Brief History of Army MI - Fort Huachuca - U.S. Army

A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCECIC units played an even moreimportant role in the postwar occupationof both Germany and Japan,investigating and apprehending warcriminals, rounding up Nazis, andcountering Communist subversion.For instance, the 970th CIC Detachmentin the American Zone of Occupationin Germany, picked up over120,000 Nazis after the war.In the European theater, many ofthe CIC’s counterespionage dutieswere usurped by the OSS. But in thePacific that was prevented by a commanddirective from GeneralMacArthur’s headquarters, proscribingthe OSS from operating in theSouthwest Pacific Area. There wasanother important difference in CICoperations in the Pacific. With fewerurban areas to secure or captured soldiersto interrogate, the CIC was ableto devote more of their time assistingwith combat intelligence and in workingon captured documents. In theLeyte campaign, CIC took into custodyofficials working for the Japaneseand in Luzon in January 1945,30 CIC detachments came ashorewith the invasion force.The CIC secured and capturedenemy headquarters, interrogatedprisoners, and impounded enemydocuments. They arrested or surveilledany suspected enemy agents.They surveyed and protected publicutilities, supply depots or any otherpotential targets of sabotage. Theyseized radio stations and telephoneswitchboards, halting all communicationsand turning over any communicationsdata to Signal Corps personnel.They shut down presses andseized mail for censorship teams.They cooperated with local provostmarshals on matters of law and order.CIC operatives familiarizedthemselves with local economic, politicaland social conditions, and cultivatedwell-placed informants.In the first two months of 1944the CIC headquarters was abolished,its school transferred, and its stagingarea closed down, perhaps the victimof enemies in the Army bureaucracy.It was combined with the ProvostMarshal General, briefly called theSecurity Intelligence Corps, and itsZone of Interior missions were turnedover to the Army Service Forces. Theoverseas CIC detachments continuedto function as before. The CounterIntelligence Corps would reemerge asa separate entity before the war wasover. A new CIC center and schoolwere opened at Fort Meade, thenCamp Holabird, in July 1945, andthe office of the Chief, Counter IntelligenceCorps was reestablishedunder the Intelligence Division of theArmy Service Forces in July 1945,with the Security Intelligence Corpsbeing reassigned from the ProvostMarshal General.The World War II infantry divisionsincorporated a cavalry reconnaissancetroop. Each of their regimentsalso had an Intelligence and Reconnaissance(I&R) Platoon which providedpatrols, observation posts, andperformed other tactical intelligencecollecting missions on behalf of theS2 or regimental intelligence officer.This was typical of the tactical intelligenceorganization of World War IIand reflected a growing appreciationof an organized military intelligenceeffort. Teams of interpreters, interrogators,Order-of-Battle specialistsand photo interpreters were allocatedto each division by theater-level militaryintelligence services. Corps andarmies were also supported by intelligencedetachments.While the Army Air Forces didthe aerial reconnaissance, the Armyretained a small recon capability byusing their L-4 “Grasshoppers” whenthey were not flying their normal artilleryobservation missions.In the allied invasion of Sicily inJuly 1943, deception operations convincedHitler that the blow was goingto fall in the Balkans and that iswhere he moved his reinforcements,allowing the allies to avoid massivecasualties. Deception operations werecarried out by what was called the “A”Force, a forerunner of Eisenhower’sOps “B” deception unit before theNormandy landings. The operationsincluded a body washed up on thecoast of Spain with documents showingthat the allies would next moveon Greece and Sardinia. The ruse suggestedSicily was just the cover targetfor the invasion of Sardinia. Othertechniques included an inflated alliedOrder of Battle fed to the Germansby radio traffic, double agents andrumor. The enlarged OB led theGermans to believe the allies had thecapabilities to carry out these ambitiousassaults around the Mediterranean.Rumors were spread abouttroop movements to the areas of thenotional assaults. Radar reflectors andjamming devices were used at thetime of the actual landings in Sicilyto cloak the invasion, while feints andphoney radio communications divertedGerman attention to otherlanding sites.Deception operations took the artto new levels before the Normandyinvasion when small deception unitsimitated larger tactical formations byfielding mock equipment like inflatabletanks. To complete the picturefor German analysts, the Signal SecurityAgency’s Protective SecurityWrite Fort Huachuca Museums; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca; ATTN: ATZS-PAM; Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.29