Brief History of Army MI - Fort Huachuca - U.S. Army

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAA Brief History of U.S. Army IntelligenceThe American Revolution wasone of the great upsets of history. Asmall colonial force, made upmostly of militia, eventually defeatedthe splendid disciplined ranksof the professional British Army,with a grateful nod to French navalpower. It was a vision that shapedthe American Army over the centuriesto come. The ideas of freedomand democracy would cloak theAmericans in invulnerability. Nolarge standing professional armywould be needed. The Britishexperience had taught America thatregular armies were engines ofoppression. Instead they woulddepend upon their militia. Whendangers reared, determined Americanmales would pull their huntingrifles off the wall and they wouldprevail.This anti-standing-Army attitudewould inhibit the growth of the U.S.Army and retard the development ofprofessionalism in its ranks. But itwould also shape its character, callinginto play in all of its wars the qualitiesof resourcefulness and ingenuity.These characteristics would be especiallyapparent in the field of militaryintelligence, which was forced to reinventitself in every campaign. Whilethe British Army formed a Departmentof Military Knowledge as earlyas 1803 to collect terrain and Order2Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEof Battle information on potentialfoes, no such organization existed inthe U.S. Army until 1885, and thenit was on an insignificant scale.The Revolutionary War, with theappearance of the Continental Armyin 1775, is thought to be the beginningof American military history,even though many of its key participantswere seasoned in the French andIndian War. It was that earlier war onthe North American continent thatgave the American Army its uniquepersonality, its hardy resourcefulness,its frontiersman’s distaste for authority,and its irregular way of fighting,even though it rested solidly on Englishmilitary traditions.The Revolutionary War was oneof generalship, tremendous courageand suffering, and, not surprisingly,military intelligence. Because it wasimpossible to know where one’s sympathieslie, it was also difficult toknow whom to trust. Spies were everywhereon both sides. GeneralGeorge Washington relied heavilyupon the use of spies and his ledgersshow that he spent $17,000 on hisnetwork of paid informants. To safeguardsecurity, Washington wouldnot reveal the identity of these menand this secrecy became the subject ofthe novel The Spies by James FenimoreCooper.The year 1776 appears on theArmy’s military intelligence emblem,a reference to the formation ofKnowlton’s Rangers as a recon andintelligence unit during the AmericanRevolution. Realizing how blind hewas to the British movements aroundNew York, General George Washingtoninstructed Lt. Col. ThomasKnowlton, another experienced veteranof the French-Indian war, tohandpick a company of volunteers toscout British positions and gather intelligenceon their movements andintentions.It was from the ranks ofKnowlton’s Rangers that CaptainNathan Hale stepped to undertake anespionage mission, one that wouldultimately result in his capture andpresent him the opportunity to declarewhile standing on the Britishgallows, “I regret that I have but onelive to give for my country.”No lesser fate was handed downto Knowlton and his Rangers. Theintrepid colonel had been killed in actionon 16 September and his companywas decimated in the battle. Thiswas not an auspicious beginning forU.S. Army intelligence. But therewould be some important triumphsin the months and years to come, aswell as some unforgivable tragedies.Major Benjamin Tallmadge, a Yaleclassmate of Captain Nathan Haleand an officer in the Second ConnecticutDragoons, was a veteran of somehard fighting at Long Island, WhitePlains, Brandywine, Germantownand Monmouth. The former Connecticuthigh school superintendentwould be charged with superintendinga network of spies in and aroundhis native Long Island. Tallmadge alsohad a hand in counterintelligence efforts,exploiting the capture of theBritish operative Major John Andrewhich led to the exposure of BenedictArnold as a turncoat and spy.The Culper Ring was the bestknown net run by Tallmadge, withample direction and advice from GeneralWashington. In this role he wasseen as a proto-G2, serving the commander.But, as several historians ofthis period are quick to point out,Washington acted as his own intelligenceofficer, never relinquishing controlof intelligence operations and alwaysplacing the gathering of informationabout the enemy uppermostin his command priorities.Washington was not only aspymaster but a master of deceptionoperations, the most striking of whichwas the battle of Yorktown where theBritish were frozen in their vulnerablepositions by an ingenious campaignof misinformation. The AmericanRevolution was a laboratory for rudimentaryintelligence gathering and itwas given form and purpose by theCommander in Chief of the Americanforces himself. General Washingtonis eminently quotable on the subjectof the importance of good intelligence.However, for all of Washington’semphasis on intelligence in the newbornAmerican Army, after the war’send in 1783 no intelligence organizationhad been institutionalized andthat discipline would be largely ignoredover the next century.The explorations of men likeCaptain Meriweather Lewis and SecondLieutenant William Clark in1804 up the Missouri River and thereconnaissance of First LieutenantZebulon M. Pike into Colorado andNew Mexico in 1806 can rightly beseen as intelligence operations as theirobject was the acquisition of informationabout unknown terrain. Butthey were peacetime efforts by adventuroussoldiers.It would take the War of 1812 toremind the amateur American Armythat intelligence was a function ofwarfare that could not be ignoredwithout deadly consequences. InAugust Colonel William Hull surrenderedDetroit to the British, havingfallen victim to their clever misrepresentationsof their strength. TragicWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.3

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAloss would befall the Americans againtwo years later when British troopsmarched through Washington, torchingthe capitol and the White House.Both of these defeats and others canbe traced to faulty or absent tacticalintelligence, although the U.S. Armywas woefully unprepared in mostother respects as well.Secretary of War JohnArmstrong, who took office in February1813, was known to have strongopinions about the requirement toobtain good intelligence. The intelligencesystems of the day were conventionslike cavalry reconnaissances,cavalry screens, outposts, pickets,scouts and spies. In the field, intelligencewas the job of Indian scouts andspies. William Henry Harrison had13 “spies and scouts” in his employwhen he marched on his way to theBattle of Tippecanoe. The British alsodepended heavily on the help of Indiansfor intelligence purposes. EnterprisingIndians like Tecumseh regularlycaptured the mail to learn of theAmerican’s situation.Sometimes prisoners and deserterscould be the source of informationand at least one commander,Brig. Gen. Zebulon Pike, took advantageof a lull during the attack of FortYork in April 1813 to personally interrogatea few prisoners.Deception was used repeatedlyduring the War of 1812, mostly bythe British, to misrepresent strength.At the siege of Fort Wayne, Tecumsehsought to convince the small Americanforce that he had been reinforcedby British artillery by setting updummy guns made from logs, demonstratingthe military sophisticationof this Indian adversary.By the time of the 1846 MexicanWar, the intelligence art was still unformedand did not exist in the curriculumof the U.S. Military Academyor in the drill manuals of the day,but only in the minds of some offic-4Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEers as an ill-defined requirement akinto reconnaissance. In spite of knowingnothing of the terrain or theenemy’s numbers or dispositions, theAmerican units under Zachary Taylorwere able to succeed in NorthernMexico only because of the extraordinarymettle of their soldiers.Winfield Scott, moving on theMexican capitol after landing atVeracruz, was likewise blinkered, buthe was ably served by a soldier withan acute insight into the exigencies ofwarfare. Colonel Ethan AllenHitchcock spent a considerableamount of his time as Scott’s InspectorGeneral seeing to the intelligenceneeds of his commander, relying oninformers and his Mexican Spy Company.A life of philosophic inquirymay well have honed his clarity ofvision which allowed him to foreseethe possibilities presented by a nativeintelligence and reconnaissance company.But the Mexican SpyCompany’s contribution was notScott’s sole tactical intelligence tool.The purpose of intelligence was alsonotably served by daring reconnaissancesmade by young engineeringofficers like Robert E. Lee and GeorgeB. McClellan.During and after the war, the officersof the Army Corps of TopographicalEngineers were assigned amission unique in U.S. Army history.They were to reconnoiter routesthrough rarefied and intimidatingmountain ranges, canyons awesomein their vastness, down rushing riversand across parched deserts, so that theAmerican people could expand westwardto Pacific shores and so that theArmy outposts placed to protect thepioneers could be supplied overland.At the same time they would observeand record a plethora of data on theheretofore unknown natural historyof some of the most exciting wildlifehabitats in the world. These menranged over America’s great Southwest,campaigned during the 1846-48 Mexican War, surveyed the newborder with Mexico, opened wagontrain trails, provided tactical maps forthe Indian-fighting Army, mappedtranscontinental railroad routes andproduced, in just twenty years, oneof the most comprehensive scientificinventories ever made of any part ofthe earth. They were men like JohnC. Fremont, William H. Emory,Lorenzo Sitgreaves, Amiel W.Whipple, George H. Derby, John G.Parke and George Stoneman.The American Civil War, like theAmerican Revolution, was an occasionfor widespread human intelligenceoperations, owing to the fact of anidentical language and the shared culturalbackgrounds of the protagonists.It was an easy matter to conceal allegiancesand pass through the familiarcountryside. It was also the brink ofthe modern era of warfare, employingnew technologies like railroads,telegraphs, photography and lighterthan air ships. This opened new avenuesfor intelligence exploitation.With the proliferation of new conceptsof warfare came the attendantpotential for intelligence opportunities.It became incumbent upon theintelligence operative to invent waysto seize these chances. Signals intelligencewas born. Codes were decipheredwith regularity by both sides.Aerial reconnaissance emerged withThaddeus Lowe and his ballooncorps. The role of cavalry was redefined.Special operations werelaunched to infiltrate battle lines andspread havoc in the enemy’s rear. Railroadsbrought a new dimension formassing forces and supplying armies.They also became the obvious targetfor sabotage.During the Civil War the U.S.Army began using the telegraph, notonly to link major headquarters, buttactically, in the form of the “FlyingTelegraph.” This was the name givento the Beardslee magneto-electric telegraphset, the American army’s firstelectric weapon. It was portable,hand-operated, without batteries, andcould signal over several miles of insulatedfield wire. For the first timethe U.S. Army had an electronic Command,Control and Communications(C3) system. And, for the first time,telegraph lines were tapped and messagesintercepted.Captain Anson Stager, head of theMilitary Telegraph Service, establishedin 1861, developed a route transpositioncryptosystem to provide an elementarysafeguard against wiretapping.It scrambled the words of a messageaccording to a prearranged patternand, although far from sophisticated,it defied Confederatedecryption, at least according to employeesof the Military Telegraph Service.The Federals on the other handhad little trouble with the Confederates’Vigenere polyalphabetic substitutionsystem, owing to their habitof only partially encrypting the messagesand leaving substantial plaintextclues. The possibility of using thevulnerable telegraph to send misleadingmessages was not lost on eitherside, and both made good use ofdisinformation.It was during the Civil War thatthe Army Signal Corps first beganattempting aerial surveillance fromlighter-than-air balloons overlookingenemy lines. (During the MexicanWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.5

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAWar a civilian balloonist suggestedtheir use, but the idea was rejected asimpracticable.) Thaddeus S. C. Lowe,a 28-year-old New Hampshire meteorologist,demonstrated the usefulnessof balloons as observation platformsto President Lincoln in 1861when he sent the first air-to-groundtelegraph message. The president authorizedthe formation of an ArmyBalloon Corps with Professor Lowe,commissioned a captain, at its head.By the end of 1861, Lowe had a fleetof seven balloons and nine aeronautsto man them. In March 1862 withMcClellan’s Army of the Potomacfacing Confederate positions atYorktown, Lowe took Brig. Gen.Samuel P. Heintzelman, one of thecorps commanders, aloft and describedthe intelligence value of theobservation flight:The entire great fortress wasablaze with bonfires, and the greatestactivity prevailed, which was not visibleexcept from the balloon. At firstthe general was puzzled on seeing morewagons entering the forts than weregoing out, but when I called his attentionto the fact that the ingoingwagons were light and moved rapidly(the wheels being visible as they passedeach camp-fire), while the outgoingwagons were heavily loaded andmoved slowly, there was no longer anydoubt as to the object of the Confederates.It was one of the earliest recordedinstances of an intelligence analystkeeping the commander informed.But the value of Lowe’s observationswere deemed marginal by most commanders.Little could be seen fromgreat distances, especially when theenemy’s positions took advantage offoliage cover. Lowe’s salary was cutfrom $10 per day to six, an insult inLowe’s mind. He resigned in protestand the balloon corps was deactivatedin April 1863.6Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEIt was at the time of the Civil Warthat photography was introduced asa means of recording military information.Thaddeus Lowe had usedcameras to take pictures from the basketof his balloon.In the American Civil War theprincipal intelligence gathering arm ofthe U.S. Army was the cavalry. Earlyin the war, however, they could notbe said to live up to the present-daymotto of the Military IntelligenceCorps, “Always Out Front.” Ratherthe cavalry seldom ventured very farfrom its infantry and artillery support.Its sorties were marked by timidity,and therefore its usefulness as the eyesof the army was hooded. That is untilthe arrival upon the scene of a “Manon Horseback”—Brig. Gen. JohnBuford.Buford recognized that theUnion cavalry was no match for thebetter mounted Confederate cavalry.He also knew that the use of horsemenas shock troops with sabersdrawn was a thing of the past. Massedformations of cavalry only made bigtargets for the more accurate, fartherranging and more rapid-firing rifle.Instead he called upon his Indianfightingexperience and used the cavalrylike dragoons. The horse offeredmobility, but when it came to fightinghe dismounted the troops and hadthem seek cover. In this way he wasable to repel charge after charge of confederatesin the saddle. This meantthat Buford could keep his cavalry outon reconnaissance without fear of beingbeaten off by the enemy. This hedid tenaciously, taking many importantprisoners and gathering some veryuseful intelligence information suchas a letter from Lee outlining his planfor the campaign found in the pocketof J.E.B. Stuart’s adjutant.Maybe the best combat commanderof the Civil War, PhilSheridan was called by WilliamSherman “A persevering terrier dog—honest, modest, plucky and smartenough.” He was also rememberedas the best informed commander ofthe war, relying on a highly organizedspy network and reconnaissance.What we call intelligence today,Sheridan called “that great essential ofsuccess, information.” This careful attentionto intelligence would servehim well again in the Indian Warswhen he assembled an intelligencenetwork composed of scouts who hadmuch experience with the Indians andcould keep him informed, not onlyof enemy movements, but of their intentions.The lack of any official intelligencegathering body was keenly feltin the opening years of the Civil War.A railroad detective named AllanPinkerton became the secret service ofthe Army of the Potomac, telling itscommander, George McClellan, thatthe Confederates facing him weredouble the strength they actually wereand feeding the cautious McClellan’spenchant for inaction. Pinkerton andhis men were better at counter intelligencethan they were at pinpointingorder-of-battle information. Theysnagged some southern spies inWashington. The detective alsoseemed more at home with a politicalkind of espionage.Military intelligence took on amore professional look in early 1863when Colonel George H. Sharpe,Assistant Provost Marshal of theArmy of the Potomac, formed theBureau of Information to provide amore efficient and systematic collectionof military information from allsources. Sharpe appointed as hisdeputy John C. Babcock, a volunteerin the Sturgis Rifles and, after his enlistmentexpired, a civilian order-ofbattleexpert with the TopographicalDepartment. It was Babcock whostayed on after Pinkerton resigned toprove that accurate information couldbe assembled about the enemy’s numbers.Third in command was CaptainJohn C. McEntee.The bureau employed some 70“guides” to gather intelligence in thefield. Using information collectedfrom their own scouts, from southernrefugees and deserters, from interceptedcommunications, from balloonobservations, from military patrols,prisoner interrogations, andfrom open sources like newspapers,they were able to write informed andcoordinated intelligence summariesfor the commander. Sharpe also benefitedfrom a windfall of informationprovided by the Richmond underground,a highly organized and farreachingspy organization improbablydirected by Elizabeth Van Lew, a 44-year-old abolitionist in 1862 and aresident of the southern capitol.Among Van Lew’s sources was MaryBowser, a freed slave who was plantedas a housemaid in the home ofJefferson Davis. The Bureau of Informationwas the first case in the U.S.Army of a modern military intelligenceorganization, comparing intelligencefrom a number of sources andevaluating it before passing it along.The head of the bureau was promotedto brigadier in March 1864. It wouldseem that the U.S. Army had realizedthe importance of the intelligencefunction and the necessity of havingit performed by a distinct unit of specialists.But at war’s end, the bureauwas disbanded and its members returnedto civilian life. The lessonWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.7

