here - Center on International Cooperation - New York University

Review ofPolitical2010MissionsA Project of the <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation

Review ofPolitical 2010Missions

This volume is a product of the <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation’s (CIC)Prevention Strategies program. CIC is an independent institution housed at NewYork University.Project TeamVOLUME EDITOR AND LEAD RESEARCHERRichard GowanSERIES EDITORBruce D. JonesSERIES COORDINATORAlischa KugelRESEARCH OFFICERMorgan A. HughesGUEST CONTRIBUTORSIan Johnstone, Ian Martin and Teresa WhitfieldCONTRIBUTORSSara Batmanglich, Patrick Duplat, Richard Gowan, Tom Gregg, Leigh Nolan,Benjamin C. Tortolani, Elsina Wainwright, Erin Weir, Teresa WhitfieldThe <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation is solely responsible for the contentof this publication. Any errors of fact or analysis, and any and all judgmentsand interpretations about missions and operations discussed <strong>here</strong>in, are those ofCIC alone.This project was undertaken at the request of and with the support of the UNDepartment of Political Affairs, the UN Department of Field Support and theOSCE Secretariat.

Review ofPolitical2010MissionsA Project of the <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation

© 2010 by Xanthus Design. All rights reservedISBN: 978-1-4507-3345-8 (pbk)Printed and bound in the U.S.A

Table of ContentsForeword, B. Lynn PascoePreface, Bruce D. JonesMission AcronymsMap of Global Peace Operations, 2009-2010ixxixvxviii1 Strategic Summary iRichard Gowan2 Thematic Essays 72.1 All Peace Operations are Political, Ian Martin.......................... 82.2 Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions, Ian Johnstone.......... 152.3 Political Missions, Mediationand Good Offices, Teresa Whitfield......................................... 273 Mission Reviews 1 353.1 Middle East.......................................................................... 363.2 West Africa........................................................................... 453.3 Central Africa....................................................................... 573.4 Western Balkans.................................................................... 653.5 Afghanistan .......................................................................... 753.6 Iraq ...................................................................................... 833.7 Nepal.................................................................................... 893.8 Somalia................................................................................. 951 Each chapter covers missions in a specific region or country. A small number of missions aredescribed in stand-alone box text within chapters devoted to other regions. These include the AUmission in Kenya (p. 97), the Special Advisor on Cyprus (p. 125) and the Special Advisor on thePrevention of Genocide (p. 120).

vi | Contents4 Mission Notes 1 1014.1 Caucasus and Moldova .........................................................1024.2 Central America and the Caribbean.......................................1074.3 Central Asia.........................................................................1114.4 Myanmar.............................................................................1174.5 Western Sahara....................................................................1235 Global Statistics on UN and OSCE Missions 1275.1 Global UN Mission Statistics................................................1285.2 Global OSCE Mission Statistics...........................................1356 UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics 1416.1 BINUB (UN Integrated Office in Burundi)...........................1446.2 BINUCA (formerly BONUCA, UN Peace-buildingOffice in the Central African Republic).................................1496.3 CNMC (Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission)...................1566.4 Personal Envoy, Western Sahara............................................1606.5 Special Adviser, Cyprus........................................................1636.6 Special Adviser, Myanmar.....................................................1686.7 Special Envoy, Implementation of Resolution 1559................1716.8 Special Envoy, LRA-Affected Areas......................................1746.9 UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)................1776.10 UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq)............................1836.11 UNIIIC (UN International IndependentInvestigation Commission)...................................................1896.12 UNIOGBIS (formerly UNOGBIS,UN Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau).........................1926.13 UNIPSIL (UN Integrated Peace-buildingOffice in Sierra Leone).........................................................1976.14 UNMIN (UN Mission in Nepal)...........................................2026.15 UNOWA (UN Office for West Africa)..................................2076.16 UNPOS (UN Political Office for Somalia).............................2116.17 UNRCCA (UN Regional Centre for PreventiveDiplomacy for Central Asia).................................................2166.18 UNSCO (UN Special Coordinator Officefor the Middle East Peace Process)........................................2206.19 UNSCOL (Office of the UN SpecialCoordinator for Lebanon).....................................................223

Contents | vii7 OSCE Mission-by-Mission Statistics 2277.1 OMIK (OSCE Mission in Kosovo).......................................2287.2 OSCE BiH (OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina).......2367.3 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat....................................................2427.4 OSCE Centre in Astana.......................................................2467.5 OSCE Centre in Bishkek......................................................2507.6 OSCE Mission to Moldova...................................................2547.7 OSCE Mission to Montenegro..............................................2587.8 OSCE Mission to Serbia......................................................2617.9 OSCE Office in Baku...........................................................2657.10 OSCE Office in Tajikistan....................................................2697.11 OSCE Office in Yerevan.......................................................2737.12 OSCE Presence in Albania...................................................2777.13 OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje........................................2817.14 Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Officeon the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference...286

ForewordAs the United Nations and itspartners work to prevent andresolve deadly conflict around theglobe, field-based political missions arean increasingly important instrumentin their employ. UN political missionsare operating today in some the mostdifficult of the world’s hotspots –from Iraq to Afghanistan, Somaliato the Middle East – promotingpeace, reconciliation and goodgovernance in war-torn societies. Atthe same time, possibly because theseoperations lack the same visibilityof peacekeeping or humanitarianaid, their relatively discreet activitieshave made them a lesser known andunderstudied phenomenon.This new publication by NYU’s<strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation– a first-of-its-kind review ofpolitical missions in the field – helps toaddress this gap. Its observations andrecommendations should be lookedat carefully by practitioners, UnitedNations Member States, and all otherswho take an active interest in internationalconflict resolution. On behalfof the United Nations, I would like tocongratulate the <strong>Center</strong> for taking thisimportant initiative, which complementsits well-regarded Annual Reviewof Global Peace Operations.The moment has arrived to paycloser attention to this topic. At atime when the burden of violent conflictsis overtaxing the ability of theinternational community to respond,political missions have the potential tohelp save lives and scale down costlycommitments in managing crises andrebuilding after civil wars. They arealready making an important differencein many places, as this studycompellingly illustrates.The United Nations has morethan a dozen political missions in thefield today – covering a wider varietyof states and regions than any otherorganization. They range from classicmediation efforts led by a senior envoyand a small staff – such as the Secretary-General’s good offices for Cyprus orWestern Sahara – to very sizeable andmulti-faceted field operations in complexand dangerous environments, suchas the UN political missions in Iraq andAfghanistan. They include a uniquemission assisting the peace process inNepal as well as peace-building officestending to the difficult politics of postwarreconciliation and state-building inplaces such as Sierra Leone, Burundi,Guinea-Bissau and the Central AfricanRepublic. The list also includes regionaloffices serving as platforms for preventivediplomacy in West Africa andCentral Asia. A similar office is soon tobe established for Central Africa.If t<strong>here</strong> is a common threadconnecting these and other diverseoperations profiled in this study it maybe this: the conviction that at the rootof most violent conflicts around theix

x | Forewordglobe lay political problems requiringpolitical solutions. Different stages ofconflict require us to adapt and tailorour responses. The international communityneeds to enhance its ability notonly to stabilize conflicts and tend tothe humanitarian suffering they produce,but ultimately to find lastingpolitical solutions.As we increasingly look to politicalmissions as an option for respondingto crises, serious efforts of this kind toassess their performance, draw attentionto their needs, and shed light ontheir positive contributions are bothtimely and much needed. As this studymakes clear, among the most importantchallenges moving forward is toensure that political missions have adequateresources and oversight to carryout their mandates successfully.CIC has provided us with a valuablemirror on our work, and a learningtool for the future.B. Lynn PascoeUnited Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs

PrefaceThe <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation(CIC) is committed to expandingand deepening the analysis ofmultilateral security instruments,ranging from sanctions to post-conflictpeace-building. Our work - not leastour Annual Review of Global PeaceOperations series, established in 2006– illuminates the scale, complexity anddiversity of international interventionsin states and regions at risk of conflict.It is inevitable that some cases, suchas Afghanistan, receive more dayto-dayattention than others. Butto understand the contribution ofmultilateral institutions to internationalsecurity, it is necessary to map the muchwider web of activities undertaken bythe UN and other global and regionalorganizations.What can we learn from thesemapping exercises? This simple butimportant fact: “conflict and cooperationamong states on matters of peaceand security have been increasinglymanaged, regulated, or implementedby and through multilateral securityinstitutions.” 1 Yet a great deal ofacademic literature on internationalcooperation ignores these operationalphenomena. Policy-makers oscillatebetween searching for “off the shelf ”conflict management tools at the UNand other institutions and announcinginitiatives to transform those institutions– often repeating previous,forgotten experiments.A fuller, more realistic understandingof what international institutions aredoing today – and what they havedone, well or badly, in the past – is aprerequisite for managing more effectivereforms in future.This Review of Political Missions isCIC’s first attempt to map a poorlyunderstoodbut very widespread formof multilateral engagement in conflictaffected(or at risk) areas. It shedslight on the work of primarily civilianmissions (occasionally buttressed bysmall numbers of military monitorsand policemen) in mediating conflicts,devising and monitoring peace agreementsand promoting good governanceworldwide. Many of these missionsexist in a gray area between large-scalemilitary peacekeeping and more traditionaldevelopment aid and humanrights monitoring. The variety of additionaltasks of the missions we analyze– from helping re-house displaced personsand refugees to advising on thedestruction of out-of-date armaments– is remarkable. But as Ian Johnstonenotes in his thematic essay, all are insome way involved directly or tangentiallyin “political process management.”This may sound technocratic.But as Johnstone shows – and CIChas underlined in a series of reportspublished in recent years – successfulpolitical processes are essential tocreating sustainable peace. 2Ian Martin has learned this thehard way. As he argues in his openingessay to this Review, all peacexi

xii | Prefaceoperations are political. Some analystsforget this when dealing with largescalepeacekeeping and developmentissues: it is easy to focus on the numberof blue helmets or aid dollars involved.When we turn to political missions,the challenge is different. How canwe analyze and evaluate the impact ofrelatively small numbers of civilianson complex political processes, especiallywhen some of these processes(like those in the Western Balkans)are more than a decade old. As TeresaWhitfield argues <strong>here</strong>, opportunitiesfor mediation and good offices cannotbe encapsulated in formal mandates.Politics is a slippery business.We hope that, in mapping thesemissions, we can make their work alittle easier to grasp. Precisely because“political process management” is sohard to grasp, we are confident thatreaders will dissent from many ofour judgments and analyses. But wehope that they will appreciate that,by searching for commonalities andseeing patterns in disparate missions’activities (such as those suggested inRichard Gowan’s strategic summary)we can sketch out the framework forbetter missions in future. Ian Martin,Ian Johnstone and Teresa Whitfieldoffer elements of this framework,ranging from planning to managementissues and mandates to doctrine– although they each recognize theprimacy of flexibility.AcknowledgmentsThis volume emerged throughconversations with the UN’sDepartment of Political Affairs, andwas made possible through the generoussupport of the Government of Norway,the Government of Switzerland andthe United States Institute of Peace.The Secretariat of the Organizationfor Security and Cooperation inEurope provided considerable data andadvice on its missions, while the UN’sDepartment for Field Support ensuredthat we had access to all the facts onfigures on UN missions.We are extremely grateful to B.Lynn Pascoe, UN Under-SecretaryGeneral for Political Affairs, SusannaMalcorra, UN Under-Secretary Generalfor Field Support, and Marc Perrinde Brichambaut, Secretary General ofthe OSCE for authorizing their staffsto give us their support and time overthe last year.We cannot thank all the officialswho assisted us, often giving us verydetailed responses to our individualquestions. At the UN Departmentof Political Affairs, we owe particularthanks to Chris Coleman and KarinaGerlach for giving the project impetus.We received a great deal of supportfrom Sebastian von Einsiedel, EikoIkegaya, Jared Kotler, Adrian Morriceand Vincent Pasquini. Michele Griffinand Steven Siqueira encouraged theproject in its early stages before leavingDPA to work elsew<strong>here</strong> in the UN system.We would like to extend an evengreater vote of thanks to Tania Belisle-Leclerc, a veteran of our Review ofPeace Operations who took a lead rolein guiding a new project through DPA.In the Department of FieldSupport, Hannah Davies played ahugely important role in identifyingand collating UN figures after AdrianHills kindly set the process in motion.Roy Doyon and Ayako Kagawa providedessential support in creatingmaps for this volume.At the OSCE, Dov Lynch rapidlytook up the suggestion of involvementin this project, while John Crosby wasvery helpful in collecting the necessarydata. The OSCE’s Gottfried Hanneand Alice Ackermann also gave us veryhelpful advice.Franck Afanyiakossou of theECOWAS Secretariat provided us

Preface | xiiiwith information on its network ofoffices. Benedikt Franke advised onthe AU and Giovanni Grevi on theEU’s Special Representatives.A significant number of internationalofficials based in West Africa,the Middle East, Somalia and WesternBalkans helped our researchers visit andunderstand these regions, as did manydesk officers and public affairs officersin New York. We would like to mentionthe UN’s Department of PublicInformation, Field Generation Service(Office of Military Affairs), FieldPersonnel Division, Logistical SupportDivision, Office of Rule of Law andSecurity Institutions, and PeacekeepingSituation <strong>Center</strong>.We have learned a huge amountfrom all these colleagues, but all errorsof fact, analysis and judgment in thiseditorially independent publication arevery much our own.We would like to thank BeritEnge and Elin Graae Jensen of theNorwegian Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Pascale Baeriswyl and BennoLaggner of the Swiss Ministry of ForeignAffairs and Abiodun Williamsand Lawrence Woocher of the U.S.Institute of Peace for their interest inour work and generous support.A special thanks is due to IanMartin, one of the UN’s most accomplishedand principled officials. Hisessay in this volume offers a windowinto the insights he has gainedas mediator, human rights observer,impartial investigator, election monitor,special representative and missionhead in operations in Latin America,Africa, Asia and the Middle East.At CIC – in addition to the authorslisted at the start of this volume – weowe thanks to many colleagues includingYvonne Alonzo, Rahul Chandran,Lynn Denesopolis, Victoria DiDomenico,Antonie Evans, ShepardForman, Noah Gall, Megan Gleason,Andrew Hart, Laurie Mincieli, YanikkLewis, Melissa Lucas, Nealin Parker,Ahmed Salim, Michele Shapiro, JakeSherman, Benjamin Tortolani andEmily Anne West. Sara Batmanglichwas instrumental in getting the projectgoing. Alice Bosley gave up a large partof her summer vacation to discoveringand confirming obscure facts for us.I would particularly like to thankIan Johnstone and Teresa Whitfield,both CIC Fellows, for their contributions,and Alischa Kugel for overseeingthe project with an unusual combinationof grace and attention to detail.Alischa coordinated the multipleparallel processes involved superbly.We were particularly fortunate tohave the support of Morgan AshleyHughes, who mastered the complexdata process.The staff at Xanthus Design – andin particular Farhud Batmanglich andJason Moore – have been creative andpatient partners in turning our raw textand data into book and website form.Five years of producing the AnnualReview of Global Peace Operations havetaught us a lot about the amount ofintellectual and organizational laborthat goes into such a volume. Whenwe decided to use a similar model toexamine political missions, t<strong>here</strong> wasone obvious decision: to ask RichardGowan to reprise his highly successfulrole as impresario of the first AnnualReview. In the interim, Richard hasgone on to run the CIC end of theCIC-Brookings-Stanford collaborationon Managing Global Insecurity,as well as becoming a fellow of theEuropean Council on Foreign Relations.I am very grateful that he waswilling to lend his considerable talentsto this fledgling edition of the politicalmissions review.Bruce D. JonesDirector and Senior FellowNYU <strong>Center</strong> on InternationalCooperation

xiv | PrefaceNotes1 Bruce D. Jones and Shepard Forman, “Introduction: ‘Two Worlds’ of internationalSecurity”, in Bruce D. Jones, Shepard Forman and Richard Gowan, Cooperating forPeace and Security: Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of Changing U.S.Security Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p8.2 See, most recently, Richard Gowan and Bruce D. Jones, Back to Basics: the UN and ConflictPrevention in an Age of Strategic Uncertainty (<strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation,2010). All CIC papers are at www.cic.nyu.edu.

Mission AcronymsBINUBBINUCACNMCEUBAMEUSRAICOMAPPMIB/OEAOAS/AZOMIKOHROSCE-BiHUNAMAUNAMIUNIIICUNIOGBISUNIPSILUNMIKUNMINUNOGBISUNOWAUNPOSUNRCCAUNSCOUNSCOLUN Integrated Office in BurundiUN Integrated Peace-building Office in the Central African RepublicCameroon-Nigeria Mixed CommissionEU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and UkraineEU Special Representative for AfghanistanInternational Civilian Office (Kosovo)OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in ColombiaOAS Mission of Good Offices between Columbia and EcuadorOAS Office in the Adjacency Zone between Belize and GuatemalaOSCE Mission in KosovoOffice of the High Representative (Bosnia and Herzegovina)OSCE Mission to Bosnia and HerzegovinaUN Assistance Mission in AfghanistanUN Assistance Mission for IraqUN International Independent Investigation CommissionUN Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-BissauUN Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra LeoneUN Interim Administration in KosovoUN Mission in NepalUN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-BissauUN Office for West AfricaUN Political Office for SomaliaUN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central AsiaOffice of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace ProcessOffice of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanonxv

Review ofPolitical 2010Missions

Strategic Summary 1Richard Gowan1

2 | Review of Political 2010 Missions1.1S t r a t e g i c S u m m a r yStrategic SummaryOverviews of international engagement inconflict-affected states typically focus onmilitary peacekeeping and the economics of postconflictpeacebuilding. This excludes an arrayof primarily civilian missions deployed by theUnited Nations (UN) as well as other multilateralinstitutions in countries and regions that are at riskof, experiencing or emerging from violence. Thehallmark of these missions is political engagementwith governments, parties and civil society aimed ataverting, mitigating or stopping conflict.T<strong>here</strong> is not even a satisfactory collective termfor these mechanisms. This volume’s title nods tothe phrase “Special Political Missions” used by theUN, but this is a budgetary category. It also coversthe “field presences” of the Organization of theSecurity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) anda variety of “offices” and “centers” launched by otherorganizations. Such titles give very little idea ofwhat these missions really do.Yet, as this volume shows, they are doing a greatdeal. Over fifty active missions (and some that haveclosed in the last one to two years) are described inthe pages that follow.They include the UN’s assistance missionsin Afghanistan and Iraq as well as a variety ofOSCE and European Union (EU) presences in theBalkans, but are spread as far apart as Belize andNepal. They range in size from a handful of staffto operations involving hundreds of internationaland locally-employed personnel. Some have clearmandates to guide and sustain mediation processes(such as the UN’s long-running efforts to makepeace in Somalia). Others are tasked with indirectlycontributing to stable and sustainable politics suchas promoting good governance, justice or securitysector reform.The majority of missions we cover focus onindividual countries, although t<strong>here</strong> are a smallnumber of regional offices and representatives(discussed in the next section). Multilateralpolitical missions dealing primarily with bilateralconflicts are very rare, reflecting the general trendby international organizations to focus on internalconflicts.Most current political missions are in statesthat have experienced serious conflict (like Bosniaand Herzegovina) or narrowly avoided it (likethe Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedoniaand Kenya). Some are in countries experiencingongoing combat (such as Iraq) or going throughescalations in violence (from Afghanistan to theCentral African Republic and Kyrgyzstan). Fewmissions play a purely preventive role, but many areDrawing parametersIn spite using a broad definition of “politicalmissions,” we have still had to exclude somepotential candidates from the volume. These includesome small OSCE offices, including those in Zagreb,Minsk and the Ukraine; a significant number of EUdelegations (previously European Commissiondelegations) involved in conflict management; andUN envoys not supported through the SpecialPolitical Missions budget. T<strong>here</strong> would havebeen arguments for including all of these, but weconcluded that most of these examples resembled“normal” diplomatic or development presencesrather than political missions in our sense. Wehave also excluded election observer missions andhuman rights monitoring missions, in spite of theirpolitical significance.

STRATEGIC SUMMARY | 3involved in efforts to prevent escalations to violenceor returns to war after peace deals. 1Many political missions exist in a grey areabetween humanitarian action, human rightsmonitoring, development work, peacebuildingand traditional diplomacy. Rather than attempt todefine its subject-matter narrowly, this volume castsits net broadly. It includes, for example the EU’sSpecial Representatives, envoys who often havevery limited staffs – or are even based in Brusselsrather than the countries that they deal with.Does it make sense to treat these operationsas a co<strong>here</strong>nt category? As the next section of thissummary underlines, clusters of missions havetended to emerge in certain regions for historicallyspecific reasons, such as the web of OSCE presencesin the Balkans launched in the later 1990s. Manymissions are descended from, or accompanimentsto, large peacekeeping operations or militarydeployments (as in Iraq and Afghanistan).Yet, for all their differences, the mechanisms thisbook groups under the headline of political missionsdo have certain characteristics in common. IanJohnstone argues that it is even possible to discern thebasis for an emerging doctrine for such operations.For the purposes of this overview, however, it ispossible to identify three central factors.• Political origins: these missions deriveauthority from multilateral decision-making inpolitical forums such as the Security Council,the EU Council and OSCE PermanentCouncil. This distinguishes them from, forexample, parallel field presences governed bythe UN Development Programme board.• Political means: while many of the missionsaddressed <strong>here</strong> conduct humanitarian, economicand other tasks – with associated leverage –they rely on political persuasion as a primarymeans of achieving their goals. These missions’credibility rests on their relationships withdomestic political actors.• Political goals: in spite of the multiplicity oftasks they undertake, the missions share the aimof launching and supporting political processes.This does not preclude focusing on otherpriorities such as justice and development. Butthese other goals are pursued in the context offostering sustainable political settlements.These are rough criteria, and raise furthercomplications. What, for example, do we mean bya political process? Does it necessarily imply thehigh-level implementation of a peace agreement,as in the UN operation in Nepal? Or can it alsoembrace long-term efforts to include minoritiesin municipal politics, a focus for the OSCE in theBalkans?Ultimately, this volume does not try to resolvethese terminological issues. Instead, it aims to mapa variety of missions and learn from their actualactivities on the ground. A number of commonproblems and patterns emerge from this mapping.These suggest that, although hard to define, politicalmissions are a distinct form of multilateral activity– and that they play a greater role in internationalsecurity than is commonly recognized.Mapping the fieldHowever they are defined, political missions are notnew. In the post-Cold War period, internationalorganizations have initiated a series of waves ofcivilian missions in response to evolving politicalchallenges. In the early 1990s, the CSCE (theOSCE’s forerunner) deployed a variety of politicalmissions and envoys to post-Soviet states fromEstonia to the Ukraine. This generation ofoperations successfully assisted these countries’transitions from Communism. Having succeeded,they are largely forgotten.Studying the global map at the beginningof this volume, it is very easy to identify six mainclusters of current political missions. It is strikingthat t<strong>here</strong> are only a few political missions – suchthe UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) – that falloutside these groupings:• The European cluster: the single largestcluster of political missions remains in the WestBalkans and the Black Sea region (includingMoldova and the Caucasus). The OSCEstill has missions across most of the formerYugoslavia. International civilian offices playan active role in the political developmentof Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo –the heads of these serve as the EU’s SpecialRepresentatives, as the EU has taken primaryresponsibility in the area.

4 | Review of Political 2010 Missions• The Middle Eastern cluster: the UNmaintains political missions in Lebanon andthe Occupied Palestinian Territories. TheUN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) isgaining new prominence as US forces graduallyleave the country.• The Central Asian cluster: while the UNAssistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)is among the most widely-known UNoperations of any type, t<strong>here</strong> is also a web ofsmaller political missions across Central Asia.These include a UN regional center and OSCEoffices in national capitals. This year’s Kyrgyzcrisis has brought the difficulties of operating inthe wider region into focus.• The Central and East African cluster: the UNhas a long-standing political mission dealingwith the Somali conflict and missions in theCentral African Republic and Burundi. T<strong>here</strong> isa small office in Kenya supporting the AfricanUnion-mandated process to resolve the tensionsrevealed by the 2007 elections.• The West African cluster: in addition to aregional political office based in Senegal, theUN has peacebuilding offices in Sierra Leoneand Guinea-Bissau, while ECOWAS has anetwork of early warning offices and envoysacross the region.• The Latin American cluster: the Organizationof American States has sent missions toColombia, Ecuador, Haiti, and the Guatemala-Belize border.Reviewing these clusters, certain patterns emerge.The first is the distinction between those regionsin which the UN has a primary role in deployingmissions (including Africa, Central Asia and theMiddle East) and those in which other organizationstake the lead (Europe and Latin America). In theAfrican case, it is striking that the African Unionhas yet to develop sizeable political missions, incontrast to its peacekeeping role.A second pattern is that, while political missionsmay be distinct from peacekeeping operations andother military deployments, the two tend to befound alongside each other.Of the UN political missions covered in thisvolume, almost two-thirds were deployed to acountry at the same time as a peacekeeping or othermilitary operation or to replace one. While fewerthan half of the OSCE’s missions deployed in similarcircumstances, its larger missions in the Balkanshave usually worked alongside peacekeepers.This degree of overlap matters because, as IanJohnstone notes in his contribution to this volume,t<strong>here</strong> is an ongoing debate as to whether politicalmissions act as alternatives or adjuncts to largescalepeace operations. The data suggests that inmost regions (with the exception of Latin Americaand Central Asia beyond Afghanistan) militaryoperations still tend to set the strategic frameworkfor political missions. However, this does not haveto be the case, as Ian Martin’s discussion of thedeployment of UNMIN shows.Martin focuses on the UN Mission in Nepal(UNMIN), which he devised and led. This involvedan arms monitoring component but was not atraditional peace operation – its primary identityand purpose was political. In such contexts, politicalmissions can offer an alternative to peacekeeping– similarly, fewer than ten OSCE observers keepwatch on large military forces in Nagorno-Karabakhas an alternative to a separation force.It has been argued that political missionscould deploy at earlier notice to avert conflictsaltogether, removing the need for peacekeeping.However, examples of effective preventive civiliandeployments deployed to countries at risk of conflictremain rare.It thus seems probable that global trends in thedeployment of political missions will continue to beaffected by peacekeeping and military trends. Themain “growth areas” for political missions appearto be Central and West Africa, in part because ofthe drawdown of peacekeeping forces t<strong>here</strong>. Thewithdrawal of Western troops from Iraq and, intime, Afghanistan may well lead to an expansion ofthe UN’s role in both places.The UN is likely to come under competingpressures to sustain and expand its missions inAfrica and the Middle East at the same time,stretching its personnel and resources.In the meantime, it is probable that the longrunningpolitical missions of the European clusterare likely to shrink in the years ahead. Yet cautionis required <strong>here</strong>: as our review of the Balkansnotes, past predictions of these missions’ demisehave proved incorrect. The OSCE still has 2,000personnel in the field. Two thirds of these are in theBalkans.

STRATEGIC SUMMARY | 5The fact that political missions – and, bydefinition, the problems they address – come ingeographical clusters raises the question of whetherregional political missions might not address theproblems more effectively. The UN has experimentedwith this approach in West Africa and Central Asia,and will soon do so in Central Africa. The OSCEdoes not have regional missions, but its presencesin Central Asia and the Balkans undertake crossborderissues. The EU has appointed a number ofregional special representatives.Regional approaches bring problems – it ishard to draw up mandates that ensure the head ofa regional office has all the access he or she needson a country-by-country basis. However, ourreviews suggest that regional approaches may alsoallow organizations to address cross-border securityissues, from trafficking to border security. They mayalso reduce the financial and managerial pressuresof deploying country-specific operations.Operational challengesSustaining, financing and managing politicalmissions is a growing challenge for the UN andother organizations. The UN faces particulardifficulties staffing its missions in Afghanistan andIraq, which involve nearly 3000 staff combined orroughly three-quarters of the personnel deployedin UN political missions worldwide (see missionreviews). These two missions account for over halfthe Special Political Missions budget. However,managerial problems also affect smaller missionsand recruitment is a problem for other organizations– 30% of staff posts in EU civilian mission areunfilled. Most OSCE staff come on secondmentfrom member-states, and the organization hasfound it increasingly difficult to get all the types ofpersonnel it needs in recent years.Staffing problems are complicated by thefact that the political missions’ diverse range oftasks requires staff with a complex variety of skillsets.While UN political missions employed 166political affairs officers as of March this year, theyalso involved 208 personnel with other substantiveportfolios (human rights, rule of law, humanitarianaffairs and so on) in addition to 646 internationalsupport staff and 2,866 nationally employed staff.Of the international support staff, 215 were securitypersonnel, underlining the expensive challenges ofrunning civilian missions in insecure contexts.The large numbers of support and securitystaff underlines the managerial difficulties involvedin running these operations – difficulties that alsoraise questions about oversight and relations withheadquarters. This is a particular challenge to theUN, which does not maintain a “support account”for back-stopping political missions as it does forpeace operations. This means that the number ofheadquarters personnel devoted to overseeing themissions is relatively low, potentially reducing thequality of oversight.In this regard, the OSCE is at an advantage ascivilian field presences are its stock-in-trade, and itsheadquarters better adapted to meeting their needs.However, covering the range of political activitiesremains a challenge – the OSCE Secretariat isonly now developing a mediation capacity, wellafter the UN set up a Mediation Support Unit.The EU’s relations with its Special Representativesare undergoing a more fundamental overhaul inthe context of the creation of the new EuropeanExternal Action Service.A final operational challenge for all organizationsdeploying political missions is that they rarely operatein isolation from other international agencies. TheUN has prioritized integrating its overall presencein countries like Sierra Leone and Burundi underthe authority of the heads of the political missionst<strong>here</strong> (see individual mission reviews). This remainsa work in progress. Other organizations like theEU and OSCE mandate their representatives andmissions to cooperate closely with actors like theWorld Bank – nonetheless, the case studies in thisvolume show that the results vary considerably.Political challengesWhile hampered by operational obstacles, politicalmissions also face a series of political challenges thataffect or undercut their core mandates. Althoughthese are country specific, a number of genericproblems recur in the case-studies in this volume:• Winning consent: because political missionstypically rely on their powers of persuasionto make an impact, they depend very heavilyon the consent of host nations. This often

6 | Review of Political 2010 Missionscomplicates efforts to discuss human rights,even w<strong>here</strong> this part of a mission’s explicitmandate, as it risks alienating a government.In some cases, as in Iraq, we note that missionleaders have gained political trust in recentyears – in others, such as Burundi, t<strong>here</strong> isfrequent friction with the government.• Mitigating fundamental political differences:in many cases, political missions are able toaddress symptoms of deep political differences,offering frameworks for parties to a conflictto pursue dialogue or implement peace deals.Nonetheless, international missions are rarelyable to resolve core political disputes unlesst<strong>here</strong> is a pre-existing desire for this to takeplace. In Kosovo, for example, the status ofthe former Yugoslav province is unlikely to beresolved by direct action by any of the missionson the ground. For many political missions,t<strong>here</strong>fore, success can be defined in functionalterms – creating frameworks for successfulpolitical processes – rather than the final goal ofsustainable peace.• Knowing when to leave: many of the missionscovered in this volume are over a decade old,especially those in Europe. Because politicalprocesses are by definition open-endedprocesses, it is often difficult to close downmissions. T<strong>here</strong> is thus a risk that operationswill continue beyond their useful lifetime.In light of these political and operational obstacles, itwould be a mistake to over-sell what political missionscan achieve – they remain one of the tools available tothe international community in addressing conflicts,not a panacea for conflict management.Nonetheless, this volume shows that they area diverse tool, and that demand for them is likelyto increase. As Ian Martin argues in the openingessay, an awareness that all peace operations arepolitical is essential to addressing and end civilwars. A clearer understanding of what non-militaryinternational options can achieve should allowpolicy-makers to develop more effective responsesin future. By mapping current political missions, wehope to inform future planning on crisis preventionand response.notes1 A “purely preventive” role involves a mission working to avoid conflict in a country that has experienced little orno actual violence.

