Brief History of Army MI - Fort Huachuca - U.S. Army

A GUIDE TO STUDYING HISTORY AT FORT HUACHUCAtion, interrogation, technical intelligenceand counterintelligence. TheMI battalion was usually assigned toa field army, while divisions were supportedby MI detachments.First established as the U.S. ArmyIntelligence Center in September1954, the U.S. Army IntelligenceSchool was opened at Fort Holabird,Md, on 1 May 1955 to teach counterintelligence,combat intelligenceand area studies. It replaced the oldIntelligence Department at FortRiley’s Army Ground School.The Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) was created in 1961 by DefenseSecretary Robert McNamara so thatall defense intelligence operationswould be coordinated at a single andcentral high-level agency rather thanbe handled separately by the intelligenceservices of the Army, Navy andAir Force. Collection requirementsand estimates now were prepared atDIA. The agency assumed operationsof the U.S. Army Strategic IntelligenceSchool and in 1965 became responsiblefor the military attache system.The move was seen by many inthe separate services as an effort tostrip them of their autonomy. AllenDulles disagreed. “DIA was not amerger of the intelligence branches ofthe armed services, but primarily anattempt to achieve maximum coordinationand efficiency in the intelligenceprocesses of the three services.”The Counter Intelligence Corpswas renamed in 1961 as the U.S.Army Intelligence Corps, and in 1965it became a major field command ofthe Army known as the IntelligenceCorps Command. It had subordinateMilitary Intelligence Groups supportingeach Army area in the United Stateswith a network of regional and fieldoffices. Their primary work wascounterintelligence: Performing securityinvestigations of personnel needingclearances and supporting operationalsecurity.The Army Intelligence and SecurityBranch was created on 1 July 1962to meet the need for a career field forthe increasing number of officers performingintelligence missions. It wasmade up of strategic and combat intelligenceofficers from both the IntelligenceCorps and the Army SecurityAgency. It was the RegularArmy’s first MI branch. An organizationfor Military Intelligence Reserveofficers had existed in one formor another since 1921, the latest beingthe Army Intelligence and ArmySecurity Branches formed for reserveofficers in 1952. The Regular Army’sArmy Intelligence and SecurityBranch was redesignated the MilitaryIntelligence Branch in 1967.American involvement in Vietnamsteadily increased as the instabilityof the South Vietnamese governmentled to greater possibilities of aCommunist insurgent victory in theSouth. Escalating from a small advisoryrole in 1961, the U.S. committedair power and ground forces in1965. While the military fought onthe often ill-defined battlefields ofVietnam, the politicians found themselvesfaced with growing anti-warsentiment at home. Army intelligencewould be asked to contribute itsknow-how on both fronts until thewithdrawal of U.S. forces in 1973.Following the peace agreement inJanuary 1973, the last intelligenceunit pulled out by March, ending forthem what had been a mixed experience.The unpopularity of the war gaverise to the myth that the Army was“managing” its intelligence in relationto enemy strength figures, keeping thenumbers low so that the war wouldnot be seen in defeatist terms by politiciansback in Washington. Themyth was fueled by some Army officersand a CIA analyst named SamAdams, whose own calculations arrivedat much higher numbers. Theproblem lay in interpretation. If youcounted irregular forces who weresympathizers to the Communistcause and would be expected to providelogistic and service support fromtime to time, but were unarmed andnot part of a trained fighting organization,the numbers would be high.However, if you discounted these SelfDefense and Secret Self Defenseforces, as MACV J-2 did in theirmonthly Order of Battle Summary,because they did not consider themto constitute a significant threat toallied combat forces, the numberswould be lower.Army intelligence received anotherundeserved blow when the presscriticized it for failing to warn of theTet Offensive when in fact intelligencecorrectly predicted the attack to theday and pinpointed what forces wouldbe involved. If intelligence was to befaulted, it would only be for failingto appreciate the scale of the Tet Offensive.Maj. Gen. Joseph A.McChristian became the first ArmyMACV J-2 on 13 July 1965. Hisfirst move was to organize the CombinedIntelligence Center-Vietnam(CICV), a centralized intelligenceanalysis and research facility in Saigon.Every kind of intelligence data beingcollected flowed into this center foranalysis and storage in an IBM computer.Captured documents, Orderof Battle information, terrain studies,POW interrogation reports, technical36Call (520) 533-3638, DSN 821-3638, FAX (520) 533-5736.