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAabout the key role intelligence couldplay would have to be relearned, thenext time by young officers in thedecades to come who studied Europeanarmies seeking a more professionalU.S. Army.With the Civil War at an end, theAmerican Army turned its attentionto the frontier where a different kindof warfare would occupy them for thenext quarter of a century. The lowintensity conflict of the Indian Warsonce again drew forth the resourcefulnessthat would become the hallmarkof the American Army leader.The use of Indian Scouts by U.S.Army commanders on the frontierwas one way military intelligence wasemployed with ingenuity and effectiveness.A prominent example wasthe Apache campaign in Arizona andNew Mexico between 1862 and1886. Their use in Arizona, as bothspies on the reservation and as reconnaissancepatrols in the field, wasgiven credit for bringing the renegadeApaches to bay and significantlyshortening the Apache campaigns.In the 1870s, the telegraph wasemployed extensively in the Arizona/New Mexico theater of operations toquickly relay intelligence of Apachemovements and to get orders out tothe far-flung outposts. The Apacherealized the threat posed by the telegraphand severed the lines, thus effectivelydisrupting American communications.But the Indians tooktheir jamming efforts one step further,employing deception. They wouldcut the wires where they passedthrough a tree or were attached to apole and then join the wires with apiece of rawhide. When the U.S.Army rode the line looking for thebreak, they would not be able to locatethe broken line without mucheffort. One response to this problemwas to field an experimental back-upcommunications system, the heliograph.8Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEThe Apache Scout is usuallythought of as falling within the categoryof human intelligence becauseof his job as a long-range reconnaissanceman, but the Indian’s skills attracking resemble the techniques usedby the imagery interpreter. Imageryintelligence studies the earth’s surfacefor clues to identify and locate enemyactivity. Today that is accomplishedmainly by photographic, radar, infrared,or electro-optic images, someconveyed from platforms in space.The Apache too scrutinized theground for signs of enemy activity,but he gathered his images from asclose to the earth’s surface as you canget. Occasionally his platform wasthe back of a horse.The American Army had usedIndians as guides ever since its inception,but they were employed as civilians.It was not until an Act ofCongress in July 1866 that Indianswere actually enlisted and became anofficial unit of the U.S. Army. GeneralGeorge Crook made extensive useof Apache scouts in Arizona territoryto track down Apache renegades.Crook would emphasize their worthin his official report: “I cannot toostrongly assert that there has neverbeen any success in operations againstthese Indians, unless Indian scoutswere used. These Chiricahuascouts...were of more value in huntingdown and compelling the surrenderof the renegades than all othertroops...combined. The use of Indianscouts was dictated by the soundestof military policy.”On the reservation where manyIndian factions intrigued against eachother and the U.S. Army, a networkof “Confidential Indians” would reportto the military any plans or dissatisfaction.This proved useful in1882 when informants alerted theArmy to the intentions of renegadesto attack the reservation at CampGoodwin and breakout Loco and hisWarm Springs people to join themin raiding. The information, however,did not prevent Geronimo, Juh,Chato, and Nachez from doing justthat.It is now necessary to shift ourattention from the exhausting verticalchases over Southwestern mountainranges after Apache renegades tothe cooler heights of the Army hierarchyin Washington, D.C. This iswhere, according to one observer whonoticed that staff officers spent mostof their time in billiard parlors, “theballs flew the thickest.” But it wasalso where organizational decisionswere made, and while the Army inthe field was hunting for Geronimo,the Army staff was making room formilitary intelligence.In his memoirs, Ralph VanDeman claims that the 1885establishment of a military intelligencedivision under the Adjutant Generalwas the result of the Secretary of Warasking for information on a foreignnation’s military might and learningthat nothing was known about it.Whether this was the germination ofthe Army’s first headquarters level intelligenceorganization, or whether theWar Department simply saw a needto build a military reference room tohouse the influx of reports being writtenby touring military observers, thisevent is accorded the significance ofbeing the beginning of an MI establishmentwithin the U.S. Army.While the organization of thelittle MID is now thought of as awatershed, it certainly was notthought of as greatly important byMajor William J. Volkmar, who togetherwith a handful of clerks,crowded into a single room in theState, War and Navy Building. Hismodest shop was named the Divisionof Military Information, a subsectionof the Reservations Division of theMiscellaneous Branch of the AdjutantGeneral. It was not until 1889 thatthe office was charged with assembling“Military data on our own andforeign services which would be availablefor use of the War Departmentand the Army at large.” Here wouldbe filed maps and monographs, reportsand rosters. The Adjutant General,in a letter to the field, asked “allofficers” to “make report on anythingwhich it may be desirable for the governmentto know in case of suddenwar.” The determination of what wasmilitary intelligence and what was not,was left to the “discretion of the officers.”It was a minor archive thatwould grow quickly since the void itwas filling was so wide.If being lumped under “Miscellaneous”was not humbling enough,the office had to endure the sneers oftheir naval colleagues who’s Office ofNaval Intelligence (ONI) had been establishedthree years earlier. When anArmy officer was found to have borroweda report from ONI, the Navychief was outraged enough to write,“Such an incident as this served tomake me doubly cautious, especiallyin dealing with these Army people,who in matters of tact or discretionseem to me to be a lower order ofintellect than the mule.” It was anearly example of the begrudging cooperationthat was to plague jointoperations over the next century.Four years later, the Military InformationDivision (MID) was expandedto encompass a network ofmilitary attaches. The attache systemWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.9

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAwhich Congress had authorized in1889 involved the stationing of officersin four major European capitolsand one in St. Petersburg. Theirjob was to observe the training andexercises of foreign armies and makereports on their relative strengths andweaknesses. A War Departmentmemo exhorted them to:Examine into and report upon allmatters of a military or technical characterthat may be of interest to anybranch of the War Department andto the service at large. Keep informed...ofthe occurrence of all militaryexhibitions and trials of Ordnance....Examine the military libraries,bookstores and publishers lists inorder to give early notice of any newor important publications or inventionsor improvements in arms, or inany branch of the service; also givenotice of such drawings, plans, etc.;which may be of importance andwithin your power to procure.The attache in France in 1892 wasCaptain Henry Dana Borup, who wasfollowing instructions of the WarDepartment to collect “drawings,plans, etc. which may be of importanceand within your powers to procure,”when he tried to buy someplans for the fortification of the seaportof Toulon from a Ministry ofMarine employee. He was found outand earned the distinction of being thefirst attache to be expelled for espionage.Jefferson Coolidge, an Americandiplomat in France voiced hispuzzlement at Borup’s actions, callingthem “perfectly useless,” since wewere not at war with France and didnot yet possess a Navy with which toinvest Toulon.Attache duty was usually reservedfor officers who had personal wealth,since the Army lacked the funds tosupport them overseas. This criterionwas seldom a guarantee that the attachehad any knowledge of intelligencework. The MID with its attaches10Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEsoon would have a chance to proveits worth. Tensions with Spain werebuilding.American support for Cuban insurrectionistsagainst an increasinglyoppressive Spanish regime brought theUnited States and Spain ever closer towar. When an unexplained explosionsunk the U.S. battleship Maine in Havanaharbor on February 15, 1898,the incident was thought to have beencaused by Spanish treachery and itprecipitated the war, which was officiallydeclared by the U.S. Congresson 25 April. It was a war which PresidentWilliam McKinley had souughtto avoid and for which the UnitedStates was ill prepared. From a militaryintelligence standpoint, however,the U.S. Army was the best preparedit had ever been in its history.It was the first American war inwhich a military intelligence functionwas up and running before the warbegan. While the work of the MilitaryIntelligence Division would beconsidered rudimentary and slight bytoday’s standards, it was unusual forthe U.S. Army to have even this fundamentaldegree of knowledge aboutits adversary on the battlefield.During the 1890s, the MID accomplishedmuch with its dozen officers,not only monitoring the preparednessof American militia andNational Guard units, but preparingover 50,000 card file entries of informationreceived; producing muchneeded maps of Mexico, Canada,Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines;and completing studies on foreignarmies. By the time the Spanish-AmericanWar started, the U.S.Army attache in Madrid had compiledmuch useful information onSpain’s military capabilities.In 1893 the MID thought itswork sweeping enough to warrantfour branches. A Progress in MilitaryArts Branch compiled informationsent in by attaches and observers.Information about the Canadianborder was processed by the NorthernFrontier Branch. A Spanish-American Branch kept an eye on developmentsin Spanish possessions inthe Caribbean. The readiness of stateNational Guard units was monitoredby the Militia and Volunteer Branch.The MID was in good hands in1897. Its chief was Major Arthur L.Wagner, who was a respected militaryeducator and thinker, but, moreimportantly, a believer in intelligence.He brought to the job a professionalismand a voice for intelligence reform.His MID consisted not onlyof 11 officers, but a network of 40officers stationed at National Guardheadquarters around the country, whoreported directly to MID. He had16 attaches, 10 civilian clerks and 2messengers, occupying four rooms,and an annual budget of $3,640 tokeep the whole thing going. It hadbeen assembling information aboutCuba since 1892, mostly from emigresliving in New York and from travelingArmy officers like CaptainGeorge P. Scriven who toured Cubain 1893.The output of MID was prodigiousduring the years under Wagner’sleadership. Anticipating the war withSpain, MID produced special studies,orders of battle, and maps on Cuba,Puerto Rico and the Philippines.Wagner convinced the leadership tosend Lieut. Albert Rowan on an espionagemission to Cuba, and Lieut.H. H. Whitney to Puerto Rico.A basic example of human intelligenceoperations was the mission in1898 of Andrew S. Rowan. A lieutenantwith the Military InformationDivision in Washington, he was entrustedwith a job directed by thepresident himself. Chosen by his boss,Arthur L. Wagner, the Chief of MID,to carry out McKinley’s instructions,Rowan first traveled to Jamaica, thenby small craft landed on the shores ofCuba. Guided by Cuban rebels,Rowan cut through the jungles of theisland until he reached the headquartersof General Garcia. There he conferredwith the rebel leader, elicitedinformation about the strength anddisposition of Spanish forces on theisland, discussed Garcia’s suggestionsfor joint American-Cuban operationsagainst the Spanish, then returned tothe U.S., taking with him two ofGarcia’s most knowledgeable aides tofurnish intelligence information tothe American military. His exploitswere the subject of a post-war, bestsellingessay entitled “Message toGarcia,” which lauded the virtue ofself-initiative. Rowan retired in 1908as a Colonel and in 1922, after a campaignby General Nelson Miles andother friends, Congress bestowedupon him the Distinguished ServiceCross.In 1898 Wagner set up a warroom in the White House, next doorto the State, War and Navy buildingin which MID was located. Then,his staff work completed, he turnedover the reins of MID to Capt. LouisC. Scherer. Another of the officershe left behind to assume the intelligencework was Lieutenant Ralph VanDeman.Appointed to the staff of GeneralNelson Miles, the Army’s CommandingGeneral, Wagner was able touse his influence to organize the Bureauof Military Information whichWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.11

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAwould be assigned to the GeneralWilliam R. Shafter’s V Corps to centralizeand collate all intelligence informationin the theater. As visionaryas this organization was for its day,it would not get off the ground dueto petty rivalries. General Shafterwould dismiss the Bureau of MilitaryInformation, believing that Wagnerwas sent by Miles to spy on him.Without a job, Wagner volunteeredto lead reconnaissance patrols behindenemy lines to gather intelligence forBrig. Gen. Henry W. Lawton, theSecond Division commander.Remarking after the war on thefailure of General Shafter to make useof his field MI concept, Wagner said:...No use was made of the Bureauof Military Information. ...Ibelieve that a bureau...would be ofgreat value; but the utilization of sucha bureau implies a certain degree ofsystem and intelligent organization inthe military force to which it is attached.Wagner would be the first to agreethat “Intelligence is for commanders.”By the turn of the century, cameraswere being attached to large kites(which were cheaper and more portablethan balloons) and the shutterstriggered with clock devices or fuses.These kite surveillance devices werereportedly used in Puerto Rico duringthe Spanish-American War.About the use of observation balloonsin the Spanish-American War, a cumbersomedevice hard to move downthe narrow trails and an inviting targetfor enemy fire, Wagner had thisto say: “For the first time in militaryhistory a balloon was seen practicallyon the skirmish line, and it will probablybe the last time that such an exploitwill be witnessed. It is hard tounderstand what fantastic conceptionof the art of war could have causedsuch a reconnaissance to be seriouslycontemplated in the first place.”12Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEIn August 1903 the Military InformationDivision became the SecondDivision, one of the three maindivisions of the new General Staff, theothers being the First Division incharge of all Army administration andthe Third Division in charge of plans.One of the new chief of staff’s earlyactions was to issue a call for qualifiedofficers to assist the Second Divisionin translating Russian, German,French, Italian, Spanish, Portugueseand Japanese documents.The job of the Second Divisionwas spelled out as “collection, arrangement,and publication of historical,statistical, and geographical information;War Department Library; systemof war maps, American and foreign;general information regardingforeign armies and fortresses; preparationfrom official records of analyticaland critical histories of importantcampaigns.” It was also responsiblefor the system of military attaches.The first chief was Major WilliamDorrance Beach who was supportedby only five officers and the same fourrooms in the State, War and NavyBuilding. He organized the divisioninto six sections: 1. Military Attacheand Manila Office Section; to be controlledby the Division Chief, assistedby Capt. J.C. Oakes. 2. Classification,Card Indexing and LibrarySection; to operate under the supervisionof Capt. H.C. Hale, the DivisionSecretary. 3. Map and PhotographsSection; directed by Capt.H.M. Reeve. 4. Historical Section;to which any officer of the Divisionmay be assigned as required. 5.Monograph Section; to which all officersof the Division will be automaticallyassigned and provided withappropriate work projects of a continuingnature. 6. Publication Section;headed by Capt. C.T. Mencher.One of the early successes of thenew Second and Third Divisions actingjointly was anticipation of insurrectionin Cuba and the preparationof a plan for U.S. Army intervention.The Cuban Pacification plan was putinto effect after requests for aid fromthe new Cuban government in 1906.As part of the occupation forces, abranch office of the Second Divisionwas created in Havana and “engagedin collecting valuable statistical andtopographical information.”The Third Division planners, essentiallythe members of the ArmyWar College, relied extensively on informationprovided by the SecondDivision and worked closely withthem. So when the Third Divisionmoved into its new quarters in theWar College Building at WashingtonBarracks, D.C., it recommended thatthe Second Division move there tooto facilitate coordination between thetwo staffs. While objected to by themilitary information people, theChief of Staff approved the move andit was completed in May 1908. Amonth later the chief directed themerger of the Second and Third Divisionsinto a Second Section. Itschief would be the president of theWar College. A Military InformationCommittee was created in this neworganization, along with a War CollegeCommittee. The mission of theMilitary Information Committee wasnot much different from the one assignedto the second division in 1903,but centralization followed and theintelligence function was virtuallyabsorbed into the War College. Amission statement issued in February1912 showed fewer true intelligencetasks and more work related to theeducation of the Army. By May 1915the Military Information Section ofthe Army War College had even lessto do with intelligence duties, insteadbeing charged with doing “currentGeneral Staff work.”In 1898 an Insurgent RecordsOffice was created in the Manila headquartersof the Expeditionary Forcein the Philippines to sift through andtranslate the boxes of captured documentsthat could furnish valuable informationto the field commanders.The importance and scope of the officegrew and so did the staff, finallybecoming the Military InformationDivision of the Adjutant General’sOffice, Headquarters, Division of thePhilippines, on 13 December 1900.The new agency was performing alltactical and counter intelligence tasksfor the Philippines, recruiting Filipinoagents and working closely with theMID in the War Department. It waseventually merged with the War DepartmentMID on 18 June 1902, receivingits funding from Washingtonand serving as a branch of the MIDin the War Department. This had thedisadvantage of excluding the localcommander from the direction ofintelligence work.Its first chief was Lt. Colonel JosephT. Dickman, who would laterbe a major general and lead the ThirdU.S. Army over the Rhine to occupyGermany in November 1918. Hewas seconded by Captain John R.M.Taylor who would be assisted byCapt. Ralph Van Deman. It was VanDeman who set up a Map Section andordered terrain reconnaissances.Unlike Cuba, where informantswere plentiful, little was known aboutthe Philippines at the time of theSpanish American War. The researchersin MID seemed to have neglectedthese far-away Pacific islands and theirWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.13

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAdata was not always up to later standards.The aide to Maj. Gen. WesleyMerritt, commanding, Capt. ThomasB. Mott gave this picture of the MIDproduct in the summer of 1898:General Merritt had charged me,when in Washington, with collectingdata concerning the Islands and onedocument had been handed me [byMID] with special recommendationsas to its care and early return, for itwas “confidential.’ I read it eagerlywhen I got back to Governor’s Island,but as the first pages seemed familiar,I compared it with other papers I hadalready collected. Lo and behold, itwas a transcription of the article onthe Philippines from the last EncyclopediaBritannica!The Spanish-American War forthe first time presented this youngnation as a global power. Militaryintelligence had little or no effect onits outcome, but because of the commitmentof a dozen officers, militaryintelligence spread out from its fewrooms in the War Department to theprovinces of Cuba and the jungles ofthe Philippines. But as memory ofthe war receded, so too did intelligencework shrink until the word disappearedaltogether on the Army’s organizationalcharts. It would takesome troubles along the Mexican borderand a world war to revive the intelligencecraft in the second decadeof the 20th century.Despite the reorganization ofArmy by Secretary of the Army ElihuRoot and the creation of a general staffafter the turn of the century, intelligence,originally the Second Divisionof the general staff, was increasinglyignored in favor of the more robustThird Division, or plans division.There were too few voices defendingthe importance of intelligence to anArmy leadership absorbed with plansand operations. One of the few advocatesof a stronger military intelligenceorganization within the U.S.14Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEArmy, Ralph van Deman, would berecognized only when the UnitedStates was on the brink of a war. Butbefore he could be heard, anotherArmy commander was conducting arehearsal along the uneasy Mexicanborder for the full-scale war in Europe.In the mountains of northernMexico, John J. Pershing would learnsome things about intelligence.Political instability in Mexico,which often spilled across the borderin the form of bandit raids and refugeeexoduses, resulted in a troopbuildup along that border as early as1911. In 1914 it was proposed bythe Chief, Army War College Division,who also chaired the MilitaryInformation Committee of the WarCollege, that some officers along theborder be invested with intelligenceduties. This was adopted but withthe proviso that they not cross intoMexico, limiting their work to theinterrogation of refugees. That banwas lifted after Pershing mounted hisPunitive Expedition.We know that at least one intelligenceofficer crossed into Mexico. In1916 a lieutenant of the First ArizonaInfantry, Sidney F. Mashbir, was askedby the Department Commander,Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, to conducta secret reconnaissance of northernMexico to check out persistent rumorsof a sizable Japanese militarypresence. Mashbir, an Arizonan familiarwith the Sonoran desert, withthe help of his Papago (today TohonoOodham) spies, found Japanese rationtins and Kanji written on rockfaces that confirmed that Japanesemilitary exercises were being conductedand that Japanese patrols mayhave even crossed into the UnitedStates to obtain water.During the Punitive Expeditioninto Mexico in 1916 led by GeneralJohn J. Pershing, human intelligence(HUMINT) and signals intelligence(SIGINT) took on new proportions.Although an embryo intelligence staffhad been organized in 1903 as part ofthe Army’s General Staff, it was upto General Pershing to organize hisown field intelligence network. Herealized that good intelligence wasnecessary if he was to track down thebandit/revolutionary Pancho Villa.Pershing appointed an intelligenceofficer to his staff, Major James A.Ryan, 13th Cavalry, and started an “InformationDepartment.” Later, whenfive separate districts were establishedin the Mexican theater of operations,he instructed the district commanders“to organize [their] own agents andestablish as far as possible [their] ownservice of information.”The Information Departmentemployed a network of agents whowere reported to have penetratedVilla’s camp. The department reportedin 1917 that it “soon was ableto decipher any code used in NorthernMexico. Thereafter, by tappingthe various telegraph and telephonewires and picking up wireless messageswe were able to get practically all theinformation passing between the variousleaders in Mexico.”Apache scouts from Fort Huachucaaccompanied the 10th Cavalry andothers from Fort Apache joined the11th Cavalry on their long scouts intoMexico in search of the bandit/revolutionary,Pancho Villa. It was thelast time Indian Scouts were used inU.S. Army operations, though theyremained as part of the U.S. Armyuntil 1947.Captain Parker Hitt was 34 yearsold in 1911 when the Signal Schoolat Fort Leavenworth conducted itsfirst conference on militarycryptology. The infantry officer hadinterrupted his studies in civil engineeringat Purdue University to jointhe Army in 1898. He served in thePhilippines, Alaska and Californiabefore attending the Signal Schooland then becoming an instructor atthat institution. He possessed a flairfor solving ciphers and decipheredcoded messages intercepted fromMexico from both the agents ofPancho Villa and the Constitutionalists,the latter code becoming knownas the Mexican Army Cipher Disk.Hitt wrote the U.S. Army’s first publicationon cryptology in 1915 whenhis Manual for Solution of MilitaryCiphers was printed at FortLeavenworth. From 1914 to 1917,Hitt developed a code machine that,after some improvements by JosephMauborgne, Chief of the SignalCorps’ Engineering and Research Division,would become in 1922 theArmy’s M-94. It was used up untilWorld War II. In the 1930s it wasreplaced by the M-138a, which incorporatedsome more improvementson Hitt’s prototype. As a Colonel,Parker Hitt went to France with theAmerican Expeditionary Force (AEF)in 1918 and served on Pershing’s staffbefore becoming the Chief SignalOfficer for the 1st Division.Known as the Father of MilitaryIntelligence, Ralph Van Deman hadworked as a young lieutenant in theMilitary Information Division in thedays of Arthur Wagner, who we thenmust call the “Grandfather of MilitaryIntelligence.” He was influencedby the scholarly Wagner who had afirm conviction in the importance ofWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.15