Thematic Essays 2All Peace Operations Are Political, Ian MartinEmerging Doctrine for Political Missions, Ian JohnstonePolitical Missions, Mediation and Good Offices, Teresa Whitfield7

8 | Thematic Essays2.1 T h e m a t i c E s s a y sAll Peace Operations Are Political:a Case for Designer Missions and the Next UN ReformIan MartinIn mandating, funding and (for the most part)managing its peace missions, the United Nationsmaintains a distinction between peacekeepingoperations and special political missions. Fiveuseful editions of the Annual Review of GlobalPeace Operations have treated peace operations aslargely synonymous with peacekeeping, definingthem as in-country operations that are authorizedby a multilateral body, that are multinational intheir composition, that have a substantial militaryor police component, and that are deployed insupport of a peace process or conflict managementobjective. Yet not every peace operation deployedwith a conflict management objective need havea substantial uniformed component. And everymilitary peacekeeping operation is in<strong>here</strong>ntlypolitical, doomed to stagnation or ultimate failurein the absence of an effective political process.Within the UN today, organizational divisions andrelationships, funding arrangements and mechanismsfor mandating and accountability are dysfunctional forthe rational planning and evolution of peace operations.An unduly linear approach to peacemaking,peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and thinking whichis boxed into separate concepts and precedents forpeacekeeping, special political and peacebuilding missionsand offices, do not adequately correspond to thediverse needs of countries in conflict or transition.They can result in the imposition of inappropriatetemplates, rather than operations being designed inaccordance with the country-specific context. Increasinglythe large, multidimensional peacekeepingmission has become the norm and t<strong>here</strong> are resistancesto departing from its template. InsufficientMaoist army weapons being registered and stored by UNMIN, with support ofInterim Task Force members.consideration is given to the possibility of lighter –and cheaper – options. It is time for a fundamentalreview and reform, the centerpiece of which shouldbe the merger of the departments responsible andcommon funding arrangements.UNMIN: a Designer MissionTo illustrate the potential of lighter missions – andemphasize the need for flexibility in designingUN Photo / Sagar Shrestha

All Peace Operations are Political | 9them – I turn to my own experience planningand leading the special political mission in Nepal,UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal). 1 Themission qualified for inclusion in the Annual Reviewof Global Peace Operations, as well as in this volume,on the basis of its military component. But whetheror not a military component of 186 unarmedserving and retired military officers deployed as“arms monitors” to monitor two armies totaling over100,000 combatants qualifies as “substantial,” it wasan unusual - indeed a unique - mission for the UN.Overall, UNMIN was sufficiently unusual for meto be told with some exasperation at headquarters,in the course of mission planning, that “we don’twant designer missions: we do template missions.”In fact, Nepal offers a case study in the need tobe flexible in tailoring a peace operation to theparticular context, and in the ability of a relativelylight mission to make a contribution to peaceprocess implementation no less successful than thatof many far larger operations. The need for suchflexibility is part of the case for major changes inUN arrangements for the management, fundingand oversight of peace operations.That the UN was able to play a substantial rolein support of Nepal’s peace process was, first andforemost, the result of low-key political engagementundertaken by the Department of PoliticalAffairs from 2003, after Secretary-General KofiAnnan had publicly offered good offices to seek toend an increasingly bloody armed conflict betweenMaoist insurgents and the state. The UN’s in-countryinvolvement with the conflict deepened when,in April 2005, the government of King Gyanendrasought to defuse international condemnationof both conflict-related abuses and its violations ofdemocratic rights by accepting the establishment inNepal of an Office of the High Commissioner forHuman Rights (OHCHR-Nepal). Engagementwith the parliamentary parties, then excluded fromgovernment, with the Maoist leadership, and withcivil society, which had lobbied for the UN’s humanrights role, fortified the conviction of all these actorsthat the UN should assist in implementing the peaceprocess which would follow once their alliance hadsucceeded in bringing down the king’s government.Several factors ensured that Nepal was not acandidate for the peacekeeping template. The UN’skey role emerged from the agreement between theparliamentary parties and the Maoists that thearmies which had fought the war would be restrictedto barracks (for what was then still very much theRoyal Nepalese Army) and cantonments (for theMaoist army) during the election of a constituentassembly which would afford an opportunityfor the Maoists’ republican and federalist agenda.This agreement, which became the basis of theextraordinary people’s movement that ousted KingGyanendra from power in April 2006, providedfor the restricted armies to be placed under internationalsupervision. In subsequent negotiations,the Maoists were required to agree, as a conditionfor joining the interim legislature and government,to storage of their weapons under UN surveillanceand monitoring. The UN would maintain aroundthe-clocksurveillance at eight weapons storageareas (including one w<strong>here</strong> an equivalent number ofNepalese Army weapons were stored) and monitor28 Maoist army cantonment sites and the hundredsof barracks and installations of the Nepalese Army.The Nepalese parties were adamant that theydid not want these functions to be carried out byarmed peacekeepers: when they formalized theirrequest, it was for monitoring of the arms and armiesby “qualified civilian personnel.” The pride theNepalese Army and establishment took in Nepal’slong-standing participation in UN peacekeepingwas reflected in reluctance to become a recipient ofblue helmets. The Maoist leadership had developedsome confidence in UN impartiality, but in its rankssuspicion of military interventions was rife. Indiahad only reluctantly come to accept the need forany UN role, and initially hoped that Nepal couldbe kept away from the Security Council. Delhicertainly did not want to see a UN peacekeepingforce in a neighboring country with which it has anopen border.At UN Headquarters, some felt that the rolerequested could only be properly performed byarmed peacekeepers in substantial numbers, andcertainly by serving military personnel, not byretired officers, as the request for qualified civiliansimplied. This was supported by pragmatic considerations.Outside the UN, retired military and policeofficers have been deployed to carry out militaryor quasi-military monitoring tasks – for example,in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan, Sri Lanka andAceh. However, the UN itself had no precedent andno system for such recruitment. Eventually the partieswere persuaded to agree to accept a mix of active

10 | Thematic Essaysand retired officers, on the understanding that allwould be unarmed and in civilian attire. In orderto mount an around-the-clock presence at weaponsstorage sites before UN monitors could providethis, the Maoists and the government proposedthe recruitment of an Interim Task Force (ITF) ofNepali ex-servicemen from the Indian Army. Thisfurther unorthodox arrangement gave rise to morenervousness at UN Headquarters, and UNMINtook no formal responsibility for the ITF. But its111 members, selected by consensus between thetwo sides, became invaluable to the overall monitoringpresence at the cantonments, even after thefull deployment of UNMIN’s 186 arms monitors.Beyond arms and armies, the broader role soughtfrom the UN was focused on the constituent assemblyelection, together with a continuation of humanrights monitoring by OHCHR-Nepal and a moregeneral request to assist in monitoring the ceasefirecode of conduct, later subsumed in the ComprehensivePeace Agreement (CPA). The UN offered toprovide technical assistance to the Election Commissionat national, regional and district levels, andto deploy a team of five expert monitors to review theelectoral process, independently of UNMIN, as wellas encouraging observation by others.Ensuring adequate political space and a levelplaying field for all political parties in the ruralareas, w<strong>here</strong> t<strong>here</strong> had been a prolonged absence ofan effective state, would be crucial for the credibilityof the election. UNMIN t<strong>here</strong>fore planned fora civil affairs component which, together with districtelectoral advisers and OHCHR human rightsofficers, would make up a significant UN presencebeyond Kathmandu.The Nepalese political actors took justifiablepride in the fact that their peace process was theirown, and not imposed or mediated by any externalactor. 2 T<strong>here</strong> was no formal facilitation of overallnegotiations, although the UN’s chief militaryadviser chaired the negotiation of the crucial agreementon monitoring arms and armed personnel.Thus UNMIN was tailored to the request of theparties and its constraints.For those of us planning the mission, t<strong>here</strong> wasone particular respect in which we believed at theoutset that the constraints led the mission to fall shortof the needs of the situation. The UN was consciousthat it was assuming the responsibility of monitoringtemporary arrangements for the two armies withSigning of the agreement on the management of arms and armies,8 December 2006.only vague definitions in the CPA of processes bywhich the Interim Government would address theirfuture: the “integration and rehabilitation” of Maoistcombatants and the “democratization” of the NepaleseArmy. We would have preferred to includetechnical assistance to resolving these security sectorissues in the mandate and staffing of the mission, andwere told that such UN assistance would be requiredeventually; it was mainly Nepal’s deference to Indianwishes that precluded a request for any such UN role.UNMIN in PracticeThe achievements in the period for whichUNMIN was conceived and planned, through tothe holding of the constituent assembly election,were considerable. Within the Joint MonitoringCoordination Committee ( JMCC), skillfullychaired by UNMIN’s Chief Arms Monitor, initiallyfrosty dealings between senior officers of the twoarmies thawed into cooperation. Not a shot wasfired between the two armies, and t<strong>here</strong> was not asingle known case of weapons being removed fromthe storage containers. The relationships forgedwithin the JMCC enabled UNMIN to interveneto defuse situations that threatened the politicalprocess or could derail the election.The Election Commission, which happilyproved to be both highly competent and ofunimpeachable integrity, successfully navigated twoelection postponements and overcame the considerabletechnical and logistical challenges it faced forthe April 2008 poll. Campaigning was peaceful inUN Photo

12 | Thematic EssaysThe handicap of being a special politicalmission, funded from the regular UN budget,rather than a peacekeeping mission funded by separateassessment, went beyond the limitation onpre-commitment authority. Ranking third in sizeand cost among special political missions to thosein Iraq and Afghanistan, UNMIN appeared as alarge operation – w<strong>here</strong>as alongside peacekeepingmissions it would have appeared as a relativelylight mission offering high value for money. Thedownward pressures on staffing and funding tobe provided from the regular budget are inevitablyacute, although UNMIN did win most of itsbattles for resources, including – with the Governmentof Nepal’s support against the view of theAdvisory Committee on Administrative and BudgetaryQuestions – its civil affairs staffing.All Peace Operations Are PoliticalNepal thus offers one example of the case formissions to be designed according to their context,and of the unhelpfulness of the distinction betweenpeacekeeping and special political missions. Toproceed from first principles rather than fromcurrent structures, it seems self-evident that peaceoperations should be designed according to theparticularities of the peace process or conflictmanagement objective they are to support, withmaximum flexibility and scope for innovation.Since the needs of the situation will evolve,although not always in positive directions, themission should be continuously reassessed andreconfigured as necessary. Functions which canachieve their objective in the short-term, which itis to be hoped will include the military contributionto stabilization, should not be unduly prolonged.Peacebuilding functions need to be planned in arealistic, longer time-frame. At all times the missionneeds to be governed by a political strategy aimingto bring together all aspects of the internationalengagement to promote sustainable peace.Thus if peacekeeping is defined by the needfor a substantial military component, it representsa limited stage in support of a peace process ormanagement of a conflict. However, peacebuildingfunctions, which have increasingly come to becarried out within multidimensional peacekeepingoperations - such as security sector reform, policedevelopment and promotion of the rule of law - arein<strong>here</strong>ntly long-term, and their success is likely tobe prejudiced if planned within the time horizon ofthe peacekeeping stage.Peacemaking, or mediation, and peacebuilding,or development, have a much longer-term horizon.Implementation of even the best negotiated peaceagreement requires continuous mediation amongnational actors, as well as regional and internationaldiplomacy, throughout the peacekeeping stage andbeyond, and peacekeeping will stagnate or fail if itis not accompanied by an active political strategy.Peacebuilding should begin as soon as the minimumdegree of security exists, in order to contributeto sustainable peace. A political or mediating roleis likely to remain essential for successful peacebuildingin fragile states beyond the requirementfor peacekeeping.Continuity of political strategy, flexiblereconfiguration of the operational presence andlong-term peacebuilding are not well served bycurrent arrangements within the UN system. Initialmediation is the responsibility of the Departmentof Political Affairs (DPA). Once a country situationrequires a UN peacekeeping presence, responsibilitytransitions to the Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO). This implies a discontinuityin political oversight, and can result in marginalizingthe political expertise hitherto built up withinthe Secretariat. It also carries the risk that thedemands of managing large operations, often incrisis situations, result in an insufficient focus onpolitical strategy, as well as disconnect from theUN’s wider diplomatic engagements in the regionand beyond.Much attention is currently focused on whenthe peacekeeping stage can end, and what follows.The fact that this may imply a transfer of leaddepartment responsibility can distort the objectiveanalysis of what is required. It is likely – and desirable– that the requirements shift away from theinternational security presence, while longer-termsecurity sector, rule of law and other peacebuildingefforts should be sustained. A desire to end apeacekeeping presence can give rise to prematuredisengagement from such long-term tasks; conversely,a recognized need for the continuation ofcivilian activities carried out within a peacekeepingmission can unnecessarily prolong the retention ofa military component.

All Peace Operations are Political | 13A political lead and the continued integrationof peacebuilding and development activities arelikely to remain desirable beyond the presence ofinternational security forces: the integrated peacebuildingmission in Sierra Leone demonstrates thevalue of this approach. The lesson most commonlydrawn from the 2006 crisis in independent Timor-Leste, which exploded as a UN transition from apeacekeeping mission to a follow-on integratedoffice was about to take place, is the wrong one: thefailure to foresee and attempt to avert the crisis wasthe consequence of inadequate political engagement,rather than of premature withdrawal of themilitary presence. The transition through differentstages of the UN peace operation in Burundi hasbeen bedeviled by arguments around the timing ofthe transfer of departmental responsibility whichappear to have had little or nothing to do with theactual nature of the mission.UN “peacekeeping” missions have come toinclude not only missions with civilian functionsgreatly exceeding their peacekeeping functions,but also missions w<strong>here</strong> the peacekeeping functionis carried out by another international actor orhas come to an end. The peacekeeping frameworkwas ill-equipped to plan and manage transitionaladministrations with full governmental responsibilitiesin Kosovo and East Timor. This year’sdisaster in Haiti requires international securityfunctions in the short-term, but the future UN roleis not appropriately conceptualized and planned asa peacekeeping mission.The different funding procedures for“peacekeeping operations” and “special politicalmissions” create a distinction that does not correspondto country requirements. What constitutes abig special political mission, as in Nepal, would bea relatively small peacekeeping operation. It makesno sense to fund such missions out of the regularbudget. As long ago as 1995, in the Supplement toan Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General BoutrosBoutros-Ghali drew attention to the need to establishagreed procedures for the financing of “a classof field missions which are neither peacekeepingoperations nor the kind of recurrent activity which isnormally funded by the regular budget.” 4When it comes to mandating and accountabilityarrangements for peace and security operations, theSecurity Council is the appropriate body to haveoversight of those which require the deploymentof international security forces. It is questionable,however, whether it is the appropriate bodyto have oversight of transitional administrations,reconstruction and state-building, or broaderpeacebuilding. Its relationship in this respect to thePeacebuilding Commission and the effectiveness ofthe latter are yet to be fully determined.The Next UN ReformThe time has come for a fundamental review andmodification of UN departmental structures,funding mechanisms and mandating andaccountability arrangements, with the objective ofcreating a system able to ensure that field operationsare designed, modified, funded and managedaccording to the mix of political, peacekeeping andpeacebuilding functions required by each countrycontext and its evolution.The fundamental requirement for this to beachieved is the merger of the two departmentscurrently responsible for running peacekeepingand political missions, namely DPKO and DPA.A single peace and security department shouldbe charged with the political oversight and direction,as well as the operational management, of allpeace operations deployed by the UN, regardlessof whether they include uniformed personnel. ThePeacebuilding Support Office should become partof the merged department, and specialized unitssuch as the Mediation Support Unit, the ElectoralAssistance Department and the Office for Rule ofLaw and Security Institutions should deliver theirtechnical expertise to all peace operations on thesame terms.The establishment of the Department of FieldSupport (DFS) has been an important step towardsrecognizing that t<strong>here</strong> are equal needs for support tofield operations of diverse kinds, irrespective of currentdepartmental management. The DFS GlobalSupport Strategy, endorsed in July 2010 by MemberStates, offers a platform for more efficient andfaster support for all peace operations, regardlessof their size or designation. Member States shouldaccept that all peace operations ought to be fundedoutside the regular budget of the Organization,as they are not intended to be recurrent expenses.Member States also need to consider what wouldbe the most effective mechanisms for the Security

14 | Thematic EssaysCouncil, the Peacebuilding Commission, and allthose contributing funding and personnel, to providesupport and maintain scrutiny of all peaceoperations, without undue duplication.These would not be easy reforms, and it wouldbe foolish to think that they would be universallywelcomed within the Secretariat or among MemberStates. But they would be real reforms, which wouldoffer the prospect of UN peace operations betterdesigned to meet the diverse challenges of peacemaking,peacekeeping and peacebuilding that theinternational community is confronting today.notes1 Ian Martin was Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Nepal and head of UNMIN, February2007-February 2009, and previously served in Nepal as Representative of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights (May 2005-August 2006) and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for support to Nepal’speace process (August 2006-February 2007).2 Although the UN, a Swiss conflict adviser, a South African consultant contracted through USAID and the IndianEmbassy engaged continuously with members of both the government and Maoist negotiating teams. See TeresaWhitfield, Masala Peacemaking: Nepal’s Peace Process and the Contribution of Outsiders, Conflict Prevention andPeace Forum, October 2008.3 The conclusions of a November 2009 workshop identifying lessons from UNMIN are presented in TeresaWhitfield, Focused Mission: Not So Limited Duration, <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation, New York University,February 2010. See also: Astri Suhrke, “Virtues of a Narrow Mission: The UN Peace Operation in Nepal,”http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?3745=virtues-of-a-narrow-mission.4 United Nations, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of theFiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60, S/1995/1, 25 January 1995, paras. 31-32.

Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions | 152.2 T h e m a t i c E s s a y sEmerging Doctrine forPolitical MissionsIan JohnstoneThe term ‘political mission’ is not well-specified,as the introduction to this volume makes clear.The UN’s budgetary category for special politicalmissions covers operations that go beyond the purely‘political’ (such as sanctions committees); many UNentities that perform political functions do not carry thelabel (peacekeeping operations for example); and manyentities deployed by other international organizationsfit the description (like Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe field operations). While exercisesin definition can be a distraction, greater conceptualclarity on what political missions do is a necessary firststep in thinking about how to make them more effective.This Review covers field missions that engage in goodoffices, mediation, facilitation, political monitoringand oversight (see sections 3 and 4 of this volume). Theyoperate at different points in the conflict cycle, fromprevention to peace-building. And they function atvarious geographic levels, from the most local to thesub-regional. The more than forty missions that meetthe criteria are one of a menu of crisis response/conflictresolution options available to the UN and otherorganizations. While they perform a range of functions,‘political process management’ 1 is at their core. Thisessay elaborates on what that means by examiningmandates and by identifying guiding principles thatare emerging from accumulated experience.Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon consulting with the then Assistant-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Haile Menkerios, 21 April 2008.The essay is in two parts. The first considersmandates, broken down by (i) scope and pointson the conflict cycle; and (ii) source of authority.For each category, I address a number of conceptualissues, dilemmas and challenges. In the secondpart, I set out a number of guiding principles forpolitical missions. This emerging doctrine is drawnfrom the cases as well as academic and officialliterature on mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.They are presented as a first attempt tocodify lessons learned in order to help guide theformulation of mandates and operational strategiesin the future.UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

16 | Thematic EssaysMandatesScopeThe range of mandates and functions of specialpolitical missions defies easy categorization. Thetable in this chapter shows their scope. These missionsoperate at the regional, bilateral, state andsub-state levels and they intervene at every pointin the conflict cycle: prevention, on-going conflict,peace implementation and post-conflict. Manyoperate at more than one geographic level and persistthrough the conflict cycle. Functions range frommonitoring (early warning of incipient conflict)to mediation (negotiation of ceasefires and peaceagreements) to the far end of peacebuilding (capacitybuilding for economic reconstruction). Self-evidently,“politics” is at the heart of political missions,but that raises as many questions as it answers:• What distinguishes political missions fromother international organization field presencesthat serve a political purpose?• Is the political mandate restricted to what isexplicitly authorized, or are certain functionsin<strong>here</strong>nt?• Are these missions most effective when politicalprocess management is their sole function,or do multiple mandates provide leverage theywould not otherwise have?The answer to these and other questions is thestarting point for developing a ‘doctrine’ – a frameworkof guiding principles – for political missions.All peace processes are driven by an over-archingpolitical imperative: to establish sustainable peace,defined not as the removal of all conflicts from asociety, but when “the natural conflicts of any society”can be resolved without violence. 2 This hasimplications for all dimensions of a peace process:security, governance, rule of law, economic reconstructionand social well-being. 3 In that sense, everypeace operation is a ‘political mission.’ Peacekeepingand peacebuilding are political instruments,as are the various ways in which governments aremonitored and supported in their security, governance,human rights and socio-economic activities.Yet the term ‘political missions’ is not co-terminouswith those other instruments, let alone a catch-allto describe every entity in an international organizationthat serves a political function. Indeed, theUN Department of Political Affairs has describedits Special Political Missions as a cost effectivealternative to peacekeeping operations or otherlarge field presences. 4 The European Union SpecialRepresentatives tend to complement not subsumethe work of larger operations in places like Bosnia,Kosovo and Moldova. And OSCE missions coordinatewith other OSCE institutions like the Officeof the High Commissioner for National Minorities,but are seen as quite distinct.Thus the first definitional step is to conceive ofpolitical missions as field operations whose principalmandate is ‘political’ in the narrow sense of goodoffices, mediation, facilitation and political oversight,even if they also perform a range of otherfunctions that contribute to a broader peace process.This excludes peacekeeping operations witha substantial military and police presence, humanrights offices and monitoring missions, security sectorreform missions, electoral observation missionsand UN Country Teams.Three conceptual issues emerge fromaccumulated experience of political missionsso-conceived. First, must the political mandate beexplicit, or can ‘good offices’ be implied? The termgood offices is a loose one in UN usage. Originallyapplied to the role of the Secretary-General, it connoteseverything the UN can do of a diplomaticnature to help prevent, manage or resolve conflicts.It encompasses fact-finding and investigation;informal contacts and consultations with partiesto a dispute; rapid diplomatic action to prevent aminor conflict from escalating; public statementsdesigned to express international concern or tocoax the parties into dialogue; as well as formalmediation and conciliation. Most political missionshave an explicit mandate to engage in this type ofactivity: the United Nations Assistance Missionin Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United NationsPolitical Office in Somalia (UNPOS), the UnitedNations Special Coordinator Office for the MiddleEast Peace Process and the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) missionin Moldova, for example. The United NationsIntegrated Office in Burundi’s (BINUB) mandatenow includes a “robust political role” 5 and while theUnited Nations Peace-building Office in the CentralAfrican Republic’s (BONUCA) good officeswere used more in the lead-up to the political dialogue,the subsequent United Nations IntegratedPeace-building Office in the Central African

18 | Thematic EssaysEmerging Doctrine for Political MissionsPreventionOngoing ConflictPeaceImplementationPeacebuildingRegional1. Support capacitybuilding/sustainabledevelopment:• UNRCCA2. Tackle organizedcrime:• UNOWA• UNRCCA3. Provide regional earlywarning:• UNSCO (mediamonitoring)4. Coordinate regional/country efforts,either international orbilateral:• UNOWA5. Develop relations withregional organizations:• UNOWA• UNSCO6. Monitor/Promotehuman rights andminority rights:• UNOWA7. Facilitate dialogue/more generalmediation:• UNSCO• UNRCCA(water agreements)1. Negotiate peaceagreements/ceasefires:• Special Envoy to LRAAffected Areas• Special Envoy to GreatLakes Region• UNSCO2. Support peacekeeping:• UNOWA3. Coordinate regional/country efforts,either international orbilateral:•Special Envoy to LRAAffected Areas4. Develop relations withregional organizations:• UN Special Envoy toLRA Affected Areas5. More generalmediation:• Special Envoy to LRAAffected Areas1. Fact finding:• Special Envoy to theGreat Lakes Region2. Support inimplementingagreements/int’lrulings:• UNSCO3. Supportimplementation ofboundary agreements/border management:• UNOWA4. Reintegrationprograms for formermilitia/monitor armsand armed personnel:• UNOWA5. Monitor/Assistdemobilization/withdrawal/weaponsstorage etc:• UNOWA1. Governance/electoralassistance:• UNOWA2. Assist in protectionof a population:• UNSCO3. Support capacitybuilding/sustainabledevelopment:• UNOWA• UNSCO4. Coordination ofhumanitarianassistance/donor aid:• UNSCO5. Coordinate regional/country efforts, eitherinternationalor bilateral:• UNRCCA• UNSCO6. Monitor/Promotehuman rights andminority rights:• Special Envoy to LRAAffected Areas7. Monitor internal/regional political andsecurity developments:• Special Envoy to LRAAffected Areas8. Support PeacebuildingCommission/peacebuilding efforts:• Special Envoy to theGreat Lakes RegionBilateral1. Negotiate peaceagreements/ceasefires; coordinateregional/countryefforts, eitherinternational orbilateral; developrelations with regionalorganizations; moregeneral mediation:• CNMC1. Support inimplementingagreements/int’lrulings; supportimplementation ofboundary agreement/border management;monitor specificterms of peaceagreements; monitor/assist demobilization/withdrawal/weaponsstorage etc:• CNMC1. Assist in protectionof a population;support capacitybuilding/sustainabledevelopment:• CNMCContinued on page 19

20 | Thematic EssaysEmerging Doctrine for Political Missions (Continued)PreventionOngoing ConflictPeaceImplementationPeacebuildingState(Continued)9. Support countryrelations withregional neighbors/internationalcommunity:• UNIOGBIS10. Monitor/Promotehuman rights andminority rights:• BINUCA• UNMIN• BINUB• UNIOGBIS• UNAMA11. Monitor internal/regional politicaland securitydevelopments:• UNPOS• BINUB• BINUCA• UNIOGBIS12. Monitor/Train police:• BINUCA13. Supportimplementationof constitutionalprovisions:• UNAMI• UNIPSIL14. SupportPeacebuildingCommission/peacebuilding efforts:• UNIPSIL• UNMIN• UNIOGBIS• UNSCOL• BINUB• BINUCASub-State1. Governance/electoralassistance:• UNSCO (Palestinianelectoral assistance)1. Supportimplementation ofinternal boundaryagreements• UNAMI1. Assist in protection ofa population:• UNAMI• UNMIN

Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions | 21prisoners; facilitating reconstruction assistance; andregional confidence-building. One of UNAMA’smost significant recent political accomplishmentshas been to position itself as the principal interlocutorbetween the Afghan government and externalactors, facilitating a more unified political voiceamong the latter.W<strong>here</strong> a mission is on the conflict cycle alsohas an impact on strategy. Lakhdar Brahimi andSalman Ahmed highlight the inverse relationshipbetween the longevity of a peace process and theroom for it to play an effective political role. 12 Thishas been described as an ‘obsolescing bargain’: themoment outside actors have maximum leverage isimmediately after the agreement is signed, whenthe local authorities are most dependent on theinternational community to help implement a peaceagreement. 13 As the peace process progresses anda government rebuilds its legitimacy and capacity,the need for external assistance and susceptibilityto outside pressure – even in the form of mediation– diminishes. At that point, discreet efforts that donot threaten a government’s authority are likely tobe more effective than public diplomacy, thoughmediators must take care to preserve the politicalspace they have. 14 Thus BONUCA began by playinga prominent role in fostering political dialogue,w<strong>here</strong>as BINUCA is now working more discreetlyto keep all parties (government, political oppositionand civil society) committed to the peace process.The OSCE presence in Croatia went from a broadmandate to promote reconciliation, the rule of lawand human rights in the aftermath of the Balkanwars, to a more limited role of monitoring theprogress of cases before the International CriminalTribunal for the former Yugoslavia.Third, giving primacy to politics can be difficultwhen a mission is carrying out multiple functions.On the one hand, situating a political missionwithin a peace-building office can provide leveragethat a small political presence alone would not have.On the other hand, political and development mandatesdo not mix easily as the former requires somedistance from the government w<strong>here</strong>as the latterrequires proximity. How does one balance localownership and “support to government” with theimpartiality and independence required to performan effective political role? A mission leader that isworking with the government on peacebuildingUN SRSG Kai Eide visits Bamyan Province, Afghanistan, 24 July 2009.may find it difficult to deliver tough politicalmessages or to be trusted as an honest broker byopposition groups. This issue arose in BINUB,w<strong>here</strong> extensive peacebuilding tasks (Burundi wasone of the first ‘clients’ of the Peacebuilding Commission)may have distracted from its core politicalfunction. UNPOS, by way of contrast, has struggledwith coordination in part because the formerpolitical head of the mission (the SRSG) wantedto go beyond an ‘integrated approach’ to structuralintegration, with directive authority over the UNCountry Team – a proposal resisted by humanitarianactors in particular. The UN Security Counciland SG’s policy committee endorsed the formerapproach, but the SRSG continued to push forthe latter. Multiple mandates can also lead to alack of co<strong>here</strong>nce and even confusion as is the casefor UNOWA, which has little sense of prioritiesbeyond the effective good offices role it is playing.A related point is the problem of inflatedexpectations. Some missions suffer from a limitedmandate but big problems to address (UNMIN andUNAMA), others from an expansive mandate withlimited resources (UNAMI, UNOWA, UNIOG-BIS). Benchmarking is one way of addressingthis problem, as way of generating agreement onpriorities and measuring progress towards theirachievement. Is benchmarking of political missionspossible? Progress towards political goals is hard tomeasure and almost impossible to reduce to timelines.Nevertheless, properly devised benchmarks,based on the mandate and prepared in consultationwith national actors, can help to manage expectationsof what the mission can and cannot achieveeither on its own or in collaboration with partners.UN Photo/Fardin Waezi

