The Victims of Terrorism: An Assessment of Their Influence and ...

4 The Victims of Terrorismful, organizations, this has not been true of the 9/11 groups that both proliferated and pursueddeliberately narrower, respective agendas. Whatever the group’s aims, however, the mostimportant metric of success, when defined as the ability to impact government officials’ decisionmaking,has been capable leadership and clear, focused direction. Not surprisingly, thosegroups with both of these attributes were able to attract and retain the most sustained mediaattention for the longest time.Thus, the most consequential group was doubtless the FSC. Established in the earlyspring of 2002, its 12 members, all leaders of other groups with knowledge of the issues anda common goal, began to pressure Congress and the White House to appoint an independentinvestigative commission to examine the attacks. 3 Untrained for the roles they took on, these12 individuals extensively lobbied Capitol Hill, orchestrated media appearances, and held rallies.All of this planning and strategizing took place via weekly conference calls, meeting inperson only at scheduled events. According to one member, the persistence of their efforts wasthe result of a pressing sense of “urgency and conviction—urgency because of the imminentthreat of another terrorist attack, and conviction that drastic changes were necessary to correctlong-standing and deeply entrenched deficiencies in Washington” (Eckert, 2006). Walkingthrough the halls of the Senate and House office buildings, the FSC became a powerful forcein Washington, successfully demanding audiences with members of Congress, a result of boththeir cause and status as victims. On November 27, 2002, their efforts were rewarded whenPresident George W. Bush signed into law a bill mandating the creation of the National Commissionon Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission”).Throughout the 9/11 Commission’s 20-month tenure, the FSC actively monitored itsprogress: themselves acquiring the necessary and often specific knowledge and expertise inareas within the commission’s remit to better scrutinize the direction of its inquiries, monitorprogress, and thus ensure their influence over the entire process. One of the group’s strategies,for example, was to assign each member to a commissioner with whom they had frequent contactto address the FSC’s questions and concerns throughout the development of the nearlytwo-year–long inquiry (Eckert, 2006).The 10 commissioners leading the inquiry recognized that it was largely the families’activism that led to the creation of the 9/11 Commission. While FSC members worked tirelesslytoward establishing a commission and, later, toward advocating an increase in its budget,the relationship between the two was not always cooperative. According to the commission’sco-chairs, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, throughout the duration of the investigation “wehad our ups and downs with the families, whose list of questions would grow. Often they wereour closest allies, supporting our requests for more funding or more time on Capitol Hill.Sometimes, they were aggressive critics, issuing press releases blasting our approach” (Kean,Hamilton, and Rhodes, 2006, p. 27). Indeed, the families became the commission’s sharpestcritics, frustrated over its approach to accountability. Furthermore, witnesses were not placedthe attacks on the WTC. Weiner was a member of the Family Steering Committee for the 9/11 Independent Commission(FSC), actively involved throughout the 9/11 Commission hearings.3 The FSC was not initially founded with the involvement of all 12 members. Some joined later (Lemack, 2006a).