institute, the African Academy of Sciences and the Heinrich Boll Foundation,26-29 April 2002, Nairobi (Kenya).

28 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13As is clear, internal and external visions of African development haveexisted since the early years of independence. These visions have,however, differed fundamentally in terms of the development strategiesthey advocated. And the present dominance of the external vision ofAfrican development simply reflects the reality of Africa’s weakness andthe strength of external powers.4. ConclusionThe first major OAU Initiative on Economic Development started with theMonrovia/LPA in 1979/80. Before then, the OAU was mainly concernedwith inter-state relations and the politics of decolonisation. At this point,two simple questions arise with regard to these initiatives. Firstly, whywere/are OAU Initiatives different from those driven by the externals?And secondly, why do African Heads of States subscribe to radicaldevelopment approaches at the OAU level, but fail to implement these atthe national level? The answers to these questions are complex, but canpartly be found in the following explanations:(i)(ii)During the first 15 years of independence, there was a strongpresence of former colonial powers in African countries, be thisin terms of technical personnel, aid and strong political tiesbetween former colonial governments and the African politicalleadership. The influence of the metropolitan governments ontheir former colonies and their economic policies wasessentially direct. By the end of the 1970s, as Africa was facinga serious economic crisis, the direct influence of former colonialpowers began to weaken, or rather to change form.In the 1960s, African economies were doing quite well. Theygenerally had relatively plentiful foreign currency reserves andthe emerging class of African businessmen accumulating wealththrough the state institutions was very optimistic about thefuture. This emerging class favoured the pursuance of policiesrecommended by colonial advisors and the continuity ofeconomic structures that prevailed under previous colonial rule,without any radical change. Where some African governmentstried to adopt some radical approach to development and tochange the existing economic structure through nationalisationand diversification of external economic links, there was

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 29immediate and strong media reaction, diplomatic isolation andeconomic pressure to halt such “move to the left” which wasessentially perceived as economically disruptive. Such reactionwas witnessed in Tanzania, Guinea Conakry, Ghana (underNkrumah), Congo Kinshasa (under Lumumba), Benin, Somaliaand Uganda (under Obote I).(iii) The second half of the 1970s saw the economic crisisintensifying all over the African continent. There were seriousrumblings among the population and especially the military. Inmany countries, the military took power and this led to aworsening of the economic and political situation. In responseto this, the OAU began to take up economic development aspart of its mandate and soon initiated discussion ondevelopment issues. Similarly, the UNECA began to be moreactive than before in tackling development issues. As mentionedin earlier sections of this paper, these changes took place in thecontext of the strong ideological debate of the 1970s regardingalternative paths of development for Africa. The OAU’slanguage and perspective absorbed some basic ideas of theongoing debate, which tended to reinforce strong feelings ofcontinental nationalism, at the root of the OAU’s very existence,and leaned towards alternatives to existing developmentapproaches. African political leaders themselves found it easierto accept such alternative approaches to development becausethey saw on the ground, in their own countries, the drawbacksof approaches inherited from former colonial powers.(iv) Yet, at country level, most political leaders found it extremelyhard to debunk or reject prevailing economic policies because(a) the cost of disruption resulting from such change was toogreat, (b) the power of the emerging African economic elitewithin the existing political and administrative structures wastoo strong and favoured continuity of previous policies,including rent seeking behaviour and artificial shortages fromwhich some elite groups gained economically, and (c) the powerand influence of the externals was also very strong and, alliedwith some local groups, threatened to disrupt the economies ofAfrican countries in the event continuity was questioned. As aresult, it was easier for Heads of States to continue with theinherited economic policies and strategies at the country level

30 DPMF Occasional Paper No. 13while, at the same time, endorsing radical alternative economicstrategies and policies at the OAU level. Schizophrenia becamea standard political behaviour among African political leaders, abreakdown occurring between OAU resolutions, with distinctpan-African leanings, and actions taken at country level. In thisrespect, the following statement by Prime Minister MelesZenawi is quite apt:“African states have been given names such asneopatrimonial, prebential, vampire and various otherexotic names. The underlying fact is that African states aresystems of patronage and are closely associated with rentseekingactivities. Their external relationship is designedto generate funds that oil this network of patronage. Theirtrading system is designed to collect revenue to oil thesystem. Much of the productive activity is mired in asystem of irrational licenses and protection that isdesigned to augment the possibilities of rent collection.Much of the private sector in the continent is an active andcentral element of this network of patronage and rentseekingactivity’ 23 .(v)Given this situation, the more the crisis deepened in Africa andthe more countries became indebted, the easier it became for theexternals to ensure that the traditional economic strategies andpolicies inherited from the colonial period continued to prevail.Indeed, as the crisis deepened and African countries becameweaker, the externals had a unique opportunity to intervenestrongly at country level and to direct economic strategies andpolicies, often literally managing and administering keyinstitutions in African economies. This was particularly the casein much of the 1980s and some would even argue this continuesto be the case at present – at least in many small countries ofAfrica.(vi) However, this strong interventionist role of the “externals” hadto have an ideological and intellectual basis in the new era. Andthis was provided by the WB and IMF through their various23 Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. 2002. Speech made at the NEPAD Symposium in AddisAbaba, 27 th May 2002. The Ethiopian Herald, June 2.

Abdalla Bujra. Pan-African Visions of Development 31strategic reports (at country level) and major publications onAfrica. These included the Berg Report (1981), the Long TermPerspective Studies (1989), Adjustment in Africa (1994) andmore recently Can Africa Reclaim the 21 st Century? (2000).(vii) At the cost of repetition, it is necessary to point out at this stagethat there is a fundamental difference between all pre-NEPADAfrican Initiatives (especially since the Monrovia/LPA of1979/80) and the NEPAD initiative of 2001/2. All pre-NEPADAfrican initiatives had, at the core of their plans/agendas, thefollowing principles which, needless to say, are absent fromNEPAD:a. Self-reliance as an organising principle of economicand other forms of development;b. Equality as a fundamental principle and goal ofeconomic development;c. A strong role for the public sector;d. The continuous interrogation of the presentinternational economic order and the fight, by variousmethods, for a NIEO;e. Much stronger efforts towards economic co-operationand integration.From the perspective of the externals, the above principles obviouslymake African initiatives radical and ideological i.e. leftist. Moreimportantly, if African countries were to practically follow theseprinciples, their economies would become difficult to exploit and to bringunder the hegemony of external powers driving globalisation. Hence, thestrong opposition of the externals to African initiatives and, since NEPADhas dropped any pretence to following the above principles, it is notsurprising that the G8 have welcomed it with open arms and given it moralsupport so far.Finally, the African people and even the peoples of the externals arenowhere to be seen in this struggle for the development soul of the Africancontinent.

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