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAintelligence. Van Deman was an intellectualin his own right, a graduateof Harvard, Yale, and Miami MedicalSchool, with degrees in both lawand medicine, first entering the Armyas a surgeon. He would carry on thecrusade for a professional intelligenceorganization within the U.S. Army.While his wife was going up forplane rides with the Wright brothersin the Virginia countryside [thus earningthe distinction of being the firstwoman passenger], Van Deman in1909 was laboring in obscurity, butacquiring more experience than anyother officer in the American Armyabout the subject of intelligence. Hehad the opportunity to draw an thatextensive experience when he was assignedin 1915 to the Army War College,the organization that had absorbedthe functions of intelligenceand relegated it to an obscure committee.Following the lead of his boss, theChief of the War College Division,Brig. Gen. H.H. Macomb, VanDeman sought to convince the ArmyChief of Staff Maj. Gen. Hugh L.Scott that a separate intelligence functionwas needed in the Army’s generalstaff. He wrote a staff study tothat effect, but was turned down byScott who thought that our allies inEurope would provide all the informationthat we needed if we enteredthe war in Europe. Repeated briefingsby Van Deman failed to movethe chief, a man who President WilliamTaft thought was “wood to themiddle of his head.” When Brig.Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn, Macomb’s successorresubmitted the recommendationto form an intelligence sectionjust one week after Congress declaredwar, it was again firmly turned down.Van Deman resorted to other means,enlisting the support of his Britishintelligence counterparts to urge thecase at higher governmental levels,and even using an unnamed woman16Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEwriter who had influence with Secretaryof War Newton D. Baker. Withsuggestions now coming from Scott’ssuperiors, he reversed himself a fewdays later in April 1917.When a separate Military IntelligenceSection was organized in May1917 by Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn,Chief of the War College Division, itwas given these functions:(a) The collection, collation anddistribution of military information.This will be understood to embraceevery class of military information,formerly handled by the InformationCommittee or by the War CollegeDivision as a whole.(b) The supervision of the dutiesof our Military Attaches abroad, insofaras those duties pertain to the collectionof military information.(c) Officers and Intelligence Officersat posts or stations and withcommands in the field in matters relatingpurely to military intelligence.(d) The consideration of questionsof policy to be promulgated bythe General Staff in connection withall matters of military intelligence.(e) The supervision and controlof such system of military espionageand counterespionage as shall be established,by authority of the Chiefof Staff or the Secretary of War, duringthe continuance of the presentwar.(f) Cooperation with the IntelligenceSections of the General Staff ofthe various countries at war with Germany,in connection with militaryintelligence work in the United Statesand with our forces in the field, eitherat home or abroad.(g) The preparation of instructionsin military intelligence work forthe use of our forces in the field.The new organization was morethan a staff agency, but an operationaldepartment with control of all fieldintelligence units in the Army.Van Deman was named the chief ofthe new Military Intelligence Section(MIS). Starting small with three officersand two clerks, it grew with theforce of an idea whose time had finallycome, with 282 officers and 948civilians in the outfit by war’s end.Van Deman benefited from his closeliaison work with British intelligence,particularly Colonel Claude Danseyof the British Security Service whoprovided a handbook on intelligenceorganization and methods. This gavestructure to the organization whichwas divided into positive and negativebranches, positive intelligencebeing information about the enemyand negative corresponding with thejob of today’s counter intelligence.The Military Intelligence Section wasmade up of these subsections:MI meant military intelligence,with “intelligence” replacing “information,”a British usage that nowbecame institutionalized in the U.S.Army, although there were examplesof its use at least back to 1907 whenan appointment was made for an “IntelligenceOfficer for the HawaiianIslands.” Earlier in American history,intelligence was a synonym for“news.”The MIS would later become responsiblefor training all of the officersand NCOs needed inEurope in each battalion intelligencesection and those sections in regimental,divisional and corps headquarters.The Military Intelligence Section alsofilled the AEF G-2’s request for 50sergeants with investigative experienceand the ability to speak French. Thisbecame the nucleus of the Corps ofIntelligence Police (CIP) organized inAugust 1917. The CIP had 750agents in France, where they wereheadquartered near Bordeaux, and 500in the United States. They would becut back to 28 in the year followingthe armistice.Van Deman had ultimately accomplishedhis goal of restoring intelligenceto equal footing with theother general staff sections in the WarDepartment, as had originally beenenvisioned in 1903.The intelligence organizationwould undergo yet another reformation.Taking over as the new chief ofstaff in March 1918, Maj. Gen.Peyton C. March viewed the MilitaryIntelligence Division as “a minor appendageto the War Plans Division,”which was not quite true as it was assignedto the Executive Division ofthe General Staff. March wanted toplace MI back on the General Staff.In his 26 August 1918 reorganization,there were four divisions on the generalstaff: Operations; Military Intelligence;Purchase, Storage and Traffic;and War Plans. Replacing VanDeman who was on his way to France,Marlborough Churchill was promotedto brigadier and appointedDirector of Military Intelligence. Hisdivision would:have cognizance and control ofmilitary intelligence, both positiveand negative, and shall be in chargeof an officer designated as the directorof military intelligence, who willbe an assistant to the Chief of Staff.He is also the chief military censor.The duties of this division are to maintainestimates revised daily of the militarysituation, the economic situation,and of such other matters as the Chiefof Staff may direct, and to collect,collate, and disseminate military in-Write Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.17

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAtelligence. It will cooperate with theintelligence section of the generalstaffs of allied countries in connectionwith military intelligence; prepare instructionsin military intelligencework for the use of our forces; supervisethe training of personnel for intelligencework; organize, direct, andcoordinate the intelligence service;supervise the duties of military attaches;communicate directly with departmentintelligence officers and intelligenceofficers at posts, camps, andstations; and with commands in thefield in matters relating to military intelligence;obtain, reproduce and issuemaps; translate foreign documents;disburse and accountfor intelligence funds; cooperatewith the censorship board and withintelligence agencies of other departmentsof the Government.One of the jobs accomplished bythe MI section since its inception wasthe production of daily and weeklyintelligence summaries that covered awide range of subjects, not only military,but political, social and economicareas as well. Early efforts werecharacterized by rudimentary collectiontechniques, like newspaper clippingsand even brochures provided bythe French General Staff, and superficialassessments. But, as resourcesincreased, so too did the sophisticationand interpretative content of theintelligence summaries.By the Fall of 1918, these summarieswere being distributed to theArmy Chief of Staff, the Secretary ofState and the President. The mainsource of information was the militaryattache network, but reports suppliedby the Office of Naval Intelligenceand the State and Justice Departmentswere relied upon as well.The MI section also drew upon theservices of “confidential agents, specialinformants, and distinguishedforeign visitors.” In 1922, with itsstaff reduced, the MI division cut back18Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEproduction to a weekly basis.To respond to an increasinglypressing need for interpreters in theAmerican Expeditionary Force inFrance, the Secretary of War approvedthe commissioning a limited numberof officers who could qualify as interpreters.In July 1917, a Corps ofInterpreters was created in the NationalArmy which would fall underthe supervision of the Chief of Staffwith a close affiliation to the MilitaryIntelligence Section. Exams wereconducted around the country withthe ranks of the corps filling up with17 captains, 41 first lieutenants and72 sergeants. It sent men to all themajor field headquarters and to theMIS.American neutrality at the outsetof World War I was shattered when acoded message from German ForeignSecretary Arthur Zimmerman to theMexican government was interceptedby the Americans and deciphered byBritish Intelligence. TheZimmerman telegram proposed analliance between Germany andMexico in the event of war with theUnited States. If the alliance provedvictorious, Mexico would regainTexas, New Mexico and Arizona. Asa result, border outposts at Douglas,Naco and Nogales were strengthened.The lessons Pershing learnedabout the value of military intelligenceduring the 1916 Punitive Expeditioncaused him to place great relianceupon this tool during World War Iwhen he commanded the AmericanExpeditionary Force and organized aG2 section along French and Britishexamples. An intelligence section existedin every battalion and highercommand.Adopting an organizational systemfor his American ExpeditionaryForce (AEF) staff, General Pershingtook the four main staff sections fromthe French (Personnel, Intelligence,Operations, and Logistics) and addedthe British prefix “G” for GeneralStaff. So his intelligence staff, led byColonel Dennis E. Nolan, a Spanish-American veteran and close friend ofVan Deman, became the G2 withthese various subsections and duties:G2A (Information): 1-Order ofBattle and Strategic Intelligence, 2-Translation/Interpretation and TechnicalIntelligence, 3-Situation Mapsand Aerial Reconnaissance, 4-Summariesand Terrain Studies, 5-ArtilleryTarget Development, 6-Radio Intelligenceand Carrier Pigeons, and 7-Dissemination and G2 Journal.G2B (Secret Service): 1-CounterespionagePolicy and Investigationof Atrocities, 2-Dissemination of Informationfrom Secret Sources andControl of Intelligence ContingencyFunds, and 3-Index of Suspects, Controlof the Civil Population andCounterespionage Operations.G2C (Topography)G2D (Censorship) 1-Press Relationsand Press Censorship, 2-CensorshipRegulations and Postal and TelegraphicCensorship, and 3-Photographand Movie Censorship andVisitors.G2E (Intelligence Corps)Nolan had far-reaching plans forhis intelligence network, extending itbeyond the collection of battlefieldintelligence. He wanted his G-2 toreach beyond the front in France andBelgium and collect strategic intelligencefrom theaters in Italy andMacedonia, places where the AEFmight be expected to fight later in thewar. For this purpose he formed aG-2 Secret Service unit which also hada counterespionage staff with stationsin neutral countries.In the AEF, intelligence was nowrecognized as a critical element of warfighting.Up and down the commandstructure could be found G-2s.Starting at the infantry battalion, anintelligence staff officer could callupon a reconnaissance platoon of 15scouts, 11 observers, and 2 snipers, atotal of 28. The regimental intelligenceofficer had eight observers. Eachdivision had a G-2 who also was assignedmen to act as observers. Atthe Corps level, the G-2 could relyupon observation posts, balloons, aerosquadrons with both visual and photographicrecon, and flash or soundrangingteams which targeted enemyartillery. These tools gave him theability to look five miles beyond theenemy’s front-line positions.In addition to those assets atcorps, the field army headquarters hada radio intelligence section workingon decoding and translating enemymessages. Intercept was done by aSignal Corps radio section at GHQin Chaumont, using a combinationof direction-finding equipment, listeningposts, and induction coilsplaced near enemy ground lines.Communications security was undertakenby the Signal Corps.A Radio Intelligence Subsection(RIS) was created under the AmericanExpeditionary Force G-2 early in1917, long before the first Americanfighting forces would arrive. Cooperatingwith their French and Britishallies counterparts, they prepared forthe coming joint operations.When the American First Armyarrived in France, a three-man RIS wasformed on 12 June 1918 with“Code” and “Goniometric” (DirectionFinding) sections. Commandedby First Lieutenant Charles H. Matz,Write Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.19

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAit was enlarged to three officers andeight men by the armistice. The FirstArmy RIS was responsible for analyzingand translating communicationsintercepted by the Signal Corps radiointelligence operators, and locatingenemy radio stations based on bearingsplotted by Signal Corps “gonio”operators. These Signal Corps radiointelligence personnel had arrived inFrance in December 1917 and hadundergone training enabling them tointercept messages at the rate of 25words per minute and to translate 15words per minute from the German.All of their intercept, direction-finding,or wire-tap stations were tied intothe division RIS.The goniometric teams used theportable SCR-83 radio receiving setswith six-foot-square antennas. Twostations could triangulate signals transmittedby enemy radios and pinpointtheir locations. By analyzing trafficand combining that information withdirection-finding, they could determinethe depth of the enemy echelonsand compile a daily order of battle.One indication of the value ofthis kind of information occurred atthe battle of Saint Mihiel in September1918 when American commanders,believing the Germans to havewithdrawn from the salient, consideredsending up the infantry withoutartillery support. Goniometric stationswarned that all the enemy radiostations were still operating in theirformer positions, a solid indicator theenemy was still there. General JohnPershing decided to attack only aftera four-hour artillery preparation, thussaving the lives of considerable infantrymen.In that same battle, SIGINTalerted the Americans to a Germancounterattack, giving the strength andexact time three hours before it waslaunched.The GHQ also had 450 sergeantsin its Corps of Intelligence Police bywar’s end. The AEF G-2 had a psy-20Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEchological warfare mission, bombardingGerman troop concentrationswith 3 million propaganda leaflets deliveredby balloon, plane and infantrypatrols.Perhaps a tribute to its versatilecapabilities, G-2 also collected somemarginal missions, like publishing thenew Stars and Stripes newspaper, considereda morale builder, supervisingeight Army artists in the theater, andbeing the principal section for pressrelations. Having the department responsiblefor keeping the Army’s secretsalso charged with releasing informationto the press was not asound idea. It would foster distrustand hamper Army press relations inthe years to come.Like Van Deman’s organizationback in Washington, Pershing’s AEFG2 would be a model for supportingtactical organizations. In his book,Military Intelligence: A New Weaponin War, published after the war, WalterC. Sweeney wrote:There is nothing new in a recognitionof the necessity of having ampleinformation of the enemy uponwhich to base military plans. The successfulplan of campaign always hasbeen and always will be based uponknowledge of the strength, situation,plans and intentions of the enemy.What is new, however, is that inrecent years there has been such anincrease in the amount of informationof the enemy to be gathered, andso many changes in the means andmethods of collecting and utilizing it,as to make necessary the creation ofan entirely new organization or systemto keep track of it....Before America entered theWorld War, the Military IntelligenceService, as a coordinated and cooperatingsystem, did not exist in our militaryestablishment.... There was noconception of the modern IntelligenceService which, with specially trainedpersonnel, would make systematicand continuous effort to find out andrecord the strength, position, situation,and movements of the enemy....During the World War, under thename of Military Intelligence, therewas built up in the American forces acarefully organized system representedby an Intelligence Service group at everyheadquarters from that of the battalionon up to include the War Department.On 1 February 1918 in Nogales,Arizona, Lothar Witzke, carrying aRussian passport identifying him asPablo Waberski, was taken into custodyas a suspected German spy andsaboteur. He was arrested at gunpointby two U.S. Army agents, membersof Van Deman’s Military IntelligenceSection. Upon his person was an encodedletter from the German consulin Mexico City charging him withundercover operations in the UnitedStates. In fact this German naval officerhad been responsible for severalincidents of sabotage, including thefamed Black Tom explosion. It wasthis message, decrypted in Washingtonby MI-8, the code and cipherssection of the Military IntelligenceSection, that led to his conviction forspying. The damning message read:“The bearer of this is a subject of theEmpire who travels as a Russian underthe name of Pablo Waberski. Heis a German secret agent. Please furnishhim on request protection andassistance; also advance him on demandup to 1,000 pesos of Mexicangold and send his code telegrams tothis embassy as official consular dispatches.”Convicted by a militarycourt, his death sentence, the only oneto be handed down during WorldWar I, was later commuted by PresidentWilson to life imprisonment.Witzke was released fromLeavenworth prison in 1923, owingin part to his heroism during a boilerexplosion incident.The Witzke case was not only anexample of good Army counter intelligence,but was illustrative of oneof the more dubious functions of theMIS, the “counterespionage amongthe civilian population” charged to theMI-4 subsection. Encroaching on civilianjurisdictions, domestic securitybecame one of the largest areas of MISoperations during and after the war.One of the areas in which the Armyfocused was “Negro subversion andpolitical demagoguery,” disseminatingcounterpropaganda in black communitiesin the Southeast. The Armyinvestigated what they considered tobe anarchist or revolutionary organizationslike the Industrial Workers ofthe World, the Communist party, theCommunist Labor Party, and theUnion of Russian Workers. After anincident in October 1922 in Oregonin which the American Federation ofLabor was included among these organizations,a wave of protests wassparked and field commands wereordered by the War Department notto involve themselves in the collectionof unauthorized domestic intelligence.After the war, GeneralMarlborough Churchill, the successorto Van Deman as Director ofMilitary Intelligence in Washington,made the case for a separate intelligenceorganization within the WarDepartment.At present, the Military IntelligenceDivision is one of four coordinatedivisions of the General Staff....Write Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.21