22 | Thematic EssaysSource of AuthorityThe political missions covered in this review areall mandated by or carry the institutional imprimaturof an international organization. That distinguishesthem from the multitude of bilateral and nongovernmentalmissions that engage in politicalaction. Most of the UN missions are authorized bythe Security Council (SC) or the General Assembly,although a few are the initiative of the Secretary-General, established through an exchange of letterswith the SC. The OSCE Permanent Council hasestablished missions, or renewed missions establishedby predecessor organs like the Committeeof Senior Officials (Moldova). European SpecialRepresentatives support the work of and report tothe High Representative of the Union for ForeignAffairs and Security Policy. They are appointed bythe European Council on the recommendation ofthe High Representative. Some are double-hatted,for example the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina(BiH), who is also the High Representative forBiH under the Paris/Dayton agreements, and theEUSR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,who also heads the European Commissiondelegation t<strong>here</strong>. 15 The OAS Mission to Supportthe Peace Process in Colombia was established bythe Permanent Council, a plenary body that reportsto the OAS General Assembly. The African Union(AU) has a mission in Kenya established by thePeace and Security Council.It is generally assumed that multilateralmandates lend legitimacy to a mission. For theUN, this stems from its universal membership,the impartiality of the mandating body and theperceived independence of the Secretary-Generaland his representatives. The legitimacy of regionalorganizations turns on their proximity to a conflict,the assumption being that those who are closer toa problem are better-placed to get involved. It alsoturns on the values embodied in their constituentinstruments. Thus most OSCE missions aremandated to carry out their specific functions “inconformity with OSCE principles, standards andcommitments.” 16 In promoting EU policies andinterests, EUSRs are meant to “play an active rolein efforts to consolidate peace, stability and the ruleof law.” 17 However, these assumptions should notbe taken at face value. Not all parties to a conflictview the UN Security Council as an ‘impartial’ bodyor the Secretary-General as entirely independent.EU Special RepresentativesThe role of the EU’s Special Representatives(EUSRs) was a source of controversy in 2010. Theeleven EUSRs had all been appointed before theEU’s Lisbon Treaty came into force, providing thebasis for a new European External Action Service(EEAS). One feature of the EEAS is the creation ofnew EU Delegations – de facto embassies – buildingon the European Commission’s pre-existingnetwork of delegations. Some European officialsquestioned the need to maintain EUSRs in light ofthis new system.However, other officials argued that many of theEUSRs had political skills and contacts that couldnot easily be replicated by the heads of EU Delegations.The role of EUSRs appeared particularlyimportant in places – like Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina– w<strong>here</strong> the EU has an operational policeor military presence. In July 2010, it was agreedto end the mandates of four EUSRs (in the FormerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, theMiddle East and the South Caucasus) as of February2011. T<strong>here</strong> were ongoing questions over thestatus of the EUSR in Kosovo for political reasonsinvolving its claim to independence.This debate was largely driven by organizationalconcerns – although it was complicated bydifferences between EU member states overwhich EUSRs should remain in place. It alsopoints to questions common to other organizationsresponsible for envoys and political missions:should these entities be treated as distinctfrom ‘normal’ diplomatic or development structures,or should they be integrated into a singlestandardized system?Proximity may not be good thing if a regional organizationis dominated by a hegemon with a stake inthe outcome of a conflict. Many of the EU’s missionsare ‘out of area,’ implying that the values ofthe organization are being exported and may beresisted by key stakeholders, such as the EUSRin Afghanistan.Multilateral mandates may also enhance theeffectiveness of a mission. Association with aninternational organization can provide leveragethat might not otherwise exist. Consider high levelmediation. The Humanitarian Dialogue <strong>Center</strong> hasproduced a guide that lists three types of mediationin armed conflict: facilitation, problem-solving andpower or “manipulative” mediation. 18 On a spectrumfrom least to most interventionist, the first

Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions | 23is essentially an enabling role w<strong>here</strong>as the last usespolitical authority and military or economic powerto pressure the parties towards an agreement. Specialpolitical missions, by definition, do not have militaryresources at their disposal although some aredeployed alongside military forces. The EU missionin Kosovo, for example, benefits from NATO’s militarypresence. UNAMA is co-deployed with ISAF,which creates both opportunities for and obstaclesto political action. The United Nations SpecialCoordinator in Lebanon (UNSCOL) benefits fromthe United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’s(UNIFIL) high profile, based on a clear divisionof labor between the two missions. BONUCA/BINUCA, on the other hand, has not really benefittedfrom the presence of the better resourcedMINURCAT in part because the leadership of thetwo missions do not coordinate well.The authority that comes with UN SecurityCouncil backing is the principal source of leveragefor UN missions. How much leverage this providesdepends on the unity and the attentiveness of theCouncil. This has been a source of contention inrespect of missions established by an exchange ofletters between the SG and the Security Council,like UNRCCA. The five countries in the regionwanted a political facilitator, but the wider UNmembership was not enthusiastic about a centerfor preventive diplomacy. Ultimately establishedthrough an exchange of letters with the SG, someSC members see it as essentially an SG initiative,contributing to a disconnect between the Counciland the center. Other missions established inthe same way — UNOWA, UNSCOL and theCNMC — do not suffer from that problem. Theinfluence of EUSRs depends in part on the extentto which the EU is unified behind their mandate(consider Kosovo, w<strong>here</strong> different attitudestowards Kosovo’s declaration of independence hascreated divisions within the EU). OSCE officesare often in a delicate position based on divergencesbetween Russia and the West, for examplein Armenia and Azerbaijan. Regardless of formalauthority, the central point is that politicalmissions have little more than diplomatic and persuasivepower to rely on and so the extent to whichthey can point to the strong backing of an internationalorganization (and the diplomatic powerthat resides t<strong>here</strong>) the more influential they arelikely to be.T<strong>here</strong> is a caveat, however. Hammarskjold’snegotiation of the release of the American aircrew inChina gave birth to the so-called ‘Peking formula’:in order to be effective the SG must sometimesdistance himself from political bodies. 19 Secretary-General Kofi Annan operated on the same basiswhen he went to Iraq in 1998 to negotiate a memorandumof understanding for the return of weaponinspectors. While he had the blessing of the SecurityCouncil, he deliberately avoided getting explicitterms of reference, not wanting to appear a mere“letter carrier” (a fate that befell Perez de Cuellar in1990). 20 The calculus may be different for enduringmissions as opposed to one-off diplomatic efforts,but it does suggest that political micro-managementby the authorizing body can be detrimental. This isespecially true when micro-management is subjectto sharp differences among powerful states in theorganization or, conversely, is seen as the hand ofa single powerful state with a national interest in aparticular outcome.Guiding principles for politicalmissionsWhile developing doctrine for political missions atthis stage would be premature, it is not too soon tobegin codifying best practices. The principles beloware a first attempt, motivated by the sense that t<strong>here</strong>is enough accumulated wisdom and experience toidentify some basic lessons to help guide the formationof mandates and operational strategies. As withpeacekeeping, 21 peacebuilding 22 and mediation 23principles — and military doctrine for that matter —these are rules of thumb, to be applied flexibly andtailored to context.1) Implied MandatesMandates given by intergovernmental bodies tendto set out the core tasks of a political mission inbroad terms, leaving considerable discretion in howto fulfill those tasks. At least some functions shouldbe seen as implied, that is “conferred upon [the mission]by necessary implication as being essential tothe performance of its duties.” 24 A political missioncould not succeed in any of its enumerated tasksunless it is understood to have at least the followingpowers, regardless of whether expressly conferred

24 | Thematic Essaysin the mandate: good offices, coordination andengagement with key stakeholders. The mannerin which those implied powers are exercised mustbe context specific, but they can serve as a valuablecheck against efforts to deprive a mission of politicalspace.2) The Instrumentalization of PoliticsThe good offices and mediation role of a politicalmission is the means to multiple ends – the achievementof sustainable peace in the long run, but alsothe many dimensions of that peace, from securitysector reform and transitional justice to economicreconstruction. This instrumentalization of politicsturns on its head the adage that humanitarian anddevelopment functions should not be instrumentalizedfor political purposes. In fact, these other functionsoften cannot be achieved without a politicalmission to create the necessary conditions. Thatrequires proactive leadership and attentiveness topolitical relations at every level: with and betweenthe parties to a conflict, important domesticconstituencies, other countries with a stake andexternal actors on the ground.3) Impartiality in the Best Interests of the ProcessA political mission cannot be seen as serving theagenda of any party to a conflict, outside actor, orspecial interest. As with peacekeeping, impartialitydoes not mean neutrality in the sense of passivity orequal treatment of all parties in the face of abuses.It should be understood as impartiality in the “bestinterests of the process” 25 and in accordance withfundamental international norms. The principlerelates to one of the prerequisites for successfulmediation: trust. Only by gaining trust as an impartialintervenor can a political mission function as anhonest broker among all parties and deliver toughmessages when necessary. 264) Inclusive Political ProcessAn effective political process requires inclusiveengagement with all stakeholders: national andinternational. The starting point is the identificationof capable and legitimate partners within thehost government. 27 Because it may take time for thehost government to acquire legitimacy, a politicalmission must also typically engage with oppositionparties, other influential domestic actors and thepopulation at large. Individual ‘spoilers’ can besidelined, entire constituencies cannot. 28 Effectivepolitical process management also requires ongoingengagement with key regional players and internationalactors – both those who can play a constructiverole and those likely to be disruptive. Howinclusive the process is will depend on the stage of aconflict cycle: it may be necessary to start with thosewho hold power and expand as calm is restored andthe institutions of government are being built.5) Integrity, if not IntegrationThe first dictionary definition of integrity isad<strong>here</strong>nce to a set of values; a second definition isthe state of being complete or undivided. 29 Politicalmissions must demonstrate both. They shouldseek to uphold the norms of the organization andinternational law, for example by sitting down withalleged human rights abusers when necessary butnot endorsing amnesty deals for the most egregiouscrimes. Integrity in its second sense impliesan integrated approach. Multiple mediators shouldnot be played off each other; political, developmentand human rights actors should work in harmony.In some circumstances, this may require structuralintegration, but ‘form should follow function.’ Whatmatters is unity of purpose and a shared strategy;the best institutional arrangements for carrying outthat strategy will vary.ConclusionThe purpose for setting out these five principles<strong>here</strong> – implied mandates, instrumentalized politics,impartiality, inclusiveness and integrity – is not tosuggest a template for political missions but to deepenunderstanding of what they do and how well they doit. The deployment of political missions, before, afteror instead of heavy peacekeeping is a growing fieldof practice. Like peacekeeping, the techniques havebeen improvised and lessons learned through trialand error. Either through a rational application ofthose lessons or the inertial force of precedent, practices– both good and bad – have been carried overfrom mission to mission. Codifying best practices ina set of guiding principles helps to design mandatesthat build on the successes and to develop strategiesthat avoid the mistakes.

Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions | 25notes1 This term is borrowed from Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed, “In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The SevenDeadly Sins of Mediation,” in <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations2008, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 10. The authors used it to describe the political functions of the headof a peacekeeping mission.2 United Nations, No Exit Without Strategy: Security Council Decision-Making and the Closure or Transition of UnitedNations Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc., S/2001/394, (New York: United Nations,2001), 2.3 These sectors have been described as the “end-states” of a peace process. United States Institute for Peace, GuidingPrinciples for Stabilization and Reconstruction, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 14.4 United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Annual Appeal 2010, 5.5 Security Council resolution 1902 (2009). Prior to then, the political mandate of BINUB was circumscribed by thegovernment’s reluctance to accept proactive external involvement in governance matters.6 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 1998), 175-76.7 The implied powers doctrine holds that the legal personality and degree of autonomy of an organization is grantedimplicitly by the functions to be performed. As stated by the International Court of Justice in the Reparations Case,“under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expresslyprovided by the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance ofits duties.” International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, (1948-1949), Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949 , ICJ Rep. 1949.8 See the UNMIN chapter in this volume.9 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, (New York: United Nations, 2008), 50–51.;United Nations, A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, (New York: UnitedNations, July 2009); United Nations, Integrated Mission Planning Process, (New York: United Nations, 2004); EspenBarth Eide, Anja T<strong>here</strong>se Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, Karen von Hippel, Report on Integrated Missions: PracticalPerspectives and Recommendations, (New York: United Nations, 2005); United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict. UN doc. A/63/881–S/2009/304, (11 June 2009);United Nations Integrated Planning Process (IMPP), Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General, 13 June2006. Approved through Decision 2006/26 of 14 June 2006.10 See The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, http://www.osce.org/about/13510.html.11 European Union, EU Council Secretariat Fact Sheet: EU Special Representatives (EUSR/4), http://www.eusrbih.eu/gen-info/?cid=283,1,1 ( July 2007).12 Brahimi and Ahmed, 12.13 Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations.(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 309. See also, Michael Doyle, Ian Johnstone, Robert Orr, eds.,Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador (Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1997).14 Brahimi and Ahmed, 12.15 EUSR fact sheet.16 See, for example, the mandates for Albania, Montenegro and Serbia on OSCE website (www.osce.org).17 EUSR fact sheet.18 Hugo Slim, A Guide to Mediation: Enabling Peace Processes in Violent Conflicts, (Geneva: Centre for HumanitarianDialogue, 2007), 13.

26 | Thematic Essays19 In the case of the airmen, the General Assembly had issued a statement harshly condemning China and theSecurity Council was paralyzed by the Soviet veto. The GA resolution included language asking him to do what hecould and, to the surprise of many, visited Peking not as an emissary from the Security Council but in his own rightas SG. Brian Urquhart, “The Evolution of the Secretary-General” in Secretary or General? Simon Chesterman,ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12-13; James Traub, “The Secretary-General’s Political Space” in SimonChesterman, ed., 187.20 Ian Johnstone, “The Role of the Secretary-General: the Power of Persuasion Based on Law,” Global Governance,Vol. 9(3), (2003), 444.21 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008) 50–51.22 United States Institute for Peace, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, (Washington, DC: UnitedStates Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 14.23 Hugo Slim, A Guide to Mediation: Enabling Peace Processes in Violent Conflicts, (Geneva: Centre for HumanitarianDialogue, 2007).24 International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, (1948-1949),Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, ICJ Rep. 1949.25 Slim, 37.26 Brahimi and Ahmed, 14.27 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008), 50–51.28 Brahimi and Ahmed, 16.29 “integrity.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary- 10th ed. (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster,Incorporated, 1996), 608.

Political Missions, Mediation and Good Offices | 272.3Political Missions, Mediationand Good OfficesTeresa WhitfieldT h e m a t i c E s s a y sMediation and good offices are variously employedin support of national peace processes underway,to help initiate new ones, in response to suddenpolitical crises, or to help prevent or avert conflictsthat threaten. Most commonly undertaken by highprofile mediators or envoys engaged on behalf ofthe UN Secretary-General, a regional organization,an individual state, or even a non-governmentalactor, mediation and good offices also representcore functions of special political missions. Fulfillingthem is not without its challenges. Some functionsrelate to the intrinsic complexity of the conflictsor situations with which political missions engage.Others reflect the limitations of their mandateand resources, sensitivities surrounding nationalsovereignty, varying degrees of support or pressurefrom external actors, and questions regarding theintegration of each mission’s activities with those ofother international actors.Quantifying the impact of the mediation andgood offices undertaken by political missions isdifficult. This is both because of their great diversityand – in contrast to some high profile mediations– because much of their political work is necessarilydiscreet, in support of decisions and steps thatmust be taken by parties to a conflict or nationalactors, and over-determined by a multitude of otherfactors. The work of a political mission fielded by amultilateral organization is also intricately connectedto the degree of support provided from theorganization’s member states.Rather than attempt such an evaluation, thischapter provides a brief analysis of the varied formsUN Envoy Joaquim Chissano and mediator Riek Machar of the Government ofSouthern Sudan in discussions with commanders of the Lord’s Resistance Army.in which political missions engage in mediation andgood offices. Its emphasis is not on the envoys andothers engaged in Cyprus, the Eastern DRC andelsew<strong>here</strong> that, by an anomaly of UN budgeting, areclassified as “special political missions,” but ratherthe field based missions themselves. It questions theextent to which these missions can perform usefulroles of mediation and good offices, both when suchactivities are specified within their mandates andwhen they are not. The small size and low price tag ofmost political missions as compared to peacekeepingoperations – as well as the less-than-headline-grabbingnature of many of their achievements – contributes tothe relative obscurity of their efforts. However, thischapter suggests that under some circumstances theyare able to make contributions quite distinct fromthose that might be offered by a more high profile anditinerant envoy.UN Photo / Timothy McKulka

28 | Thematic EssaysThe utility of “good offices” and thechanging face of mediation“Good offices” are long established but poorlydefined as a flexible tool for international diplomacyand action. “Good offices” are not mentionedin the UN Charter (but perhaps embraced by article33 (1) which lists “other peaceful means of theirown choice” among measures available to states toachieve the peaceful settlement of disputes). Yet atthe United Nations, and in some other organizationssuch as the Organisation of American States(OAS), the term “good offices” has evolved veryhelpfully to mean almost anything – from a welltimedtelephone call by the Secretary-General,to exploratory conversations, or a full-fledgedmediation effort conducted in his or her name.This broad interpretation of good offices isindicative of profound shifts in peacemaking.During the past ten years, recognition that differentconflicts and stages of conflict require differenttypes of mediator and mediation has been accompaniedby both the profusion of mediators and adiffusion of the concept of mediation. 1 Formalnegotiations – such as those seen on Cyprus orin Kenya in recent years, or those pursued by theUnited States in the Middle East – may be few andfar between, but activities exploring or preparing formediation, or the discreet facilitation of contactsand dialogue, are widespread. Such good offices cantake place long before conditions may be ripe for anegotiation. And, as many peacekeeping operationshave found, they are likely to continue throughoutthe implementation of peace agreements.The United Nations remains a reference pointfor international mediation, even as the frequencywith which its Secretary-General or his staff arecalled upon to lead a mediation effort have declinedmarkedly in the years since the end of the ColdWar. It has found that it need not be at the forefrontof an effort to play an effective role, and in some circumstancesmay even have greater room for its goodoffices before it becomes necessary to negotiate theparameters of a mandate. 2 The UN has graduallyadapted to the rise in the activity of regional organizationsas well as an increase in the engagementof individual states and independent mediators. Itis also increasingly developing its capacity to providemediation support to its own representativesas well as to other peacemakers. Secretariat officialsrecognize that these developments have creatednew opportunities for collaboration between differentactors (political missions among them) withdistinct comparative advantages, as well, at times, asunhelpful competition among them.A number of UN political missions – from theSecretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus,Personal Envoy for Western Sahara or the UNPolitical Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to theengagements of Special Envoys on the areas affectedby the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA, 2006-2009)or on the Eastern Democratic Republic of theCongo (2008-2009) – have nevertheless operatedunder mandates that empower UN officials to conductgood offices or mediation in its classic form.This entails a process of dialogue and negotiationin which a third party assists two or more conflictingparties, with their consent, to prevent, manage orresolve a conflict without recourse to force.Some of these political missions reflect theUN’s role as a mediator of last resort. They encompassissues of deep intractability which geopoliticalfactors render unsuitable for other mediators (suchas divisions within the African Union and amongstother interested states over Western Sahara or thecomplex relationship of Greece and Turkey, bothNATO members, to the Cyprus conflict). Thesecan remain on the UN agenda almost indefinitely.Others reflect more recent conflicts in Africato which the UN’s appointment of senior regionalleaders – former President Joaquim Chissano ofMozambique in the case of the areas affected bythe Lord’s Resistance Army and former PresidentOlusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria in the Eastern DRC– combines regional credibility and leverage withthe authority of the global organization. A similaryet more low key role is fulfilled by the UN Officefor West Africa (UNOWA), which works closelywith regional actors in the context of a broadmandate for good offices. 3 Given its small size andthe extreme volatility of the countries under itspurview, it has a seemingly limitless opportunity topursue them.Meanwhile, t<strong>here</strong> are many contexts in whichthe good offices of regional organizations andother actors may be more acceptable to nationalsensitivities than the United Nations. Individualstates – among them several such as Qatar, SaudiArabia and Turkey are attractive to conflict partiesbecause of their Islamic credentials – have grown in

Political Missions, Mediation and Good Offices | 29prominence as peacemakers. Meanwhile, in parallelto the growing role of the African Union in the promotionof peace and security, regional organizationssuch as the OAS, OSCE and the EU (the latterthrough its network of Special Representatives)have undertaken a range of political interventions,at times involving the deployment of political missions.In the case of the OAS in particular, a growingnumber of missions (the OAS Office in the AdjacencyZone between Belize and Guatemala; theMission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia;the OAS Mission of Good Offices to Ecuador andColombia) have had clear responsibilities for goodoffices and mediation.Elsew<strong>here</strong> t<strong>here</strong> are many situations in whichregional organizations lack the mandate or capacityto engage, and national as well as regional actors(such as India in the case of Nepal) have activelyresisted an explicit good offices role for the UN. Yetw<strong>here</strong> the opportunity is presented, the imperativeto pursue political activities that are in the interestof sustainable peace remains. As current and formerofficials of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)agreed in a workshop held in late 2009, “‘good offices’are in<strong>here</strong>nt in a UN political mission headed by arepresentative of the Secretary-General.” 4Special political missions under UN mandates,in addition to those deployed by the OSCE, theOAS and others, engage as one amongst a numberof external actors in a given political situation. Theclear “win” represented by the successful mediationof a peace agreement is rarely within their sights.Goals and achievements are of a lesser magnitude,with the advantages – and at times disadvantages –of political missions tied to the fact that they are, forthe most part, in the field. In the best case scenariothey are able to win the confidence of national actorsand work to fulfill mandates variously described asbeing to “support,” “encourage,” “assist” or “advise”the peacemaking, building or consolidation of theirnational counterparts. 5individual entries within this volume testify, thepast year has seen a major, but frustrated, attempt toreach a settlement of the Cyprus question; a patientif unrewarding effort to make some headway on theintractable issue of Western Sahara (complicatedby the fact that both the parties to the conflict andthe major powers on the Security Council appearnot unhappy with the status quo); and intensepolitical work to sustain the Transitional FederalGovernment of Somalia that emerged from theUN-mediated Djibouti peace agreements reachedin late 2008. Elsew<strong>here</strong> UNAMI has assumed agrowing political profile in Iraq – notably in defusinga potentially explosive situation over the disputedcity of Kirkuk and in smoothing the path toelections in 2009 and 2010 – and UNOWA playeda critical role in supporting the ECOWAS-ledmediation in Guinea, whilst also undertakingsignificant involvements in Mauritania and Niger.These headline engagements mask a host ofongoing work in which good offices encouragedialogue amongst political leaders (from Afghanistanand Burundi to Lebanon, Nepal, Somalia andSierra Leone); engage with regional and other leadersto address sudden internal crises (in Lebanon,West Africa and Guinea Bissau, as well as elsew<strong>here</strong>);address differences that develop around the conductof elections (across the board but notably in Afghanistanand Iraq); and assist national authorities preparefor disputes over natural resources (Central Asia) oraddress trans-border threats to peace and securitysuch as drug trafficking and other criminal activities(in Central Asia again, but also across West Africa).By any assessment, this is a mixed bag. A briefreview of some of the activities pursued by the UN’spolitical missions in the Middle East and Africa,before consideration of the properties and possibilitiesspecific to those political missions constitutedwith a regional mandate, suggests the complexity ofthe challenges facing political missions, but also theopportunities with which they are presented.A mixed bagIn practical terms, what political missions canachieve depends on the diplomatic and entrepreneurialskills of those who lead them, the resources attheir disposal and the combination of circumstancesand events within which they are engaged. As theMiddle East and IraqAlthough multiple UN peacekeeping and politicalmissions are deployed in the Middle East, theoverall impact of the UN presence upon the regionin political terms remains less than the sum of itsparts. An independent peacemaking profile iscircumscribed by Israel’s suspicion of the UN as

30 | Thematic Essaysa political actor, the UN’s membership of theQuartet alongside the European Union, Russiaand the United States, and the fact that the latterwill be the preeminent external actor in anyeffort to resolve the region’s inter-twined conflicts.The plethora of envoys, missions and offices createproblems of coordination within the UN. Thesehave not been helped by the overlapping aspects ofsome of the UN’s mandates in the Middle East, or,at times, the contrasting personalities of those wholead their implementation.Nonetheless, the UN fulfills a multitude ofessential political tasks that contain the effects ofconflict and may yet help ease the parties towardsresolution. 6 These include functioning as a valuedchannel of communication – even an occasionalmediator – between Israel, Syria and Lebanon;amongst Lebanese political actors; between Israeland Hezbollah and, quietly, between Hamas, Israeland other international actors.The UN’s good offices have been engaged inthe provision of technical advice to prevent crisesand keep political processes on track in Lebanon aswell as the occupied Palestinian territory. The organizationhas an unusual degree of access to regionalactors that others will not deal with directly – butcannot be ignored. In spite of limitations on theUN’s interactions with Hamas, especially on contactswith senior envoys, it has been able to maintainsubstantive dialogue at the working level. Such contactshave allowed the UN to mediate agreementsbetween Israel and Hamas that ensured that essentialgoods could be transported into Gaza and topass messages to other Quartet members.In the meantime, the UN has the advantage ofbeing able to act with relative impartiality amongstthe various Lebanese communities. It has longstandingrelations with Hezbollah as a consequenceof its peacekeeping responsibilities in the south ofthe country and high-level contacts on issues such asprisoner exchange. UNSCOL has passed messagesbetween Hezbollah and other political actors, anddraws on its access to Hezbollah to lower tensionscaused by security incidents with Israel.The political space for the engagement ofUN political missions in the Middle East isdetermined by factors and actors that lie far outsidethe office of the Secretary-General. The emergingpolitical role of the UN Assistance Mission inIraq (UNAMI), however, illustrates that changesin the overall political environment may allow forunexpected opportunities.In UNAMI’s case, these opportunities werefacilitated by a shift in approach by the UnitedStates and the adroit response to it by the mission’sleadership. In 2007 the US began to see the benefitsof the UN’s undertaking political tasks for which itsown overwhelming military presence in the countryrendered it unsuitable. A new SRSG (Staffande Mistura) arrived in Iraq soon after UNAMI hadbeen given an expanded mandate from the SecurityCouncil with instructions from the Secretary-General to do more to assist the Iraqis.UNAMI was tasked by the Security Council(SCR 1770) to “advise, support and assist” thegovernment and people of Iraq in advancing an“inclusive national dialogue and political reconciliation.”Balancing a desire to do more with respectfor sensitivities regarding Iraqi sovereignty led themission to assume a “cautiously proactive” attitude.It concentrated its efforts on a few initiatives ratherthan spreading itself thinly across an impossiblybroad mandate. By working in partnership with theUnited States and gradually winning the confidenceof the Iraqi authorities, it was able to provide extensivetechnical advice on Iraq’s electoral processesand to develop a major role in helping address thepotentially explosive problem of Kirkuk and otherdisputed areas.Political and Peacebuilding Missions in AfricaPartnerships of very different kinds shape allpolitical missions in Africa. The UN’s field operations,as its envoys deployed from New York, workclosely with the African Union and sub-regionalorganizations. Joint envoys have been appointed –and in the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) ajoint AU-UN mission deployed. In Kenya a hybridmediation effort, led by Kofi Annan and the AU’sPanel of Eminent African Personalities but supportedby the UN and other actors, has given wayto a special political mission – the Coordinationand Liaison Office of the Panel of Eminent AfricanPersonalities – that continues to operate with UNassistance. In West Africa, UNOWA is specificallytasked to work with the sub-regional organizationECOWAS, which has taken the leadingrole in countering the region’s instability andconflict-prone tendencies.

