The Uncertain Oracle: Some Intelligence Failures ... - U.S. Army

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and heard didn’t seem any different from whatwe had been seeing and hearing for the past tenyears. The Koreans, up to that point, had donenothing to our ships, while the Russians had harassedthem. The mission looked like it would bequiet and safe. The logic was in the message. Ittook me about as long to approve it as it did toread it.” The proposal worked its way throughsucceeding headquarters. From Commander inChief Pacific (CINCPAC) it went to the DefenseIntelligence Agency where it was bundled withseveral dozen other proposals into 14 to 16 inchesof dense paperwork. An overworked staff officerdid not have time to ask any questions andhe also approved it.So the mission was launched as planned as aminimal risk with no air support, no escort, andthe Pueblo’s pair of inadequate .50 caliber machineguns useless under frozen tarpaulins. Themission was based on a fatal presumption expressedby Captain George L. Cassell, assistantchief of staff for operations at CINCPACFLT, whothought “It didn’t follow that these people [theNorth Koreans], although they were attacking ourpeople across the DMZ, would do anything acrossthe water.”44Tet OffensiveIt was a lousy year for intelligence coups. As1968 began, a message to the Defense IntelligenceAgency from the National Security Agency, alertingthem to the possibility that the North Koreansmight seize the US intelligence ship Pueblo wasmisplaced on a clipboard and lost. It was locatedthree weeks later. Later in the year, after buildingup their troops for seven weeks on the border,the Soviet’s invaded Czechoslovakia, takingthe U.S. by surprise. Then there was the Tet Offensivein Vietnam.During the Tet holiday in Vietnam, a time oftraditional ceasefires during the war, on 31 January1968, the Communist forces launched a majorsurprise offensive, attacking cities, militaryand government targets throughout the country.Simultaneous armed insurrection by South Vietnamesecitizens was a key part of the Communiststrategy. If this succeeded, tens of thousands ofthe southern populace would be added to theirnumbers. But it failed to materialize. As a diversion,the North aimed thrusts along the borderwith South Vietnam, especially the U.S. firebaseat Khe Sanh. These attacks successfully divertedthe allies attention away from their planned Tetattacks nationwide, but at the same time strainedtheir resources.Documents captured in November 1967 includedan order to the People’s Army which read:“Use very strong military attacks in coordinationwith the uprisings of the local population to takeover towns and cities. Troops should flood thelowlands. They should move toward liberatingthe capital city.”45Concentrated attacks on U.S. facilities at DaNang, Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa Air Base, and thelogistical complex at Long Binh, caused initialconfusion but were eventually thrown back byquickly responding American combat units. Thebloody battle at Hue where U.S. Marines weredesperately engaged and the attacks on governmentoffices in Saigon, most dramatically the U.S.Embassy, came as shocks to the already anxiousAmerican psyche. There seemed to be fightingand destruction everywhere. Television setsthroughout the United States magnified this perception.But the allies rallied to stymie the enemy.American firepower was brought to bear.By 21 February, the Communists were withdrawingeverywhere but Hue where they would holdout until the 24th when the Imperial Palace wasrecaptured.There were 4,000 Americans killed orwounded, and between 4,000 and 8,000 casualtiesfor the ARVN. The Communists lost between40,000 and 50,000 killed in action. Their VietCong infrastructure was destroyed. Ironically,Tet was the biggest victory the allies ever gainedover the Communists during the war, but it wasnot recognized as such at the time. Instead, Tetwas seen by American political leadership andthe American people at large as proof that wewere not winning in Vietnam and could be surprisedand hurt by an offensive by an enemy thatmost military intelligence experts were countingout.The Tet Offensive was a turning point in thewar. It produced a staggering recoil in the Americanconsciousness. It was a blow to the political
will on the homefront from which it would neverrecover. From that point on the U.S. policiesshifted toward a reduction of U.S. involvementin the war. President Lyndon Johnson decided afew months later not to seek reelection. Tet wasimmensely successful and owed its success to itssurprise. This was a result that was not foreseenby the planners of Tet. North Vietnamese GeneralTran Do said after the war, “We did notachieve our main objective.... As for making animpact in the United States, it had not been ourintention—but it turned out to be a fortunate result.”46One of the reasons U.S. analysts were surprisedwas the overreach and irrationality of theenemy plan, as it was based on the faulty assumptionthat the South’s citizens would seize this opportunityto join with the Communists to overthrowtheir government.Collection did not fail before Tet. The allieshad a captured order for the attack, tape-recordeddiscussions taken off agents at Qui Nhon, prisonerinterrogations, the unprecedented numberof high priority messages that were interceptedby SIGINT pointing to the attack, and the strongevidence provided by premature attacks in I andII Corps Tactical Zones.Ephraim Kam assigns three levels of reliabilityto intelligence information: Nonreliable or partlyreliable, reliable but controlled [enemy knows weknow and can change plans], and reliablenoncontrolled [evidence that enemy does not knowwe know]. The attack order intercepted severalweeks before the Tet offensive was deemed asunreliable because it was written by someoneoutside the highest levels of the Communist leadership,because it was not specific as to the dateof the attack, and because it was then easily mistakenfor propaganda.47There were at least four accurate reports ofenemy intentions. General Phillip Davidson,Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J-2),briefed General Westmoreland on 13 January thatattacks against Saigon were imminent andWestmoreland responded by strengthening thecity, a move that probably prevented its completeoccupation. But allied attention was drawn to thenorth by the enemy threat at Khe Sanh. On themorning before the attack, General Davidson predictedthat the precipitate attacks against the citiesin I and II Corps foreshadowed similar attacksthroughout the country within 24 hours.Westmoreland heeded this warning but it wastoo late to take any real action to change any defensivedispositions. (The warning itself did notseem extraordinary to most commanders whowere used to receiving everyday information fromMACV headquarters over the telephone. Sincethe troops were on alert as often as they were offalert, this one issued at 1125 hours on 30 Januaryseemed not at all unusual.) The North Vietnamesehad achieved surprise.Because U.S. intelligence analysts did not correctlyput together all the pieces of the puzzle untilhours before the Tet offensive, too late to make adifference, they are credited with an intelligencefailure.James Wirtz analyzes that failure of intelligenceanalysis in light of six empirical questions. “Werethe Americans surprised because they failed to:(1) identify the adversary; (2) estimate the probabilityof attack; (3) determine the type of actioninvolved; (4) identify the location of the attack;(5) predict the timing of the attack; and (6) determinethe motivation behind the initiative?”48Because it was wartime, the question of identifyingthe adversary becomes moot. When at war,it is also likely that an attack will take place, soanalysts assumed that a major offensive was to beexpected. And the type of action involved wasalso easy to figure since the North had no assetsto launch an air, amphibious, naval, airborne ornuclear attack. The attack would be undertakenby ground forces. So the clues to the analysisfailure lay in the where, when and why.U.S. leaders had two choices as to where theenemy blow would fall—urban areas or along theDMZ. They chose the DMZ because, amongother reasons, it coincided with their analogies toDien Bien Phu. U.S. commanders were also moreinclined to see their troops as the biggest threat tothe enemy and to protect their own forces. Becausethey were dug in around Khe Sanh and wellprepared, they would have preferred the attackto strike there. These beliefs were reinforced bySIGINT that indicated a massing of NVA troopsalong the borders.49 So the predispositions of
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The Uncertain Oracle: Some Intelligence Failures ... - U.S. Army

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