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAThis staff organization is essential tosuccess. It is especially vital in intelligenceadministration, ...[since] it isobvious that national policy must dependon correct predictions concerningthe international future.[In sum] there must be a G2in the War Department ...performinga similar function, not only with theWar Plans Division in the initiationand perfection of plans, but concurrentlywith the State Department inthe work of prediction upon whichnational policy is based.Soon after becoming the Chief ofStaff of the Army, General John J.Pershing reorganized the War DepartmentGeneral Staff to resemble hisAEF structure. Effective 1 September1921 there would be five GeneralStaff Divisions: The Personnel Division(G-1), the Military IntelligenceDivision (G-2), the Operations andTraining Division (G-3), the SupplyDivision (G-4), and the War PlansDivision (WPD). This organizationwould be duplicated down to divisionlevel, with battalions and companiesadopting the “S” prefix to delineatetheir S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4.The G-2 lost the Negative Branchand added the formal duty of “pressrelations.”This marked the beginning of aperiod of decline for the intelligencefunction, as its head was only authorizedto be a colonel, while all theother chiefs were general officers.They were to be called henceforth“Assistant Chiefs of Staff.” In 1920the G-2 was authorized 234 people(79 officers) and $400,000. It reacheda low point in 1939 with a total of69 personnel (20 officers) and$89,450 dollars. The division underwentan almost annual reorganizationbetween 1919 and 1939 at the instigationof each new chief.The advances in weaponry byWorld War I created a stalemate in the22Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEtrenches of France. A part of the newtechnology was full blown aerial surveillanceto determine enemy strongpoints and direct artillery fire. Sausage-shapedballoons with tail fins forstability were tethered in the thousandsalong the trenches and used byboth sides for observation. Observationballoons could reach an altitudeof between 1,200 and 1,800 meters,depending on whether it carried oneobserver or two. A fighter pilotnamed Frank Luke, Jr., from Phoenix,Arizona, earned the reputation asthe “Arizona Balloon Buster.”Aerial reconnaissance also includedairplanes. Cameras were aimedfrom the cockpit by photographers/observers. Most of the pictures weretaken at oblique angles rather thanpointed straight down. Fighter planeswere developed with the express purposeof shooting down the reconnaissanceplanes. The first American tacticalsurveillance flight of World WarI was made on 15 April 1918 byMajor Royce of the 1st Aero Squadron.Great importance was placed onaerial photography by both the Germansand the allies. Near the war’send, during the Meuse-Argonne offensivein 1918, the U.S. Army reportedthat 56,000 aerial shots wereprinted for use by the AmericanArmy. Between 1 July and 11 November1918, 1.3 million aerial photoswere taken. And the products wereapproaching a “real time” usefulnessas the time between a photographbeing taken and the time it was developed,printed and interpreted, wasas little as twenty minutes.The Army had formed an aerialphotography school in Ithaca, NewYork, in 1917. One of its first graduatesand instructors was 2d Lieut.George W. Goddard. Goddard pioneeredmany of the advances in aerialrecon, experimenting with infraredphotography, and long-focal lengthcamera lenses. On 20 November1925 he took the first night aerialphotograph, using a flash-powderbomb with timing fuses to light thecity of Rochester, New York, fromabove, while a camera shutter wasopened in his airplane. He foresawthe need of getting the photographsto the users in a timely manner, andin 1927 he took an aerial picture ofthe federal penitentiary at FortLeavenworth, Kansas, developed theshot in the plane, and transmitted thepicture telegraphically to New Yorkwithin twenty-three minutes. Between1936 and 1939 he worked ona stereoscopic camera that employedtwo lenses and a strip camera. Thestrip of film was electronically movedthrough the camera in synchronizationwith the plane’s ground speed,eliminating blurs that had existed before.Another champion of aerial photographybetween wars was CaptainA. W. Stevens, who devoted his timeto long-distance photography as a solutionto the vulnerability of reconplanes to both fighters and groundfire. Along with pilot Captain St.Clair Streett, he set a two-man airplanealtitude record of 37,854 feetin 1928, and later established anotherrecord for long-distance photographywhen he took a picture of MountRainier from a distance of 227 miles.One of the first intelligence manualsto be published was the TacticalInterpretation of Aerial Photographswhich came out in 1925.An Air Section within the MilitaryIntelligence Department was createdin 1926, in recognition of thegrowing importance of aerial reconnaissance.Maj. Joseph T. McNarney,Air Corps, was assigned to MID inAugust 1926 to act as chief of the newsection. He would:1. Handle all questions on policiespertaining to the use of Air personnelin combat intelligence.2. Handle in connection with theMap section all questions on policiespertaining to serial photographs andmapping.3. Handle in connection with theCommunications Section all questionson policies pertaining to codesor communications between airplanesand the ground.In Europe during World War I,the code analysts in the IntelligenceSection of the General Staff (G2) supervisedthe code compilers of theSignal Corps. Some of the men whoworked at making and breaking thecodes of the war in GHQ in the RadioIntelligence Section of G2 wereMajor Frank Moorman, later theArmy’s Chief Signal Officer, Lieut. J.Rives Childs, Corporal Joseph P.Nathan, Lieut. William F. Friedman,and Lieut. Herbert O. Yardley. Theywould form the nucleus of America’scryptology development.Back in the U.S., MI-8 was operatinga radio intelligence service witha line of listening posts along theMexican border. The 14 radio tractorsspaced along the border wereeventually replaced with permanentstations. A large station in Houlton,Maine, pulled in signals from theNorth Atlantic.Following the war, America’scryptology work would be a jointundertaking of the War and StateDepartments under Herbert O.Yardley, whose inflammatory bookabout his work christened the effortWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.23

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAthe “American Black Chamber.” Hiscryptology section was an outgrowthof the organization he had worked forunder military intelligence in the war.The crowning achievement of theBlack Chamber was the breaking ofthe Japanese diplomatic codes in1920. In 1929 Secretary of StateHenry L. Stimson closed the nation’sonly code-breaking office, declaring“Gentlemen do not read each other’smail.”When the American Black Chamberclosed down, the Army decidedto enlarge its cryptology operationsand appointed William Friedman,now a civilian employee and ChiefCryptanalyst of the U.S. Army SignalCorps, as its chief. In 1930 theSignal Intelligence Service was created,staffed by Friedman, three juniorcryptanalysts and two clerks. Theofficial name was the Signal IntelligenceSection, Office of the ChiefSignal Officer, but Friedman called itthe Signal Intelligence Service and thatbecame the more common usage.Friedman thought the purpose of thenew agency should be to organize andprepare “for operations at maximumefficiency in war.”Friedman conducted some shortcourses in cryptology from 1930 to1933 despite the absence of fundingfor any training. He also developedsome extension courses for an OfficerReserve Corps program. By 1934 theSIS school was formed with 1st Lt.W. Preston Corderman as the instructor.Nine regular Army officers wouldreceive extensive training in communicationsintelligence there by 1941.Signals intelligence field work wasbrought together in the 2d Signal ServiceCompany established at FortMonmouth, New Jersey, in January1939.The giant of U.S. Army cryptography,William Friedman, became theChief Cryptanalyst of the SignalCorps in 1922. His many publica-24Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEtions made him preeminent in thefield. His series of Army texts, MilitaryCryptanalysis, are the most lucidpresentations on the solution of basicciphers that have ever been published.As the Army mobilized for WorldWar II, the Signal Corps cryptographyeffort expanded under the leadershipof Major General JosephMauborgne, Chief Signal Officer, andFriedman. He reached the peak ofhis career when he and his team solvedthe Japanese PURPLE code system in1940. The strain of this endeavor,however, led to a nervous breakdownand his medical retirement as a colonelin the Signal Corps reserves.Friedman and the other inventorsin the SIS developed the M-134ACode Converter in 1937, signing theirindividual patent rights over to theSecretary of War. The machine sawlimited production because of smallbudgets and only 69 were in use justafter Pearl Harbor. Used for highlevelcommunications, it was calledthe SIGABA.The Corps of Intelligence Police,continued after the war, performingsecurity tasks for the Versailles peacetalks, conducting investigations in theU.S. Army occupation forces in Germany,and functioning in Army departments,notably in the 8th CorpsArea which encompassed the MexicanBorder. The number of noncommissionedintelligence police hit anall-time low of 15 in 1934. The organizationwas revitalized in 1940when its authorized staff was raisedto 288. The were redesignated theCounter Intelligence Corps, U.S.Army, on 1 January 1942.Attaches continued, between thetwo world wars, to be a first line sourceof information on foreign militarydevelopments. In major countries theattache was authorized an assistant inthe form of an Air Attache to look atthe technology of air warfare. Theattache in Germany was especially activebetween 1935 to 1939, makinggood use of the U.S. officers who wereattending the German War Academy.Chosen for their proficiency in theGerman language, these student officersmingled at the highest levels inthe German War ministry and wroteauthoritative studies on various assignedaspects of the German Army.Their reports found their way backto the Intelligence Branch. (The PositiveBranch was reorganized in February1922 and emerged three yearslater as the Intelligence Branch ofMID.)The National Defense Act of1920 created a military intelligencereserve within the Officers ReserveCorps. It became effective on 4 August1921, adopting the secretiveSphinx as its symbol. The ACofS,G-2, WDGS, Brig. Gen. Dennis E.Nolan, saw this as a way to expandthe number of military intelligencespecialists in time of war. But becauseof a number of factors, not the leastof which was the lack of an authorizationto grant commissions to recentlydemobilized intelligence personnel,the MI Reserve never reachedits full potential, averaging only about635 officers in the years 1921 to 1941.At the time of the Japanese attack, theMI Reserve was “woefully inadequateto fulfill its assigned mission of providinga proper cadre of military intelligenceofficers for required use inwar,” according to Maj. Gen. ShermanMiles, the G-2 at the beginning ofWorld War II.Electronic warfare got its startearly in the century, according toAlfred Price’s book, The History ofU.S. Electronic Warfare. During the1904 Japanese bombardment of theRussian naval base of Port Arthur, aRussian radio operator on shore heardradio signals from Japanese scoutingcraft used as spotters and correctlyguessed their mission. Using his sparktransmitter, he successfully confusedthe signals and unwittingly opened theera of electronic warfare. Some of theearly landmarks in EW follow. Anelementary radio direction was placedaboard the U.S. Navy coal ship Lebanonin 1906. The Navy bureau chiefwrote that “the system will have a farreachingeffect on the safety of vesselsat sea, and will possibly play an importantpart in naval warfare by makingit feasible to locate the directionof the enemy’s fleet.” Scientists at theNaval Research Laboratories atAnacostia discovered in 1922 that theradio signal that they were sendingacross the Potomac River was interruptedby passing ships, leading to thediscovery of a principle upon whichradar would be founded.A provisional Radio IntelligenceDetachment was organized at FortMonmouth, NJ, in 1934. In 1936engineers at the Naval Research Labbuilt a 28 Mhz pulsed radar thatcould detect aircraft 10 miles away.Subsequent models increased therange with the addition of megahertz.With information from NRL, theSignal Corps Lab at Fort Monmouthalso tested a 110 Mhz pulsed radar.The NRL also developed a grounddirection finder.Between wars the Regular Armyintelligence staff was again pared awayto peacetime levels. Now called theWar Department G2, there were 20officers and 48 civilians on staff.General Dwight Eisenhower remem-Write Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.25

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAbered the “shocking deficiency” in intelligenceassets that hampered planning.“The fault was partly withinand partly without the Army. TheAmerican public has always viewedwith repugnance everything thatsmacks of the spy: during the yearsbetween the two World Wars nofunds were provided with which toestablish the basic requirement of anintelligence system—a far-flung organizationof fact finders.” GeneralGeorge C. Marshall voiced a similarview of the pre-war situation. “Priorto World War II, our foreign intelligencewas little more than what amilitary attache could learn at dinner,more or less over the coffee cups.”The length of this section onWorld War I is indicative of the riseof intelligence to a fully functioningpart of military operations both onthe War Department General Staffand in the field in Europe. In thedecade following the war, however,the intelligence effort, with the exceptionof some internal security missionsand codebreaking, would collapseto almost negligible levels.If the World War I experience hadreformed intelligence as an equal partnerwith the other general staff sections,World War II would be a timeof constant redefinition for the discipline,as its several separate functionssought to organize, reorganize andmerge themselves into some kind ofmeaningful whole best suited to carryout the intelligence mission. ArmyDeputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. JosephMcNarney, himself once assignedto the Military Intelligence Departmentback in 1926, said that theArmy G-2 “was always a headache forthe War Department and was reorganizedcontinuously and unsuccessfullythroughout the war.”The shortage of trained intelligenceofficers and enlisted specialistsin the American Army promptedGeneral Eisenhower to select British26Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEofficers as his G2, a practice he continuedfrom the campaign in NorthAfrica to war’s end. General OmarN. Bradley expressed the problem thisway:The American Army’s longneglect of intelligence training wassoon reflected by the ineptness of ourinitial undertakings. For too manyyears in the preparation of officers forcommand assignments, we had overlookedthe need for specialization insuch activities as intelligence.... Insome stations, the G2 became thedumping ground for officers ill-suitedfor command. I recall how scrupulouslyI avoided the branding thatcame with an intelligence assignmentin my own career. Had it not beenfor the uniquely qualified reservistswho so capably filled so many of ourintelligence jobs throughout the war,the Army would have been pressed....Talking about both the Army andNavy, Secretary of War Henry L.Stimson concluded at the end of 1943that the “intelligence services are prettybum.”The G-2 in the War Departmentwas the largest element of the GeneralStaff. Because of the McNarneyreorganization of the Army staff, theG-2 was reduced to 16 officers and10 others, with 342 officers and1,005 enlisted and civilian personnelmoved to a newly created Military IntelligenceService. The Military IntelligenceService was formed inMarch 1942 as part of a general Armyreorganization that relegated generalstaff sections to just planning functions.This created the need for anoperating agency of G2 that couldcontrol intelligence work in the Zoneof the Interior, such as training forcombat-bound soldiers in escape andevasion and the interrogation of highlevelenemy prisoners in U.S. prisoncamps. The Military Intelligence Servicecoordinated the activities of intelligenceproduction both overseasand in the United States. It was madeup of men who were specialists in avariety of fields, including languagestudents and language experts, scholarsin areas like history, geography andeconomics, world travelers, journalists,and professional investigators.At first, the transfer of MID’soperational functions to MIS waslargely a paper exercise, since the G-2, Maj. Gen. George V. Strong,wished to maintain control over allintelligence assets so as to be in thebest position to advise the Chief ofStaff on intelligence matters.Months after the creation of theMilitary Intelligence Service, a newSpecial Branch was formed to processcommunications intelligence, an outgrowthof the Army’s inability to putMAGIC intercepts in the hands of theproper commanders before the PearlHarbor tragedy. It was headed byBrig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.Other added missions to affect theMIS were some inherited field officesin New York, San Francisco and NewOrleans. In April 1942 a fourthbranch office was set up in Miami tocounter Axis operations in LatinAmerica, which grew to become asemi-independent intelligence agencywith extensive operations in Centraland South America. It was knownsuccessively as the American HemisphereIntelligence Command, theAmerican Intelligence Command, andthe American Intelligence Service.The MIS opened offices in Londonand Washington to analyze captureddocuments under its MilitaryIntelligence Research Section. ThePsychological Warfare Branch assumedthe duties its name impliesuntil the Office of Strategic Servicespicked up this mission in December1942.In April 1943 the Military InformationDivision was given the taskof managing the Army’s World WarII history program. The HistoricalBranch was formed in August 1943with Lt. Col. John M. Kemper as itsfirst chief. It was removed from G-2responsibility in 1945.Under G2 was the Corps of IntelligencePolice, which was renamedthe Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)in 1942. With the mission of recruiting,training and administering Armycounterintelligence personnel, theCorps performed security investigationsin the United States and sent 17-man detachments to combat divisionsoverseas. One of its first and mostinfluential chiefs was Colonel H.Gordon Sheen.When the CIC was established in1942, it had an authorized strengthof 1,026. When Germany surrenderedin May 1945, that figure hadrisen to 7,500. In Washington, D.C.,the headquarters would be located ina single room in the Munitions Buildinguntil they were evicted to a seriesof other accommodations in the city.They eventually settled into a privatehome on North Charles Street in Baltimore.Their activities were far-rangingand diverse, calling upon aresourcefulness that would characterizetheir efforts in all theaters.In the United States during thewar, over 13,000 members of theCIC “pushed nearly a billion doorbells,making more than two and a quartermillion background investigationsand running down leads for thousandsof complaint cases [against suspectedsubversives].” In the U.S. the CICWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.27