Political Missions, Mediation and Good Offices | 31UN political missions in Africa have a somewhatcheckered history. In the late 1990s “peacebuildingsupport offices” were established in the CentralAfrican Republic (CAR), Liberia and Guinea-Bissau,and a distinct political office was established inSomalia. All but the office in Guinea-Bissau camein the wake of larger peacekeeping presences. Theoffices were generally viewed as overly supportiveof questionable governments (including that ofCharles Taylor in Liberia) and lost credibility asentities capable of delivering on the broad needs ofthe societies with which they were engaged.Peacebuilding offices in the CAR and Guinea-Bissau outlasted that in Liberia, and in 2005 werejoined by the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone(UNIOSIL), following the withdrawal of a muchlarger peacekeeping operation, and in 2006 by theUN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), afterthe newly elected Government of Burundi haddemanded the drawdown of the UN Operation inBurundi (UNOB). These two offices (UNIOSILbecame the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office,or UNIPSIL, in August 2008) faced the difficulttask of fulfilling their mandates in circumstancesin which national authorities had recently emergedfrom the tutelage of a peacekeeping operation.Governments were sensitive to any perceived criticismor interference from the missions, even as theywere eager to ensure the continuation of externalfinancial support.The extent to which these different offices haveexercised good offices and undertaken quiet internalmediation has varied, not least as a consequence ofthe different political trajectories followed by theirhost countries. The peacebuilding support office inthe CAR (BONUCA), in partnership with otheractors including the International Organisation ofthe Francophonie and the non-governmental Centrefor Humanitarian Dialogue, has played an activerole in supporting national dialogue and a web ofpeace talks.The decision by the UN PeacebuildingCommission to place first Burundi and SierraLeone, and then Guinea-Bissau and the CAR onits agenda, expanded the responsibilities of thepolitical missions in these countries. Senior officials– Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General(ERSGs) – heading the integrated offices wearmultiple organizational hats (acting also as ResidentCoordinators of the UN system and UNDPResident Representatives) and necessarily engagewith their host governments on different levels.In the case of Burundi, BINUB was mandated a“robust political role” that was centered on the provisionof political advice and substantive support tothe South African Facilitator of the peace processthrough a multi-stakeholder mechanism knownas the Political Directorate. Although this helpedadvance the peace process, the government becameincreasingly intolerant of BINUB (taking offence,for example, at mildly critical comments includedin reports of the Secretary-General to the SecurityCouncil) and in late 2009 it asked for the ERSG,Youssef Mahmoud, to be removed.In Sierra Leone, meanwhile, UNIPSIL and thevarious UN agencies, funds and programs presentin the country adopted a Joint Vision under whichthey agreed to combine their efforts to further theconsolidation of peace. While the approach seeksto bring together the political, humanitarian anddevelopmental aspects of the UN’s different bodies,a distinct good offices role remains available tothe ERSG. This was perhaps most in evidence inMarch 2009 when the ERSG intervened to helpmediate – and calm – politically motivated violencethat had broken out in the tense period beforelocal elections. The UN’s peacebuilding offices inGuinea-Bissau, meanwhile, have been given mandatesof increasing breadth as the implications ofthe country’s institutional weakness and vulnerabilityto drug-trafficking have become more evident.However, while UNIOGBIS’ responsibilities arebroad, the UN’s long, but relatively weak presencein the country, until recently poorly supported bymember states, means that the mission struggles toassert its political role with much authority.Regional Missions and Their UsesAs the first regional political mission, the UNOffice in West Africa (UNOWA), represents aslow-germinating experiment quite distinct fromthe country-specific political missions the UN hasdeployed elsew<strong>here</strong> in Africa. Its broad mandate,small size and extensive geographical reach (over thefifteen countries of ECOWAS, as well as Mauritania)present obvious challenges. Over the nine yearsof its existence UNOWA has responded by focussingits energies on a combination of cross-borderissues and good offices dedicated to mediating, or

32 | Thematic Essayssupporting mediation by others, the series of crisesthat have assailed the region.The office was slow to develop an effectivepartnership with ECOWAS. However, it helpeddraw attention to the cross-border nature of t<strong>here</strong>gion’s many threats to security and played a leadingrole in facilitating the implementation of theOctober 2002 ruling by the International Courtof Justice on the boundary between Cameroonand Nigeria. It has also been directly involved inregional and international responses to the successionof crises that have developed in Guinea,Mauritania, Niger and Togo.UNOWA works with several advantages. Itsregional mandate and physical location in Dakar,Senegal – long a hub for UN agencies and programmes,as well as among the most stable of WestAfrican countries – mean that it is in<strong>here</strong>ntly lessthreatening to the sovereignty of any one of thecountries under its purview than a nationally locatedpolitical mission. When relations with other actorsin the UN system are working well, it can effectivelyengage in sensitive issues whilst providing adegree of political cover to the UN Resident Coordinators,agencies and programmes who may seekless complex relations with national actors. Moreover,the circumstances of its creation – by exchangeof letters between the Secretary-General and thePresident of the Security Council – and the minimalreporting demanded of it, allow it to work witha high degree of discretionThe interlocking threats to and in West Africaboth ensure an active response at the regional leveland complicate its orchestration. Neighboringstates – particularly the landlocked states of BurkinaFaso and Mali – have great interest in maintaining adegree of stability in Guinea, for example, and canbe counted on to invest time and resources in preventingits implosion. Meanwhile at the multilaterallevel, the close coordination between Said Djinnit,the former AU Peace and Security Commissionerwho became SRSG for West Africa in February2008, and Mohammed Ibn Chambas, who untilearly 2010 was President of the ECOWASCommission, underpinned the evolving partnershipbetween the two entities and their effectivecollaboration with the African Union.The UN’s second regional mission, the UNRegional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy inCentral Asia (UNRCCA), which is based inGreek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias (right) and then Turkish Cypriotleader Mehmet Ali Talat (left) meeting under UN auspices on Cyprus.Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, also operates in complicatedterrain. A lengthy period of negotiationresulted in a broad mandate to assist the five CentralAsian states to respond to existing threats andemerging challenges. The Centre’s 2009-2011plan of action focuses on cross border threats fromillicit activities (terrorism, organized crime anddrug-trafficking); environmental degradation andresource management; and the implications of thesituation in Afghanistan.Although working with a minimal staff, andwithout the presence of a robust sub-regionalorganization such as ECOWAS as a counterpart,UNRCCA’s SRSG, Miroslav Jenca, has graduallybeen able to build up the credibility of his office.He secured a relatively high degree of access tothe region’s governments – none of which wouldhave accepted a political mission established on anational basis – and developed effective relationshipswith the region’s UN Resident Coordinators.Preventive work on the pressing problem of waterscarcity drew upon additional expertise from DPA’sStandby Mediation facility and underlined the utilityof UN technical expertise as an entry point to anissue of evident political sensitivity. In the wake ofthe uprising that toppled the government of PresidentKurmanbek Bakiyev in Kyrgzystan in earlyApril 2010, UNRCCA worked closely with theOSCE in the interests of an effective internationalresponse to the crisis.UN Photo

Political Missions, Mediation and Good Offices | 33ConclusionThis whistlestop account of the wide variety ofgood offices and mediation undertaken by politicalmissions suggests the difficulty of drawing broadconclusions from their efforts. Yet in this rapidlyevolving field some patterns are discernible.Political missions conduct more good officesand mediation takes place more frequently thanthe number of formal negotiations, or overtly mandatedactivities would suggest. This is a natural andethical response to the challenges posed to politicalmissions by the complexity of the circumstancesinto which they are deployed. It does not imply thatmandates are violated, or the wishes of host countries,regional or other international actors defied.Rather it suggests that t<strong>here</strong> are circumstanceswithin which the presence of a political mission inthe field – with the understanding of national actorsand regional and more far-flung international partners(or spoilers) that a sustained field presencebrings with it – can reap benefits distinct fromthose that might be seen from the engagement ofa visiting envoy.These benefits are by no means assured, as thewide variance in efficacy and impact evident withinthe political missions profiled in this volume makesclear. Rather they will depend on factors that fallwith differing degrees within the competences ofthose who plan, mandate, and lead political missions.Skilful diplomacy will be required to reassurenational counterparts with respect to understandablesensitivities regarding national sovereignty,but may not always be sufficient. Superior politicaland bureaucratic skills are likely to be needed tohelp design and secure an adequate mandate andresources for the mission itself. Again, such skillsmay not always be equal to the challenge.As always, the impact of external actors – inthis case political missions – will to a great extentbe determined by national factors and processes towhich their own contribution will be largely auxiliary.In the best cases, nevertheless, the advice,support and expertise that is offered throughpolitical missions’ mediation and good officesshould be received as a helpful contribution toprocesses in which the hard decisions need to betaken, and implemented, by national and regionalactors. Mediation and good offices will haveplayed their part in maximizing the contributionof the international community that the politicalmission aspires to.notes1 Martin Griffiths and Teresa Whitfield, “Mediation: Ten Years On – Challenges and Opportunities for Peacemaking,”Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, March 2010.2 The chapter on UNMIN briefly refers to the good offices conducted by the UN from New York from 2003 on andby a small team lead by the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in the months before the negotiationof UNMIN’s mandate in early 2007.3 In 2001 Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the responsibilities of the new office as including “carryingout good offices role and special assignments in countries of the subregion, on behalf of the Secretary-General,including in the areas of conflict prevention and peace-building efforts.” Letter dated 26 November 2001 from theSecretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2001/1128, 29 November 2001.4 Teresa Whitfield, “Focused Mission: Not so Limited Duration: Identifying lessons from the United NationsMission in Nepal (UNMIN),” <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation, February 2010.5 UNAMI has a mandated role to “advise, support and assist” the Government of Iraq on political processes (SCR1770); in late 2007 BINUB was given a “robust political role in support… of the peace process, in full coordinationwith regional and international partners” (SCR 1791 of 17 December 2007); UNRCCA is mandated to “encourage”the peacemaking efforts and initiatives of regional organizations such as the OSCE, the Commonwealth ofIndependent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (S/2007/279).6 Lizzie Sellwood, “The Role of the United Nations in Middle East Conflict Prevention,” <strong>Center</strong> on InternationalCooperation, July 2009.

Mission Reviews 33.1 Middle East3.2 West Africa3.3 Central Africa3.4 Western Balkans3.5 Afghanistan3.6 Iraq3.7 Nepal3.8 Somalia35

36 | Mission Reviews3.1 M i s s i o n R e v i e w sMiddle EastThe Levant region of the Middle East remainsstrategically important to both regional andgreat powers. In 2009 the region continued tostruggle with the destabilizing effects of non-stateactors, the fragility of weak states, the insecurityof porous and disputed borders and tensionscaused by the unresolved conflict between Israel andthe Palestinians and the wider Arab world. WhileLebanon and Israel have maintained a tenuouscessation of hostilities since the 2006 war, they haveyet to arrive at a formal truce. The Israeli/Palestinianconflict remained resistant to mediation efforts inthe face of Israeli measures in East Jerusalem andthe remainder of the West Bank, Israeli-Hamastensions, the chronic de-development and humanrights situation in Gaza, and internal Palestiniandivisions between Hamas-controlled Gaza and thePalestinian Authority-controlled Palestinian areasin the West Bank.In this bleak assessment t<strong>here</strong> have howeverbeen signs of incremental progress in the region’soverall stability in the past year. Political tensionsin Lebanon that turned into violent street clasheswere calmed following the election of a governmentof national unity. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory,the Palestinian Authority’s state-buildingagenda pursued by Prime Minister Fayyad has reinvigoratedefforts to build institutions and refocusedpolicies in core governance areas like economicgovernance and rule of law. The Obama administration’sincreased focus on the Israeli/Palestinianconflict has met with varied results – proximity talksdid not start until May 2010 and t<strong>here</strong> has beenno successful transition to direct negotiations, butthe fruits of a redoubled mediation effort will onlybecome known over the next 12-18 month period.The UN’s role in conflict prevention in thispolitically fraught region is complex and subject tooften lightening quick changes in the political situationon the ground. This chapter will focus on therole in conflict prevention of UN political missionsactive in Lebanon, Israel and the Occupied PalestinianTerritory.UNSCOBackground to MissionAlthough United Nations involvement in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict dates back to 1948, it was onlythrough the 1994 Oslo Accords that the Office ofthe UN Special Coordinator for the Middle EastUN Special Coordinator Office for the MiddleEast Peace Process (UNSCO)Authorization Date 16 September 1999(UNSC Letter S/1999/983)Start Date 1 October 1999Special Coordinator Robert H. Serry (Netherlands)Deputy SCMaxwell Gaylard (Australia)Budget$16.3 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2011)Strength as of International Civilian: 27early 2010 Local Civilian: 26For detailed mission information see p. 220

Middle East | 37Peace Process (UNSCO) was established. UNSCO’smandate was to coordinate and strengthen UNinter-agency cooperation to respond to the needsof the Palestinian people and to mobilize financial,technical, economic and other assistance. In 1999,UNSCO’s mandate was expanded to represent theUN Secretary-General in discussions with the partiesand the international community and to improveUN development assistance in support of the peaceprocess. Since 2002, the Special Coordinator hasbeen the Secretary-General’s envoy to the MiddleEast Quartet, and an integral partner to the RoadMap launched in 2003.UNSCO is comprised of three offices inJerusalem, Ramallah and Gaza, and has a rovingregional presence. In 2006 its coordination capacitywas increased with the appointment of a DeputySpecial Coordinator, who simultaneously acts as theHumanitarian and Resident Coordinator and leadsthe UN Country Team (UNCT), which consists ofover 21 organizations.Recent DevelopmentsIn December 2008 and January 2009, Israellaunched “Operation Cast Lead” in response torocket fire from Gaza. The conflict further exacerbatedthe humanitarian and security situation inGaza, which had seen restrictions in imports anda ban on exports since 2006. Several regional partiessought to mediate during Cast Lead to urgeceasefires from Hamas and Israel, but eventuallyit was the passage of Security Council Resolution1860 that provided the framework for an endto the violence. In the aftermath of the conflict,Egypt, as mandated by the League of Arab States,launched several rounds of intra-Palestinian reconciliationtalks. 1 The Quartet was not active in any ofthese mediation attempts. And UNSCO’s notableabsence from the negotiations underlined its limitedability to influence the political processes bothas an advisor to the parties and in working with theQuartet. However, behind the scenes UNSCO was

38 | Mission Reviewsactive in urging all parties to make progress and inpromoting regional and international unity on theissues of discontent. In addition, UNSCO supportedthe engagement of the Secretary-Generalwith the Security Council during the Gaza war andhis peace mission to the region, including his visitto Gaza in the immediate aftermath of hostilities.While the hardening of the security situationput a strain on the working relationship betweenUNSCO and the Israeli government, the missioncontinues to maintain channels of communicationwith a range of non-state and state parties – includingIsrael. The Special Coordinator, the DeputySpecial Coordinator and their staff continue tocultivate constructive relationships with variousministries and departments of the Government ofIsrael as well as the Palestinian Authority includingformal and informal communication and coordinationchannels. They also continue relations withEgypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and membersof the Quartet as well as with a wide networkof interlocutors in civil society including NGOs andthe media. UNSCO maintains an office in Gazaand has informal but regular political contacts withHamas, that are officially restricted to the “workinglevel,” and also engages with the local authorities onhumanitarian issues.Recent initiatives that UNSCO has facilitatedinclude negotiating improved humanitarian andmaterial access into Gaza. While access remainstenuous and insufficient due to tight Israeli securitycordons, 2 some materials that Israeli authoritieshave recently approved for entry 3 include wood,aluminum and glass for winterization efforts –albeit in limited capacities. Construction materialssuch as concrete remain tightly regulated and as aresult few of the buildings destroyed in OperationCast Lead have been reconstructed. UNSCO hashowever negotiated approval for the completionof some existing UN projects in Gaza including ahousing project in Khan Younis – though this fallsshort of the request to finish all existing UN projectsincluding schools and hospitals. As noted byQuartet statements and Security Council briefings,the humanitarian situation in Gaza due tothe Israeli and Egyptian blockade remains dire andprospects for reconciliation between Hamas andthe Palestinian Authority are rapidly deteriorating.In Jerusalem, Special Coordinator Serry hasbeen active in defusing tensions between Israel andSecretary-General Ban Ki-moon (second from right), and Robert H. Serry (right),Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Mr. Ban’s PersonalRepresentative to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the PalestinianAuthority, observe the progress on a UN-funded housing project at KhanYounis in Gaza, 21 March 2010.Palestine surrounding the contested religious siteof Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, and in highlightingthe dangers of “Hebronization” of the citydue in particular to Israeli settlement activity inPalestinian neighborhoods.The continued lack of progress on a politicalsettlement is a clear impediment to UNSCO’s workin the region. However, in 2009 t<strong>here</strong> seemed to beredoubling of preparatory work with the parties inwhatever capacity is available on issues below thelevel of status discussions. UNSCO is working withthe Palestinian Authority (PA) in its preparations toenter international agreements that do not requirestate party status, such as the Customs Union, aswell as with legal preparation to lay the groundworkfor future state party status through such mechanismsas gaining observer status in the WTO. In addition,UNSCO strives to maintain continued focus on allsix final status issues, including Jerusalem, borders,refugees, security, settlements and water. 4The May 2009 re-appointment of SalamFayyad as Prime Minister of the PA 5 was amongthe most significant developments of the year andhis state building agenda which focuses on securityand institution building in the West Bank has beenpraised in both UNSCO’s Security Council briefsand the March 2010 Quartet statement. 6 The UNhas worked to support this agenda through a reorientationof its UN Medium Term Response Planin support of statebuilding efforts, including specificinitiatives that help to build the structures of afuture Palestinian state. UNSCO has also assistedUN Photo/Mark Garten

Middle East | 39implementation of the plan by working with the AdHoc Liaison Committee 7 in securing donor supportfor institution building, while at the local level,UNSCO is a co-chair of the Local DevelopmentForum together with the PA, the World Bank andthe Norwegians.In November 2009, Israeli Prime MinisterBenjamin Netanyahu announced a freeze of settlementconstructions in the West Bank and it appearedthat proximity talks between Israel and the PA wouldcommence. However, partial implementation of thesettlement freeze led to the temporary suspensionof the talks until May 2010, a cooling of relationsbetween the US and Israel and a revival of USinvolvement in the Quartet. In addition, Palestiniansin the West Bank and Gaza face increasing barrierswith respect to access to East Jerusalem, which hasserious economic and social implications. 8The Obama administration’s recent re-emphasison the Quartet created the space for a larger advisoryrole for UNSCO. As the only Quartet Envoypermanently based in the region, Special CoordinatorRobert Serry is able to provide authoritativeinformation and analysis to the Quartet based onthe large Country Team network and extensiveinteractions with the parties. UNSCO has beenable to play a part in promoting more balanced andsubstantive Quartet positions, as reflected in theJune 2009 Trieste and March 2010 Moscow Quartetstatements. 9 UNSCO also maintains a rovingregional presence in support of the peace process.As part t<strong>here</strong>of, Special Coordinator Serry oftenmeets with the UN Special Coordinator for LebanonMichael Williams on issues involving Lebanonand Israel. In addition, Serry conducts outreach toregional players and organizations such as the ArabLeague to address regional dimensions of the MiddleEast Peace Process and the Palestinian issue.UNSCO’s Coordinating RoleFollowing a policy decision by the UN Secretary-General that calls for an integrated approach for allUN field missions to maximize the UN’s efficiencyand effectiveness, the mission has taken a pragmaticapproach to integration with the UNCT. UNSCOt<strong>here</strong>by focuses on practical overlap by prioritizingcommunication between agencies to avoid redundancyand maximize effectiveness on shared agendaitems. Specific examples include a high degreeof integration of UNSCO with OCHA and theOffice of the Quartet Representative 10 on issues ofmovement and access from and to Gaza. Coordinationbetween these organizations is often reflectedin the monthly Security Council Briefing and in thedevelopment of common interagency positions onkey issues as well as support provided to them onprogramming, access negotiations and other efforts.One of the contributing factors to the mission’ssuccessful integration with the UNCT is thatUNSCO’s political and coordination officers sharethe same offices. This facilitates ease of communicationand access on a variety of levels and issuesbetween development coordination and politicaladvising. In addition, successful donor coordinationand donor outreach gives UNSCO significantleverage within the UN Country Team. To meetthe growing demands related to UNSCO’s coordinationrole, the mission sought and received sixnew professional posts from UN Headquarters,increasing UNSCO’s coordination staff from threeto twelve over the past 1 ½ years.ConclusionLack of progress on the political track in the past12-18 months is the most obvious hurdle forUNSCO in fulfilling its mandate. With the easingof Israeli policy on Gaza, UNSCO’s challenge willbe to ensure its full implementation and to use it asa springboard for further progress, both on accessto Gaza and on the other issues – including prisonersexchange, underlying security tensions, andespecially Palestinian disunity – which collectivelyinhibit a normalization of conditions in Gaza.However, the combination of local, regional andinternational factors will continue to render strongmediation attempts difficult to sustain.Regarding the peace process, UNSCO mustseek to support the PLO and PA in their negotiatingefforts in the face of a difficult domesticenvironment. The mission also must try to influenceQuartet positions in favor of a substantiveframework for negotiations encompassing not onlythe core issues of borders, security, settlements andwater, but also Jerusalem and refugees – and for amore comprehensive approach to peace, effortsmust also be extended to Syria and Lebanon. Inparallel, with the PA’s statebuilding plan seekinginstitutional readiness for statehood by August

40 | Mission ReviewsOffice of the UN Special Coordinator forLebanon (UNSCOL)Authorization 13 February 2007and Start Date (UNSC Letter S/2007/85)Special Coordinator Michael C. Williams (UK)Deputy SpecialCoordinatorBudget2011, UNSCO will need to continue rallying forUN support of this effort. Navigating the differentdimensions of Quartet and Security Councilengagement, and of negotiations and developmentson the ground, will continue to pose a diplomaticbalancing act for the Special Coordinator.UNSCO had some success in engaging moreclosely with the parties to the conflict. W<strong>here</strong>as in2007-2008 UNSCO experienced difficulty in obtainingaccess to higher levels of the Israeli government,late 2009 and the early months of 2010 have showna marked improvement in engagement with Ministryof Defense officials on access, though the engagementwith Israeli authorities remains at a lower levelthan with Palestinian officials in the West Bank. Acontinual challenge for UNSCO is to assert its valueadded in its political and humanitarian/developmentcoordination roles vis-à-vis the multitude of UNorganizations that operate in Israel and the OccupiedPalestinian Territory, whilst preserving its ability toserve as a credible interlocutor for all parties.UNSCOLMarta Ruedas (Spain)$8.4 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 21early 2010 Local Civilian: 51For detailed mission information see p. 223Background to MissionFollowing the withdrawal of the Israeli Forces inMay 2000, the Secretary-General established anoffice for his Personal Representative to SouthernLebanon to support international efforts to maintainpeace and security in the region – a mandatethat was expanded to all of Lebanon in November2005. In the aftermath of the July 2006 warwith Israel, the Secretary-General transformed thepresence into the Office of the United Nations SpecialCoordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), mandatedto represent him politically and to coordinatethe work of the UN in the country.UNSCOL has a two-fold political mandatecomprising both regional and internal elements: tooversee and report on the implementation of SecurityCouncil Resolution 1701, designed to lead toa permanent ceasefire and long-term solution ofthe 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict; and to providegood offices on behalf of the Secretary-General toassist domestic Lebanese parties to reach peacefulsolutions to contentious issues. The objectives ofResolution 1701 include the extension of Lebanesegovernment authority to all Lebanese territory, thedelineation of the international borders of Lebanonand the implementation of the Taif Accordsincluding disarmament of all armed groups inLebanon. 11 The Special Coordinator is mandatedto engage Lebanese parties in support of Lebanon’sinternal stability, territorial integrity and the extensionof Lebanese government control throughoutthe country. In addition, UNSCOL provides a coordinationfunction for the UN system in Lebanon,and engages in outreach to regional organizationssuch as the Arab League, the EU, as well as donorcountries, neighbors and pertinent regional powers.Through its mandated task of implementingResolution 1701, UNSCOL also coordinatesregularly with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon(UNIFIL). UNIFIL has primary on-the-groundresponsibility for military obligations on Resolution1701 south of the Litani River, while UNSCOLoversees non-military aspects of the Resolutionthroughout the country. Thus, UNSCOL is a semiintegratedmission, with UNIFIL operating underthe separate authority of the force commander.However, many elements of Resolution 1701 haveboth a security and political dimension, in whichcase UNIFIL’s Force Commander and the SpecialCoordinator must work closely together with aninformal division of labor.UNSCOL maintains bilateral ties with Israelover the implementation of Resolution 1701 andin that regard works closely with the UN SpecialCoordinator Office for the Middle East Peace Process(UNSCO) in Jerusalem and Beirut on areas ofoverlap involving Israel and Lebanon.

Middle East | 41Recent DevelopmentsIn May 2008 political tensions between thegovernment and Hezbollah, which among otherthings prevented the country’s presidentialelections, escalated and resulted in the worst violencesince the end of the civil war in 1990. Thefighting ended the same month after a powersharingpact was reached that gave Hezbollah moreseats in government, and Lebanon’s parliamentelected General Michel Suleiman as president on25 May 2008. While in June 2009, parliamentaryelections were held, the creation of a national unitygovernment was delayed – because of disagreementsover power-sharing arrangements between thefactions – until November 2009 when Saad Hariri,the son of assassinated Prime Minister RafikHariri, assumed the post of prime minister.Lebanon’s confessional system of basing politicalrepresentation on ethnic and religious identity continuesto both undergird the political system andcontribute to factionalization and political tensionsbetween Shi’is, Sunnis, Christians and Druze.In the lead up to the 2009 parliamentaryelections, UNSCOL used good offices to communicatewith Lebanese parties to maintain stabilityduring the electoral process and assisted UNDP inproviding technical support to the elections. In thiscapacity, UNSCOL established an “electoral forum”to brief relevant parties on the functioning of theelectoral process as well as technical aspects of theelection and gather donor support. The forum hasbeen well received both by the Lebanese governmentand the international community and hascontinued its work in preparations for the May2010 municipal elections.Since the establishment of the national unitygovernment and other national institutions followingthe June 2009 elections, the UN’s role in offeringgood offices to the Lebanese in support of domesticstability may be less immediately relevant. The UNt<strong>here</strong>fore focuses on working with the new governmenton state building and broader reform challenges.In its mandated Resolution 1701 capacity,UNSCOL has helped to de-escalate tense situationsand re-establish the informal truce betweenLebanon and Israel on numerous occasions. Recentexamples include responding swiftly alongsideUNIFIL to inadvertent border crossings on bothsides of the Blue Line 12 by local shepherds andothers and acting as a go-between for the Israeliand Lebanese government to de-escalate tensionsand provide factual analysis. 13 In terms of theimplementation of the objectives Resolution 1701,several areas have seen little to no progress in thepast year. In terms of the delineation of internationalborders, the status of Ghajar, a divided villageon the Lebanon border, and Shebaa farms remainsunsettled with prospects for a breakthrough in thenext year unlikely. Another objective of 1701, thedisarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon otherthan armed forces under authority of the Lebanese,presents a sizeable challenge as Hezbollah’s hold onthe South has not decreased and it is now part of thenational unity government. However, UNSCOL’sability to talk to all Lebanese factions, includingHezbollah, allows the mission latitude in providinga “go-between” role for all parties to the conflict. Inturn, UNSCOL’s Israeli interlocutors on resolution1701 value its access and analysis.CoordinationIn keeping with UN efforts to strengthen missionintegration with other UN field presences, UNS-COL has, in consultation with the UN CountryTeam (UNCT), established working groups 14 infour key areas of development and political missionoverlap: Palestinian Issues, Human Rights,Governance & Elections, Regional Disparities &Borders. Of these four groups, the latter has themost successful coordination between the politicalaspects of UNSCOL and the UNCT. The securityof Lebanon’s borders and other entry points are keyprovisions of Resolution 1701 to prevent the entryof arms and related materiel without the consent ofthe government. As controlling illegal arms trafficon the borders is not simply a matter of policing,but has a socio-economic basis, the cooperationbetween the UNCT and Lebanese Armed Forces,facilitated by UNSCOL, has been essential. Theworking group on Regional Disparities & Bordersconducted a socio-economic survey of the bordercommunities and Special Coordinator Williamshas marshaled key donors such as the US, UK, Germany,Denmark and the EU to create a commonborder position and raise funds for technical andfinancial assistance. The Secretary-General has alsotwice dispatched a team of border security experts(the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment

42 | Mission ReviewsUN International Independent InvestigationCommission (UNIIIC)Special Envoy, Implementation ofResolution 1559Authorization Date 7 April 2005(UNSC Res. 1595)Commissioner Daniel Bellemare (Canada)Budget$10.1 million(1 January 2009-31 December 2009)Strength as of International Civilian: 15early 2009 Local Civilian: 19For detailed mission information see p. 189Authorization Date 14 December 2004(UNSC Res. 1559)Start Date 3 January 2005Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)Budget$0.7 million(1 January 2010-31December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 318 September 2009For detailed mission information see p. 171UN International Independent InvestigationCommissionIn April 2005, the UN International IndependentInvestigation Commission (UNIIIC) was establishedby Security Council Resolution 1595 to probe the 14February 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime MinisterRafik Hariri, who was killed along with 22 othersin a car bombing in Beirut. UNIIIC’s mandate was laterexpanded to include assistance to the governmentwith investigating further terrorist attacks in Lebanon.Initially conceived for a three months period, theUNIIIC continued its work until 28 February 2009.While on the technical side the UNIIIC assisted theLebanese authorities with legal, forensic and analyticalexpertise in the Hariri and the other cases, theCommission’s investigative activities over the yearshave led to arrests of key suspects. In late 2008 andearly 2009, the Commission was preparing for agradual transfer of its operations, staff and assetsto the Special Tribunal for Lebanon with the viewto complete the transition by the time the Tribunalwould take up its work on 1 March 2009.The Tribunal was established in 2007 by SecurityCouncil Resolution 1757 and is based in The Hague.It is mandated to continue to investigate and thenprosecute perpetrators of the Hariri assassinationas well as other cases that the UNIIIC assists ininvestigating if they are found to be linked to theHariri case and are of similar nature and gravity. Inits last report to the Council, the UNIIIC warned that– against high expectations in some quarters – thelaunch of the Tribunal did not mean that the investigationswere completed. In the same report theUNIIIC urged the Office of the Prosecutor to continuegathering evidence to support any indictmentsbefore the Tribunal.Team [LIBAT]) to assess border monitoring andpropose measures to improve border control.UNSCOL’s access to the highest level of theLebanese government provides another platformfor successful joint developmental and political initiatives.In terms of Palestinian and Human Rightsissues, t<strong>here</strong> has been progress in the reconstructionof the Nahr el Bared camp in 2009 as well asincreased advocacy on issues such as the right forPalestinians to work and the provision of nationalIDs. The governance working group, which ischaired by UNSCOL, is organizing the electoralforums and helping to provide technical assistanceto the May 2010 municipal elections.The semi-integrated nature of the mission canoften pose a challenge in terms of the public perceptionof UNSCOL’s role in conflict mediation.UNIFIL’s sheer size and scope with commandof upwards of 12,000 international troops on theground remains the face of the UN in Lebanonfor most Lebanese. However, Special CoordinatorWilliams is very active in media outreach, widelyrecognized and afforded access at the highest levelsof the Lebanese government. UNSCOL thusmaintains a strong reputation as fair-minded withrespect to domestic parties within Lebanon andregional counterparts.ConclusionWhile relations between the political anddevelopment sides of the aisle have notably improvedin the past two years, due mainly to the good working

Middle East | 43Special Envoy for the Implementation of Resolution 1559Following the December 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1559 – which aims to strengthen the sovereignty,territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the exclusive authority of the governmentof Lebanon throughout the country – the Secretary-General appointed Terje Roed-Larsen as Special Envoy for theImplementation of the Resolution. Mr. Roed-Larsen began his appointment on 3 January 2005 and is mandatedto consult with the government of Lebanon, other interested states and UN agencies in preparing the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on the implementation of Resolution 1559. The Resolution is somewhat controversialas it is seen by some as antagonistic in tone and was adopted by the Security Council with six abstentions. 1Since the adoption of the Resolution, several of its provisions have been implemented. Following the 18-monthpolitical crisis in Lebanon and the intense violence of May 2008, the political scene in Lebanon has become muchmore stable. Elections in June 2009 finally resulted in a Unity Government created on 9 November 2009, with acalm security situation throughout the process. Political rapprochement between Syria and Lebanon and a highlevelvisit from Lebanon’s prime minister to Damascus in December 2009 marked an important step toward thenormalization of relations for the two countries. In August 2010, in a move that may positively affect its nationalsecurity and stability, the Lebanese government granted employment rights to Palestinians living in Lebanon. Notwithstandingthese positive developments, violations of the Resolution or a lack of implementation persist. Issueslike border delineation with Syria, Israel’s occupation of the northern part of Ghajar, porous borders and the presenceand interference of Hezbollah, Palestinian and Lebanese militias continue to obstruct Lebanon’s advancestoward full reaffirmation of its sovereignty and territorial control.1 The six countries that abstained from voting on Resolution 1559 were Algeria, Brazil, the People’s Republic of China, Pakistan,the Philippines and Russia. The remaining nine Council members – Angola, Benin, Chile, France, Germany, Romania, Spain,the United Kingdom, and the United States – voted in favor. See Elizabeth Sellwood, “The Role of the United Nations in MiddleEast Conflict Prevention,” <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation, New York University, 2009.relationship between the Special Coordinator andResident Coordinator – who also acts as the DeputySpecial Coordinator – the mission’s integration withthe UNCT remains fragile and subject to personalities.However, while institutional differences remain,the successful initiatives in 2009 show that somecoordination successes are starting to emerge.Changes in the regional environment, suchas an escalation of tensions between Iran andIsrael, or a shift in the dynamics with Syria, couldquickly change the internal balance in Lebanonand the tenuous cessation of hostilities betweenIsrael and Lebanon. The underlying and indeedlong-term challenges of Lebanon’s confessionalpolitical system could also change UNSCOL’slevel of involvement in Lebanon if governancechallenges, such as presented by the parliamentaryelections in 2009, arise. If such a sudden shiftoccurs, UNSCOL good offices will once again becalled upon – in the meantime a tense status quowith regard to the disarmament and disputedborder objectives of Resolution 1701 prevails.notes1 As of July 2010, Hamas has not signed the Egyptian-drafted reconciliation document, which was signed by all ofthe factions within the PLO, following several rounds of intra-Palestinian negotiations in 2009.2 In June 2010, Israel announced steps to ease the Gaza blockade allowing more goods and construction materialsto reach Gaza. The decision came in response to increased international criticism of the blockade followingIsrael’s raid on Gaza-bound aid ships on 31 May, which resulted in the death of nine passengers.3 UNSCO was able to facilitate entry of the material from the Turkish flotilla to Gaza following engagement withthe flotilla organizers, Turkey, Israel, and the de facto Hamas authorities in Gaza.

