brief in opposition to motion to dismiss - Colorado Attorney General

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no recourse to the courts to protect those rights. Defendants posit this argument on subjectmatter jurisdiction and nonjusticiability.As to the former, Defendants confound subject matter jurisdiction and nonjusticiability,failing to recognize the significant difference between the two. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.486, 512 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). The district court and the ColoradoSupreme Court plainly have jurisdiction to construe the state constitution. “Pursuant toColorado Constitution Article VI, section 1, the judicial branch of Colorado government isempowered to construe the constitution’s meaning. . . . [T]he judiciary is the final arbiter of whatthe laws and the constitutions provide. Board of County Comm’rs v. Vail Associates, 19 P.3d1263, 1272 (Colo. 2001) (citations omitted). Indeed, “[o]nly the judicial branch holds theultimate authority to construe the constitution’s meaning.” Washington County Bd. ofEqualization v. Petron Dev. Co., 109 P.3d 146, 149 (Colo. 2005).The Colorado Supreme Court has frequently exercised subject matter jurisdiction overEducation Clause claims. In Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982),the Court affirmed its function “to rule on the constitutionality of our state’s [school finance]system” and interpreted the thorough and uniform provision not to “require that the GeneralAssembly establish a central public school finance system restricting each school district toequal expenditures per student.” Id., 649 P.2d at 1025. The Lujan Court cited several cases inwhich it had previously construed the Education Clause. For example, in Marshall v. SchoolDist. RE #3 Morgan County, 191 Colo. 451, 553 P.2d 784 (1976), the Court held that theEducation Clause does not require school districts to provide students with free books. InFangman v. Moyers, 90 Colo. 308, 8 P.2d 762 (1932), the Court found that the Education Clauseassured the right of a child of a broken family to attend school in the district in which he resided14
with an informal foster family.Therefore, there can be no debate that the courts have subject matter jurisdiction over theconstruction of the Education Clause and may, indeed, must review the constitutionality ofstatutes enacted in its name.B. The Court Should Review the Claims in this ActionThe further question is whether legislation addressing the qualitative guarantee of theEducation Clause in particular is “justiciable.” That is to say: is there some overriding reasonwhy the courts should refrain from performing their traditional role in this particular context?The analytical structure for this inquiry is as follows:In deciding whether a case or controversy is justiciable, two determinations must bemade. We must first ascertain “whether the claim presented and the relief sought are ofthe type which admit of judicial resolution.” [Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-17 (1969).] Second, we must determine whether the controversy presents anonjusticiable “political question”; i.e., a question “the resolution of which should beeschewed by the courts,” Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371, 1378(Colo. 1985), because of the separation of powers doctrine inherent in the ColoradoConstitution, Colorado Common Cause v. Bledsoe, 810 P.2d 201, 205 (Colo. 1991). SeePowell, 395 U.S. at 517.Meyer v. Lamm, 846 P.2d 862, 872 (Colo. 1993).1. Lujan v. State Board of Education Affirms the Court’s Power toConstrue the Education ClauseDefendants cite Lujan for the proposition that quality of education and school finance arepolicy questions beyond the competence of the judiciary. However, the Lujan Court plainly didinterpret the Education Clause and applied its interpretation to the finance system in the contextof the claims before it. The Court did not need to interpret the phrase “thorough and uniform” ina comprehensive manner, and so held only that the mandate is “satisfied if thorough and uniformeducational opportunities are available through state action” and does not require that15
Page 1 and 2: DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OFD
Page 3 and 4: system of public schools throughout
Page 5 and 6: Amendment 23 was not intended to an
Page 7 and 8: evenues they can raise, receive, an
Page 9 and 10: electorate, reacting against the de
Page 11 and 12: State to fund a thorough and unifor
Page 13: People v. District Court, 196 Colo.
Page 17: In his concurring opinion, Justice
Page 20 and 21: Implicit are supportive services: (
Page 22 and 23: if the districts lack sufficient fu
Page 26 and 27: judicial power; that the executive
Page 28 and 29: The general assembly can reprioriti
Page 30 and 31: state auditor and treasurer from is
Page 32 and 33: There is nothing fair or just about
Page 34 and 35: Defendants offer revenues raised in
Page 36 and 37: a state must be deemed commensurate
Page 38 and 39: local over state control of instruc
Page 40: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEI hereby cert

brief in opposition to motion to dismiss - Colorado Attorney General

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