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAwas responsible for the security of theManhattan Project, the secret scientificwork on the atomic bomb, andperformed censorship duties for allmail arriving from overseas. CounterIntelligence Corps detachments wereassigned to each Army division in theNorth African, European and Pacifictheaters, with a total of 241 CIC detachmentsoperating during the war.The CIC detachment in Tunisiaconducted psychological warfare operationsin the prolonged fighting atEl Guettar. In North Africa and Italy,CIC agents accounted for hundredsof prisoners from whom they extractedvaluable information. In Sicilythey captured enemy radio transmittersand maps of enemyminefields. In Italy between October1944 and April 1945, the CICcaptured 200 German agents in theFifth U.S. Army area, including Dr.Kora, the commander of a Germanintelligence unit known as AbwehrKommando 190. CIC agents wereairdropped into Normandy on D-Day. They played an important partin the Battle of the Bulge and thecounteroffensive that followed,blunting the subversion campaign ofCol. Otto Skorzeny who had infiltratedEnglish-speaking Germans inU.S. Army uniforms to disrupt operations.In Europe teams of CIC men followedU.S. forces into combat withthe mission of scouting out and capturingGerman work on the atomicbomb and rocketry, and taking intocustody German scientists. This wasknown as the “ALSOS” Mission, ledby Col. Boris Pash who with daringand imagination personally led histeams into enemy-held territory. Inaddition to German and Italian scientists,they seized over 70 tons ofuranium and radium products thatwere shipped to the U.S. for use inAmerican nuclear projects.28Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCECIC units played an even moreimportant role in the postwar occupationof both Germany and Japan,investigating and apprehending warcriminals, rounding up Nazis, andcountering Communist subversion.For instance, the 970th CIC Detachmentin the American Zone of Occupationin Germany, picked up over120,000 Nazis after the war.In the European theater, many ofthe CIC’s counterespionage dutieswere usurped by the OSS. But in thePacific that was prevented by a commanddirective from GeneralMacArthur’s headquarters, proscribingthe OSS from operating in theSouthwest Pacific Area. There wasanother important difference in CICoperations in the Pacific. With fewerurban areas to secure or captured soldiersto interrogate, the CIC was ableto devote more of their time assistingwith combat intelligence and in workingon captured documents. In theLeyte campaign, CIC took into custodyofficials working for the Japaneseand in Luzon in January 1945,30 CIC detachments came ashorewith the invasion force.The CIC secured and capturedenemy headquarters, interrogatedprisoners, and impounded enemydocuments. They arrested or surveilledany suspected enemy agents.They surveyed and protected publicutilities, supply depots or any otherpotential targets of sabotage. Theyseized radio stations and telephoneswitchboards, halting all communicationsand turning over any communicationsdata to Signal Corps personnel.They shut down presses andseized mail for censorship teams.They cooperated with local provostmarshals on matters of law and order.CIC operatives familiarizedthemselves with local economic, politicaland social conditions, and cultivatedwell-placed informants.In the first two months of 1944the CIC headquarters was abolished,its school transferred, and its stagingarea closed down, perhaps the victimof enemies in the Army bureaucracy.It was combined with the ProvostMarshal General, briefly called theSecurity Intelligence Corps, and itsZone of Interior missions were turnedover to the Army Service Forces. Theoverseas CIC detachments continuedto function as before. The CounterIntelligence Corps would reemerge asa separate entity before the war wasover. A new CIC center and schoolwere opened at Fort Meade, thenCamp Holabird, in July 1945, andthe office of the Chief, Counter IntelligenceCorps was reestablishedunder the Intelligence Division of theArmy Service Forces in July 1945,with the Security Intelligence Corpsbeing reassigned from the ProvostMarshal General.The World War II infantry divisionsincorporated a cavalry reconnaissancetroop. Each of their regimentsalso had an Intelligence and Reconnaissance(I&R) Platoon which providedpatrols, observation posts, andperformed other tactical intelligencecollecting missions on behalf of theS2 or regimental intelligence officer.This was typical of the tactical intelligenceorganization of World War IIand reflected a growing appreciationof an organized military intelligenceeffort. Teams of interpreters, interrogators,Order-of-Battle specialistsand photo interpreters were allocatedto each division by theater-level militaryintelligence services. Corps andarmies were also supported by intelligencedetachments.While the Army Air Forces didthe aerial reconnaissance, the Armyretained a small recon capability byusing their L-4 “Grasshoppers” whenthey were not flying their normal artilleryobservation missions.In the allied invasion of Sicily inJuly 1943, deception operations convincedHitler that the blow was goingto fall in the Balkans and that iswhere he moved his reinforcements,allowing the allies to avoid massivecasualties. Deception operations werecarried out by what was called the “A”Force, a forerunner of Eisenhower’sOps “B” deception unit before theNormandy landings. The operationsincluded a body washed up on thecoast of Spain with documents showingthat the allies would next moveon Greece and Sardinia. The ruse suggestedSicily was just the cover targetfor the invasion of Sardinia. Othertechniques included an inflated alliedOrder of Battle fed to the Germansby radio traffic, double agents andrumor. The enlarged OB led theGermans to believe the allies had thecapabilities to carry out these ambitiousassaults around the Mediterranean.Rumors were spread abouttroop movements to the areas of thenotional assaults. Radar reflectors andjamming devices were used at thetime of the actual landings in Sicilyto cloak the invasion, while feints andphoney radio communications divertedGerman attention to otherlanding sites.Deception operations took the artto new levels before the Normandyinvasion when small deception unitsimitated larger tactical formations byfielding mock equipment like inflatabletanks. To complete the picturefor German analysts, the Signal SecurityAgency’s Protective SecurityWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.29

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEcommunications, plain text and lowgradefield ciphers. This was accomplishedby four officers and 100 menin a Radio Intelligence Company,working under the supervision of thecorps G-2. They manned eight to tenintercept positions and one directionfindingposition.At the end of the war, every corpsand army headquarters had an organicRadio Intelligence company, while anArmy Group had a battalion. But itwasn’t until the 113th Signal RadioIntelligence Company landed atNormandy in June 1944 that the firsttactical radio intelligence unit wasfielded. It was estimated that 26,000U.S. soldiers were involved in workingwith communications intelligenceby the end of the war.In the Battle of the Bulge in December1944 and January 1945,Third U.S. Army received airbornejamming support, but jamming wasinfrequent because the Army AirForce was reluctant to fly into heavyantiaircraft and fighter concentrationsand intelligence officers did not wantto deny themselves the good informationthey could get from signalintercepts.The second world war saw theemergence of Electronic Warfare andElectronic Intelligence with the introductionof a range of electronic breakthroughs,foremost among them theuse of long-range radio signals, or radar,to guide planes and ships to theirtarget. The U.S. Army Signal IntelligenceService was able to exploit radiocommunications by interceptingthem and passing them along to thecode-breakers who would apply carefullygathered information about theenemy’s encrypting machines andmathematical theory to decipher thecodes. Using high frequency direction-findingreceivers, the source ofthe message could be determined andthe quantity of the message trafficcould be analyzed to detect enemybuildups and deployment. A definitemilitary advantage was handed to theallies by signals intelligence.The SIS was renamed the SignalSecurity Service in 1942, and againchanged to the Signal Security Agencyin 1943. There were 935 peopleworking for the agency at the beginningof the year and 3,455 at the endof 1943. By June 1944 the effortgrew to employ over 5,100 civiliansat its Arlington Hall headquarters. InDecember 1944 the operational controlof SSA was transferred from theSignal Corps to the War DepartmentG2, its chief customer, and renamedthe Army Security Agency on 15 September1945. It opened a trainingschool at Vint Hill Farms, Virginia,which later would be moved toCarlisle Barracks, Pa., and then to FortDevens, Mass.For secure communications, theWehrmacht confidently depended ontheir electromechanical code machinewhich allowed for each encoded characterto have 1.5 million permutations.Called the “Enigma,” the machinewas thought to be impregnable.But British cryptanalysts solved theworkings of Enigma. The informationgleaned from Enigma interceptswas codenamed ULTRA and gave alliedforces a decided intelligence advantage.Signals intelligence was carriedout in the Pacific by a joint American-Australianagency known as theCentral Bureau organized on 15 April1942. Radio intercepts were handledby the U.S. Signal Intelligence Serviceand the Australian Special WirelessGroup.During World War II, the ArmyAir Corps assumed the mission ofaerial reconnaissance, mostly using P-38s, also known as F-5As, configuredwithout guns or ammo but with theirdistinctive long-range fuel tanks underthe wings. On some occasionsarmed F-6s were also used so that pilotscould attack targets of opportunity.So large had the number ofphoto recce planes grown by 1943,that the Air Corps flew as many as200 missions in one month in 1943and delivered over half a million prints.The photo planes were assigned totactical reconnaissance squadrons in1944.Training in the several intelligencedisciplines was carried out in a rangeof schools across the country. TheSignal Corps operated its SIGINTschool for officers and civilians at ArlingtonHall, its headquarters and aformer junior college for girls, whileenlisted personnel were trained at VintHill Farms in Warrenton, Virginia.The Counter Intelligence Corps conductedCI training at its U.S. ArmyInvestigative Training School in Chicago.The Military Intelligence ServiceLanguage School gave languagetraining to second generation Japanese-Americansat Fort Snelling, Minnesota.For most intelligence personnel,the Military Intelligence TrainingCenter at Camp Ritchie, Maryland,was the training site. There, in an oldNational Guard Armory, 19,669combat intelligence specialists weregraduated during the war.In the Pacific theater, GeneralDouglas MacArthur developed hisown intelligence apparatus, combiningseveral different joint and combinedorganizations under his G-2,Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby.Write Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.31

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAWorking out of Australia, theCentral Bureau performed code workand the Allied Intelligence Bureau didclandestine operations. In the SouthwestPacific Area, the AIB replaced theOffice of Strategic Services which wasprohibited from operating in the theaterby MacArthur’s policies. It usedAustralian coast watchers, many ofthem stay-behind agents, to report onJapanese fleet movements. In thePhilippines, native agents and guerillaforces were used to good advantage.An important arm ofMacArthur’s reconnaissance capabilitieswas a commando organizationknown as the ALAMO Scouts, whowere trained for patrolling behindenemy lines.The Allied Translator and InterpreterSection (ATIS) used as manyas 2,000 American Nisei soldiers toprovide interrogation and translationservices from headquarters level downto the front lines. During the war theATIS language teams translated350,000 captured documents anddebriefed 10,000 prisoners. Theunit’s duties carried over into the postwardisarming of Japan and her colonies.The section was headed byColonel Sidney F. Mashbir, himself astudent of Japanese and former undercoveragent in Tokyo.Technical intelligence (TI) teamsbegan to be deployed to the Pacific inDecember 1942 to speedily examinecaptured enemy equipment in orderto make use of its technical characteristics.The Office of the Coordinator ofInformation was established on 11July 1941 to conduct covert operationsand supply information necessaryto the national security. At itshead was William J. Donovan, a NewYork lawyer and World War I Medalof Honor winner. Exactly one yearlater President Roosevelt ordered thatthe office be renamed the Office ofStrategic Services (OSS) and placedunder control of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff. According to Allen Dulles, theagency recruited some of the nation’sbest historians and scholars to man itsresearch and analysis desks. The OSSwas given a charge “to collect and analyzestrategic information and to planand operate special services.” Someof its special services included droppingteams behind enemy lines to supportresistance movements, gatherintelligence, spread disinformation,carry out sabotage missions, and undertakecounterespionage work. OSSconducted espionage and partisanoperations which captured the public’simagination, largely because of thedescriptions of their colorful exploitspublished by their literary membersafter the war. The ranks of the OSSwere filled with some 8,000 Armypersonnel. One of the most notableof these special operatives was Col.Carl Eifler who commanded thefamed Detachment 101 in Burma andsecured the vital Stilwell Road.Maj. Gen. George V. Strong waschief of the Military InformationDivision in 1942 when the OSS camealong and was determined to have hisown foreign intelligence unit. He createdwhat became known as theGrombach Organization, named afterits head, Colonel John V.“Frenchy” Grombach, to run highlysecret operations in Europe from1942 to about 1947. Little is knownabout this shadowy Army unit andits competition with the OSS.The Army Security Agency wasformed under the command of theDirector of Intelligence, U.S. Army,on 15 September 1945. It absorbedthe missions of the former Signal SecurityAgency and its operating arm,the 2d Signal Service Battalion. It wasalso responsible for signals intelligenceand communications security of allArmy assets in the field. The first headof the Army Security Agency wasBrig. Gen. W. Preston Cordermanwho, as a first lieutenant, was the soleinstructor at the Signal IntelligenceService’s first formal school in 1934.Its all-encompassing mission was diminishedtoward the end of the decadeas some of its functions wereturned over to the Air Force SecurityService and the joint-service ArmedForces Security Agency, which wouldbecome the National Security Agencyin 1952.Acting on a proposal of WilliamDonovan of the old OSS, PresidentTruman called for the establishmentof a permanent central intelligenceagency that would operate as an armof the executive branch of governmentto counteract Communist tacticsof “coercion, subterfuge, and politicalinfiltration.” Congress passedthe National Security Act of 1947.It created the Central IntelligenceAgency which would be responsiblefor coordinating the intelligence activitiesof the various governmentdepartments and make evaluationsand recommendations to the NationalSecurity Council. In 1947 theCIA vowed “Bigger Than State by’48,” and it would succeed, receivinga larger budget allocation than theState Department a year later.While Donovan succeeded inwinning over the administration tohis recommendations concerning theneed for a national intelligence apparatus,the CIA did not do away withthe Military Intelligence Division.But recommendations from within32Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEthe Army for a Military IntelligenceCorps failed to convince the War Departmentof its need in peacetime andintelligence functions would continueto be performed by officers drawnfrom other branches. A Strategic IntelligenceSchool was opened in 1947as part of the Army’s school system.With the formation of the DefenseDepartment and the Central IntelligenceAgency by the National DefenseAct of 1947, Army intelligencebecame subordinated to the larger intelligencerole played by these organizations.Further, most of its aerialcapabilities were sheared away by thenew U.S. Air Force.U.S. Army intelligence emergedfrom World War II with an outstandingrecord, not only in SIGINT, butin all areas of combat intelligence aswell. It was a heady time for the Armyintelligence officers, former wartimeS2s and G2s, who assembled at FortRiley, Kansas, in 1946 to open theIntelligence School. They felt theyhad a lot of lessons to pass along andsome wrote books on how to performthe intelligence function. But postwardemobilization would decimatetheir ranks and reduce the AmericanArmy to its customary peacetimeshell. Few realized that America’s nextwar was only a few years away.When North Korean forces rolledacross the 38th parallel with its Soviet-madearmor in June 1950, theRepublic of Korea and its sponsor, theUnited States, were taken by surprise.A desperate perimeter set up aroundthe southernmost city of Pusan justbarely prevented the peninsula frombeing completely overrun. GeneralDouglas MacArthur’s brilliantly conceivedleft hook, landing United Nationsforces at Inchon behind the enemylines, succeeded in pushing thenow disorganized North KoreanArmy to the northernmost reaches oftheir country. But the UN allies weresurprised a second time by the Chi-Write Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.33