44 | Mission Reviews4 See February 18, 2010 Briefing to the Security Council by UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B.Lynn Pascoe.5 Salam Fayyad’s first appointment to the post by President Mahmoud Abbas in 2007 was not confirmed by thePalestinian Legislative Council.6 “Statement By Middle East Quartet,” SG/2158, 19 March 2010, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sg2158.doc.htm.7 The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee was established in 1993 by the Multilateral Steering Group of the multilateraltalks on Middle East peace in the context of the Washington Conference to provide international policycoordination development assistance to the Palestinian people. It is chaired by Norway and co-sponsored by the USand EU. Members include the PA, Israel, the UN, the IMF, Canada, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, Russia, Saudi Arabiaand Tunisia.8 UN Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, April 13, 20109 “Statement By Middle East Quartet,” SG/2152, 26 June 2009, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2009/sg2152.doc.htm; “Statement By Middle East Quartet,” SG/2158, 19 March 2010, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sg2158.doc.htm.10 The current Quartet Representative is Mr. Tony Blair. UNSCO seconds a staff member to his office11 Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) available at http://unscol.unmissions.org/portals/unscol/SC%20Resolution%201701%20(2006).pdf.12 The Blue Line is a border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel published by the United Nations on7 June 2000.13 S/2009/566 Eleventh Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of Security CouncilResolution 1701 (2006) available at http://unscol.unmissions.org/portals/unscol/SG%20Report%20on%201701-Eleventh%20(02%2011%2009).pdf.14 Although UNIFIL is not integrated into the UN Country Team it maintains observer status in theworking groups.

West Africa | 453.2M i s s i o n R e v i e w sWest AfricaIn its recent past, West Africa has been one ofthe most volatile regions of the world, sufferingfrom devastating civil wars and acute politicalinstability complicated and exacerbated by poverty,mismanaged natural resources, poor governanceand vulnerability to external shocks. The past twoyears saw the president of Guinea-Bissau murderedand unconstitutional changes of government inthree countries – Mauritania, Guinea and mostrecently, Niger. The region also continues to bea prime target for organized crime, especiallydrug trafficking, and its large numbers ofunderemployed and disaffected youth make itespecially vulnerable. Civil-military relationscontinue to pose serious governance problemsand elections, while providing hope for improvedgovernance, can be rife with tensions.T<strong>here</strong> have also been positive signs ofprogress in recent years; overall levels of violentconflict have dropped, and the rhetoric of democracyand rule of law is gradually gaining ground.The Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) has taken an assertive and progressivestance on addressing the region’s challengesand conflict prevention in general. Nevertheless,the region’s pursuit of stability is complicated byporous borders, which means that the politicalmissions operating in the region do so in a complexenvironment w<strong>here</strong> the threats and issuesare cross-cutting and inter-related and instabilitycan be contagious. The UN has four politicalmissions in the region, UNIOGBIS, UNIPSIL,CNMC, and the regional office, UNOWA. T<strong>here</strong>are also still two active peacekeeping operations,Soldier in Guinea-Bissauthe UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) establishedin 2003, and the UN Operations in Côte d’Ivoire(UNOCI) established in 2004. As these missionsdrawdown, it is likely that they too will be replacedwith political missions.UNOGBIS/UNIOGBISBackgroundThe UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) was established in 1999 with amandate particularly focused on the implementationof the Abuja Agreement between the Governmentof Guinea-Bissau and the self-proclaimed militaryjunta. Its mandate was subsequently extended in2004 and 2005 to assist with the country’s ongoingpeace consolidation and stability needs of the posttransitionalphase. 1hdptcar (Creative Commons)

46 | Mission ReviewsIn December 2007, at the request of theGovernment of Guinea-Bissau, the country wasplaced on the agenda of the UN PeacebuildingCommission (PBC). UNOGBIS’ mandate for 2008was revised to reflect its growing responsibility insupporting efforts to combat the country’s increasingchallenges with drug trafficking and organizedcrime. The 2009 mandate continued these efforts inaddition to strengthening the capacities of nationalinstitutions in order to maintain constitutionalorder; implementation of security sector reform(SSR); respect of rule of law and human rights;as well as assisting all other partners in theirengagement with Guinea-Bissau.In January 2010, the UN Integrated PeacebuildingOffice in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)replaced UNOGBIS. The mission’s mandatedresponsibilities were further expanded to providesupport to the work of the PBC and the PeacebuildingFund (PBF), coordinate SSR efforts andaddress national reconciliation issues. The shift toan integrated mission also means more resourceallocation towards these tasks, allowing for greatertechnical support to the government to enhancenational capacities and better coordination ofmission and UN Country Team (UNCT) efforts.The mission has an office that supports theSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General(SRSG) and his Deputy 2 and four substantive sections– political affairs, human rights and gender,SSR, and public information. T<strong>here</strong> is also a strategicplanning unit that undertakes joint planning;promotes integration of the political, human rightsand development agendas of the mission; and coordinatesthe efforts of UNIOGBIS with the UNCT,the PBC and the PBF. UNIOGBIS operates withan integrated strategic framework that builds onthat of the UNCT, the mission’s political and securitysector mandates, as well as peacebuilding andnational development priorities.

West Africa | 47Key DevelopmentsSeveral incidents in 2009 epitomize Guinea-Bissau’sprecarious political situation and the deleteriousrole the military plays in the stabilization of thecountry. On 1 and 2 March 2009, the Chief of theGeneral Staff and President João Bernardo Vieirawere assassinated. After the attacks, the militaryrestated their support for the constitution and theSpeaker of the National Assembly assumed dutiesas the interim President of the Republic on 3 March.However, further assassinations took place on 5 Junein the lead-up to the presidential elections when apresidential candidate, a former Defense Ministerand two of his guards were killed. The authoritiesclaimed that the victims were resisting arrest for analleged coup attempt, the existence of which has yetto be confirmed.Presidential elections were held without incidenton 28 June and went to a second round on 26 July,with Malam Bacai Sanha of the governing partywinning a majority of votes on a platform of endingviolence and promoting development throughpeace and stability. In addition to providing trainingfor election agents, funding unbiased mediacoverage and coordinating international electoralobservers, UNOGBIS was also instrumental inurging the military to keep their distance from theproceedings, and in securing an MoU between thetwo main candidates to ensure that they respectedthe results.While the peaceful election outcome boostedconfidence after a particularly violent period, thepreceding events served to highlight the criticalneed for comprehensive SSR in order to reducethe threat that rivalries, factionalization, and theinvolvement of the military pose to the politicalsp<strong>here</strong>. The transition of UNOGBIS to anintegrated field presence has enhanced the coordinatingrole that the UN is able to play with respectto SSR, which is a priority for the UN, donors and

48 | Mission ReviewsUN Peace-building Support Office in GuineaBissau (UNOGBIS)Authorization 26 February 1999and Start Date (UNSC Letter S/1999/232)First SRSGNana Sinkan (Cameroon)Budget$4.8 million(1 January 2009-31 December 2009)UN Integrated Peace-building Office inGuinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS)Authorization Date 26 June 2009 (UNSC Res. 1876)Start Date 1 January 2010SRSGJoseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)Budget$19.0 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian:18early 2010 Local Civilian: 13Military Experts on Mission: 1For detailed mission information see p. 192the government. The SSR unit within UNIOGBIShas developed a strategy for the mission and willliaise with national and international partners on itsimplementation. In addition, the unit has officerswith various specializations, some of which will beseated within the government bodies responsiblefor SSR, in order to enhance the UN’s support tothe country’s own process.Unfortunately, Guinea-Bissau’s progress towardsviable security sector reform and stability experiencedfurther setback on 1 April 2010 whensoldiers loyal to then Deputy Chief of the ArmedForces arrested the army chief, detained the primeminister and escorted former Navy Rear Admiral,José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, who had recentlyreturned from exile in Gambia w<strong>here</strong> he had fledafter a failed coup attempt in August 2008, from theUN compound w<strong>here</strong> he had been seeking asylum.While the prime minister was later released, at thetime of drafting, the former army chief remains incustody and the US government has just classifiedBubo and the head of the Air Force as “drug kingpins”for their role in trafficking narcotics throughGuinea-Bissau.ConclusionThe continued volatility of the political and securitysituation in Guinea-Bissau reinforces the rationalefor a UN integrated peacebuilding presence in thecountry to monitor and defuse situations that couldotherwise rapidly escalate. Despite facing somevery daunting challenges, UNIOGBIS is able tohave an impact because it provides unique servicesto the country, including enhancing coordinationamongst other partners. The increase in resourcesand capacity that has accompanied the shift ofUNOGBIS to UNIOGBIS will better position themission to support the government in building uptheir own sustainable capacities, as opposed to findingprovisional solutions to crises as they arise.Yet, the mission alone can only do so much inan environment w<strong>here</strong> t<strong>here</strong> are still severe socioeconomicproblems, widespread impunity, andweak state institutions to deal with either of theabove. All actors, including the government, thearmed forces, as well as international partners, mustremain committed to mobilizing, affecting and promotingchange. The national conference, “TowardsPeace Consolidation and Development” that theNational Assembly is currently planning, will bean important step towards determining a commonvision for the way forward. Additionally, althought<strong>here</strong> have been positive signs regarding the volumeof drugs transiting the country, implementation ofthe West Africa Coast Initiative will be necessary ifthis trend is to continue.Of course, many of these initiatives rely uponthe existence of more robust rule of law and a strongerjustice system in general. Successful progress onSSR as a long-term goal will remain a challengethat will require cooperation between all actors. Inthe interim, addressing the politically motivatedviolence of last year and ensuring that those responsibleare brought to justice will lay an importantfoundation for the future. Making sure the nationalcommissions of inquiry move ahead with this processin a timely manner, which they have yet to dothus far, will be an important first step in re-legitimizingthe state and its institutions in the eyes ofBissau-Guineans.

West Africa | 49UNOWABackgroundThe UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) wasestablished in 2001 by an exchange of lettersbetween the Secretary-General and the SecurityCouncil and became fully operational in January2002, with the goal of promoting an integratedsubregional approach to the peace and securitychallenges the region faced. The Office, the UN’sfirst regional political mission, covers the fifteenmember countries of ECOWAS in addition toMauritania. Its first mandate focused on carryingout good offices, enhancing and facilitating thework of other UN agencies and partners, as well asliaising and assisting the work of ECOWAS.UNOWA’s mandate was renewed for an additionalthree years in 2005, 3 and again in 2007, 4with the current mandate expiring on 31 December2010. Each subsequent mandate renewal has seenan increase and expansion in the Office’s functionsand activities. The current mandate still centers onthe performance of good offices and the mission’ssupport to ECOWAS, but also includes facilitatingharmonization between various UN entities,and developing better knowledge and awarenessof the cross-border issues the region faces, as wellas enhancing efforts to address them. In February2008, Said Djinnit became the SRSG for WestAfrica and the Head of UNOWA.As a regional mission, UNOWA is responsiblefor all of West Africa, but a de facto division of labordictates that it tends to focus and take the lead oncountries with no other UN political presence. Still,in spite of its considerable geographic and thematicscope, UNOWA is the smallest political mission inWest Africa; it contains an office of the SRSG, anda political affairs, human rights, and public informationsection that support the work of the SRSGas well as the Office’s other activities. Althoughnot intended to operationalize any programs,UNOWA’s size nevertheless constrains its abilityto fulfill what is an unusually large and complexmandate. As a great deal of UNOWA’s time andresources are expended on the good offices functionof the SRSG, many of which, because of the natureof crises in the region, are unable to be planned orallotted for in advance, more long-term work onsome of its mandated tasks suffer as a result.Key DevelopmentsOn 23 December 2008, a military junta led byCaptain Moussa Dadis Camara seized powerin Guinea after the death of the long-servingpresident, Lansana Conte. The takeover waswidely condemned by the international community,despite the fact the junta initially signaled that theyintended to hold elections within the year. When itsoon became apparent that Dadis might stand forpresident, the opposition coalition began to holdprotests, culminating in a large peaceful rally on 28September 2009 that turned violent when the armyopened fire on civilians, killing at least 157 people,and also reportedly committed other gross humanrights violations, including brutal sexual assaults.On 3 December, Dadis was shot in the head by anaide and evacuated to Morocco for medical treatmentand authority was transferred to his DefenseMinister who was more cooperative in establishinga timeline for democratic transition.Throughout the mediation process, led byECOWAS and its chosen facilitator, Burkina Faso’sPresident Blaise Compaoré, the SRSG was activelyengaged in high-level negotiations. As one of a coregroup of advisors to the facilitator – as well as representingthe UN at the International Contact Groupon Guinea - he strongly encouraged a prompt returnto constitutional order. Concurrently, UNOWAworked closely with the UN Country Team inGuinea to develop programs that address key areasof conflict prevention in order to prepare for elections,which are scheduled to take place on 27 June.UNOWA has also, at ECOWAS’ request, beenproviding advice as to how SSR can be included inthe facilitation process and be addressed during thetransitional period.UNOWA has additionally been monitoring thesituation in Niger after its coup in February, andwas involved in discussions surrounding the preandpost election tensions in Togo on how localmediation capacity can be strengthened. Throughoutprocesses such as these, UNOWA works inconcert with ECOWAS and, now more frequently,the African Union as well. This cooperation furtherstrengthens the entities’ tripartite partnership, andenhances the international community’s capacityto react against undemocratic incidents that occurin the region. In between these specific mediationefforts, the SRSG travels frequently in the region

50 | Mission ReviewsUN Office for West Africa (UNOWA)Authorization Date 26 November 2001(UNSC Letter S/2001/1128)Start Date 1 January 2002SRSGSaid Djinnit (Algeria)Budget$6.97 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 13early 2010 Local Civilian: 10Military Experts on Mission: 4For detailed mission information see p. 207Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)Authorization 17 March 2004and Start Date (UNSC Letter S/2004/298)ChairmanSaid Djinnit (Algeria)Budget$8.9 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 12early 2010 Local Civilian: 6Military Experts on Mission: 2For detailed mission information see p. 156to monitor developing situations, raise key issues ofconcern, and communicate the UN’s commitmentto West Africa.In addition to dealing with political crises,UNOWA focuses on the region-wide necessity forSSR, especially the impact that the security sectorhas on electoral processes. In order to integratethe work of the UN system in this area, UNOWAhas developed an internal strategy, in collaborationwith ECOWAS, the UN Departments of PoliticalAffairs and Peacekeeping Operations, that will nowbe communicated to all UN actors in the region.The overarching goal of this process is to assess howthe UN can best support ECOWAS in developingand implementing their own subregional SSRframework and action plan.UNOWA has also continued to supportECOWAS in the implementation of their regionalaction plan on drug trafficking by mobilizing thenecessary political support and commitment toroll-out the West African Coast Initiative. Whileseizure rates in the subregion have dropped, sustainedengagement on behalf of the region’sgovernments will be key to ensuring that the threatposed by illicit trade is contained, particularly nowthat a potentially worrisome link between drugtrafficking and terrorist financing has been identifiedin the Sahel region. 5 UNOWA has recentlystrengthened its cooperation with the UN Officeon Drugs and Crime and other partners on thisissue in order to sensitize national authorities anddo its part in maintaining international attentionso that the threat posed by the trade remains onthe agenda.ConclusionUNOWA’s role in the mediation efforts thatsuccessfully prevented the situation in Guinea fromdeteriorating further and kept it from destabilizingneighboring countries, has been an importantexample of the unique contribution an office suchas UNOWA can make. The mission will now needto turn its attention to facilitating preparationsfor credible elections in Guinea, as well as, w<strong>here</strong>possible, preemptively attending to any issues thatmay arise from these or other potentially divisiveupcoming elections in the region.The predominant focus for UNOWA in thisperiod has been on the good offices function ofthe SRSG, which is one area that a mission ofits size can have the greatest impact regionally.Because of its mandate and the high profile of itsSRSG, UNOWA has succeeded in creating thenecessary political space so that other UN actors,such as the UN Country Teams, have been able tocontinue their work irrespective of situations thathave arisen in their specific countries. Moreover,UNOWA’s especially strong working relationshipwith ECOWAS has further enabled it to providesupport to ECOWAS initiatives and contribute inways that are targeted to the region’s conflict preventionpriorities.However, UNOWA will continue to bechallenged, especially if a similarly broad and complicatedmandate, one that is neither tailored toits activities nor its resources, is forced upon it foranother three years. Still, regardless of mandate,

West Africa | 51The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed CommissionThe Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) was established following the International Court of Justiceruling on 10 October 2002 on the disputed land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. The demarcationprocess was divided into four different segments: the Lake Chad basin, the land boundary, the maritimeboundary and the Bakassi Peninsula, the most contentious because of its offshore oil deposits and fish stocks.The framework for the eventual withdrawal of Nigerian forces and the transfer of authority in the peninsula toCameroon was agreed upon in the Greentree Agreement of 12 June 2006.Because of the politically sensitive inter-state scope of its work, the CNMC does not have a formal SecurityCouncil mandate, but instead is funded as a special political mission through an exchange of letters betweenthe Secretary-General and the president of the Security Council. 9 The mandate focuses on the highly technicalaspects of the demarcation of the land boundary, as well as the more political and legal transfer of authority,demilitarization, and protection of the rights of those who are affected by the transition—including encouragingcooperative economic and environmental arrangements between the two populations.Although a separate entity, the CNMC is located within UNOWA and since May 2009, UNOWA’s SRSG alsoserves as both the Chairman of the CNMC and the Follow-up Committee for the Greentree Agreement, which isin place until 2013. The SRSG’s good offices role has been critical in ensuring that implementation continues andthat sufficient confidence is built and sustained around the process so that it is able to stay on track.In August 2008, the final handover of the Bakassi Peninsula occurred between Nigeria and Cameroon. Sincethen, demarcation has advanced along the rest of the 1,950 kilometers of land boundary and, as of early 2010,approximately 300 kilometers of disputed territory are all that remains. In November 2009, the construction of thefirst permanent demarcation pillars began and will progress throughout 2010. Assessment of the land boundary isset to be completed by 2011, with boundary pillars to be in place by 2012. Throughout this period, the CNMC willcontinue to provide technical, political and legal guidance to ensure that any remaining areas of disagreement areamicably dealt with, and that implementation and confidence-building continues apace, including the monitoringof the affected populations and their rights.The CNMC is widely lauded as an example of UN conflict prevention at its best, utilizing the UN’s technical,political and legal expertise, and good office functions, to firstly get the commitment to - and then to sustainthe implementation of - an agreement between two countries on disputed territory. Compared to other politicalmissions, it also has a very clear exit strategy. While these are certainly valid points, unique challenges alsoarise from a mission that is highly technical yet managed by a political department; the balance between thepolitical, technical and administrative tasks required has not always been an easy one to find. Moving forward, animportant aspect of ensuring that the CNMC remains a success story will not only be replenishing its trust fund tocreate the financial capacity for completion, but also guaranteeing that the rights and concerns of the populationsalong the border remain as high a priority as the more technical aspects.the Office must be able to work even more closelywith the other UN actors in the region to promotegreater collaboration and provide strategic guidanceas part of a systematized, consultative and ongoingprocess. Finding a balance between this moreconsistent work and the ad hoc shuttle diplomacyrequired of the SRSG will be difficult, but necessaryif the Office is to fulfill the core function of its mandate– to enhance the UN’s contribution towardsthe achievement of peace and security priorities inWest Africa.UNIPSILBackgroundIn December 2005, the UN Integrated Office inSierra Leone (UNIOSIL) was established to follow-onafter the withdrawal of the peacekeepingforce UNAMSIL. Its mandate was to assist thegovernment with the consolidation of peace, as wellas to help preparations for presidential and legislativeelections to take place in 2007.

52 | Mission ReviewsECOWASIn addition to the UN’s presence in West Africa,the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) also has a network of offices acrossthe region. These fall into two categories. Thefirst category includes the four “sub-regionalzone offices” of the ECOWAS Early Warning andResponse Network (ECOWARN) situated in BurkinaFaso, the Gambia, Liberia and Togo. The secondconsists of offices of the Special Representativesof the President of the ECOWAS Commissionthat assist Member States in dealing with crisissituations, or provide support in post-conflictsettings. As of mid 2010, offices of the SpecialRepresentative are located in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea,Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Togo.The UN presence transitioned again in August2008 with the establishment of the UN IntegratedPeacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). 6The Office is mandated to support the governmentin resolving tensions and addressing areas of potentialconflict; monitoring and promoting human rights andrule of law; strengthening good governance; assistingwith the constitutional review; and coordinating thework of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), andthe UN Country Team. In September 2009, UNIP-SIL’s mandate was extended until 30 September 2010 7with a request for the Office’s eventual transition intoa UN Country Team presence, with special focus onissues surrounding preparations for the 2012 elections.As one of the first fully integrated politicalmissions, UNIPSIL is unique in several ways.It is headed by an Executive Representative of theSecretary-General (ERSG), a post currently held byMichael von der Schulenburg, who also serves as theResident Representative of the UN DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) and the UN Resident Coordinator.The ERSG model is not widely utilized butworks well in this particular context because it isaccompanied by a peacebuilding strategy that alignsall aspects of the UN’s country presence, and thushaving one person in charge streamlines the decision-makingprocess and complements integration. 8UNIPSIL also has one of the most targetedmandates of UN political missions. This was activelylobbied for by the ERSG so that the mission couldhave a focused strategy—providing the politicalplatform, aid coordination and support (through amulti-donor trust fund), and technical advice—toassist the government with their own institutionbuilding and peace consolidation efforts. This isachieved by linking the mission’s guiding framework,the Joint Vision for the UN Family in Sierra Leone,to the government’s own Agenda for Change, whicharticulates its four main peacebuilding priorities asreliable power supply; increased productivity in agricultureand fisheries; improved infrastructure; andimproved heath and other social services.Covering the period of 2009-2012, the JointVision was developed in order to highlight thecommon priorities of the mission’s political, developmentand human rights mandates, and to providea framework that offers full integration at the program,planning, evaluation and operational levels ofthe following four issues: integrating rural areas intothe national economy; economic and social integrationof the youth; equitable and affordable accessto health; and accessible and credible public service.To allow for accurate monitoring, each agencyretains its own workplan and deliverables. The ideaof having one vision for the entire UN family is stillan incredibly innovative one, despite the fact it hasstreamlined what was originally thirty-two differentstrategies into one, and has the government’sown priorities at its core.UNIPSIL comprises an office to support theERSG and then five substantive sections: PoliticalAffairs and Peace Consolidation; Human Rightsand Rule of Law; Democratic Institutions; Policeand Security; and a Joint Strategic Planning Unitwhich is tasked with ensuring synergy across allof the mission’s activities. The Planning Unit alsolinks the strategies of UNIPSIL with those of thegovernment, donors and the PBC. The missionhas plans for a total of eight regional field officesto connect with local communities, assist withimplementation of UN programs and enable moreeffective outreach. Additionally, these field officeswill provide space for liaison offices of local civilsociety and NGOs.Key DevelopmentsWhile Sierra Leone has made admirable progresstowards stabilization, the country still struggles withpoor socio-economic indicators, corruption, drugtrafficking, and severe youth unemployment—all

West Africa | 53“A Shared Vision” – Integration and UN Special Political MissionsIn a Policy Committee decision of June 2008, the UN Secretary General reaffirmed integration as the guidingprinciple for all conflict and post-conflict situations w<strong>here</strong> the UN has Country Teams (consisting of UN agencies,funds and programs), a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or a political mission. The aim of the integratedapproach for field missions is to develop a shared vision among all UN actors on the ground, maximizing theUN’s efficiency and effectiveness by linking the various elements of peace operations, such as political tasks,development work, humanitarian assistance, human rights and the rule of law. However, the principle does notapply to missions mandated with strict military tasks, or to regional political offices, such as in Central Asia andWest Africa.Integration is by no means limited to one specific set up, but can take different structural forms depending on thespecific country context. Generally, the more stable a country is, the more structurally integrated a mission canbecome. As of early 2010, only two missions, UNIPSIL and BINUB, are fully structurally integrated. Both missionsare under the leadership of an Executive Representative of the Secretary General (ERSG). The ERSG position is“triple-hatted,” because it combines the functions of the mission leadership, with that of the Resident Coordinator(RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), which are responsible for the coordination and harmonization of the UNdevelopment and humanitarian actors, namely the UN Country Teams (UNCTs), on the ground.In other cases, the roles of the RC and the HC are combined under the Deputy Special Representative of theSecretary General (DSRSG). In these integrated missions, the SRSG provides the overall leadership and politicalguidance, while the Deputy is charged with coordination of the UNCTs. Current examples of such missionsinclude UNAMA and UNAMI. In a third model of minimally integrated field presences, for example in the caseof UNMIN and UNPOS, the missions are under the leadership of the SRSG but the RC/HC functions are filledoutside the mission structure by the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, who is institutionally attachedto the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and receives support from local offices of the UN Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).Independent from the level of integration, all integrated field missions should have shared analytical and planningcapacities as well as integrated strategic frameworks that should facilitate joint planning and shared objectives,divide responsibilities between the various actors and decide on mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. Atheadquarters level, task forces consisting of relevant Secretariat departments and offices, agencies, funds andprograms, provide support and policy guidance to the integrated missions. Missions in countries that are onthe agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), receive additional support through the PBC’s SupportOffice.It is important to note that the integrated approach does not seek to incorporate one UN entity into another – whilethe function of the RC/HC is structurally integrated, the UNCTs maintain their institutional independence fromthe mission. As the various UN actors operate according to their own management systems, accountability andreport structures, funding lines and budget cycles, integration implementation can be challenging. In addition,t<strong>here</strong> continues to be a lack of basic guidelines for senior mission management as to how to carry out integrationin field missions. Both elements can lead to ambiguities about the process and place heavy reliance on themission leadership to get the task done.Some actors in the humanitarian sp<strong>here</strong> voice concerns that the integrated approach diminishes the impartialityof the humanitarians, as they are perceived as intrinsically linked with the role of the mission in a country’spolitical transition process. Others argue that the set up in fully structurally integrated missions, w<strong>here</strong> the ERSGalso acts as the RC/HC, is an impediment to a more robust political role, because the mission leadership is notsolely perceived as an impartial political mediator.At the same time, while a political mission can not be perceived as partial to any party to a conflict, its goodoffices and mediation role can be instrumentalized to create the necessary conditions for successful conduct ofhumanitarian and development functions, that otherwise could not be achieved (as Ian Johnstone argues in hisessay in Section II of this volume). While integration in this context does not come without challenges, it providesan important step toward a UN system that works in unison across institutional differences.

54 | Mission ReviewsUN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in SierraLeone (UNIPSIL)Authorization Date 4 August 2008 (UNSC Res. 1829)Start Date 1 October 2008ERSGMichael von der Schulenburg(Germany)Budget$16.9 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 27early 2010 Local Civilian: 30UN Volunteers: 1For detailed mission information see p. 197within a highly divisive political environment.T<strong>here</strong>fore, while calm prevails for the most part, itis extremely tenuous.This was exemplified in March 2009 with anoutbreak of politically motivated violence precedinglocal elections. Several days of clashesbetween sympathizers of the governing party,the All People’s Congress (APC), and the mainopposition party, the Sierra Leone People’s Party(SLPP) culminated on 16 March when the SLPPheadquarters were attacked by angry crowds,resulting in injuries, extensive damage to thebuilding and property, as well as allegations ofsexual assault.During this period, UNIPSIL actively workedto mitigate the situation, including personal interventionby the ERSG to ensure that the police wereable to safely evacuate SLPP supporters trappedon the roof of their headquarters. The mission wasalso instrumental in encouraging dialogue betweenthe two parties, which led to the signing of a jointcommuniqué on 2 April. Strongly condemning violence,the communiqué seeks to encourage politicaltolerance and multiparty respect for institutionsand the political process, and agrees upon the needto pay special attention to the youth groups associatedwith the parties. While intense political rivalryremains, t<strong>here</strong> have also been increasingly positiveexchanges between the parties’ leadership, includingPresident Ernest Bai Koroma’s vocal supportfor inclusion.An important function of UNIPSIL has beento ensure that the joint communiqué does notremain solely a document, but that ad<strong>here</strong>nce andSuccessful operation: the Joint Drug Interdiction Task Force (JDITF), acooperative effort of UNIPSIL and the government of Sierra Leone, found 703kg of cocaine at Lungi Airport, April 2009.implementation continue to happen—especially inthe lead-up to the 2012 elections. UNIPSIL alsotransformed the UN radio into an independentpublic broadcaster to try to prevent the partisanbroadcasting of the past from fomenting politicalrivalry; supported the National Electoral Commissionand the Political Parties RegistrationCommission; and began building up national mediationcapacity, although this has been somewhatconstrained by the fact the mission itself does nothave a dedicated mediation specialist.To enhance the capacity of the Sierra LeonePolice to handle situations such as those that arosein March 2009, UNIPSIL’s police component hashelped with the acquisition of the necessary equipmentand training for crowd control. Additionally,the Office has successfully assisted the establishmentof the Joint Drug Interdiction Task Force,which will now become the first operational TransnationalCrime Unit under the West Africa CoastInitiative of the ECOWAS regional action plan onillicit drug trafficking and organized crime.ConclusionThe next year will be a critical one for both SierraLeone and UNIPSIL. The importance of sustainingnational reconciliation, maintaining politicaldialogue at all levels, as well as closely monitoringinterparty dynamics and campaigning in thelead-up to the 2012 elections cannot be underestimated.The incidents of March 2009 demonstratedhow close to the surface tensions still are and howUN Photo/Rudolfo Landeros

West Africa | 55they have the potential to quickly erupt into violence.The country’s other challenges, such asyouth unemployment, drug trafficking, and corruption,only serve to exacerbate this underlyingtension. However, the good relationship betweenthe government and UNIPSIL has enabled themission to provide the specific support, especiallytechnical assistance, the government requires tobuild its own capacity and begin to address thesecritical issues.UNIPSIL has attempted a unique model ofintegration—not only aligning the strategies ofthe various strands of the UN family, but also bybreaking down bureaucratic barriers between international,bilateral, national and local actors, in orderto channel focused support to the country’s peaceconsolidation needs. Yet these and other initiativeswill not be achieved if the country’s internationalpartners do not continue to support them. A donorconference held in November failed to raise enoughmoney for the multi-donor trust fund, which willimpede further implementation of the government’sAgenda for Change and the UN’s Joint Vision.Recent claims that funding for four additional yearsof peacebuilding in Sierra Leone was equivalent tothe costs for four months of the previous peacekeepingoperation emphasize the value for money thatpolitical missions such as UNIPSIL can provide ifgiven the resources to do so. As with any missionthat has moved into peacebuilding, t<strong>here</strong> is the riskof becoming complacent with relative stability. Butgiven the upcoming elections, this coming year isprecisely the time that momentum in Sierra Leoneneeds continue.notes1 The mission was established by Security Council Resolution 1233 of 6 April 1999, following a letter(S/1999/232) from then Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Security Council on 3 March 1999. In 2004, theSecurity Council decided in Resolution 1580 to extend UNOGBIS’ mandate as a special political mission, andexpanded the mandate accordingly. In November 2005, nearing the expiration of that mandate, the President ofGuinea-Bissau requested the Office’s extension.2 Although, at the time of drafting, t<strong>here</strong> is still no Deputy.3 Security Council Resolutions 797 and 858 (2004)4 Security Council Resolution 754 (2007)5 The Sahel region is a belt of land that lies on the southern edge of the Sahara desert and runs across thecontinent encompassing parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan,Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea.6 Security Council Resolution 1829 (2008)7 Security Council Resolution 1886 (2009)8 Only UNIPSIL and BINUB currently have ERSGs.9 Most recently, Security Council Resolutions 642 and 643 (2009).

