The Victims of Terrorism: An Assessment of Their Influence and ...

An International Comparison: Israel, Northern Ireland, and Terrorist Spectaculars 35Black’s plan and Swire immediately began to petition for its acceptance (McNeil, 1998). Fouryears later, the Clinton administration agreed to a trial in the Netherlands at the Hague’sInternational Court of Justice. This angered many U.S. Pan Am 103 families, who felt that, byso doing, the U.S. and British governments were compromising with Libya. The nine-monthtrial ended on January 31, 2001, with the conviction of Abdelbaset al Megrahi and the notguiltyverdict delivered to the accused Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, both unanimous (Cohen andCohen, 2001, pp. 232, 240, 242, 296, 297, and 301). Convinced of Libya’s innocence, groupmembers of UK Families Flight 103 did not hesitate to publicly express their dismay with theguilty verdict delivered to Megrahi (Reid, 2001).In sum, victims’ groups in Israel and Northern Ireland have had fewer accomplishmentsthan have those for 9/11 especially and for Pan Am 103. There are various explanations forthis discrepancy, many of which have already been touched on and are very similar to thosedifferentiating the sets of 9/11 and Pan Am 103 groups. First is the sheer catastrophic size ofthe 9/11 attacks, which attracted far more attention and thus were complicit in soliciting widespreadsupport from both the U.S. public and government officials. The smaller scale of attacksabroad and the frequency with which they occur has meant that these groups have neither thesame media presence nor political clout because they directly affect a proportionately smallerpercentage of the population. Furthermore, international groups have not been able to gainsubstantial membership interest among concerned citizens who do not have any connectionto a particular terrorist incident or tragedy. In addition, Web sites maintained by the overseasgroups are consistently inferior to those for 9/11 (although a few mirror their sophistication),despite their being considerably more advanced than that for VPAF 103.The primary reason for what can be viewed as the fundamental inability of internationalvictims’ groups to achieve a level of change comparable to that attained by 9/11 groups stemsfrom the dynamics of their messages. Undeniably, the missions of many 9/11 groups are limitedin scope, but this does not necessarily hinder their success. Take FSC, for example, whichfocused solely on the formation of an independent investigative commission. In this scenario,a well-defined mission helped members best concentrate their efforts on a specific goal. Groupswithin the third tier characteristically have similarly narrow objectives but failed to gain thesame level of recognition as those within the first or second tiers because of their missions’concomitant narrow appeal. As such, these groups, like those abroad, have difficulty procuringand maintaining levels of membership. Terrorist attacks in Israel and Northern Ireland do nothave the same effect on the public in both those countries as 9/11 did on the American peopleas a whole. Accordingly, the foreign victims’ groups lack the membership bases necessary toeffectively challenge government legislation.International Terrorist SpectacularsThroughout the world, there are groups outside Israel and Northern Ireland that bear somesimilarity to the composition and missions of those in the United States. These groups tendto be the products of major attacks that traumatically rattled their respective countries. Suchattacks, also known as spectaculars, are consequently associated with high levels of death and