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAnese intervention which drove UN/US forces, now under Gen. MatthewRidgway, back south of Seoul. A UNoffensive would regain a line roughlyapproximating the old 38th parallelborder. Bitter fighting marked thestalemate over the next two years beforea truce was concluded in July1953.In August 1950, Colonel T.F. VanNatta, an Instructor at the Commandand General Staff College, was writingin Military Review that the intelligencesystem had been substantiallyimproved and sound doctrine established.He urged commanders tolearn how to use intelligence and torealize that it was their responsibility.He cautioned them not to expect theG-2 to know what the enemy intendedto do, but to concentrate oncapabilities. He said the results a commandergets from intelligence willdepend on the “quality of the peoplehe uses and the amount of personalattention he gives.”Korea was another crisis for Armyintelligence, as it was in fact for theentire post-World War II U.S. Army.General James Van Fleet, who commandedthe Eighth U.S. Army from1951 to 1953, remarked that sinceWorld War II “we have lost throughneglect, disinterest, and possible jealousy,much of the effectiveness in intelligencework that we acquired sopainfully in World War II.” In hisopinion, the Army had not “yet approachedthe standards we reached inthe final year of the last war.”With the dismantling of almostall of the Army’s intelligence specialisttraining following World War II,the Korean War found the U.S. Armywithout order of battle specialists,photo interpreters, technical intelligenceanalysts, or even languagetrainedinterrogators. The IntelligenceDepartment, opened in 1947at Fort Riley’s Army Ground Schoolwas not graduating anywhere thenumbers needed. It took over threemonths to get the 60th Signal ServiceCompany, an ASA unit, to Koreato support the Eighth U.S. Armywith communications intelligence.By war’s end the ASA’s 501st CommunicationReconnaissance Groupwas providing support with three battalionsand five companies.Detachments of MI specialists,CIC, and ASA personnel were attachedto each division. As they werein World War II, 17-man CIC detachmentswere assigned to each divisionand they largely succeeded in protectingrear areas against enemy intelligenceactions. As intelligence specialistswere graduated from the IntelligenceDepartment, they were shippedto Korea to MI units like the 500thMI Service Group and the 163d MIService detachment which supportedtactical units.The commander’s tools in theKorea fighting were limited to prisonerinterrogation and aerial reconnaissance.There was little in the wayof SIGINT. Allied commanders werealso hamstrung by the prohibition ofoverflights or agent penetrations beyondthe Yalu, into Chinese territory.This blinded them to the size and imminenceof the Chinese intervention.Aerial reconnaissance played animportant role in Korea, such as deliveringphotos of the Inchon areaprior to the landing there. The AirForce effort was hampered by the initiallack of Army photo interpreters.For military intelligence, the KoreanWar was fought in World War IIterms. Little had changed in the intelligencearena in either technologyor organization. But the war wouldprovoke postwar appraisals and resultin some important changes in intelligenceorganization and professionalism.The changes took hold just intime for another war in Asia.The National Security Agencywas created in 1952 to eavesdrop onthe enemy. Its mission was to pullradio transmissions out of the etherand decode them. The agency’s emphasison closely guarded secrecyamong its employees caused some tointerpret its acronym as “Never SayAnything.” NSA’s establishmentmarked a shift in intelligence gatheringaway from the infiltrated or recruitedagents that had provided informationfrom time immemorial toelectronic surveillance. Russian penetrationof British intelligence serviceshad compromised spy networks and,to some minds, made the use of humanagents too untrustworthy.In the period following the KoreanWar, intelligence became agrowth industry as it began to garnernew respect. New agencies and professionalforums flourished. In 1955the Signal Corps transferred itsproponency for electronic intelligenceand warfare to the Army SecurityAgency which became a field operatingagency under the Army Chief ofStaff instead of being subordinate tothe Acofs, G-2. The U.S. Army SecurityAgency was made a majorArmy command in 1964.In 1956 the G2 in theDepartment of the Army wasredesignated the Assistant Chief ofStaff, Intelligence (ACSI), a two-starbillet. Thus intelligence was onceagain relegated to a secondary positionas Personnel, Operations, andLogistics were all reorganized asDeputy Chief of Staff positions filled34Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEby Lieutenant Generals.To complement communicationsintelligence, the CIA initiated a programof imagery intelligence over theSoviet Union in 1956, using a planecalled the U-2, designed by KellyJohnson at Lockheed Corporation.Able to fly at 70,000 feet, the U-2could stay above enemy missile ceilings.In 1960, however, a new highaltitude defense missile brought downa U-2 and its pilot, Gary Powers, wascaptured. The incident caused PresidentEisenhower to cancel U-2 flights.The aerial surveillance mission wascontinued by satellite reconnaissanceemploying high-resolution camerasdeveloped by Polaroid. The satelliteprogram had been receiving high priorityfunding since 1955 and in 1959the National Reconnaissance Officewas formed under Air Force auspicesto control the satellite systems whichbegan operating in 1960.When the Department of Defensewas reorganized in 1958, an IntelligenceDirectorate, J2, was set up underthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCSJ2 would be disestablished five yearslater as a result of the Defense IntelligenceAgency’s assumption of manyof its roles. Concurrently, a UnitedStates Intelligence Board was createdwith the Army’s Assistant Chief ofStaff for Intelligence as one of thevoting members.Lessons from the Korean Warand “Operation Sagebrush,” a 1954maneuver held in Louisiana,prompted a new tactical intelligenceorganization known as Military IntelligenceOrganization (MIO).Adopted in 1958, MIO tailored theintelligence support to Army theatersof operation by assigning military intelligencepersonnel to an MI Battalion,rather than assigning themindividually to tactical units. Subordinateelements of the battalionwould perform specialized tasks forthe tactical commander like collec-Write Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.35

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAtion, interrogation, technical intelligenceand counterintelligence. TheMI battalion was usually assigned toa field army, while divisions were supportedby MI detachments.First established as the U.S. ArmyIntelligence Center in September1954, the U.S. Army IntelligenceSchool was opened at Fort Holabird,Md, on 1 May 1955 to teach counterintelligence,combat intelligenceand area studies. It replaced the oldIntelligence Department at FortRiley’s Army Ground School.The Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) was created in 1961 by DefenseSecretary Robert McNamara so thatall defense intelligence operationswould be coordinated at a single andcentral high-level agency rather thanbe handled separately by the intelligenceservices of the Army, Navy andAir Force. Collection requirementsand estimates now were prepared atDIA. The agency assumed operationsof the U.S. Army Strategic IntelligenceSchool and in 1965 became responsiblefor the military attache system.The move was seen by many inthe separate services as an effort tostrip them of their autonomy. AllenDulles disagreed. “DIA was not amerger of the intelligence branches ofthe armed services, but primarily anattempt to achieve maximum coordinationand efficiency in the intelligenceprocesses of the three services.”The Counter Intelligence Corpswas renamed in 1961 as the U.S.Army Intelligence Corps, and in 1965it became a major field command ofthe Army known as the IntelligenceCorps Command. It had subordinateMilitary Intelligence Groups supportingeach Army area in the United Stateswith a network of regional and fieldoffices. Their primary work wascounterintelligence: Performing securityinvestigations of personnel needingclearances and supporting operationalsecurity.The Army Intelligence and SecurityBranch was created on 1 July 1962to meet the need for a career field forthe increasing number of officers performingintelligence missions. It wasmade up of strategic and combat intelligenceofficers from both the IntelligenceCorps and the Army SecurityAgency. It was the RegularArmy’s first MI branch. An organizationfor Military Intelligence Reserveofficers had existed in one formor another since 1921, the latest beingthe Army Intelligence and ArmySecurity Branches formed for reserveofficers in 1952. The Regular Army’sArmy Intelligence and SecurityBranch was redesignated the MilitaryIntelligence Branch in 1967.American involvement in Vietnamsteadily increased as the instabilityof the South Vietnamese governmentled to greater possibilities of aCommunist insurgent victory in theSouth. Escalating from a small advisoryrole in 1961, the U.S. committedair power and ground forces in1965. While the military fought onthe often ill-defined battlefields ofVietnam, the politicians found themselvesfaced with growing anti-warsentiment at home. Army intelligencewould be asked to contribute itsknow-how on both fronts until thewithdrawal of U.S. forces in 1973.Following the peace agreement inJanuary 1973, the last intelligenceunit pulled out by March, ending forthem what had been a mixed experience.The unpopularity of the war gaverise to the myth that the Army was“managing” its intelligence in relationto enemy strength figures, keeping thenumbers low so that the war wouldnot be seen in defeatist terms by politiciansback in Washington. Themyth was fueled by some Army officersand a CIA analyst named SamAdams, whose own calculations arrivedat much higher numbers. Theproblem lay in interpretation. If youcounted irregular forces who weresympathizers to the Communistcause and would be expected to providelogistic and service support fromtime to time, but were unarmed andnot part of a trained fighting organization,the numbers would be high.However, if you discounted these SelfDefense and Secret Self Defenseforces, as MACV J-2 did in theirmonthly Order of Battle Summary,because they did not consider themto constitute a significant threat toallied combat forces, the numberswould be lower.Army intelligence received anotherundeserved blow when the presscriticized it for failing to warn of theTet Offensive when in fact intelligencecorrectly predicted the attack to theday and pinpointed what forces wouldbe involved. If intelligence was to befaulted, it would only be for failingto appreciate the scale of the Tet Offensive.Maj. Gen. Joseph A.McChristian became the first ArmyMACV J-2 on 13 July 1965. Hisfirst move was to organize the CombinedIntelligence Center-Vietnam(CICV), a centralized intelligenceanalysis and research facility in Saigon.Every kind of intelligence data beingcollected flowed into this center foranalysis and storage in an IBM computer.Captured documents, Orderof Battle information, terrain studies,POW interrogation reports, technical36Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEintelligence reports, information fromcovert agents, and photo interpretationwas brought together from bothU.S. and RVN sources. McChristianconsidered the CICV “one of the finestsupports of combat intelligencethat was ever deployed in support ofour forces in wartime.”The U.S. and the South Vietnameseoperated four intelligence centersin 1967. They were the CombinedIntelligence Center, Vietnam;Combined Military InterrogationCenter; Combined Document ExploitationCenter, and CombinedMateriel Exploitation Center. TheCICV employed about 500 Americanand 100 South Vietnamese. TheAmerican staffing for these centerscame from the 519th MI Battalionwhich also supplied the manpower forthe MI detachments serving withARVN corps, divisions and provincialheadquarters. They not onlytrained the ARVN counterparts butprovided intelligence of U.S. field intelligenceadvisors and the U.S. intelligencecommunity. Lt. Gen. WilliamE. Potts, Gen. Creighton Abrams’J-2, would gradually between 1969and 1972 turn these centers over tothe Vietnamese.On 1 June 1967, McChristianwas replaced by Army Maj. Gen.Philip Davidson who reorganized theArmy intelligence units to more efficientlysupport the units in the field.The U.S. Army Intelligence Command(USAINTC) was established in1965 as a major Army command(MACOM) to handle counterintelligencefunctions in the United States,collecting domestic intelligence in theevent federal troops were called outto intervene in riots. It operated withseven Army counterintelligencegroups. With the widespread antiwarfeeling and unrest, the FBI was hardpressed to meet the demands of preparingdomestic intelligence and theU.S. Army Intelligence CommandWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.37

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAfilled the void. This involvementwith civilian intelligence brought criticismand recriminations for the Armywhich ended its domestic collectionin 1970. The Defense InvestigativeService came into being to performthe background investigations necessaryto grant security clearances, a jobthat had made up 90 percent ofUSAINTC’s mission. Significantlycut back in mission and personnel,USAINTC was closed down in 1974.It was replaced by the U.S. Army IntelligenceAgency (USAINTA), a fieldoperating agency of ACSI.The U.S. Army Security Agency(USASA) became a major army fieldcommand in 1964 and then becameknown as the U.S. Army Intelligenceand Security Command (INSCOM)in 1977.Army Chief of Staff Harold K.Johnson approved on 1 July 1967 therecommendations of the NorrisBoard, a body specially created to lookat the Army’s intelligence programsand organization. As a result, the oldArmy Intelligence and SecurityBranch, which had included the ArmySecurity Agency (ASA), now becamethe Military Intelligence Branch. TheMI mission changed from one ofcombat service support to combatsupport. And now the Army beganstudying the possibility of moving theIntelligence School from FortHolabird and centralizing the trainingfor the many intelligence specialties.The early years of the war foundmilitary intelligence assets inadequateand unsophisticated, a situation whichhad become the pattern in everyAmerican war. In 1965 there were200 U.S. army officers serving as intelligenceadvisers with Republic ofVietnam troops. When U.S. combattroops were committed in thatyear, the 704th Intelligence CorpsDetachment, a detachment of the500th Intelligence Corps Group, andthe 3d Radio Research Unit were onduty in Vietnam. But there wereshortages of specialists, especially linguists.Lieut. Gen. Harry W. O.Kinnard, commanding the 1st CavalryDivision in 1965, commented onthe early problems with identifyingthe enemy:When I took the 1st CavalryDivision to Vietnam in 1965, I knewthat finding the enemy would be oneof our toughest jobs. It occurred tome that perhaps we would be able toidentify the guerrilla, a farmer by dayand a fighter by night, by the darkcircles under his eyes.... As it turnedout, our surveillance was just aboutthat unsophisticated.But improvements were on theway. By the 1968 Tet Offensive,there were 2,500 intelligence specialistsin country under the supervisionof the U.S. Military Assistance Command,Vietnam (MACV), J-2. InSaigon the 525th Military IntelligenceGroup exercised command and controlover the 135th MI Group, acounterintelligence unit; the 149thMI Group, which engaged in positivecollection; the 1st MI Battalion(Aerial Reconnaissance); and the519th MI Battalion, which operatedthe joint US/RVN intelligence centers.The combined intelligence centersshared jointly gathered intelligence,translated captured documentsand interrogated prisoners. There wasa center at MACV and at each of thefour corps areas in which the Republicof Vietnam Army (ARVN) operated.There were over 600 intelligenceadvisers on the ground nowwith the RVN Army. The 509thRadio Research Group ran a field stationand provided support through itstactical units to units down to brigadelevel. Combat troops had their ownorganic intelligence assets.Another unique type of unit to beintroduced in the Vietnam War wasthe Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol(LRRP) which consisted of fourto six-man teams inserted into enemyterritory to gather intelligence or submitbattle-damage assessments. TheMilitary Assistance Command, Vietnam,Studies and Observation Group(MACV-SOG) was a joint serviceunit under the command of the Commander-in-Chief,Pacific(CINCPAC), which inserted intelligenceteams into enemy territory byland, sea or air.It was during the Vietnam Warthat military intelligence reached apotential unparalleled in history. Usingthe latest electronic gear to detectthe enemy, both from the air and theground, hostile concentrations werepin-pointed and enemy traps wereavoided or surprised. Ground surveillanceradars were employed, sidelookingairborne radar (SLAR) wasdeployed and a variety of night observationdevices were used whichtook advantage of infrared and image-intensification.The first use of UnattendedGround Sensors (UGS) was made bythe Marines at Khe Sanh in 1968.They were credited with contributingto the successful defense of theMarine base and would evolve in bothsophistication and numbers deployed.The UGS could detect the presenceof the enemy by acoustic, seismic, ormagnetic indicators which were sentback to monitoring stations.38Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEThe combat intelligence battalionthat was assigned to a division duringthe Vietnam War was organized asfollows: A headquarters and headquarterscompany was responsible forcommand and control, communications,radar, remote sensor and vehiclemaintenance, and supply services.Ground surveillance radars and remotesensors were deployed by a materielexploitation platoon of theHHC. An intelligence operationscompany furnished counterintelligenceand interrogation support forthe division and manned the battlefieldinformation control centers(BICC) and battlefield informationcenters (BIC). Long-range reconnaissancefor the division was providedby the ground recon-naissance and surveil-lancecompany. An aerial targetacquisition and combat surveillancecompany had the job of providingboth aerial electronic surveillance andimagery inter-pretation through theuse of utility and attack helicopters.Some concepts growing out of theVietnam experience were the Surveillance,Target Acquisition, Night Observation(STANO) program, an intensivemanagement system for surveillanceoperations and products; andthe Integrated Battlefield ControlSystem (IBCS), a program designedto aid the commander’s decisionmakingprocess by combining all ofthe technological tools.Perhaps the single greatest reasonfor the improved intelligence apparatusin the Vietnam War was the senseof professionalism instilled by an MIbranch. During the war in Vietnam,the Military Intelligence Branch grewto 7,000 officers and became the fifthlargest branch. Colonel William F.Strobridge, the G2 in the 4th InfantryDivision operating along the Cambodianborder in 1970, expressed hisfeelings on being in the Military IntelligenceBranch, created only threeyears earlier:...possibly unlike the non-MIBranch officer, I felt as an MI officerworking as a combat division G2 thatI was at the zenith of my professionaland personal satisfaction. I was playingfirst fiddle for a varied and skilledassemblage of intelligence players thatwere part of my chosen career field. Ifelt, as an MI officer, I had greatercommand of the multiple types ofintelligence support I could get for thedivision. As an MI officer, I couldtalk nose-to-nose with other MIpeople on the quality and timelinessof their support, and as an MI officerI could eradicate any hangups MI personnelmight have about supportingan infantry division. There is no questionin my mind that the MI specialists,sergeants, warrant officers, lieutenants,captains, and majors that Iworked with each day passed the testin the 4th Infantry Division, becausewhen the division commander receiveda richly deserved promotion,he specified he wanted another MIofficer for his G2.Despite all of the acknowledgedsuccess of intelligence support in Vietnam,there were still deficiencies, mostof which could be categorized under“untimely response.” It was GeneralPatton who remarked that he likedintelligence, “like eggs, the fresher thebetter.” The appetite for intelligenceis and always will be insatiable. Theresult is often an information overloadthat strains the ability of the systemto process and disseminate theanalyzed information in a timely manner.In Vietnam, depending on thesource, the time elapsed from the occurrenceof an event to the time thereport reached the hands of the usercould range from 15 minutes in thecase of a triggered ground surveillanceradar to 72 hours in the case of anagent report. In between were elapsedtimes of 20 minutes for an airbornepersonnel detector, 50 minutes for anunattended ground sensor, an hourand a half for a usually reliable intelligencereport, known as “special intelligence,”four hours for SLAR and airborneinfrared, five and one-half hoursfor prisoner interrogation, and sixhours for intelligence civic action program.These processing times weretoo long to be useful to the commanderwho was dealing with a fastmoving,guerilla force which dependeda great deal on deception.After Vietnam, the U.S. Armywas determined to find a better wayto organize and focus its intelligenceassets to more efficiently serve thecombat commander.In the final years of the VietnamWar, and over the decades that followed,Army intelligence faced athicket of challenges and alternatingbouts of contraction and growth. Thelast quarter of the 20th century wouldbe a time of self-definition and reemergenceas an equal partner withoperations, personnel, and logistics.With the war in Southeast Asiaover, the emphasis pivoted to theEuropean theater where intelligencewas expected to counter the superiornumbers of the Warsaw Pact forceswith the celerity of its early warninginformation.The MI community would betransformed, not only by its ownfrenzy of reorganization, but bychanges taking place in the U.S. Armyas a whole. In 1972 the draft was discontinued,drying up a reservoir ofWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.39