Central Africa | 573.3 M i s s i o n R e v i e w sCentral AfricaCentral Africa is a hub of both UN peacekeepingand political missions. As of 2010, the UNhad troops deployed in the Eastern DemocraticRepublic of Congo (DRC), the Central AfricanRepublic (CAR) and southern Sudan. Yet it alsomaintains a separate political mission in CARand a peacebuilding office in Burundi. It recentlyconcluded the mandate of a special envoy focusedon the Lord’s Resistance Army (see box), a militiathat has operated in northern Uganda as well asCAR, DRC and south Sudan.These overlapping activities represent thelatest stage in the UN’s efforts to stabilize CentralAfrica, which date back to the 1990s. For muchof the last decade, these efforts have centered onmilitary operations. While the largest missions inthe region have been those in the DRC (with over20,000 personnel) and south Sudan (with nearly9,000), UN peacekeepers also deployed to CARfrom 1998 to 2000 and Burundi from 2004 to 2006.The Security Council mandated a small peacekeepingpresence in north-eastern CAR in 2008 as partof a larger mission (MINURCAT) primarily basedin neighboring Chad.Yet, while the number of peacekeepers in t<strong>here</strong>gion remains significant, t<strong>here</strong> appears to bea shift away from the military option to politicalengagement across central Africa. The limits ofpeacekeeping – and potential for new approachesto mediation – were highlighted in late 2008, whenUN forces in the eastern DRC faced a major rebeloffensive. The UN deployed a special envoy, formerNigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo, withPeace-building Office in the Central AfricanRepublic (BONUCA)Authorization Date 10 February 2000 (UNSC Pres.Statement S/PRST/2000/5)Start Date 15 February 2000First SRSGCheikh Tidiane Sy (Senegal)Budget$8.8 million(1 January 2009-31 December 2009)UN Integrated Peace-building Office in theCentral African Republic (BINUCA)Authorization 3 March 2009and Start Date (UNSC Letter S/2009/128)SRSGSahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia)Deputy SRSG Bo Schack (Denmark)Budget$18.0 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 26early 2010 Local Civilian: 54Military Experts on Mission: 2Police: 6UN Volunteers: 2For detailed mission information see p. 149a small political team to lead negotiations (see“Regional Approaches”).After a long-running dispute with the governmentof Chad, MINURCAT will close in December2010. Early this year, the Congolese governmentcalled for the UN to withdraw troops by mid-2011.

58 | Mission ReviewsChild in a rebel camp in the north-eastern Central African Republic,22 February 2010.Although this is unlikely to happen, the UN’s presencein the region may increasingly rest on politicalmissions rather than peacekeeping forces.BONUCA/BINUCAThe UN has maintained a peacebuilding office inCAR since 2000. Known by its French acronymBONUCA, this was established to replace a UNpeacekeeping operation (MINURCA), which haditself been deployed in 1998 to replace an inter-African force. These sequential deployments hadbeen aimed at stabilizing the country after a seriesof mutinies by unpaid soldiers in 1996 threatenedto plunge the country into civil war.Although MINURCA oversaw electionsthat reaffirmed the incumbent civilian president,Pierre Holtz/UNICEFAnge-Félix Patassé, in office it was clear that CAR’sfuture stability was not guaranteed. BONUCA wascharged with supporting the government, promotinghuman rights and continuing security sector reformsinitiated by MINURCA – from the beginning, themission included a small number of uniformedmilitary and police personnel for this task.Civil-military relations remained tense. T<strong>here</strong>were attempted coups in 2001 and 2002. In February2003, General François Bozizé succeeded inseizing power while President Patassé was abroad.Although Bozizé enjoyed the support of Frenchtroops and a small sub-regional peacekeeping force,he faced significant disorder in the north-west of thecountry (w<strong>here</strong> Patassé loyalists mingled with localresistance groups) and in the north-east (affectedby a spillover of violence from neighboring Chadand Darfur). This worsened in 2004-6, with largenumbers of refugees flowing from north-east CARinto Chad amid rumors of severe violence by rebelsand government forces against civilians.BONUCA’s ability to affect the course of theseconflicts was slight. In 2005, it supported electionswon (fairly, by most accounts) by Bozizé. The headof mission Lamine Cissé was also involved in mediatingspecific crises as they arose. But BONUCA’sefforts at security sector reform proved limited –by mid-2005, it had trained fewer than 500 policeand gendarmes, and the army remained small andirregularly-paid.When, at the end of 2006, President Bozizéagreed to hold a national political dialogue in an

Central Africa | 59The Lord’s Resistance Army 1In December 2006, the outgoing UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Joaquim Chissano – formerPresident of Mozambique – as his Special Envoy for the LRA-Affected Areas. The Lord’s Resistance Army,formed in the late 1980s, is a militia with an appalling record on human rights abuses, initially in northern Uganda.In 2006-7, it seemed possible that the Government of South Sudan might be able to broker a peace agreementbetween Uganda and the LRA, and Chissano co-chaired talks in Juba, Sudan.The talks were unsteady from the beginning – although Chissano is credited with having played an important roll inensuring that they did not break down very early. Nonetheless, the situation in northern Uganda did improve somewhatthrough 2007. This was in part because the LRA used the lull of the talks to relocate to north-east DRC. Inmid-2008, however, the talks foundered on the fears of the LRA’s leader Joseph Kony that he could be sent beforethe International Criminal Court, which had issued his arrest warrant in 2005.In November 2008, Chissano and his south Sudanese counterpart issued an ultimatum calling for Kony to returnto negotiations by the end of the month. Kony did not comply, and Ugandan forces launched a large-scalemilitary offensive against the LRA in the north-east DRC. This mission had Congolese permission, and the LRAwent into retreat. Though Chissano’s mandate was set to run through December 2009, the Secretary-General choseto suspend the Envoy as of June 30, 2009, in response to Kony’s lack of cooperation with the process. He indicatedthat any dramatic shift in LRA policy might alter this choice.This success was only temporary, however. The LRA continues to operate on Congolese territory, and is anincreasingly frightening presence in south-eastern CAR. It also has a growing presence in southern Sudan on theborder with the DRC and CAR. The UN estimates that it has driven 25,000 people from their homes in 2010. TheLRA thus has the potential to destabilize these three countries, all of which face other internal threats. While theUS government has committed to draft a strategy for dealing with the movement, it threatens to be a dangerousfactor in the region’s politics for years to come.1 This account of negotiations with the LRA follows Ronald R. Atkinson, “From Uganda to the Congo and Beyond: Pursuing theLord’s Resistance Army,” International Peace Institute, 2009.effort to resolve the multiple crises facing CAR,the lead role in designing the process fell to theHenri Dunant <strong>Center</strong>, a conflict-mediation NGO.BONUCA took a supporting role, although themission took credit for hammering out final detailsin 2008.BONUCA also surprised some observers inearly 2008 by publishing a report on human rightsthat was highly critical of abuses by the army (someindependent analysts even argued that it was toosoft on rebel actions). When the dialogue beganin December 2008, it appeared to reduce tensions,although the government was not keen to follow up.In 2008, the EU deployed troops to the northeastof CAR as part of a joint operation with theUN in Chad. The security situation in the northeastimproved but remained precarious. Thesub-regional peacekeeping force was also strengthened.In 2009, former President Patassé returnedto the CAR and met with Bozizé, apparently oncordial terms.Special Envoy, LRA-Affected AreasAuthorization Date 30 November 2006(UNSC Letter S/2009/930)Start Date 30 June 2009Special Envoy Joaquim Chissano(Mozambique)Budget$1.8 million(1 January 2009-31 December 2009)Strength as of International Civilian: 522 September 2008 Local Civilian: 1For detailed mission information see p. 174T<strong>here</strong> were simultaneous calls for an overhaul ofBONUCA, which was accused – in the words of theInternational Crisis Group – of being weak in “research,analysis and the development of policy lines.” 1In May 2008, the Security Council requested thePeacebuilding Commission (PBC) to consider policyoptions for CAR. Belgium led the commission’s

60 | Mission ReviewsUN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)UN Photo/Sylvain LiechtiAuthorization Date 25 October 2006(UNSC Res. 1719)Start Date 1 January 2007ERSGCharles Petrie (UK/France)Deputy ERSG Bintou Keita (Guinea)Budget$46.3 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 117early 2010 Local Civilian: 243Military Experts on Mission: 5Police: 8UN Volunteers: 47ERSG Youssef Mahmoud comes out of a UN helicopter during a visit in Gitega.For detailed mission information see p. 144efforts to develop a new approach, and in May 2009,the PBC adopted a new strategy for CAR focusingon (i) security sector reform; (ii) governance andthe rule of law; and (iii) attempting to stimulate theeconomy through local development initiatives. 2On 1 January 2010, BONUCA was turnedinto an integrated mission – with the acronymBINUCA – with the goal of better coordinating theUN’s activities in CAR. The transition was complicatedby slow progress in filling senior posts, butthe primary challenge proved to be preparing fornational elections scheduled for the spring of 2010.The first round of voting was pushed back fromApril to May and then to October. These delays areseen as having advantaged opposition parties, andPresident Bozizé has publicly accused BINUCA ofpressuring him to delay the process. The Belgianambassador to the UN reportedly warned the PBCthat “other areas of the country’s peacebuildingprocess have been largely ignored or forgotten inthe meantime.” 3CAR’s government has raised particularconcerns about slow progress in demobilizingrebel groups, on which BINUCA is workingwith military monitors deployed by other centralAfrican governments. The challenges toCAR are exacerbated by two security problems.The first is the forthcoming closure of MINUR-CAT. Although t<strong>here</strong> have only been about 300MINURCAT personnel in CAR, their presenceis generally considered to have been a stabilizingfactor to date. While the UN Secretariat mootedthe possibility of keeping a peacekeeping forcein CAR, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon insteadsuggested to the Security Council that the emphasisshould be on strengthening CAR’s security forces.The second major security issue has been theinfiltration of the Lord’s Resistance Army – pushedout of Uganda and eastern DRC – into south-eastCAR in 2008. The NGOs Human Rights Watchand Enough estimate that the LRA has killed some2,500 people and abducted nearly 700 children inCAR and the DRC in the last eighteen months.BINUCA has also highlighted this crisis, reportingthat thousands of civilians have been displaced.BINUCA faces gigantic immediate securityand political challenges, to say nothing of theunderlying development and governance issueshighlighted by the PBC. While based on one ofthe longest-running UN political missions, its workhas hardly begun – and the context for achieving itsstated goals is deteriorating. It remains to be seen ifthe Security Council and regional powers will giveit the long-term support it needs to stabilize CAR.BINUBIn late 2006, the Security Council mandated apeacebuilding office in Burundi (BINUB) toreplace a peacekeeping force (ONUB) deployed inmid-2004. ONUB took over military duties from apeace operation deployed by the African Union in2003 to oversee a ceasefire between the governmentand rebel force and assist with national elections.The elections went smoothly but the newpresident, Pierre Nkurunziza, believed that ONUB

Central Africa | 61had been too close to his political opponents, andasked for the mission to leave.BINUB took over many of ONUB’s non-militaryduties on 1 January 2007. It was also chargedwith overseeing a ceasefire between the governmentand Palipehutu-FNL, the last major rebel group,signed in October 2006. A South African contingentfrom ONUB remained in Burundi to providesecurity. It was decided that Burundi would be oneof the first countries put on the PBC’s agenda, andit agreed to a country strategy in June 2007.The political situation in Burundi was notpromising. Talks between President Nkurunziza’sgovernment and the FNL broke down in thesecond quarter of the year, and t<strong>here</strong> was heavyfighting between FNL factions in September 2007.BINUB had only an observer status in the talks,and a South African mediator led efforts to calmmatters. In April and May 2008, government forcesand the FNL returned to hostilities, which lastedone month. Over the course of the year, the FNLand government resolved their differences, and inJanuary 2009 the FNL turned itself into a “normal”political party.Following this success, Uganda, Tanzaniaand South Africa (the leading members of thelong-standing Regional Initiative for Burundi)announced the creation of a Partnership for Peacein Burundi (PPB). This involved the three countriesas well as BINUB – additionally tasked with actingas the new entities’ secretariat – and the InternationalConference for the Great Lakes Region. ThePPB’s goals were to prepare the way for electionsscheduled for 2010 and assist in rehabilitatingrestive former FNL fighters.The optimism of early 2009 eroded as the2010 elections approached. In late 2009, Burundi’sgovernment requested that the UN replace theExecutive Representative of the Secretary-General,Youssef Mahmoud. Although government spokesmeninsisted this was a routine request, they did notdeny that they felt Mahmoud had been too criticalof the authorities and too lax on the opposition.As the polls approached, a steady stream of violentincidents – often involving the radical youth wingsof the competing parties – added to internationalconcerns, especially as the police did little to haltthe violence.On 1 June 2010, the main opposition candidatescompeting with President Nkurunziza for theUN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (left) is met by Yves Sahinguvu, First VicePresident of the Republic of Burundi, as he arrives in Burundi capital Bujumbura.presidency – including FNL leader AgathonRwasa – withdrew, citing intimidation and fraud.UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visitedBurundi just over a week later and urged all partiesto move forward with the electoral process.The Security Council made a statement to thesame effect. The President ran unopposed at theend of the month, gaining nearly 92% of votes cast.Although t<strong>here</strong> were violent incidents around thepresidential poll, they did not escalate as severely assome analysts feared. In August, dissatisfied membersof the FNL voted Agathon Rwasa out of officeas party leader.BINUB thus continues to face a troubled politicalclimate, in which a consensual political process isnot yet secure. The mission has also had to contendwith the managerial challenges of acting as the primaryconduit between Burundi’s government andthe Peacebuilding Commission and PeacebuildingSupport Fund (PBF), both new elements of theUN system. Two recent reviews of BINUB’s performancein this regard highlight that both BINUBand the government faced a “steep learning curve”in dealing with these new mechanisms, especially asBINUB struggled to find staff to evaluate projects. 5Nonetheless, the Peacebuilding Fund disbursed$35 million on 17 projects in Burundi betweenearly 2007 and late 2009. While it has been arguedthat some of these met short-term needs ratherthan serving long-term strategic peace consolidation,some projects clearly did help foster stabilityin difficult political times. These include initiativesto improve military morale and increase theUN Photo

62 | Mission Reviewsaccountability of the intelligence services. However,some projects stumbled due to basic oversights – inone case, the distribution of new police uniformsfailed to boost morale as the clothing was very poor.Regional ApproachesWhile both BINUB and BINUCA are engaged in thespecific problems of strengthening unstable politicalsystems, the UN and other international organizationscontinue to explore regional approaches tostabilizing Central Africa. From 2002 to 2006, IbrahimaFall of Senegal acted as the Secretary-General’sSpecial Representative for the Great Lakes Region.As such, he was involved in the creation of the InternationalConference for the Great Lakes Region.This grouping, developed under the auspices of theUN and AU, was meant to create a legal frameworkfor regional diplomacy, in some ways comparableto the Conference on Security and Cooperation inEurope (forerunner of the OSCE).Ban Ki-moon did not replace Fall as SpecialRepresentative for the Great Lakes, but in December2008 he appointed Olesegun Obasanjo SpecialEnvoy for the Great Lakes Region, albeit with avery different brief. The eastern DRC had beenshaken by a successful offensive by the CongrèsNational Pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) ledby Laurent Nkunda. The UN peacekeeping force(MONUC) had been involved in Congolese armyoperations against the CNDP and was now at amilitary disadvantage. A range of powers, includingthe US, France and Britain, became involved inmediation efforts.It was widely recognized that Rwanda was keyto any settlement in the eastern DRC. Obasanjoand his co-facilitator Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzaniaopened up communications between theCongolese government, General Nkunda andRwanda. Obasanjo initially conducted shuttlediplomacy in the field, but an office staffed by officialsfrom the UN Department of Political Affairs(DPA) was set up to support his efforts withMkapa. Nkunda was arrested in a joint DRC-Rwandan operation, and on 23 March 2009 theCongolese government and new CNDP leadershipsigned a peace agreement. The Nairobi officecontinued to function until June 2010, and theSpecial Envoy on the Great Lakes RegionAuthorization Date 29 October 2008(S/PRST/2008/40)Start Date 1 January 2010Special Envoy Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria)Co-facilitator Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania)Budget$3.0 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 51 January 2010mediators devised a range of agreements aimed atreducing violence and assisting the vulnerable ineastern DRC.The European Union has also had a SpecialRepresentative (EUSR) for the Great Lakes Regionsince 1996. This post was held from its inceptionto 2007 by Aldo Ajello, a former senior UN official,and since then by Roland van de Geer. Whilethe post’s mandate was initially very broad – tohelp mediate the regional wars of the late 1990s– it gradually became more focused on the peacebuildingprocess in the DRC. This was reinforcedwhen the EU sent a series of military, police andSSR missions to the DRC – although the EUSRdoes not have command responsibility for these, heis meant to provide political guidance. Additionally,the EUSR is mandated to support stability inBurundi, Rwanda and Uganda and interact withthe International Conference for the Great LakesRegion. The mandate was updated in 2007 toinclude, among other tasks, contributing to theefforts to deal with the LRA. While a numberof EUSRs’ mandates will end shortly, Europeangovernments decided to extend that for the GreatLakes.The UN Department of Political Affairs hasargued that it should maintain a regional approachto central Africa by setting up an office in the regioncomparable to UNOWA in Dakar (see p. 207).UN officials suggest that this should be a relativelyfocused set-up, with a strong envoy backed by asmall political team. This proposal has been debatedat length in New York in 2010, and althoughit encountered some skepticism from SecurityCouncil members, has finally been approved.

Central Africa | 63ConclusionCentral Africa and the Great Lakes face manifoldunresolved security threats, from the continuingactivities of the LRA to the possibility ramificationsof violence in southern Sudan after the 2011referendum on independence t<strong>here</strong>. The structuresof democratic governance are still evolving acrossthe region, with frequent setbacks. The overallnumber of peacekeepers in the region (possiblyexcluding Sudan) is likely to decline in the yearsahead – potentially increasing demand for effectivepolitical missions to take on some of theirduties. BINUB and BINUCA both still havemany problems to resolve. But they may well bethe prelude to a new growth of political missionsin central Africa.notes1 International Crisis Group, “Central African Republic: Keeping the Dialogue Alive: Crisis Group Africa BriefingN°69,” 12 January 2010, 10.2 See Security Council Report, “Central African Republic: Monthly Forecast,” June 2009.3 J. Brouillaud, “CAR Configuration and Security Council Meet to Discuss Elections and Chairman’s Visit toBangui,” Institute for Global Policy, 7 July 2010.4 See Shepard Forman, Gigja Sorenson and Rahul Chandran, “A Field-based Review of the PeacebuildingCommission in Burundi,” <strong>Center</strong> on International Cooperation, 2010; and Susanna Campbell, with LeonardKayobera and Justine Nkurunziza, “Independent External Evaluation: Peacebuilding Fund Projects in Burundi,”Peacebuilding Fund, 2010.

Western Balkans | 653.4 M i s s i o n R e v i e w sWestern BalkansThe Western Balkans have been a testing-groundfor a huge range of political missions since theearly 1990s. These have ranged from light-weightcivilian monitoring missions meant to help containthe Yugoslav wars to long-serving presences taskedwith promoting good governance, fair elections,minority rights and economic rehabilitation.These long-term presences were usuallydeployed to support or replace peacekeepers.The large military forces that stabilized the regionhave now downsized, while some internationalcivilian missions are likely to remain in place for aconsiderable time.Today, two organizations have prominentpolitical missions in the Balkans. The Organizationfor Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)maintains field presences in Albania and all the formerconstituent parts of Yugoslavia except Slovenia(its presence in Croatia, however, is now an office inZagreb and will not be discussed <strong>here</strong>).Some of these presences remain sizeable. TheOSCE is mandated to keep 199 international civilianstaff in Kosovo – 10% more than the UN hasdeployed across Iraq.The second major institutional player is theEuropean Union. The EU has peacekeepers inBosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and policemenin Kosovo, w<strong>here</strong> European troops also providethe bulk of NATO’s military presence (KFOR).The European Commission has established anextremely significant presence – and financialleverage – across the region.The EU has also appointed Special Representatives(EUSRs) to BiH, the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo.Each of these figures also has responsibility forsome sort of field presence, although these arenot straightforward European political missions.The EUSR in BiH also serves as the InternationalHigh Representative, answering to a PeaceImplementation Council of fifty-five countries andorganizations. 1 The EUSR in Kosovo is similarlydouble-hatted as the International Civilian Representative(ICR, answering to a Steering Group of28 countries that recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty).The EUSR in FYROM has also acted as the headof the European Commission’s delegation t<strong>here</strong>since late 2005.In addition to the OSCE and EU, the UN hasa residual presence in the Western Balkans. TheUN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo(UNMIK), having had executive authority and alarge civilian police arm from 1999 to 2008, has anincreasingly reduced profile.Although UNMIK is still formally a peacekeepingoperation, UN officials in Pristina often refer to it asa de facto political mission. The UN also maintainsan office in Belgrade (UNOB), technically part ofUNMIK but also following wider regional affairs.It has long been recognized that this patchworkof overlapping mandates and missions couldbe rationalized. From 2002 onwards (when theIHR in Sarajevo, Paddy Ashdown, was doublehattedas EUSR) it was commonplace to argue thatthe region’s future would be defined by its gradualabsorption into the EU. In this context, OSCEmissions were partially oriented towards helpingthe former Yugoslav states meet EU standards.

66 | Mission ReviewsEUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina/Office ofthe High Representative (OHR)Authorization Date 11 March 2002 (2002/211/CFSP)Start Date June 2002Head of Mission Valentin Inzko (Austria)BudgetEUSR: $3.1 million(1 March 2010-31 August 2010)OHR: funded by the PeaceImplementation Council (PIC),whose budget is about $12.6million (2010-2011)Strength as of International Staff: 24July 2010 (OHR) Local Staff: 144OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina(OSCE-BiH)Authorization 8 December 1995and Start Date (MC(5).DEC/1)Head of Mission Ambassador Gary D. Robbins(United States)Budget$19.9 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 691 August 2010 Local Staff: 439For detailed mission information see p. 236Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, visitsthe OHR in Sarajevo, February 2010.Successive high representatives in Sarajevo suggestedthat the EU take responsibility for Bosnianaffairs, and UNMIK officials declared that Kosovo’sfuture lay with the Union.These transitional processes have suffered aseries of set-backs in recent years. Political tensionsOHRin BiH have delayed the changeover to EU oversight.The lack of international consensus onKosovo’s status has meant that UNMIK remains inplace and has complicated the efforts of the ICR/EUSR to play a role in Serb-majority north Kosovo.These political complications have not preventedpolitical missions across the region fromdevolving increasing responsibilities to nationalauthorities. The EU is reconfiguring its own presencein the region as it consolidates its foreignpresences in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty. Themandate for the EUSR in FYROM will, for example,end next year but the EU Delegation in Skopjewill continue to play an influential role. T<strong>here</strong> istalk of a new EU super-envoy in Sarajevo to cutthrough the political impasse t<strong>here</strong>. Yet the rationalizationof the international political presence inthe Western Balkans is incomplete.Bosnia and HerzegovinaThe Office of the High Representative (OHR) inBosnia and Herzegovina and the OSCE Missionin BiH were launched following the 1995 DaytonPeace Agreement that ended the Bosnian war.Under Dayton, the High Representative is mandatedto give guidance to the civilian componentsof the international presence (including the OSCEand UN agencies) but does not have direct authorityover them. Although only answerable to thePeace Implementation Council, the High Representativeis mandated to report to the UN SecurityCouncil, the European Union, the US, Russia andother interested parties.Both missions have operated alongsidesuccessive military operations (led by NATO from1995 to 2004 and then by the EU) and police missions(led by the UN from 1995 to 2003 and theEU t<strong>here</strong>after). In 1997, the Peace ImplementationCouncil granted the High Representativepowers – known as the Bonn powers – to removeBosnian officials and impose legislation withoutreferring to national officials. In 2002, the fourthHigh Representative, the United Kingdom’s PaddyAshdown, was double-hatted as the EUSR withthe task of coordinating the EU’s various policytools in BiH more effectively. This did not, however,give him command of the EU’s police andmilitary missions. 2

Western Balkans | 67Since its foundation, OHR has been engagedwith issues ranging from refugee return to economicreconstruction. Over the last decade, the over-archingchallenge has been political: to persuade BiH’stwo post-Dayton components, the Bosnian-CroatFederation and Republika Srpska, to help build upnational-level institutions, especially in the area ofpolicing and justice. This consolidation is necessaryboth to overcome the de facto division of the countryinto two halves – which fuels talk of secessionamong top politicians in Republika Srpska – andis a precondition for progress towards inclusionin the EU.Ashdown, who used the Bonn powers far moreextensively than his predecessors, is widely creditedfor having created momentum for the consolidationof BiH as a state (although critics argued that hedisenfranchised local leaders to a dangerous extent).In 2006, Ashdown was replaced as both HighRepresentative and EUSR by German politicianChristian Schwarz-Schilling, who aimed for a lowerprofile and argued that OHR should be phasedout, affirming the EUSR as the top internationalfigure in BiH.During Schwarz-Schilling’s tenure, t<strong>here</strong> wasuneven progress on police and security sectorreforms. Although the BiH government agreedto a Stabilization and Association Agreement(SAA) with the EU in December 2007, RepublikaSrpska’s leaders continued to talk about secession.Having previously agreed to roll up OHR by June2008, the Peace Implementation Council reversedits decision in February 2008. Schwarz-Schilling’ssuccessor Miroslav Lajcak publicly complained thata “positive, constructive atmosp<strong>here</strong>, which led tothe initialing of the SAA” had deteriorated rapidly,and that “the political leadership once again took updiametrically opposed and maximalist positions.” 3In mid-2010, OHR remains in place – Lajcakwas replaced by an Austrian diplomat, Valentin

68 | Mission ReviewsInzko, in early 2009. It is a relatively small presence,with 24 international staff and 144 nationalstaff as of July 2010. While double-hatting extendsbeyond the High Representative/EUSR himself tohis cabinet, political unit, legal unit and press office,the Deputy High Representative – an Americandiplomat – is not double-hatted. Security sectorand economic issues, too, are dealt with by OHRofficials who lack an extra EU identity (t<strong>here</strong> arealso separate OHR and EUSR administrationsupport units).Tensions have persisted with Republika Srpska.In 2009, Inzko used the Bonn powers (which neitherSchwarz-Schilling nor Lajcak had utilized) to overrideproposals by the Bosnian Serb assembly to takeback powers they had ceded to the national level.Some regional experts even questioned whetherBiH might find itself on the road to renewed conflict.These concerns may have been exaggerated,but in the summer of 2010 the outgoing DeputyHigh Representative, Raffi Gregorian, complainedthat the international community lacked the will toface down the Bosnian Serb leaders.T<strong>here</strong> have been reports the EU will attempt tobreak this deadlock in the near future. The EUSR’smandate was extended for another year by Europeangovernments in July 2010. However, CatherineAshton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreignand Security Policy, is said to have considered creatinga stronger envoy in Sarajevo – with the EUtaking over OHR’s responsibilities and authority,and possibly gaining extra powers such as the rightto place sanctions on individual politicians. Thesofter approach adopted by Schwarz-Schilling maysoon be replaced by greater EU assertiveness.While OHR maintains four offices outsideSarajevo, its field presence has always been limitedrelative to that of the OSCE, which has fourteenregional offices, sixty-nine international staff andnearly 440 local personnel. The mission’s mandateis wide-ranging covering (among other issues)democratization, security issues, human rights,social and economic issues, education and community-levelpolitical engagement.The mission’s profile was highest in theimmediate post-Dayton period, when it was taskedwith supervising the first national elections. In thisperiod, the OSCE helped put in place the basic elementsof a democratic process, down to offeringpolitical parties office space and computers. It hasgradually reduced this role. In 2002, BiH authoritiesran national elections on their own, with theOSCE monitoring the process. The OSCE continuesto publish needs assessments before all Bosnianpolls and reviews the processes. In July 2010 it recommendedthat OSCE personnel observe nationalpolls the following October.The OSCE also runs a variety of technicalprojects aimed at improving parliamentary practices.Perhaps reflecting the tendentious nature ofpolitics in Sarajevo – and leveraging its field network– the OSCE has launched a series of projectspromoting municipal-level democratization acrossBiH. These have included a “beacon” scheme, aimedat highlighting particularly successful mayors andother local officials. A 2009 “Local First” schemeaims to combine support to the municipal authoritieswith work with civil society organizations,consolidating the OSCE’s range of local activities.Other OSCE activities are focused on promotingcompliance with the organization’s standards inareas like civilian oversight of security affairs. Nonetheless,t<strong>here</strong> are limits to what the organizationcan achieve through legislative advice and technicalassistance. A BiH-wide education law passedin 2003 on the basis of OSCE advice has helpedmodernize teaching, but has not ended politicalmanipulation of teaching in some areas.Overall, the persistence of deep politicaldifferences within BiH continues to present majorobstacles to both OHR and the OSCE, if in verydifferent ways at different levels. It remains to beseen whether a tougher line by the EU might breakdown these obstacles.KosovoDespite the challenges they face, the OHR and OSCEhave a fairly clear division of labor in BiH. The formerfocuses on high politics while the latter maintains agreater field presence. This is partially replicated inKosovo, but is constrained by political factors.Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independencein February 2008 complicated the efforts of the EU,OSCE and UN. Between 1999 and 2008, the threeorganizations had worked closely within the frameworkprovided by UNMIK. The OSCE Missionin Kosovo (OMiK) had made up one of UNMIK’spillars, dealing primarily with democratization,

Western Balkans | 69OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK)Authorization and 1 July 1999Start Date(PC.DEC/305)Head of Mission Ambassador Werner Almhofer(Austria)Budget$30.3 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 1661 August 2010 Local Staff: 485For detailed mission information see p. 228EUSR in Kosovo/International Civilian Office(ICO)Authorization and 4 February 2008Start Date(2008/123/CFSP)Head of Mission Pieter Feith (Netherlands)BudgetEUSR: $2.2 million(1 March 2010-31 August 2010)parliamentary and municipal affairs – although aquirk in the initial planning phase meant that it alsoset up Kosovo’s police school. The EU provided theeconomic pillar of UNMIK, but had passed on mostof its functions to Kosovo’s authorities by 2008.In 2007, UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari laidout proposals for “supervised independence” forKosovo, involving the UN’s withdrawal but continuingroles for the OSCE and EU (NATOwould also maintain a peacekeeping function).The EU planned to take over policing and justiceduties from UNMIK while an InternationalCivilian Office (ICO) would take responsibilityfor political support to the government. Ahtisaarirecommended that the International CivilianRepresentative (ICR) heading ICO should doubleas EUSR. The OSCE would “assist in themonitoring” of the settlement.This carefully-crafted plan foundered onSerbia’s refusal to countenance Kosovo’s independenceas well as the lack of consensus in the SecurityCouncil on the issue. Kosovo declared itself independentin February 2008, sparking short-lived butsignificant violence in the Serb-majority northernregion. UNMIK and OMiK announced that theywould operate on a “status neutral” basis accordingto their pre-existing mandate.While ICO planners had been based in Pristinabefore February 2008, and had already been workingclosely with Kosovo’s government, they couldhardly adopt a neutral posture as their designatedpurpose was to help build up an independent state.ICO thus proceeded on the basis of the AhtisaariPlan. This complicated the position of the ICR/EUSR Pieter Feith, as a minority of EU membersrefused to recognize Kosovo. 4Through much of 2008, the elements of theinternational presence in Kosovo appeared adrift.UNMIK focused on finding a modus vivendithat would let the EU deploy its rule of law mission(EULEX). The OSCE angered the Kosovarauthorities by publishing a critical study of theadministration of justice since the declaration ofindependence. ICO set up an office in Serb-majoritynorth Kosovo, but was pressured to leave.In late 2008, the combined efforts of the EUand UN resulted in a deal by which the EU deployedits EULEX mission on a “status neutral” basis –UNMIK shrank rapidly, moving its headquarters toa logistics base on the edge of Pristina. Since then,the various international missions in Kosovo havemaintained differing views on its status.While UNMIK keeps officials in north Kosovoworking with Serb communities, its duties are nowlargely political. UN officials have, for example,accompanied Kosovo’s representatives to regionalforums from which they would otherwise be barred.Kosovo’s leaders chafed at this. In March 2010,Prime Minister Hashim Thaci attended an informalEU-Balkans summit in Slovenia – Serbia refusedto participate because Kosovo was represented as astate rather than a UN protectorate. In June, bothsides attended an EU summit in Sarajevo, but thiswas organized so as to minimize the status issue. 5The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Lamberto Zannier, continues to speak outon ethnic tensions in Kosovo and maintain linkswith the Kosovo Serbs. The UN Office in Belgrade(UNOB), a satellite of UNMIK, facilitates thesecontacts, although the US and EU members preferto discuss Kosovo directly with the Serbs.The primary international interlocutor withKosovo’s government is now the ICR/EUSR.ICO’s initial list of priorities focused on helping thegovernment build institutions – such as the constitutionalcourt and a diplomatic service – that hadnot existed under UNMIK. Following the Ahtisaari

