A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAA <strong>Brief</strong> <strong>History</strong> <strong>of</strong> U.S. <strong>Army</strong> IntelligenceThe American Revolution wasone <strong>of</strong> the great upsets <strong>of</strong> history. Asmall colonial force, made upmostly <strong>of</strong> militia, eventually defeatedthe splendid disciplined ranks<strong>of</strong> the pr<strong>of</strong>essional British <strong>Army</strong>,with a grateful nod to French navalpower. It was a vision that shapedthe American <strong>Army</strong> over the centuriesto come. The ideas <strong>of</strong> freedomand democracy would cloak theAmericans in invulnerability. Nolarge standing pr<strong>of</strong>essional armywould be needed. The Britishexperience had taught America thatregular armies were engines <strong>of</strong>oppression. Instead they woulddepend upon their militia. Whendangers reared, determined Americanmales would pull their huntingrifles <strong>of</strong>f the wall and they wouldprevail.This anti-standing-<strong>Army</strong> attitudewould inhibit the growth <strong>of</strong> the U.S.<strong>Army</strong> and retard the development <strong>of</strong>pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism in its ranks. But itwould also shape its character, callinginto play in all <strong>of</strong> its wars the qualities<strong>of</strong> resourcefulness and ingenuity.These characteristics would be especiallyapparent in the field <strong>of</strong> militaryintelligence, which was forced to reinventitself in every campaign. Whilethe British <strong>Army</strong> formed a Department<strong>of</strong> Military Knowledge as earlyas 1803 to collect terrain and Order2Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY <strong>MI</strong>LITARY INTELLIGENCE<strong>of</strong> Battle information on potentialfoes, no such organization existed inthe U.S. <strong>Army</strong> until 1885, and thenit was on an insignificant scale.The Revolutionary War, with theappearance <strong>of</strong> the Continental <strong>Army</strong>in 1775, is thought to be the beginning<strong>of</strong> American military history,even though many <strong>of</strong> its key participantswere seasoned in the French andIndian War. It was that earlier war onthe North American continent thatgave the American <strong>Army</strong> its uniquepersonality, its hardy resourcefulness,its frontiersman’s distaste for authority,and its irregular way <strong>of</strong> fighting,even though it rested solidly on Englishmilitary traditions.The Revolutionary War was one<strong>of</strong> generalship, tremendous courageand suffering, and, not surprisingly,military intelligence. Because it wasimpossible to know where one’s sympathieslie, it was also difficult toknow whom to trust. Spies were everywhereon both sides. GeneralGeorge Washington relied heavilyupon the use <strong>of</strong> spies and his ledgersshow that he spent $17,000 on hisnetwork <strong>of</strong> paid informants. To safeguardsecurity, Washington wouldnot reveal the identity <strong>of</strong> these menand this secrecy became the subject <strong>of</strong>the novel The Spies by James FenimoreCooper.The year 1776 appears on the<strong>Army</strong>’s military intelligence emblem,a reference to the formation <strong>of</strong>Knowlton’s Rangers as a recon andintelligence unit during the AmericanRevolution. Realizing how blind hewas to the British movements aroundNew York, General George Washingtoninstructed Lt. Col. ThomasKnowlton, another experienced veteran<strong>of</strong> the French-Indian war, tohandpick a company <strong>of</strong> volunteers toscout British positions and gather intelligenceon their movements andintentions.It was from the ranks <strong>of</strong>Knowlton’s Rangers that CaptainNathan Hale stepped to undertake anespionage mission, one that wouldultimately result in his capture andpresent him the opportunity to declarewhile standing on the Britishgallows, “I regret that I have but onelive to give for my country.”No lesser fate was handed downto Knowlton and his Rangers. Theintrepid colonel had been killed in actionon 16 September and his companywas decimated in the battle. Thiswas not an auspicious beginning forU.S. <strong>Army</strong> intelligence. But therewould be some important triumphsin the months and years to come, aswell as some unforgivable tragedies.Major Benjamin Tallmadge, a Yaleclassmate <strong>of</strong> Captain Nathan Haleand an <strong>of</strong>ficer in the Second ConnecticutDragoons, was a veteran <strong>of</strong> somehard fighting at Long Island, WhitePlains, Brandywine, Germantownand Monmouth. The former Connecticuthigh school superintendentwould be charged with superintendinga network <strong>of</strong> spies in and aroundhis native Long Island. Tallmadge alsohad a hand in counterintelligence efforts,exploiting the capture <strong>of</strong> theBritish operative Major John Andrewhich led to the exposure <strong>of</strong> BenedictArnold as a turncoat and spy.The Culper Ring was the bestknown net run by Tallmadge, withample direction and advice from GeneralWashington. In this role he wasseen as a proto-G2, serving the commander.But, as several historians <strong>of</strong>this period are quick to point out,Washington acted as his own intelligence<strong>of</strong>ficer, never relinquishing control<strong>of</strong> intelligence operations and alwaysplacing the gathering <strong>of</strong> informationabout the enemy uppermostin his command priorities.Washington was not only aspymaster but a master <strong>of</strong> deceptionoperations, the most striking <strong>of</strong> whichwas the battle <strong>of</strong> Yorktown where theBritish were frozen in their vulnerablepositions by an ingenious campaign<strong>of</strong> misinformation. The AmericanRevolution was a laboratory for rudimentaryintelligence gathering and itwas given form and purpose by theCommander in Chief <strong>of</strong> the Americanforces himself. General Washingtonis eminently quotable on the subject<strong>of</strong> the importance <strong>of</strong> good intelligence.However, for all <strong>of</strong> Washington’semphasis on intelligence in the newbornAmerican <strong>Army</strong>, after the war’send in 1783 no intelligence organizationhad been institutionalized andthat discipline would be largely ignoredover the next century.The explorations <strong>of</strong> men likeCaptain Meriweather Lewis and SecondLieutenant William Clark in1804 up the Missouri River and thereconnaissance <strong>of</strong> First LieutenantZebulon M. Pike into Colorado andNew Mexico in 1806 can rightly beseen as intelligence operations as theirobject was the acquisition <strong>of</strong> informationabout unknown terrain. Butthey were peacetime efforts by adventuroussoldiers.It would take the War <strong>of</strong> 1812 toremind the amateur American <strong>Army</strong>that intelligence was a function <strong>of</strong>warfare that could not be ignoredwithout deadly consequences. InAugust Colonel William Hull surrenderedDetroit to the British, havingfallen victim to their clever misrepresentations<strong>of</strong> their strength. TragicWrite <strong>Fort</strong> <strong>Huachuca</strong> Museums; U.S. <strong>Army</strong> Intelligence Center and <strong>Fort</strong> <strong>Huachuca</strong>; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; <strong>Fort</strong> <strong>Huachuca</strong>, AZ 85613-6000.3