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAcollege-trained manpower; by 1973the strength was cut by half, causingsome leaders to refer to it as “a hollowArmy;” and in 1976 women soldierswere assimilated across the Armyrather than segregated in the now defunctWomen’s Army Corps.In 1970 a former MI officer,Christopher Pyle, wrote an articledetailing Army surveillance of legitimatepolitical organizations like theNational Association for the Advancementof Colored People, supervisedby the U.S. Army Intelligence Commandat Fort Holabird, Maryland. Ittriggered congressional investigationsand resulted in the June 1970 AdjutantGeneral directive which halted allArmy involvement in domestic intelligence.Recriminations lingered in thepublic mind over the next decadeabout the part played by Army counterintelligencein reinforcing the FBIat times when domestic intelligencewas collected on anti-war activities.The Army was a reminder to manyof the divisions over the Vietnam Warthat tore the fabric of American society.The special problems that facedArmy intelligence in those uncertainpostwar years included the lack of anycentral organization. The pieces thatmade up the MI mosaic were oftenscattered, isolated and uncoordinated.They needed to be cemented togetherin some more practical organization.This fusion did not happen all at once,but incrementally and tentatively.Since 1945 the Army SecurityAgency (ASA) controlled the Army’scode and signals intelligence througha vertical organizational structure inwhich all its units reported directlyupward. In 1955 it took over all ElectronicWarfare responsibilities and in1964 it became one of the Army’smajor field commands. The ASA ranits own training schools and undertookits own research and development.It encompassed a network oflistening posts around the worldcalled field stations, and operatedaloft in specially configured U-21scalled Special Electronic Mission Aircraft.This vast effort was indicativeof the predominant role that SIGINThad assumed in the Cold War. Becauseof its self-sustaining commandstructure and the cloak of secrecy thatshrouded its operations, it wasthought to be separated from theArmy main stream by a metaphorical“green door.”Since 1965 the U.S. Army IntelligenceCommand performed theHUMINT and counterintelligencemissions for the Army. With sevensubordinate groups in the continentalUnited States, it conducted backgroundinvestigations on Army personneland became involved in domesticintelligence work during theheight of the anti-Vietnam Warmovement. This latter role was thesubject of much civilian criticism ofthe government and was dropped inthe early 1970s. At the same timethe Intelligence Command waswhittled away to two subordinategroups, and its mission of performingbackground checks was turnedover the Defense Investigative Servicespecifically created for that purpose.Eventually, it was discontinued entirelyin 1974 and succeeded by theU.S. Army Intelligence Agency whichassumed the HUMINT missions forthe Army.One of the most far-reachingchanges to the MI structure was theestablishment of a home for militaryintelligence training at FortHuachuca. Heretofore, ASA did itstraining at the U.S. Army SecurityAgency Training Center and Schoolat Fort Devens, Massachusetts, whilethe U.S. Army Intelligence School atFort Holabird, Maryland, carried outschooling in general military intelligence.In 1966, Maj. Gen. Joseph A.McChristian, the Assistant Chief ofStaff for Intelligence, asked that theArmy’s intelligence training be examinedfor the purpose of consolidatingthe fragmented training that wasspread over several commands andconducted at different schools. TheArmy Chief of Staff, Gen. Harold K.Johnson, responded by forming theNorris Board to evaluate intelligenceprograms. He approved the NorrisBoard recommendations on 1 July1967.As a result of the initiative of Maj.Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, theNorris Board deliberations, and theovercrowded conditions at FortHolabird, it was determined to consolidateMI training at a single newlocation. In 1971 the concept becamea reality when the Intelligence Schoolwas moved from the banks of ColgateCreek to the foothills of theHuachuca Mountains. From its inceptionin 1971, the U.S. Army IntelligenceCenter and School contributeda host of innovations and programsthat would revamp the MI community.The Commanding General of theIntelligence Center and School wasmade the proponent for the MilitaryIntelligence Branch in 1983. As such,he became concurrently the Chief,Military Intelligence. In October1989, the CG of the Intelligence Centerand School became FortHuachuca’s installation commander,making Army intelligence the leadagency at that historic site.40Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEIn 1974 the Chief of Staff directeda study to determine the bestorganization to carry out intelligenceand electronic warfare missions.Called the Intelligence Organizationand Stationing Study (IOSS), itschairman Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Ursanoannounced its recommendations in1975. It resulted in a basic restructuringof military intelligence assets,one that would completely revampthe intelligence organization and howthey did business. The Ursano Boardfound that intelligence productionwas compartmentalized, especiallywithin ASA which did not share itsproduct with the tactical commanderor make the electronic warfare weaponryavailable to the Army as a whole.Likewise, it determined that intelligencewas inefficiently organized invertical lines which did not intersect.The U.S. Army Security Agencywas merged with the U.S. Army IntelligenceAgency and its intelligenceproduction components formed anew major Army command on 1January 1977 called the U.S. ArmyIntelligence and Security Command(INSCOM). The “green door” ofASA had been unhinged. NowINSCOM had the mission of accomplishingmulti-discipline intelligence,security, and electronic warfare functionsat the echelon above corps. Itpooled a number of its newly acquiredproduction functions into an Intelligenceand Threat Analysis Center in1977. In 1978 it took over the U.S.Army Russian Institute and in 1980it gained the Special Security Groupwhich disseminated Sensitive CompartmentedInformation (SCI) to theentire army.The former Foreign Science andTechnology Center of the Army MaterielCommand and its Missile andSpace Intelligence Center both cameover to INSCOM in 1983 and werecombined with the Intelligence andThreat Analysis Center to form theWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.41

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAshort-lived Army Intelligence Agency,a field operating agency of ACSI.It was INSCOM, the Army’s ServiceCryptologic Element (SCE), thatsupported operations of both theNSA and Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA). INSCOM’s 704th MI Brigade,formerly the CONUS MIGroup, exercised command and controlover many of INSCOM’s subordinateagencies and provided staffpersonnel for the National SecurityAgency, at Fort Meade, MD.When INSCOM took over theArmy Security Agency’s mission andassets, it assumed control of a networkof fixed installations called field stationsat Berlin and Augsburg, Germany;Sinop, Turkey; Okinawa andMisawa, Japan; Pyongtaek, Korea;Key West, Florida; and San Antonio,Texas. In 1986 the station atOkinawa was shut down, but otherscame on line during that decade atKunia, Hawaii, and Panama. Thesestations housed sophisticatedSIGINT equipment and were recognizableby their large antenna arrays.In 1987 MI brigades and battalionswere organized to provide the Armypersonnel at these field stations unitswith which to identify.INSCOM also fieldedmultidiscipline MI groups to supporttheater-level Army operations aroundthe world. The original four groupswere the 66th (the largest in Munich,Germany), 501st (at Yongsan, a neighborhoodof Seoul, Korea), 500th (locatedat Camp Zama in the suburbsof Toyko, Japan), and 470th (atCamp Clayton, Panama). A fifth, the513th MI Group, was added in 1982at Fort Monmouth, NJ, to supportcontingency operations for theArmy’s Central Command.During the 1980s, INSCOMalso operated a number of specializedintelligence, counterintelligence, andsupport organizations. They were the902d MI Group which was responsiblefor the Army’s counterintelligencethroughout CONUS; the SpecialSecurity Group, the agency thatcontrolled the Sensitive CompartmentedInformation traffic to themajor Army commands and accreditedthe facilities; the Central SecurityFacility which oversaw the workof the Investigative Records Repositoryand the Freedom of Informationand Privacy Office; the U.S. ArmyRussian Institute at Sheridan Barracksin Garmisch, Germany; and the ForeignLanguage Training Center, Europe.INSCOM moved into its newheadquarters at Fort Belvoir, VA, in1989.Field intelligence units, followingthe Ursano report, were no longercontrolled by the Assistant Chief ofStaff for Intelligence, but integratedinto the normal Army commandstructure, making them responsive tothe tactical commander. The old ASAunits were absorbed into combat electronicwarfare and intelligence(CEWI) units which combined Armyintelligence and security disciplines.The Yom Kippur War of 1973 validatedthe theories of many Armythinkers who saw an increasing rolefor electronic warfare.The new multi-disciplined CEWIunits supported divisions with CEWIbattalions and corps with CEWIgroups and later brigades. This gavethe tactical commander better controlover electronic warfare, signals intelligence,operational security, andground surveillance radar which werenow integrated into one unit. Theyeliminated the old isolation of thevarious components of the intelligencepicture and enabled electronicwarfare to assume a more useful placein the commander’s arsenal. In October1976 the first CEWI battalion,the 522d MI (CEWI) Battalion, wasactivated. After a series of field tests,it was decided to activate CEWI unitsArmywide during 1983. In the wordsof one observer, “the intelligence communityhad gone all out tactical.”The line companies performed thefunctions of collection and jamming,ground surveillance through radarsand sensors, and service support, whilethe headquarters company handledcollection management, counterintelligence,interrogation, and aviationpersonnel. Airborne collection battalionswere redesignated as MilitaryIntelligence Battalions (Aerial Exploitation)as part of the 1985 reorganizationand they combined aerial surveillancewith imagery interpretation.CEWI groups became brigades in1985.A test for the tactical capabilitiesof MI and its organization arose withthe launching of an invasion ofGrenada in the Carribean, thoughtnecessary by President Ronald Reaganto protect American citizens and interests.Operation URGENT FURY, thecode name for the U.S. invasion ofpolitically torn Grenada, involvedJoint Task Force 120, commanded byVice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III.Army Major General H. NormanSchwarzkopf was his deputy. The islandof Grenada had been dividedinto two zones of responsibility, thenorthern part to be occupied by theNavy and Marines, and the southernportion belonging to the Army andAir Force. Navy SEALs landed on24 October 1983 at 2200 hours on42Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEthe northeast coast to reconnoiterwhat would be Marine landingbeaches. On the southern tip of theisland, an Air Force AC-130 Spectre,armed with infrared sensors and lowlightTV cameras was taking a lookat the Point Salines airfield in preparationfor the 1st and 2d battalionsof the 75th Rangers to jump in.The Marines landed on 25 October,took the defenders by surprise,and secured the Pearls airport by 0630.The Rangers encountered stiffer resistancefrom Cuban forces, but by midmorningof the 25th the runway atPort Salines was open and the leadelements of the 82d Airborne Divisionbegan arriving at 1405 hours.The U.S. citizens attending medicalschools on the island were rescued, thedictator General Austin and his bodyguardswere taken into custody, andthe island was cleared of all resistanceby D+5. Eleven soldiers, three Marinesand four Navy SEALs died inOperation URGENT FURY and 116U.S. personnel were wounded. Theloss of Grenada was a severe setbackfor Cuban prestige and a signal thatU.S. interests in the Caribbean wouldbe upheld by force, if necessary. Mostof the 82d Airborne was withdrawnin November and all U.S. combatforces were out by December.The 525th Military IntelligenceGroup of the XVIII Airborne Corpssupported the 82d Airborne Divisionwith tactical intelligence collected andproduced in its Intelligence OperationsCenter. It was a windfall formilitary intelligence as tons of captureddocuments gave important informationabout Cuban and Sovietintelligence activities in the Westernhemisphere. Captured Soviet-manufacturedmilitary equipment kepttechnical intelligence specialists busy.Did MI’s tactical CEWI unitsmeet the test of the URGENT FURYoperations? According to John F.Stewart, Jr., the commander of theWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.43

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCA525th MI Group, “CEWI works.”He found intelligence and electronicwarfare units under his command tobe responsive to the tactical commander.The United States Military LiaisonMission (USMLM) to the Commander-in-Chief,Group of SovietForces in Germany (GSFG), was anoutgrowth of the 1947 PotsdamAgreement, dividing Berlin into zonesof occupation. Housed in a buildingdesigned by Albert Speer, Hitler’s chiefarchitect and Minister of Munitions,the liaison mission’s job was to insurethat terms of the Potsdam agreementwere met by the Soviets in their zone.This involved unrestricted travel forthe members of the mission and presenteda unique window into EastGermany. A casualty of the ColdWar, Lt. Col. Arthur D. Nicholson,was a military intelligence officer servingwith the U.S. Military LiaisonMission at Potsdam, East Germany,when he was gunned down by a Sovietsentry in 1985. He was on a missionto observe Soviet facilities, asprovided for in a long-standing internationalagreement, when he waskilled.Since 1956 the two-star AssistantChief of Staff for Intelligence occupieda lesser niche in the Departmentof the Army hierarchy, symbolic forsome of the back seat to which Armyintelligence had been relegated. In1987 the Assistant Chief of Staff forIntelligence on the Army staff wasupgraded from a two-star position toa three-star job and renamed theDeputy Chief of Staff for Intelligenceor DCSINT. Now Army intelligencehad been reestablished at the Armystaff level on an equal footing withthe other Deputy Chiefs. Lt. Gen.Sidney T. Weinstein was the first toassume the new position of DCSINTin the Pentagon.The Military Intelligence Corpswas founded on 1 July 1987, the 25thanniversary of the establishment of thefirst Regular Army intelligence branch.The MI Corps would embrace allArmy intelligence personnel, includingcivilians, in the tradition of theArmy regimental system. Maj. Gen.Julius Parker, Commanding Generalof the Intelligence Center and School,became the first head of the Corps inactivation ceremonies at FortHuachuca. It was a milestone thatGeneral Parker, called “a recognitionand celebration of our evolution froma plethora of diverse and separate intelligenceagencies into the cohesiveMI community we enjoy today. Inshort, it symbolizes the fact that MilitaryIntelligence has truly arrived.”In late 1989 MI would have anothertest of its ability to support thecombat commander when PresidentGeorge Bush decided intervention inPanama was necessary to stop the drugtrafficking of Panamanian dictatorManuel Noriega.Operation JUST CAUSE, 20December 1989 to 31 January 1990,depended on meticulous planning,rapid force projection, the element ofsurprise, and a versatile, professionaljoint force. On D-Day simultaneousattacks took place across the isthmusof Panama. Nine separate task forceseach were given specific objectives,which were largely accomplished duringthe first day of the operation. OnD+1 the Panama Canal was reopenedto traffic, the Marriott Hotel wastaken and hostages there protected,and Task Force Bayonet began civilmilitaryoperations in Panama City tohandle the growing flow of refugees.On the second day the PanamanianPolice Force was formed and the U.S.Army began civil-military operationsin earnest. Penonome Prison was surrenderedwithout a fight and mopping-upof hold-out PanamanianDefense Forces began. Joint patrollingwas undertaken with the Panamanians.Dictator Manuel Noriega,after taking sanctuary in the Vaticanembassy, surrendered to U.S. forceson 3 January.Intelligence support for militaryoperations was provided by the 470thMI Brigade stationed in Panama andits 29th MI Battalion, along with theintelligence assets of the organizationsmaking up the joint task force. MIdoctrine proved itself flexible enoughto support contingency operationslike JUST CAUSE. One participantcredited a large part of the U.S. Army’ssuccess in Operation JUST CAUSEto Intelligence Preparation of theBattlefield.One of the most shaping developmentsin recent years for Army intelligencewas the 1987 publicationof the Army Intelligence, ElectronicWarfare, Target Acquisition MasterPlan, or AIMP. It was a coherent planfor guiding intelligence systems andorganizations into the age of high-techwarfare. It evaluated future threats,determined requirements, and prepareda response that addressed all ofthe systems that would need to bedeveloped and procured in order tomodernize Army intelligence for arange of contingencies. It was thegenesis for the Intelligence Revolutionand would stock the Army intelligencearsenal with electronic weaponry.This singular, visionary planwould be reassessed by the 1991 MIRelook and revised in 1993 to takeinto account the lessons of the GulfWar.44Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEIn 1989 all of the traditionalthreats to the security of the UnitedStates and her allies and all of the anticipatedscenarios were overturnedand made unlikely by the dissolutionof the Soviet Union and the WarsawPact alliance. The Berlin Wall thathad stood for so many years at thesymbolic divide of East and Westcame down in an exuberant celebrationof the demise of the cold war.Germany was reunited in October1990 and there seemed little need ofthe large American Army presence ineastern Europe. The U.S. Army underwenta major retrenchment,shrinking in manpower and moneyto a much more compact contingencyforce. Doctrine began to redefine themilitary services as a force-projectionteam, a small but mobile force relyingupon technology to overcome itsstripped down combat formations.Army intelligence, because of theAIMP, was well positioned to reevaluateits role in the new order. Followingthe Desert Storm experience, anMI Relook panel was reinstitutedwith Brig. Gen. John F. Stewart, Jr.,the G2 for Army forces in Gulf War,as its head. In view of the new U.S.Army structure, and the reorientationof the mission to force projection, thepanel made a number of recommendations.It called for giving the combatcommanders a complete pictureof the battlefield and targets by usingthe array of interacting systems envisionedin the AIMP to relay the bestand most current information fromthe national and theater levels, whileat the same time allowing them toshare their own information withthose at comparable and higher levels.This would allow for a smallerMI force structure, but one that wasstill responsive to commanders.There would also be a greater relianceon reserves, like the Utah NationalGuard’s 300th MI Brigade, to providelinguists in times of crisis.The MI Corps took its share ofcuts in the Army downsizing of the1980’s and 1990’s. In Europe wherethe Soviet threat had all but disappeared,three field stations were closeddown. Field Station Berlin atopTeufelsberg, a cold war landmark,closed its gates in 1992. Field StationAugsburg was closed in 1993, aswas Field Station Sinop, which had acommanding view of the Black Seafrom that Turkish port since 1951.The 66th MI Brigade moved its headquartersfrom Munich to Augsburgin 1992. With the inactivation of theVII Corps, the 207th MI Brigade anda number of MI battalions assignedto the divisions had their flags cased.The Army Intelligence Agencywas organized in 1985 as the fieldoperating agency for ACSI, coordinatingall intelligence production. Itpicked up remaining pieces of intelligenceproduction that had been assignedto the Army Materiel Commandand the Office of the SurgeonGeneral. As part of Army streamliningin the post-cold-war era, it wasdisestablished in 1992, its functionsbeing divided up by INSCOM andDIA.In a January 1993 ceremony atFort Devens, the colors of the 112thMI Brigade were cased. Its functionswere absorbed by Fort Huachuca unitsas part of the Army’s reconsolidation.It was one of four MI brigades to bedeactivated out of a total of eighteen.Atop the U.S. Army intelligenceorganization in 1993 was the DeputyChief of Staff for Intelligence(DCSINT), who controlledINSCOM, as well as four directorateswithin the ODCSINT. The IntelligenceSystems Directorate was responsiblefor the major collection systems,such as SIGINT, PHOTINTand HUMINT. The CounterintelligenceDirectorate made policy forsecurity and counterintelligence activities.The Foreign Intelligence Directoratewas involved in the productionof intelligence, determining collectionrequirements, and preparing technicalintelligence. The Foreign LiaisonDirectorate coordinated intelligencematters with allies.INSCOM was the operating intelligencearm for the U.S. Army, directlysubordinated to DCSINT. Itwas not only involved in collection,analysis, and counterintelligence, butperformed SIGINT/COMSEC missionson behalf of the National SecurityAgency.As the turn of the century drewcloser, MI soldiers found themselvesengaged in a wide array of operationsother than war, from peace keepingin Somalia to drug interdiction operationsin the American hemisphere.What would be the role of Armyintelligence without the traditionalSoviet adversary? A dangerous butmiscalculating Iraqi strongman wouldhelp the U.S. Army provide some ofthe answers to that question.On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded itsoil-rich and defenseless neighbor Kuwait.The United Nations SecurityCouncil condemned the attack andfour days later invoked economicsanctions against Iraq. OperationDESERT SHIELD officially beganon 7 August and by 9 NovemberPresident George Bush was announcingthat as many as 400,000 U.S.troops were slated to be deployed tothe Persian Gulf. The U.N. resolvedon 29 November to use “all necessaryWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.45