70 | Mission ReviewsPlan, it was also tasked with assisting a decentralizationprocess to create six new municipalities togive Serb communities increased self-governance.Officials recognized that the window of opportunityto influence Kosovo’s government was limited. ICOscored an important success in late 2009 by facilitatingan agreement between Kosovo and FYROM ontheir border. This opened the way for Macedonianrecognition of Kosovo. ICO and Kosovo’s governmentalso succeeded in laying the groundwork forfour of the six planned new municipalities in timefor local elections in mid-November 2009. Electionswere held in a fifth in July 2010. ICO officials havebeen satisfied with progress in many aspects of institution-buildingbut serious challenges remain. Oneis endemic corruption. The other is relations with theSerb-majority north.The corruption issue has gained prominencein 2010. In 2008-9, officials expressed concernthat ICO was not working closely enough withthe EU’s “status neutral” rule of law officials. Thisyear, however, the ICR has taken a tough line withthe government, telling the European Parliamentthat “weak governance, widespread corruption andbreaches in the rule of law” were holding Kosovoback. 6 Underlining the problem, EULEX policehave arrested senior government officials includingthe President of the Central Bank.Pieter Feith has also pressed the governmenton media freedoms, an issue that falls within hispurview as EUSR. In June 2010, another disputeemerged with the government over the use ofKosovo’s public pension fund. ICO has final controlover this money, which is invested abroad, andhas refused to let the government repatriate it. Thesums involved – with over €300 million abroad –are likely to ensure that this remains a sore point.ICO’s relations with north Kosovo also remaintense. In January 2010, the ICR took steps to createa new municipality in North Mitrovica – thesixth of those proposed by the Ahtisaari Plan andthe most contentious. Mitrovica, divided into Serband Albanian halves, has been the center of significantacts of violence since the declaration ofindependence. While Feith appointed a fourteenpersonMunicipality Preparation Team, Serbsreacted angrily to a leaked document laying outICO’s plans for northern Kosovo. These includednew arrangements to bring the two halves of Mitrovicacloser, the closure of the UNMIK office in thecity (often seen as pro-Serb) and a new “EU House”in the north.As the leaked paper stated, one goal of this programwas to minimize Belgrade’s influence over t<strong>here</strong>gion. ICO’s proposals were coordinated with anincrease in the EULEX presence in the north andplans by the European Commission to fund newprojects in the region, which is still reliant on subsidiesfrom Serbia. The EU House opened in March2010 and is overseen by the EU’s Official Representativefor Northern Kosovo, Italian ambassadorMichael Louis Giffoni. T<strong>here</strong> have yet to be anyelections in North Mitrovica, however, and the citysaw another spell of violent protests in the summerof 2010.ICO’s future relations with both Kosovo’sgovernment and the Serb minority thus remainuncertain. The mission’s own future may be affectedby the rationalization of EU representations underthe Lisbon Treaty. By early 2010, many ICO officialspredicted that the Office could be phasedout to make way for a consolidated EU presenceunder the EUSR. However, this is complicated bythe objections of those EU members that do notrecognize Kosovo. In July 2010, European governmentspostponed a decision on whether to renewFeith’s mandate as EUSR due to differences overICO’s activities.Status issues also continue to affect OMiK, theOSCE’s largest mission. With four regional centersin addition to its head office in Pristina, the OSCEhas prioritized maintaining visibility across Kosovo.In April 2009, the mission published an articleunderlining that the OSCE would continue to actas the “the eyes and ears of the international community”while UNMIK shrank and the EU focusedon direct support to the authorities. 7 This roleincludes monitoring of the legal system and “proactivemonitoring” of municipal authorities, whichthe OSCE helped to develop before 2008.Nonetheless, the OSCE has faced a recurringdilemma: how can it genuinely support elements ofthe emerging Kosovar state without endorsing it?This does not affect all of its activities: since February2008, OMiK has worked on problems includingtrafficking, minority education and transport rightsthat do not necessarily affect status issues. TheOSCE now provides extensive planning support toKosovo’s Central Electoral Commission, but it nolonger oversees and certifies results as it did in theUNMIK era.The OSCE had a significant role in promotingdecentralization in the UNMIK period, and continuesto work closely with municipal authorities.

Western Balkans | 71OSCE officials, especially those who enjoy goodrelations with Serb communities, have performeduseful roles in quietly facilitating communicationsover tense issues since February 2008. One area inwhich ICO and the OSCE share clear commonconcerns is the politicization of the media, whichOMiK has also raised publicly.OMiK has thus played a version of the broadmonitoring role foreseen in the Ahtisaari proposals,although in far more constrained circumstances.The broader question facing ICO, OMiK andUNMIK is whether they can continue to maintaincordial working relations with Kosovo’s governmentwhile also holding it to account over corruption.The International Court of Justice’s July 2010 decisionthat Kosovo’s declaration of independence wasnot illegal will have emboldened those politicianswho would like to govern the nascent state with lessinternational interference – or no interference at all.Other missions in the regionAlthough the international presence in the WesternBalkans remains centered on BiH and Kosovo,t<strong>here</strong> are significant political missions in Albania,FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia. The OSCEPresence in Albania – with nearly 100 staffers andfour offices in addition to its headquarters in Tirana –is primarily focused on direct support to governmentministries and municipal authorities. It is involved intechnical projects ranging from environmental affairsto border management. Some of the projects are ona considerable scale, such as the creation of a newnational registration system costing over €2 million.In the last two years the OSCE has also assisted thegovernment initiate a program to destroy large quantitiesof ammunition and rocket fuel left over fromthe Communist era – although a political mission,the OSCE Presence thus also draws on the organization’sexpertise in conventional military affairs, builtup following the Cold War.T<strong>here</strong> is no EUSR or EU security mission inAlbania, but the OSCE has worked alongside asizeable European Commission presence, whichhas dealt not only with political issues but alsowith police reform. Albania’s connection to Euro-Atlantic security structures deepened further in2009 when it became a member of NATO. Concernswere raised, however, when the oppositionOSCE Presence in AlbaniaAuthorization and 27 March 1997Start Date(PC.DEC/160)Head of Mission Ambassador Robert Bosch(Netherlands)Budget$4.4 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 211 August 2010 Local Staff: 74For detailed mission information see p. 277EUSR for the Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedoniaAuthorization and 29 June 2001Start Date(2001/492/CFSP)Head of Mission Erwan Fouéré (Ireland)Budget$.4 million(1 April 2010-31 August 2010)OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to SkopjeAuthorization Date 14 August 1992(15-CSO/Journal No. 2, Annex 1)Start Date September 1992Head of Mission Ambassador Jose-Luis Herrero(Spain)Budget$11.0 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 541 August 2010 Local Staff: 145For detailed mission information see p. 281Socialist party decided to boycott parliament aftercontroversial elections in mid-2009. The boycottended in May after the European Commissionand European Parliament offered to mediate. Thedispute remains unsettled.In FYROM, the EU and OSCE continue tooversee the Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed bythe Macedonian government and ethnic Albanianleaders in 2001. The OSCE’s Spillover MonitorMission in Skopje predates the Ohrid agreement byalmost a decade – the first monitors were deployedin 1992, “spilling over” from Yugoslavia.

72 | Mission ReviewsOSCE Mission to MontenegroAuthorization and 29 June 2006Start Date(PC.DEC/732)Head of Mission Ambassador Paraschiva Badescu(Romania)Budget$3.2 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 131 August 2010 Local Staff: 32For detailed mission information see p. 258OSCE Mission to SerbiaAuthorization Date 11 January 2001 (PC.DEC/401,as the OSCE Mission to theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia)Start Date 29 June 2006Renamed the OSCE Missionto Serbia (PC.DEC/733)Head of Mission Ambassador Dimitrios Kypreos(Greece)Budget$10.6 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 341 August 2010 Local Staff: 124For detailed mission information see p. 261The mission was expanded significantly afterthe Ohrid Agreement was devised to end thelow-level Albanian-Macedonian conflict. NATOdeployed peacekeepers, while the OSCE’s immediatetask was to manage the redeployment ofpolice into Albanian areas and to train 1,000 new“non-majority” officers. It completed this processin 2003, when the EU deployed a police monitoringmission to FYROM, also taking over militaryduties from NATO. Nonetheless, tensions overpolicing in Albanian areas did not subside completely,and the OSCE continues to support policetraining and rule of law reform.While the EU’s military and police deploymentsin 2003 were early tests of the organization’speacekeeping potential, it had already appointed aEUSR for FYROM during the Ohrid negotiations.In the immediate post-Ohrid period, t<strong>here</strong> werefrequent turf-wars between the EU police missionand European Commission officials. In 2005 it wasdecided to double-hat the EUSR as the head of theCommission delegation, and in 2006 the EU’s policetraining activities were transferred to the Commission.The EU’s presence in FYROM morphed intosomething close to an integrated political mission.Both the EUSR and OSCE Head of Missionare members of a “principals committee,” which alsoincludes the US ambassador and NATO’s headquartersin Skopje, left in place after the transfer ofpeacekeeping duties to the EU in 2003. The committee,chaired by the EUSR, makes frequent jointstatements on FYROM’s affairs. In April 2010, thecommittee members warned of widespread “talkof separatism, conflict, abandonment of the OhridFramework Agreement” and a weakening of politicaldialogue, reflecting a growing sense of renewedinter-ethnic unease. 8 This was exacerbated in Mayafter the International Criminal Tribunal for theformer Yugoslavia upheld a 12-year prison sentencefor a Macedonian policeman involved in the 2001conflict. The OSCE has also raised concerns aboutMacedonian policy towards minority education,and the government’s relations with opposition partiesof all ethnic backgrounds are strained.In August, the EU, OSCE, NATO and USreleased a more conciliatory statement on the ninthanniversary of the Ohrid Agreement, but stillemphasized the need to ensure “further measuresin the fields of equitable representation, decentralizationand education.” 9 With elections slated for2012, FYROM may well experience further tensions.It has been decided that the EUSR’s mandatewill end in February 2011, but the EU Delegationand OSCE will still have a challenging role to playensuring stability.The OSCE’s missions in Montenegro andSerbia were originally one operation, founded in2001, but split in two when the countries dividedin 2006. They are also unusual for OSCE missionsin the region in that they were not launched to preventa war or restore peace in a post-conflict setting.Instead, the original mission’s main goal was to helpSerbia and Montenegro consolidate democracyafter the fall of Slobodan Milosevic.

Western Balkans | 73Men wave EU and Macedonian flags in front of the Macedonian governmentbuilding in Skopje, 14 October 2009.The mission in Belgrade has also become heavilyinvolved in reforming Serbia’s police, and it hasa number of offices around the country focused onthis task. Since 2006, it has been intimately involvedin the creation of a new basic policy training schoolin Sremska Kamenica, and plays a role in effortsto combat organized crime, working both with theSerbian authorities and NGOs. The mission hasalso supported the government conduct war crimestrials, an initiative coordinated with similar OSCEactivities across the region (the OSCE Office inZagreb, which replaced a much more extensive missionto Croatia, has monitoring war crimes cases asit residual priority).The Mission to Serbia also maintains anoffice in the Sandjak, a Bosniak-majority area ofsouth Serbia, which has sometimes been cited as aOgnen Teofilovskipotential focus for any future ethnic tensions. Themission in Montenegro is relatively small (with 13international staff compared to 34 in Serbia) butworks in similar areas. It is also involved in a policetraining school, and supports rule of law initiativesand democratization. Significant challenges remain,especially in combating Montenegro’s organizedcrime networks.ConclusionInternational political missions remain a significantelement in the governance of countries in t<strong>here</strong>gion. They are also involved in cross-regionalinitiatives on problems such as remaining refugeecommunities. How long will this last? Some Balkangovernments believe that they will not be able tomove towards EU membership while still hostingOSCE presences. However, the region’s progresstowards the EU is likely to remain uncertain – onlyCroatia is on track for membership in the Union inthe near term.Moreover, tensions in BiH, FYROM and northKosovo have convinced many outside policy-makersthat it would be a mistake to cut back the internationalpresence in the region too soon. It is possiblethat the EU’s ongoing overhaul of its institutionalpresence across the Balkans will create a new frameworkfor stability. Regardless, much work remains.notes1 The Peace Implementation Council is charged with implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement.2 The heads of these missions report directly to Brussels, although the EUSR is mandated to give them politicalguidance.3 Miroslav Lajčák, “Press conference by the High Representative Miroslav Lajčák following the PeaceImplementation Council Steering Board session in Brussels,” 27 February 2008, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressb/default.asp?content_id=41353.4 The non-recognizing members of the EU are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.5 The conference followed the EU’s “gymnich” format, which involves private meetings and no final statementapproved by all participants.6 “Kosovo bank leader arrested in corruption probe.” CNN, 23 July 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/07/23/kosovo.corruption.arrest/index.html.

74 | Mission Reviews7 “OSCE Mission in Kosovo steers steady course in changing environment.” OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 7 April2009, http://www.osce.org/kosovo/item_2_37167.html.8 “Joint statement by the Heads of Mission of the EU, NATO, OSCE and the United States in Skopje.” OSCESpillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, 27 April 2010, http://www.osce.org/skopje/item_1_43658.html.9 “Joint statement by the EU Special Representative, the NATO HQ Skopje Commander, the Head of the OSCEMission to Skopje and the US Ambassador.” OSCE Website, 12 August 2010, http://www.osce.org/item/45757.html.

Afghanistan | 753.5M i s s i o n R e v i e w sAfghanistanFew political missions have come undersuch intense scrutiny as the UN AssistanceMission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The overallinternational strategy in Afghanistan has been thetopic of increasingly heated debate in the last twoyears, and UNAMA’s relationships with the Afghangovernment and its opponents have both beenquestioned. With little clarity over the mediumand long-term future of US and NATO forcesin the country, UNAMA’s own future cannot becompletely certain. However, over the last year, theUN has made efforts to reconfigure and revitalizethe nine-year old mission.UNAMA’s ability to monitor and affect Afghanaffairs is complicated by a deteriorating security situation.By January 2010, security incidents were 40 percent higher than the previous year. While the majorityof the incidents occurred in the south and east ofthe country, the insurgency has managed to spreadits activities into areas previously considered stable.The brunt of the conflict has been borne by the civilianpopulation, with a total of 2,412 civilian deathsrecorded in 2009 1 and 1,271 recorded in the first sixmonths of 2010. 2 The deterioration in the securityenvironment has also resulted in reduced freedom ofmovement for civil servants and UN officials.The rising violence did not stop presidentialelections in 2009. The polls proved extremely controversial,but President Hamid Karzai ultimatelysecured a second term. In January 2010, the Britishgovernment hosted an international conferenceon Afghanistan with the participation of over 70states and organizations. The resulting communiquéhighlighted the “goals of greater AfghanOpening of a new provincial office in Sar-i-Pul province, 9 May 2009.Leadership, increased Regional Cooperation andmore effective International Partnership.” 3 Theparticipants foresaw a gradual transfer of responsibilitiesfrom international agencies and forces tothe Afghan government, although they reaffirmedthat UNAMA remained “the primary internationalorganization for coordinating international support”in the meantime.At the end of 2009, the Special Representativeof the Secretary-General, Kai Eide, announced hisintention to leave his post in early 2010. Prior tothe London conference, Ban Ki-moon announcedthat Staffan de Mistura, the former head of theUN Assistance Mission in Iraq (see p. 83) wouldreplace Eide. De Mistura has been responsible forUN Photo/Fardin Waezi

76 | Mission ReviewsUN Assistance Mission inAfghanistan (UNAMA)Authorization 28 March 2002and Start Date (UNSC Res. 1401)SRSGStaffan de Mistura (Sweden)Deputy SRSG Martin Kobler (Germany) andRobert Watkins (Canada)Budget$241.9 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as International Civilian: 338of early 2010 Local Civilian: 1,336Military Experts on Mission: 16UN Volunteers: 43For detailed mission information see p. 177EUSR for Afghanistan (EUSRA)Authorization Date 10 December 2001(2001/875/CFSP)Start Date December 2001Head of Mission Vygaudas Ušackas (Lithuania)Budget$3.3 million(1 April 2010-31 August 2010)reorienting UNAMA to support the focus on transferringresponsibilities to the Afghans.BackgroundFollowing the fall of the Taliban regime, a numberof prominent Afghan leaders came together underUN auspices in Bonn, Germany, in December 2001.Their goal was to establish a permanent Afghangovernment. The Bonn Agreement establisheda transitional government led by Hamid Karzai,and prescribed the drafting of a new constitutionand the holding of elections. In March 2002, theSecurity Council established UNAMA to supportthe political objectives of the Bonn Agreement,coordinate humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstructionactivities and mediate disputes.The 2004 presidential elections saw Karzaidemocratically elected as president of Afghanistan.Eleven months later, in September 2005, a new Parliamentand Provincial Councils were elected. Thismarked the end of the transitional administrationand the conclusion of the Bonn Process. The UNSecurity Council and the new Afghan governmentagreed on various sectors that would shape anew mandate for UNAMA and guide its variousactivities. Its mandated tasks have evolved over thecourse of the post-Bonn period and today includecooperation with the International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF), political outreach throughoutthe country and promoting regional cooperationto help stabilize Afghanistan. The mission is alsomandated to provide good offices in support ofAfghan-led reconciliation programs and supportefforts to improve governance and the rule of law.Coordinating humanitarian aid and monitoringhuman rights remain priorities, as is supporting theelectoral process through the Independent ElectionCommission of Afghanistan. UNAMA’s mandateis renewed annually in March.UNAMA is headquartered at two mainlocations in Kabul and as an integrated mission hastwo substantive pillars under the overall leadership ofthe SRSG. Pillar I focuses on political activities andis headed by the Deputy SRSG and Pillar II workson reconstruction, relief and development issuesand is headed by another Deputy SRSG who alsofunctions as the Resident Coordinator and ResidentHumanitarian Coordinator. UNAMA has eightregional offices in Kandahar, Gardez (Paktia), Jalalabad(Nangahar), Herat, Mazar-i Sharif (Balkh),Kunduz, Kabul and Bamiyan as well as 15 provincialoffices. UNAMA also has liaison offices in Tehran,Islamabad and Ashgabat. A back office for administrativetasks is being established in Kuwait.Despite UNAMA’s integrated structure andcoordination role t<strong>here</strong> are few practical examplesof broad based institutional cooperation. In addition,coordination of priorities between UNAMA’sheadquarters and its liaison and regional officespose challenges as priorities and needs among theoffices may differ significantly. Communicationand coordination within the mission itself is sometimesproblematic, as a top-level split over theconduct of the 2009 Afghan elections made clear(see “electoral politics” below).UNAMA’s mandate was revised in March 2010to reflect the conclusions of the London conference.SRSG de Mistura has aimed to streamlinethe mission’s activities, arguing that “we cannotcover everything, and if we did, we would not beable to make a difference.” 4 His focus is on the “3+1

Afghanistan | 77Security Council Sanctions Committees and Panels of ExpertsSanctions Committees and Panels of Experts are part of the UN budgetary category “Special Political Missions,”which covers a broad range of missions that in their functions go beyond the purely political. Because SanctionsCommittees and Panels of Experts are distinctly different from the other types of missions that fall under thiscategory, this volume does not include information on all Committees or Panels. Instead, it provides informationonly on those entities that work closely with a political mission covered in this volume. 1Sanctions are one tool available to the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that the Councilcan enforce against states or other entities that threaten international peace and security. During the years of theCold War the Security Council rarely made use of this tool, imposing sanctions only twice, once on Rhodesia in1966 and then on South Africa a decade later. However, the end of this era brought about a steep increase in theCouncil’s use of sanctions and initiated a debate on their effectiveness that still lingers today.The 1990 comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq that included a ban on all trade with Iraq as well asan embargo on its oil exports were particularly scrutinized and became the focal point for intensified assessmentof sanctions regimes as a whole. The restriction of the flow of goods into the country had devastating effectson the population while leaving the regime largely untouched, clearly missing the purpose of the sanctions. Oneoutcome of the debates around the Iraq sanctions was that the Council moved from comprehensive to “targeted”sanctions, which limit embargoes to specific commodities and natural resources, such as arms and diamonds,as well as travel bans, freezing of assets or diplomatic restrictions, with the intention of confining the effects toregime leaders or culpable entities.As the sanctions regimes increased in numbers and complexity, so too did the need to adequately monitortheir implementation and compliance. In order to oversee implementation of its sanctions, the Security Councilestablished so-called Sanctions Committees, composed of representatives of the Council. The SanctionsCommittees are tasked to monitor developments related to the sanction regimes and make recommendationsto the Council on how to counter sanction violations or on listing or delisting specific commodities or persons onsanction lists.In August 2010, for example, the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee completed a two-year reviewof 488 individuals and entities on the Committee’s sanction list. The Committee had been criticized for listingindividuals who have since deceased or are wrongly listed. In an effort to create incentives for insurgents to join thegovernment, Afghanistan too exerted pressure on the Committee to remove Taliban names from the list. Despiteinitial opposition by Russia, who is represented on the committee, 45 names were deleted from the list, including10 Taliban and 35 Al-Qaida fighters as well as 14 further individuals and 21 firms or other organizations. 2In their work, Sanctions Committees are often supported by Panels of Experts 3 that operate independently from theUN Secretariat but are institutionally attached to the UN Department of Political Affairs, which primarily providesadministrative support. These small teams of experts conduct in-depth investigations into cases of sanctionviolations and propose ways to combat them, which inform the Sanctions Committees’ reports to the Council.Increasingly, the Sanctions Committees and Expert Panels cooperate with field-based UN political or peacekeepingmissions, who can provide them with analysis on specific situations or can engage in monitoring activities. 4Once sanctions are imposed, their proper implementation and compliance is essential in order for them to servetheir purpose. Monitoring sanction regimes and investigating “sanction busting” activities t<strong>here</strong>fore is crucial.However, Panels of Experts often face considerable obstacles to their work. Sanctions are most often imposedon countries or entities in countries that are in or emerging from conflict and are already plagued by severegovernance and security failures. Weak institutional capacities, porous borders, and a lack of resources necessaryfor monitoring or enforcing sanctions pose considerable challenges to effective sanction implementation. Inaddition, t<strong>here</strong> are concerns about a lack of involvement and ownership of non-Council members in processesrelating to sanction regimes, which can lead to variability in sanction implementation. Indeed, while only theSecurity Council votes to implement sanctions, the entire UN membership is required to comply and to enforcethem. 5 Lastly, Sanctions Committees and Expert Panels are formed on an ad-hoc basis with renewable mandates

78 | Mission ReviewsSecurity Council Sanctions Committees and Panels of Experts (Continued)lasting for several months. The ad-hoc arrangement means that t<strong>here</strong> is no institutional home that would allowfor a permanent sanction monitoring presence and/or follow-up to situations after an expert panel concludes itswork, further limiting the long-term impact of sanctions.Sanctions Committees and Panels of Experts constitute an important mechanism in sanction implementation andmonitoring. In their reports Panels of Experts often address a country’s underlying socio-economic problems,calling attention to crucial governance deficits and recommending steps for the international community toaddress these issues. In addition, greater involvement of peace missions in the Expert Panels’ work may leadto increased regional inter-mission cooperation on issues such as border security, thus strengthening UN fieldpresences. However, t<strong>here</strong> is a sense that the mechanism has not yet achieved its full peacebuilding impact, atleast in part due to the difficult balance between the competing needs for increased institutional support andcontinuous independence.1 For more information on all current Sanctions Committees, see “Security Council Sanctions Committees: An Overview,” UnitedNations, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/index.shtml.2 Louis Charbonneau, “UN panel finishes Taliban/al Qaeda blacklist review,” Reuters, 2 August 2010, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N02111225.htm.3 Sometimes also referred to as Monitoring Mechanisms or Groups of Experts.4 For more detailed information on the work of Panels of Experts, see Katherine Andrews with Tobias C. Berkman “UnitedNations Mechanism for Combating Illegal Trade in Regions of Conflict,” Stimson Backgrounder, The Henry L. Stimson <strong>Center</strong>,June 2005.5 Stimson Backgrounder, p. 6.priorities” of elections, internal political dialogue,regional dialogue and constructive engagement andgreater aid co<strong>here</strong>nce.Security SituationThe determination of the Taliban insurgencywas demonstrated by the brazen attack on a UNGuesthouse on 28 October 2009, which killed fiveUN staff and injured a number of others. To date,UNAMA’s activities continue to be circumscribedby security concerns.The United Nations Department of Safetyand Security assesses roughly 94 districts out ofalmost 400 districts as very high risk and a further81 districts as high risk. Access to outer areas hasbecome increasingly difficult, compounded furtherby the insurgency’s aggressive tactic to cut off majorprovincial centers. Consequently, areas that havea permissible security environment are increasinglyinaccessible to the mission. In recognition ofthe changed security environment, the UN designatedAfghanistan’s southern region as a Phase 4– Emergency Operations only. Practically this meansthat the maximum number of UN internationalstaff (from both UNAMA and the UN CountryTeam) permitted in the south-east region is 20(17 in Kandahar and 3 in Uruzgan).Despite a generally good working relationshipbetween the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF) and UNAMA, the increased presence ofinternational military forces and the in<strong>here</strong>nt riskof greater civilian casualties have created tensionsbetween the two actors. In principle, ISAF seeksUNAMA’s political advice about the conduct ofmilitary operations but in reality, with a variety ofmilitary operations ongoing and the limited coverageof UNAMA’s field presence, this is often not thecase. It is to UNAMA’s credit that due to its leadershipand outspoken stance on civilian casualties in2008 and 2009, ISAF reassessed the use of air assetsduring operations, which has led to a reduction inthe number of civilian fatalities.While engaging closely with the military forcesunder ISAF, UNAMA is also mandated to executeits political role, to coordinate the facilitation of thedelivery of humanitarian aid and to monitor andcoordinate human rights protection. UNAMA ist<strong>here</strong>fore caught in the conflicting role of being animpartial political mission and a coordinator that isasked to engage directly with military actors. While

Afghanistan | 79the population does not link UNAMA to militaryoperations, actions that affect large parts of thepopulation strengthen sentiment against the presenceof foreigners in general.Electoral Politics, 2009-2010In 2009, the greatest political challenge to UNAMAand other international actors arose from presidentialand provincial council elections, conducted inAfghanistan in August. Despite Taliban threats,millions of Afghans cast their votes, although theturnout remained well below 2004 levels. Followingserious allegations of widespread fraud,Afghanistan’s Election Commission ordered a runoffelection after an investigation invalidated votesfrom all major candidates – among them nearly onemillion pro-Karzai votes from the south. Politicalcrisis was averted just days before the scheduledvote, when Karzai’s top rival withdrew.Prior to the polls, UNAMA was particularlyengaged in mediation and political outreach. Themission conducted political dialogue with membersof the senior leadership of the Afghan governmentand other interlocutors to build a position oftrust. These efforts were traditionally based largelyon principles of humanitarian access and revolvedaround events such as the 21 September poliovaccination drive. On the regional and provinciallevel the mission is engaged routinely with politicaloutreach and engagement of local communities.Examples of these activities include tribal conflictresolution over resources and dispute resolution.UNAMA played an important role in supportingthe electoral process in both the run-up to and theaftermath of the 20 August presidential elections.This was overshadowed by disagreement betweenSRSG Kai Eide and his political deputy, DSRSGPeter Galbraith over how to deal with widespreadelectoral fraud charges. In an open letter, writtenin October 2009, Galbraith charged that Eide hadeffectively taken the side of Karzai at critical juncturesin the campaign, suppressed or played downcredible reports of widespread fraud and precludedUN staff members from intervening to prevent it.Eide responded that he had always acknowledgedthe electoral fraud that took place, but that it wasthe role of Afghanistan’s electoral institutions todetermine the extent of fraud and provide remedies,UNAMA’s SRSG Staffan de Mistura greets an Afghan deminer during theobservation of the International Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine ActionDay, 3 April 2010.not the role of the UN. In the end, the five-personElectoral Complaints Commission, which includedthree international experts appointed by Eide,ordered an audit of suspicious votes that led tothe removal of more than a million votes from thefinal count.This dispute, which became very public andquite bitter, resulted in the UN Secretary-Generalwithdrawing DSRSG Galbraith from service andoffering a public comment of support to SRSGEide. The accompanying media debate divided themission, with several staff loyal to Galbraith handingin resignations in protest. Nonetheless, UNAMA’spolitical engagement helped to deter Karzai andhis rival Abdullah Abdullah from escalating theirdifferences to the point w<strong>here</strong> Afghanistan’s post-Bonn political system collapsed.The confrontation within UNAMAhighlighted a further tension in its mandate. TheSRSG is tasked with promoting a more unitedpolitical voice and co<strong>here</strong>nt support on behalf of theinternational community to the Afghan government.In this regard, Kai Eide succeeded markedly duringhis tenure in becoming the main interlocutor betweenthe government and the international community.However, it is often far from straightforward forthe SRSG to manage a relationship with the seniorpolitical leadership while maintaining an impartialrole in political events. Some critics charged thatEide put too much emphasis on establishing a closerelationship with Karzai - a move that proponentsdefended as necessary due to a lack of institutionalstructures in Afghanistan, but that led to perceptionsof partiality during the electoral process.UN Photo/Eric Kanalstein

80 | Mission ReviewsShortly after Staffan de Mistura took office,another election-related row threatened to sourUNAMA-government relations. With parliamentaryelections slated for September 2010, PresidentKarzai declared in February that he would appointall the members of the Electoral Complaints Commissionfor the new polls. This was a challenge tothe UN, which, as noted, had previously appointedforeign experts to act as three of the Commission’sfive members. Under pressure from the US andother donors, and having accused the internationalcommunity of electoral fraud in the previous year’selection, Karzai eventually backed down and agreedto the UN appointing two foreign commissioners.Meanwhile, the SRSG has warned that the pollsmay be threatened by serious violence.Dialogues and SanctionsIn line with second of the “3+1” priorities, deMistura met with a delegation from Hizb-i-Islami,an anti-government militant group, in March 2010.The group, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, had previouslyoffered the government a fifteen-point peaceplan – although the very first point, the withdrawalof all foreign forces within six months, ensured thatit had little chance of success. No further meetingswith the group have been reported.In early June, President Karzai convened aConsultative Peace Jirga, involving some 1,600 delegatesto discuss Afghanistan’s future. UNAMAwas not involved in devising this event, but bothBan Ki-moon and SRSG de Mistura publiclypraised the initiative and UNAMA provided somelogistical support.Both in speaking to the press after the PeaceJirga and in briefing the Security Council at the endof June, the SRSG linked the internal dialogue tothe issue of targeted UN sanctions against individualAfghan leaders. UNAMA has an informal relationshipwith the UN Security Council Al-Qaida andTaliban Sanctions Committee that was establishedby Resolution 1267 on 15 October 1999. The 1267list, as it is referred to, has been renewed, broadenedand strengthened each year since its inception so thatnow the sanctions measures also apply to designatedindividuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida,Osama bin Laden and/or the Taliban. Practicallyfor UNAMA, t<strong>here</strong> has been little formal engagementon the issue by the mission’s leadership, buton the working level, UNAMA’s political officershave cooperated with the Committee. The natureof this cooperation has been largely informationsharing in an effort to improve the quality of the listand ensure the information on the list is more accurate,as well as acting as a liaison, when necessary,between the Committee and the Afghan governmententities responsible for providing informationto the Committee for the purpose of delisting them.This collaboration has increased knowledge of theactual identities of those listed while also reducingthe possibility of individuals with the same namesbeing targeted due to a mistaken identity. In July2010, the Committee completed a two-year reviewof 488 individuals and entities on the 1267 list. Inall, the Committee removed 45 names from the list,including 10 Taliban and 35 Al-Qaida fighters aswell as 14 further individuals and 21 firms or otherorganizations. Remaining on the list are 311 entitiesassociated with Al-Qaida and 132 associatedwith the Taliban. 5In addition to actions intended to promoteinternal dialogue, UNAMA has also pursued thethird of the “3+1” priorities, regional dialogue. In thefirst half of the year, the SRSG visited both Iran andPakistan. In June 2010, Security Council ambassadorsvisited Afghanistan on the initiative of Turkey,then holding the Council’s rotating presidency. Ontheir way back to New York they convened for adiscussion of peacekeeping in Istanbul – de Misturaattended this and met with Turkish officials onAfghan issues.Aid Co<strong>here</strong>nceOn the “+1” of the “3+1” priorities, aid co<strong>here</strong>nce,UNAMA does not aim to direct multilateral andbilateral aid, but to minimize duplication. In thefirst half of 2010, the mission concluded that thelevel of duplication was relatively low, but thatmore aid needed to go to directly support theAfghan authorities. De Mistura has emphasizedthe role of the Joint Coordination and MonitoringBoard ( JCMB), a 28-member committee of donorslaunched in 2006 and co-chaired by the UN andAfghan government.