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAmeans” to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwaitand gave them a deadline of 15January 1991 to do so. Three daysbefore the deadline, the U.S. Congressgranted President Bush the authorityto employ military force. The dayafter the deadline for Iraqi withdrawalpassed, on 16 January, the U.S. andcoalition forces launched a massive airstrike against strategic targets in Kuwaitand Iraq that opened theDESERT STORM phase of the operation.The ground attack began on24 February. One hundred hourslater, on 28 February, Iraq agreed to atemporary cease-fire and it becamepermanent on 3 March when theyaccepted conditions for a permanentend to the shooting.A key to the quick and overwhelmingvictory was the rapid andefficient mobilization of logisticforces to support the campaign. The22d Support Command marshaled300,000 soldiers, 12,000 trackedcombat vehicles, and over 100,000wheeled vehicles in support of theU.S. Army Central Command’s combatforces.In the Army’s history of the GulfWar called Certain Victory, Brig. Gen.Robert H. Scales, Jr., gave an idea ofsome of the problems Army intelligencefaced in that conflict. There wasthe lack of Arab linguists, notablythose familiar with the Iraqi dialect; apaucity of HUMINT from theclosed, tightly supervised Iraqi society;the limited use of radio or radarby the Iraqis to deny SIGINT; andthe absence of good maps of the Kuwaititheater.One of the advantages for theU.S. forces was its familiarity with theSoviet equipment it would encounter,the fruit of years of technical intelligencedirected at the SovietUnion.Some units, like the 101st AirborneDivision, enjoyed good linguistsupport. The 132 linguists of the101st were instrumental in debriefingsome 400 Kuwaiti refugees beforethe DESERT STORM phase.Another difficulty was the scopeof the operations themselves. Theland area was large and intelligence hadthe early mission of enforcing theblockade of Iraq, one that required allair, sea, and ground traffic to be monitored24 hours a day. As the crisisworsened and military action becamea possibility, thousands of targetswithin Iraq and Kuwait had to beidentified and photographed and thedeployments and movements of enemyforces had to be plotted. Overheadreconnaissance had to be deployedin a map-making effort for thetheater of operations.The aerial recon effort was hamperedby the deletion from the inventorythe previous year of the SR-71Blackbird. This aircraft’s high-altitudeand high-speed allowed it tophotograph 30-mile swaths of enemyterritory at 2,000 miles per hour anddo so outside the range of air defenseweapons.Because of the requirement for arapid buildup of large numbers oftroops in the theater, the combat unitswere sent in first, followed by theirsupporting units. So in the firstmonths of the crisis, the troops onthe ground were blinded by the lackof their own tactical intelligencewhich arrived over the next fivemonths. Assigned to XVIII AirborneCorps, the 15th MI Battalion did notarrive until mid-October to providethe Army’s only aerial collection. Toreinforce INSCOM signals intelligencein the theater, the 204th MIBattalion was deployed from Europe.Tactical intelligence, or informationon the specific enemy formationsexpected to be engaged, was producedat Corps level and below. It flowedupward from battalion, brigade, divisionand corps “2” shops, eventuallycoming together at the 513th MIBrigade, a unit under the operationalcontrol of ARCENT, where it wasfused with strategic intelligence pulleddown from national levels of intelligencegathering. This informationwas intended to give the theater commandera broad overview of the developingsituation. The Foreign MaterielIntelligence Battalion of the513th MI Brigade was kept busy exploitingan unprecedented windfall ofcaptured equipment. They were assistedby members of the U.S. ArmyForeign Science and Technology Center.Upon its return to the U.S. afterDesert Storm, the 513th would relocateto Fort Gordon, GA, where itwould collocate with a new RegionalSIGINT Operations Center(RSOC).The commander in the field hadmuch more technology to deploy andmany more decisions to make thanany of his predecessors in history. Butwith all the added complexities, hehad little tactical information to goon, either because his organic intelligenceunits had not yet become operationalin the theater, or if they haddeployed they were positioned far tothe rear to avoid tipping off the enemyof allied intentions. It was notuntil 19 January when the intelligenceunits moved into to their forwardpositions that they could begin towork on those enemy units to theirfront. The strategic intelligence collectedby national-level agencies wasof little use to the commander, ex-46Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEcept in those cases where imagery locatedenemy emplacements to hisfront. The Defense IntelligenceAgency was not staffed or trained toprovide the kind of tactical intelligencea field commander needs. Scalescited an example of a national analystwho saw Iraqi troops movements astraining maneuvers while an experiencedArmy officer “familiar with thelast-minute starts and stops of tacticalmaneuver saw the moves as a finalshift to attack positions.”At the Department of Defense, aJoint Intelligence Center was set upin August to combine the service-specifictactical intelligence. The DODJoint Intelligence Center was the workof Brig. Gen. John Stewart, Jr., whodrew heavily upon the Army personnelin the Intelligence and ThreatAnalysis Center. The Army’s Intelligenceand Threat Analysis Center producedtemplates showing every Iraqidivision in and around Kuwait on1:50,000 scale maps. They depictedIraqi obstacle defenses, tanks, armoredvehicles, artillery tubes, vehicles, commandposts, and supply dumps, andwere updated daily right up to the endof the war. General Stewart was transferredto the theater in December tofunction full time as the ARCENT,or Third Army, G2. TheCENTCOM J2 was Brig. Gen. JohnLeide.High above the cradle of landbetween the Tigris and Euphrates Riversin February 1991 was amassed themost impressive array of intelligencegatheringesoterica ever assembled inone place. It was as if civilization, nowin the prime of life, had returned toits birthplace to show off what it hadlearned over the intervening years.The intelligence arsenal was notonly hovering dome-like over the nationof Iraq, but encircling it on theground. It contained a little galaxyof satellites like the Keyhole, whichwas said to be able to see things assmall as a compact disc, or the cloudpiercingLacrosse designed to keep itseye on the movements of the WarsawPact forces. In addition to thepicture-taking satellites, there werethe listening kind, like the Magnumand Vortex.In the earth’s atmosphere cruised23 different kinds of aircraft, addingtheir imagery, electronic and eavesdroppingcapabilities to the fray. TheU2s alone took more than one millionfeet of film. Enemy airspace wascross-hatched with allied aircraft,mostly American, bristling with antennae.Rivet Joint and Senior Spanplatforms locked on enemy communicationsfrequencies. Notably missingwas the SR-71 Blackbird whichhad been mothballed a year earlier.Imagery piled up in Saudi Arabiaby the truckload. By one author’sestimate, “there were 200 tons of intelligence‘product’” by war’s end.This unprecedented volume causedproblems for the hundreds of analystsstretched in a chain from the JointImagery Production Complex atRiyadh Air Base, to CENTCOM’sJoint Intelligence Center, to thePentagon’s own JIC, to the NationalPhotographic Interpretation Centerin the Navy Yard in D.C. Theworkload was too overwhelming andthe process could not meet the demandfor timely answers, especiallyin the realm of Battlefield DamageAssessment.The question of just how degradedthe enemy units actually werewould be a point of contention betweenthe military on the ground inthe theater who were able to factor ingun camera footage, defector reportsand other close-in sources of intelligence,and the more cautious CIAwhich relied mainly on satellite pictures.From the point of view of theground commander, it was better toerr on the side of lower damage thanbe surprised by an enemy strongerthan expected.With as many as 3,000 sorties perday, BDA was a tough picture to bringinto focus. There were subjective factorslike the characteristically optimisticpilots’ reports, sometimes called“ego BDAs,” and natural obstacles likecloud cover and imprecise wide-anglephotos. To arrive at some kind ofconsistent baseline, different formulaswere used and then discarded ifthey proved flawed. Eventually, byearly February Brig. Gen. Stewart, putin charge of BDA by the CINC, arrivedat a formula that seemed to givea reasonable basis for estimating theenemy’s losses and effective strength.He assigned his highest confidence tohigh-resolution U2 photos, gave a 50percent weight to the F-111 and F-15E gun-camera footage, and reducedA-10 pilot reports to one-third.SIGINT was of little use since theIraqis were all but off the air. Heproofed his resulting figures by concentratinga second time on a few enemyunits and comparing the resultswith his initial estimates. If they werethe same, he could confirm that hisformula was consistent. Stewart hadto justify his methods and his assessmentsto Defense Secretary RichardCheney and JCS Chairman Gen.Colin Powell on 9 February whenthose officials spent a day in Riyadhbeing briefed by Gen. Schwarzkopfand his staff.Satellite coverage produced vastamounts of photos, but never enoughWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.47

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAto satisfy tactical commanders whowere desperate for detailed photographyof targets in their area of responsibility.There were not always processesin place to disseminate satelliteimagery at the national level down tothe tactical users. An exception wasthe XVIII Corps which, as the nation’scontingency force, had their own satellitetransmission capability, the TacticalExploitation of National Capabilities(TENCAP) Imagery ExploitationSystem, back at Fort Bragg. TheArmy force structure had eliminatedthe aerial exploitation units at divisionand corps level, choosing to dependon imagery produced at higherlevels and transmitted to them viadigital bandwidths. The communicationssystems for this imagery wasstill in development and not ready forthe battlefield. The gap was filledwith off-the-shelf software and prototypeequipment.Two battlefield surveillance systemswere deployed in OperationDESERT SHIELD/STORM withremarkable success. These were theJoint Surveillance Target Attack RadarSystem (JSTARS) and the unmannedaerial vehicle (UAV). TheJSTARS was in developmental stages.It consisted of a synthetic apertureradar mounted in an Air Force Boeing707 that could operate in a targetingmode or as a surveillance system, orin both modes simultaneously. Thenear-real-time information passedback to air or artillery weapons systemswas detailed enough to targetattacks while the surveillance field ofvision was 25x20 kilometers, largeenough to watch movement in theentire Kuwaiti theater of operations.The system allowed the commanderto see to a depth of 150 kilometers inall kinds of weather.A JSTARS package was deployedto Saudi Arabia in mid-January. Itconsisted of two E-8A aircraft (speciallymodified Boeing 707s), and sixground station modules. Each groundstation was manned by a sergeant andtwo specialists. They were located atCENTAF Tactical Air CommandCenter, ARCENT Main, ARCENTForward, XVIII Corps, VII Corps,and with the Marine headquarters.Special modifications were made tothe two aircraft to enhance datalinkconnectivity to the Riyadh-basedheadquarters. Self-defense systemswere added to the planes to increasetheir survivability in the event air superioritywas not achieved. The rangeof the JSTARS was also doubled forthe Gulf War deployment. TheJSTARS increased the limited coveragethat was provided by Side-LookingAirborne Radar (SLAR) missionsflown by the Mohawk battalions assignedto VII and XVIII Corps.On one occasion when B-52s arrivedon station and cloud cover preventedthem from finding targets, theCENTCOM Air Force commander,Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, turnedto JSTARS. Pfc. Timothy Reagan onduty in the ground station pointedout an Iraqi convoy that he had onhis screen and Horner directed the airstrike against it, destroying the convoyand demonstrating the value ofboth JSTARS and its operators.When the ground war began,JSTARS provided the ARCENT G2the capability of tracking all Iraqimovements and determine what theirplan of action was. These situationalassessments were extremely importantto the corps commanders who couldreadjust their attack plans at variouspoints in the decision-making process.To give the commander a betterclose-in picture, the Pioneer UnmannedAerial Vehicles (UAV) werecalled upon. There were six PioneerUAV systems deployed to OperationDESERT STORM—One each onthe battleships Wisconsin and Missouri,three with the Marine Corps, and onesystem deployed with an Army taskforce. The latter was a 36-man platoonof five UAVs sent from FortHuachuca on 10 January. It arrivedin the theater on 26 January andlaunched its first mission on 1 Februaryin the VII Corps. The soldiersfrom Company E, 304th MI Battalion,111th MI Brigade, operated a400-pound, prop-driven airplanemounted with a television camerathat was capable of day or night monitoringof the battlefield. The UAVhad two ground pilots, one to maketakeoffs and landings and another tofly it down range. It had a payloadoperator to monitor the onboard camera,a mechanic to perform maintenance,and an electronic technician.The Pioneer, with its 100-mile range,24-hour capability, and near-real-timedata link, could provide targeting informationand act in a reconnaissancerole.TROJAN SPIRIT, a satellite thattransmitted secure voice and digitalimagery to trailer-mounted terminals,was another system that was rushedto the battlefield from the testing labs.It arrived in February, was fielded andits operators trained.Despite the admirable efforts torush the means of disseminating imageryintelligence to the field, it was acase of too little too late, and most ofthe mountain of imagery was movedby old fashioned courier. “ThroughoutJanuary and February, daily courierscarried 200 pounds of annotated48Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCEphotos, maps overprinted with Iraqitemplates, and other intelligencedocuments, moving 27 tons of materialfrom one end of the theater tothe other.” The commanders wereoften frustrated in their efforts to getup-to-date intelligence.To fill the void of qualified linguists,Lt. Gen. Charles B.Eichelberger, Deputy Chief of Stafffor Intelligence, paved the way to recruitand train young Kuwaitis in theUnited States, most of them attendingcollege, and ship them to the theateras sergeants in the Kuwaiti Armyto act as linguists in intelligence units.The DIA formed support teamsat the various corps and ARCENT toaccess the national military intelligencedata and imagery base.A four-day target developmenteffort, focused the national collectionsystems, the theater U-2 and RF-4CPhantom II reconnaissance aircraft,corps aerial exploitation battalions,and the airborne radars they employedagainst a host of possible key targetslike command and control facilities,artillery, armored formations and logisticsbases. Enemy deserters werealso questioned about targets. A prioritylist was developed by theARCENT G2 and revalidated rightup until they were attacked.A high-profile job for Army intelligencewas locating the Scudlaunchers that played such havoc withthe coalition. The long-range, highfrequencysignals used to control theScud missiles were vulnerable to jammingby the TLQ-17 Sandcrab,manned by a platoon from the 201stMI Battalion. The jamming forcedthe Iraqis to resort to less secure communicationswhich could be intercepted.But the effort expended todirect intelligence assets at the Scudsites slowed the targeting missions forthe ground war.Write Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.49

The Sandcrab jammer was positionedin northern Saudi Arabia, withits 5,000 watts of power and a massivetransmitter. It was ready to go towork jamming enemy transmissions,raising the old electronic warfare debateof whether it was better to foregojamming in favor of intercepting theenemy signals. A compromise wasreached whereby Sandcrab jammedonly the encoded beginnings of Iraqitransmissions, causing the enemy tobecome confused and send in theclear.The Iraqi COMSEC would haveto be rated as good however, but thiswas achieved by not talking on theradio at all or using secure land linesthat had not been severed by thebombing, a measure that crippled theability of units to communicatereadily. Despite their prolonged silence,just before the ground war alliedintelligence targeted for destructionwhat were believed to be signalnodes, but left four intact in the hopesthat the enemy would resume radiocontact in the heat of battle. And theydid, leading to valuable NSA interceptswhich, in conjunction withJSTARS, brought into view a vividpicture of their movements and intentions.The commander of allied forcesin the Gulf War, Gen. H. NormanSchwarzkopf, gave military intelligencetop marks during Congressionaltestimony on 12 June. Overall, hesaid, “it was excellent. We had very,very good intelligence support. Wehad terrific people. We had a lot ofcapabilities.” But he did find areas,like battlefield damage assessment,real-time imagery, interoperability,and overly caveated intelligence estimates,that could use improvement.His experience was incorporated intothe findings of the House Armed ServicesCommittee’s report on IntelligenceSuccesses and Failures in OperationsDESERT SHIELD/STORM issuedon 16 August 1993. The Oversightand Investigations Subcommitteeconcluded that:Intelligence collection...wasgenerally very good and deservingof praise.Intelligence distribution overallwas very poor, particularlywhen it came to serving air fightingunits. Both the hardware andthe people failed.Intelligence analysis wasmixed. The concept was brilliant.but the count of dead Iraqi tanks,APCs and artillery pieces exposeda major systemic failure in theability to accurately make battlefielddamage assessment.Overall, DESERT STORMcould be adjudged as an overwhelmingsuccess for U.S. Army intelligence.In addition to the above-stated opinionof the commander of the coalitioneffort, this conclusion was expressedby a captured Iraqi officerwho noted:We had a great appreciationof your intelligence system; weknew from our experience in theIranian War that at all times youcould see us during day and nightand knew where we were on theground. If we communicated,you could both hear us and targetus, and if we talked too long,you would target us and destroyus with your ordnance. On theother hand, as we looked at ourintelligence system, we had noidea where you were on theground, we had no intelligencesystem capabilities to see whatyour dispositions were, and wehad no way to monitor your communications.We knew you weregoing to attack only when youoverran our front line positions....”Ironically, when talking about hisown Army’s lack of sophisticated intelligence,he could have been describingthe U.S. Army in the early stagesof the Korean War just 40 years earlier.