Afghanistan | 81The EUIn 2001, the European Union created the post of Special Representative (EUSR) for Afghanistan. The EUSR isbased in Kabul, with a broad focus on monitoring and reporting on human rights, political, constitutional and securitydevelopments. At first, coordination between the EUSR and the European Commission’s office in Kabul(responsible for aid) was very low, although it gradually increased over time. The EUSR in 2009 was a formerItalian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ettore Francesco Sequi.Sequi was replaced in April 2010 by Vygaudas Ušackas of Lithuania, who is double-hatted, functioning as the headof the Delegation of the European Union and as well as EUSR. Given that the European Commission is one of thelargest donors providing official development and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, it is likely that the positionof EUSR will become considerably more influential in the future than it has been hitherto.In addition to its civilian presence, the EU also has a Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). Launched in 2007,the mission has suffered from poor staffing and has failed to play a serious role in the security sector reformprocess. The EUSR is only responsible for giving the mission political guidance, as it has its own reporting lineto Brussels.Meeting on 8 July 2010, the JCMB agreedto ambitious targets for expanding the size of theAfghan army by 30% and the police by 20% by theend of October 2011. It also touched on job creation,boosting government service delivery and regionaleconomic ties. On 20 July, the UN co-chaired aconference in Kabul addressed by Ban Ki-moon, USSecretary of State Hillary Clinton and other foreigndignitaries. The government laid out an economicplan that reflected the JCMB’s previous discussionsof development needs.ConclusionWhile UNAMA receives more public attention thanmost political missions, its performance has beenovershadowed by debates within NATO – and, toan even greater degree, in the US – about the futurestrategy for Afghanistan. At the time of writing, theUS “surge” in the country is ongoing – its implicationsfor UNAMA remain uncertain.External factors aside, recruitment andretention remain possibly the largest obstaclein terms of UNAMA’s ability to implement itsmandate. In July 2008, as part of a vision for anexpanded role of the mission and its broader fieldpresence, a near doubling of the mission’s budgetand staffing was approved. However, in light ofthe security environment, especially the targetingof the UN Guesthouse in Kabul and the killingof 5 employees, recruiting and retaining staff hasbeen a constant challenge and the mission has acurrent vacancy rate of 40%. Most dramatically, thestaffing difficulties were demonstrated by thevacated Deputy SRSG political affairs post thatwas only filled with a permanent candidate in midMarch 2010, leaving UNAMA’s political sectionwithout leadership for six months. Aside fromquantity, the availability of qualified staff is alsoan issue. Although UNAMA is mandated to leaddonor coordination efforts, t<strong>here</strong> is a lack of sufficientlyqualified staff. The mission also competesfor candidates with the UN Development Programme,which is sometimes perceived as a moreattractive option.The most important factor in decidingUNAMA’s future will, however, be whether theAfghan government, the US and other powersconcerned with Afghanistan settle on a durablepolitical strategy for stabilizing the country– something force cannot achieve alone – andwhether UNAMA is permitted to play a lead rolein implementing such a plan. Without such astrategy, a decade of support to Afghanistan willgo to waste.

82 | Mission Reviewsnotes1 UNAMA, “Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009,” January 2010.2 UNAMA, “Afghan Civilian Casualties Rise 31 Per Cent in First 6 Months of 2010,” 10 August 2010, http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1741&ctl=Details&mid=1882&ItemID=9955.3 “Communiqué of ‘Afghanistan: The London Conference,’” 20 January 2010, http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/Documents_Communique%20of%20London%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf.4 United Nations, “SRSG Staffan de Mistura Briefing to Security Council,” 30 June 2010, http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1747&ctl=Details&mid=1958&ItemID=9477.5 Security Council, “Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee Concludes Review of ItsConsolidated List, Pursuant to Resolution 1822 (2008),” 2 August 2010, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9999.doc.htm.

IRAQ | 833.6 M i s s i o n R e v i e w sIraqIraq reached a turning-point in 2010 with thewithdrawal of American combat troops inAugust. Although 50,000 US personnel remain inthe country training domestic forces, the Obamaadministration has laid out a road-map for a furtherreduction of this presence in 2011. 1 The drawdownof the American presence increases the importanceof the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)as a conduit of international support to Iraq. But italso brings risks, as UNAMI previously operated inthe security framework provided by the Americans.The mission has gained increasing credibilitywith both local actors and the US in recent years,playing a particularly important role in mediatingArab-Kurdish relations. Nonetheless, UNAMInow has to navigate an uncertain political environmentfollowing the disputed outcome ofparliamentary elections in March 2010, in whichformer Prime Minister Ayad Allawi won slightlymore seats than the incumbent Nouri al-Maliki,but without attaining an overall majority, creatingpolitical deadlock. As of August 2010, delays overthe formation of a new government persist, andterrorist attacks have raised concerns about a possibledeterioration of the security situation. Whilet<strong>here</strong> are limits to UNAMI’s ability to resolveIraq’s political tensions, the mission still has animportant role to play in facilitating the country’sprolonged transition to stability.BackgroundUNAMI was established in August 2003 initially asa one-year mission. A few days after the mission’sstart of operations, a devastating bomb attack onUNAMI’s headquarters killed the Special RepresentativeSergio Vieira de Mello as well as 21 staffmembers and injured over 100. The UN withdrewthe majority of the mission’s staff members fromIraq and relocated them mainly to Amman, Jordan.In 2004, more staff returned to the mission’sBaghdad headquarters to resume its mandated taskto assist the people and government of Iraq in theformulation of new governing structures. Althoughconstrained by security concerns, UNAMI assistedin the development of Iraq’s constitution and aseries of elections.

84 | Mission ReviewsUN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)Authorization and 14 August 2003Start Date (UNSC Res. 1500)SRSGAd Melkert (Netherlands)Deputy SRSG Jerzy Skuratowicz (Poland) andChristine McNab (Sweden)Budget$158.9 million(1 January 2010-31December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 322early 2010 Local Civilian: 460Military Experts on Mission: 13Contingent Troops: 221As an integrated mission, UNAMI has two substantivecomponents handling political affairs anddevelopment and humanitarian issues – as well asindependent offices dealing with human rights andpublic information – under the overall leadership ofthe Special Representative of the Secretary-General(SRSG) Ad Melkert, who replaced Staffan de Misturain July 2009. UNAMI has a number of fieldoffices around the country – including the politicallysensitive city of Kirkuk – and coordinates the UNCountry Team, involving sixteen funds and agencies.The mission maintains a significant presence inJordan and liaison offices in Kuwait and Iran.For detailed mission information see p. 183Boundary IssuesIn August of 2007, with the US reconsideringits political and military engagement in Iraq, the UNSecurity Council significantly expanded UNAMI’spolitical and conflict resolution mandate. Resolution1770 placed an increased emphasis on the mission’sprovision of technical assistance to the governmentof Iraq and the Independent High Electoral Commissionfor holding elections, as well as a greatercoordination function for international humanitarianaid. UNAMI’s mandate also included promotingnational dialogue between Iraq’s ethnic groups andthe peaceful resolution of disputed internal boundaries,as well as fostering regional cooperation betweenIraq and its neighbors.Shortly after the new mandate was announced,the UN rotated its senior leadership in Iraq, and themission moved its headquarters from Amman backto Baghdad – although Amman continues to be thebase for a great deal of UN humanitarian and developmentactivities for Iraq. The government of Nourial-Maliki was not initially inclined to trust thenewly-strengthened mission, but it gradually cameto accept it as a useful partner. This was assistedby the Bush administration’s positive attitudetowards UNAMI after 2007, and reinforced by theObama administration’s equally supportive posture.US Vice-President Joe Biden, the White Housepoint-man on Iraq, has repeatedly and warmlypraised UNAMI in Baghdad.In August 2010, the UN Security Councilunanimously adopted Resolution 1936, extendingthe mission for a period of 12 months until 31 July2011, but leaving the mission’s mandate unaltered.On the basis of Resolution 1770, UNAMI hasbeen intimately involved in efforts to resolve Iraq’sinternal boundary issues since mid-2008 when itpublished proposals for confidence-buildingmeasures in troubled districts on the Kurdish-Arab border in the north of the country. It waswidely recognized that the greatest challenge layin Kirkuk, an oil-rich city inhabited by a mix ofKurds, Turkomen and Arabs lying just outside theKurdish Autonomous Region before 2003. In 2008,a committee of Kirkuk’s politicians (known as theArticle 23 Committee) was set up to discuss powersharingfor the city. UNAMI gave this groupconsiderable technical support, including organizinga visit for its members to Northern Ireland toobserve power-sharing arrangements t<strong>here</strong>, butits discussions proved fruitless.At first, the Kurds seemed happier than thegovernment to see UNAMI involved in this process.The mission leadership worked hard to win overBaghdad to its involvement. In early 2009, UNAMIconducted a massive field and documentary studyon the past and present status of 15 disputed areassouth of the recognized Kurdish region, includingKirkuk. The resulting report, circulated in confidencein April 2009, outlined four potential optionsfor the future status of Kirkuk. These includedplacing the Kirkuk governorate under the jointsupervision of Baghdad and the Kurdish authoritiesin Erbil or giving it a special status as an autonomousgovernment, but did not include transferringit to full Kurdish control. As a follow-up to t<strong>here</strong>port, a High Level Task Force (HLTF) composed

Iraq | 85of representatives from both Baghdad and Erbilmet under UN auspices to discuss the report’sproposed solutions. However, no immediate solutionwas forthcoming.The work of the HLTF is ongoing and as of2010, its members were primarily focused on functionalissues like property disputes and languagerights. UNAMI has provided expert support onthese issues, for example conducting a study of educationalrights with UNICEF. It is also involvedin efforts to foster political dialogue in Ninewa,a province north-west of Kirkuk with a Kurdishminority that remains more prone to violence thanother parts of Iraq. 2While the fundamental issue of Kirkuk’s statusremains unresolved – and the Kurdish parliamenthas declared that the city is part of its territory– UNAMI’s involvement in this crucial dispute bolsteredthe mission’s credibility. The willingness ofUS officials to let the UN lead on the topic, and theUN’s ability to do so, signaled UNAMI’s value as amediator. The fact that its proposals have been evenhandedwon over skeptical Iraqi Arab politicians.In 2010, Ray Odierno, the then commander ofUS forces in Iraq, raised the idea that a UN peacekeepingforce might deploy to patrol unstable areason the Arab-Kurdish boundary. 3 However, this offthe-cuffproposal won little favor in the US andwas never formally raised with the UN, and wentno further.ElectionsUNAMI has also demonstrated its credibilityin providing technical assistance to a series ofpotentially contentious elections. In January 2009it supported provincial council elections acrossthe country, overseeing the creation of a new electoralregister and data-processing system. Thesepolls were a success, contributing to the improvedrelations between UNAMI and the government.UNAMI also supported elections in the KurdishAutonomous Region in 2009.The 2010 parliamentary elections wereinevitably sensitive. The Independent HighElectoral Commission (IHEC) was in the lead, andUNAMI again provided direct technical supportand advice. In addition, members of UNAMI werepresent at polling stations on election day with anemphasis on Baghdad, Kirkuk and the Kurdish areas.It also facilitated the IHEC’s efforts to allow votingfor Iraqis outside the country, enabling the largenumbers of refugees scattered around the regionto vote. Over a quarter of a million votes were castin this way.In March 2010, the elections resulted in acontested victory for Mr. Allawi over Prime MinisterMaliki. The electoral process also saw thebanning of candidates due to allegations of ties tothe Baath Party, as well as disputes over the electionresults. A recount of all ballots cast in Baghdad governoratecame to an end on 16 May, with UNAMIofficials once again assisting the Iraqi authorities.Since the results have been certified by theSupreme Court, UNAMI’s leaders have engagedin diplomatic efforts with the competing politicalfactions in search of a resolution and reiteratedtheir willingness to further engage on the basisof consensus among political parties. To date,however, UNAMI’s efforts have not resultedin a compromise.Regional IssuesUNAMI’s mandate also includes a provisionrelated to supporting the Government of Iraq (atits request) on regional issues. While this includesdeveloping relations with neighbors such as Turkeyand Jordan, t<strong>here</strong> is a special emphasis on diplomacywith Kuwait. A number of Security Councilresolutions placing obligations on Iraq vis-à-visKuwait remain in force, including compensationpayments and border demarcation. UNAMI worksclosely with the Secretary-General’s High-LevelCoordinator for Iraq/Kuwait Missing Persons andProperty, Gennady Tarasov, on the issues involved.In 2009, Iraq called for the role of High-LevelCoordinator to be terminated, which was opposedby Kuwait due to the lack of progress in addressingpending issues between the two countries. In mid-2010, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon alsonoted with concern that Iraq had not respondedto repeated requests to pay its share of a relativelyinexpensive ($600,000) but politically sensitiveUN-managed boundary demarcation project. 4 Still,bilateral relations between the two countries haveimproved gradually, with Iraq sending its firstambassador to Kuwait since 1990 this year. Kuwait

86 | Mission Reviewsis also funding a project developed with the assistanceof UNAMI to build the Iraqi Ministry ofHuman Rights’ capacity in mass grave excavationand the identification of missing persons.Development, Humanitarian Affairsand Human RightsAlthough this review concentrates on the politicaldimensions of UNAMI’s work, the mission andUN Country Team (UNCT) is also engaged ina wide range of humanitarian and developmentactivities. These have not always been closely coordinated,and on taking over as SRSG, Ad Melkertdeclared his intention to make the activities of themission and the UNCT more fully integrated. InMay 2010 UNAMI’s Deputy Representative of theSecretary-General (DSRSG), Christine McNab(who is triple-hatted as the DSRSG, ResidentCoordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator)oversaw the completion of the first UN DevelopmentAssistance Framework with Iraq, projectedto see the disbursement of $186 billion on nearly3,000 projects over four years. Senior UN officialshave argued the organization’s interactions withIraq will increasingly focus on development ratherthan political issues. 5Iraq’s humanitarian situation remainschallenging, with approximately 1.55 millioninternally displaced persons in the country andover two million Iraqi refugees abroad. UNAMIwas heavily involved in bringing aid to the displacedduring its period based in Amman from2003-7 and continues to work closely with otherUN agencies in dealing with the problem. Whilet<strong>here</strong> is no longer a humanitarian emergency inthe country, pockets of vulnerability remain andhumanitarian needs are grossly under-funded.In July 2010, DSRSG McNab revealed thatonly $22.3 million out of $187.7 million the UNhad requested for relief operations in Iraq hadbeen received.UNAMI’s human rights office – which isinstitutionally separated from the political arm ofthe mission – releases reports every six months onthe country, and also reports to the Office of theHigh Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva.In 2009, UNAMI gave the authorities technicalAd Melkert (left), Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, isgreeted by the United Nations Guard Unit upon arrival to the United NationsAssistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) office in Baghdad, Iraq, 18 July 2009.support prior to Iraq’s first appearance at the UniversalPeriodic Review (UPR) at the UN HumanRights Council, and also backed a series of UPRrelatedcivil society projects.UNAMI also monitors the situation of membersof the People’s Mujahideen Organization of Iran (ananti-Tehran militia) at Camp Ashraf, north of Baghdadfollowing the incidents in July 2009 surroundingthe Government of Iraq’s attempt to establish apolice station in the camp which resulted in violencethat left 11 dead and over 300 injured. As aresult, UNAMI conducted a fact-finding mission – adecision that mission staff believed required considerablepolitical courage on the part of SRSG deMistura – and has kept a humanitarian monitoringpresence at the camp since then.ConclusionWhile UNAMI has taken a significant part inIraq’s political evolution since 2007, this is notcertain to continue. One reason for this is basicsecurity: although the mission is guarded by a contingentof 223 Fijian troops, its ability to maneuveraround Iraq has depended on US forces. Withthe US departure looming, UNAMI has investedin new security measures for its headquarters inBaghdad, requested more armored vehicles andair assets to allow it to operate securely and discussedreceiving protection from Iraqi forces withthe government.UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

Iraq | 87Staffing and the 2009 Human Resources Management ReformThe UN began a human resources management reform process in mid-2009 that continues to date. The reformswere designed to improve the UN’s dysfunctional employment and recruitment system, which has had negative effectson the entire system, but especially impacts field missions that often have to adapt their staffing requirementsaccording to changing political realities on the ground. In order to provide a more dynamic global work force andreduce recruitment delays, the reforms harmonized contracts between the field and Headquarters and introduceda new recruitment model, which prioritizes internal hires for vacancies. Rosters of pre-screened candidates are indevelopment, which are intended to allow for more rapid deployment of skilled staff.While the reforms were intended to improve hiring structures, the new recruitment system in some cases has furtheradded to delays, with some positions taking up to one year to fill. These delays mean that often the most qualifiedand employable candidates take up positions elsew<strong>here</strong> in the interim. Delays in recruitment exacerbate chronicallyhigh civilian vacancy rates seen across missions. As of 31 October 2009, UNAMI had a 27% vacancy rate andUNPOS was operating with 34% of its authorized posts empty. High vacancy rates hinder a mission’s ability to takeadvantage of short but crucial windows of opportunity, especially important in political missions.High mission vacancies also mean that field officers must lean on their counterparts at Headquarters for a variety ofsupport work, putting additional pressure on limited staff in New York while minimizing their role in political analysis.UNPOS again provides an illustrious example w<strong>here</strong> a desk officer in New York singlehandedly supported the dayto-dayneeds of the entire mission until a Junior Professional Officer was assigned to assist. The UNPOS Headquartersstaff was overwhelmed and found it difficult to meet mission requirements, reflective of general understaffingand underfunding of the support capacity of Headquarters. 1The reforms have also negatively affected staff mobility, especially between the field and Headquarters, limiting t<strong>here</strong>alization of a global workforce. In addition, the reforms only partially achieved harmonization of contracts. Considerablegaps remain in the terms and conditions between Secretariat staff and their counterparts in UN funds, programsand agencies, in many cases leading to competition between the various UN entities to attract the best candidates.Institutional ConsiderationsIn addition to these reforms, t<strong>here</strong> are two important institutional considerations that also have an impact on staffingof political missions – (1) the relationship between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department ofField Support (DFS), and (2) the budget approval process.Within the UN, DFS is designated to provide logistical and personnel support to field missions of both DPA andthe Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). However, DFS may be structured to better suit the needsand requirements of DPKO’s large-scale peacekeeping operations than the unique needs of niche political missions,especially with respect to their specific civilian staffing requirements, due to DFS’s growth out of DPKO’sOffice of Mission Support. Inappropriate financial and procurement rules and procedures that govern DFS makeit even more challenging for it to support both departments adequately. The institutional relationship betweenDFS and DPA, while improving, still has ample room for growth and t<strong>here</strong> is recognition within DPA that it mustfurther explore how to best utilize the resources available within DFS. In addition, the Global Field Support Strategyof January 2010 – that has received preliminary endorsement of the UN General Assembly in July 2010 butis still pending approval – seeks to address some of the above-mentioned challenges.Second, political mission budgets generally and staffing requirements in particular, are the subject of considerabledebate in the UN’s Advisory Committee on Administrative & Budgetary Questions. T<strong>here</strong> is a sense thatproposed increases in staffing are disproportionately contentious within the Committee as compared to the moretechnical requirements of a mission. In addition, existing vacancies may lead the Committee to question the wisdomof authorizing additional posts, even in the face of shifting political circumstances.Staffing represents a significant challenge to political missions, one that appears to have become more daunting– at least in the short-term – with the 2009 human resources reform. Delays in recruitment have concretenegative effects on the ability of missions to perform effectively and fulfill their mandates. As Kai Eide, outgoingSRSG of the UN Mission in Afghanistan, noted in his last briefing to the Security Council in March 2010, “the newrecruitment system put in place in July 2009 simply has not worked…If not corrected soon, it will threaten theeffectiveness, possibly even the survival, of many of the current UN Missions.”1 As noted in the 2010-2011 proposed budget for Special Political Missions (A/64/349).

88 | Mission ReviewsAnother major challenge for UNAMI isstaffing. With the majority of UN agency staffersstill based outside Iraq due to the security ceiling,t<strong>here</strong> are still limits to what the UN funds andagencies can achieve inside the country. UNAMIitself has struggled to find and keep qualified politicalstaff. In 2009, a gridlocked hiring process causeddelays of up to 14 months to fill posts. Combinedwith budgetary constrains this has resulted in a 30%vacancy rate for UNAMI in the field. However, thissituation has slightly improved since January 2010,when an exceptional authority for recruitment wasgranted to UNAMI, bringing the vacancy rate toabout 19.5%.This mixture of security and personnel concernsmeans that, even in a permissive political environment,the UN would still have to work hard tomaintain its role in Iraqi politics. The continuinguncertainty over the country’s government, and theconstant challenge of Arab-Kurdish relations, makethis an even more complicated task. It should notbe assumed that UNAMI can maintain the politicaltraction that it developed in 2007-10. This willonly be possible if Iraq’s politicians are ready towork with the mission and UNAMI is able to meettheir needs.notes1 Gordon, Michael R., “Civilians to take U.S. Lead as Military Leaves Iraq,” New York Times, 18 August 2010,http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/19/world/middleeast/19withdrawal.html.2 International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa,” Middle East Report N°90, 28September 2009.3 “US Commander says Northern Iraq May Need UN Peacekeepers,” VOA News, 6 July 2010, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/US-Commander-Says-Northern-Iraq-May-Need-UN-Peacekeepers-97862034.html.4 The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for the demarcation project.5 “As Iraq Makes Progress, UN to Focus More on Social and Economic Development,” UN News Centre, 18January 2010, http://www.uniraq.org/newsroom/getarticle.asp?ArticleID=1239.

Nepal | 893.7 M i s s i o n R e v i e w sNepalInitially slated for June 2007, elections forNepal’s constituent assembly were postponedtwice, in part as a consequence of challenges to thepeace process from marginalized groups, includingpopulations in the Terai region of Nepal borderingon India, but took place on 10 April 2008.The Maoists emerged as the strongest party in theconstituent assembly, with 240 out of 601 seats.After a protracted period of political wrangling,Ram Baran Yadav of the Nepal Congress party wasinstalled as the country’s first president and PushpaKamal Dahal, the Maoist leader more commonlyknown as Prachanda, as prime minister. In May2009, however, an attempt by Prachanda to dismissthe army chief precipitated a political crisis and theMaoists’ departure from government. A prolongedpolitical impasse then ensued, greatly complicatingUNMIN’s role.UNMIN/Sekhar KarkiBackgroundMember of UN team prepares the camp for discharge camp process,Chulachuli, Liam district, Eastern Region, February 2010.The period since January 2009 has been achallenging one for the United NationsMission in Nepal (UNMIN). Originally conceivedas a “focused mission of limited duration,” by mid2010 the mission had been extended through foursuccessive six months periods beyond the one yearmandate it had been given in January 2007, andthen for two further four month periods.UNMIN was established in early 2007 to assistin the implementation of specific elements of theComprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) whichended the decade-long conflict between the CommunistParty of Nepal (Maoist) and the Nepalistate in 2006.It was an unusual mission in several respects.It sought to provide assistance to a peace processthat was a national achievement, centered upon anagreement reached without international mediation.Its mandate was limited to the monitoring of

90 | Mission ReviewsUN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)Authorization 23 January 2007and Start Date (UNSC Res. 1740)SRSGKarin Landgren (Sweden)Budget $16.7 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 43early 2010 Local Civilian: 118Military Experts on Mission: 68UN Volunteers: 16For detailed mission information see p. 202arms and armies, technical assistance to the electoralprocess, and support to the monitoring ofthe broader aspects of the ceasefire. Moreover, fora mission with military responsibilities, its armsmonitoring component was unusually light, consistingof unarmed arms monitors (serving andretired officers) in civilian attire deployed withthe cooperation of the parties. Given the shorttime frame with which it was conceived, UNMINwas not established as an integrated mission,although it assumed an “integrated approach” toits responsibilities.That UNMIN took shape at all was aconsequence of careful political work by the UNduring the three years preceding the signing of theCPA, as well as the successful deployment of anOffice of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights (OHCHR) in Nepal in mid-2005. The UN’spolitical involvement in Nepal dated back to September2002, when Secretary-General Kofi Annanhad offered to “consider the use of his good officesto help achieve a peaceful solution” to Nepal’s conflict.1 On the basis of this offer, Tamrat Samuel, anofficial within the Department of Political Affairs,began visiting the country in mid-2003 and engagingwith all political actors, including the Maoists.Reservations that India – the regional powerand a neighbor with both significant interests inand major influence over Nepal – and some Nepalisheld about an overt “political” role for the UNcontributed to the narrow definition of UNMIN’smandate. This would emerge as a core weakness ofthe mission and the source of ambiguity and confusionabout its role.UNMIN’s arms monitoring and electoral assistancecontributed positively to Nepal’s ability tohold an election in April 2008 that was recognizedas “remarkable and relatively peaceful.” 2 However,a poor understanding of the mandate in Nepal– never effectively countered by UNMIN’s considerableefforts at communication and outreach– created a situation in which high expectations ofthe UN’s contribution were inevitably disappointed,even as some of those opposed to a more active UNrole pushed back against UNMIN’s initiatives. Themission numbered a little over 1,000 national andinternational staff at its pre-election maximum andsubsequently downsized to less than 300. That itwas small in comparison to most UN peace operationscould not redress Nepali perceptions thatits considerable size compared unfavorably to itsimpact upon the parties.UNMIN’s original mandate was designedwith the horizon represented by the elections tothe constituent assembly in mind. Some politicalparties had supported the electoral process – andthe UN role within it – with the expectation thatit would conclude with the Maoists’ defeat. TheMaoists’ success at the polls consequently changedNepal’s political landscape dramatically. In thepost-election period a lack of cooperation betweenthe political parties undermined further progressand proved a complicating factor for UNMIN.Indeed the mission’s mandate, linked to the “temporary”but ongoing presence of two cantoned andbarracked armies, became increasingly out of kilterwith the challenges Nepal now encountered.UNMIN quite properly retained the peace processas the center of its activities. However, that thepeace process assumed a central role in the longerterm calculations of either Nepal’s various politicalactors – locked in a struggle for power – or India, nolonger appeared evident.UNMIN downsized promptly in June 2008;its electoral affairs and civil affairs offices – whichhad been specifically linked to creating the conditionsfor the election – and its five regional officeswere closed; arms monitors were reduced from 186to 73 even as arms monitoring remained a centralelement in the mission’s work.The peace agreements reached in 2006 had notbeen able to negotiate the future of the armies fully,

Nepal | 91but they had prescribed processes that were to leadto the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist armypersonnel and the democratization of the Nepalarmy. Progress towards these goals was blocked bylack of commitment from the parties and resistancefrom within the army – which in 2007 and 2008had conducted new recruitment in violation ofthe peace agreements. UNMIN’s continued presence,however, remained inextricably linked to the19,000 Maoist combatants “temporarily” confinedin cantonments. This was in<strong>here</strong>ntly problematic.UNMIN’s limited political role and light monitoringhad never been intended for an extended periodand was unsuited to the changed political situationand deterioration of trust between the parties thatdeveloped in the latter part of 2009.Key DevelopmentsPersistent problems in the implementation of thecommitments entered into in the CPA and otheragreements reflected both a lack of any domesticarchitecture for their implementation and theerosion of trust between the parties. A special committeeto supervise, integrate and rehabilitate Maoistarmy personnel, provided for in the interim constitutionadopted in early 2007, met once in July 2007and then not until late 2008, just prior to a visit toNepal by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. It beganconsultations in early January 2009, but had its workdisrupted by the collapse of the government followingthe Maoists’ departure in May 2009.By the end of the year, the Maoists had beenoutside government since May; an unwieldy22-party government was in place; divisions withinand between the major political parties were impedingdialogue; Maoist agitation was on the rise; andno movement on the integration and rehabilitationof Maoist combatants was in sight. Unrest andinsecurity in the countryside was accompanied byfalling economic and social indicators. The deadlinefor the drafting of a new constitution by 28 May2010 was fast approaching even as fundamentaldifferences between the major political parties onissues such as the form of the country’s new federalstructure and system of governance had emerged.UNMIN maintained impartiality in support of thecommitments contained in the CPA, but increasingcriticism that it favored the Maoists clearly reducedits scope for a political role.Tensions rose in December 2009 as the Maoistscalled a three-day general strike across Nepalto force the government to create a new “unity”government. The demand was rejected by PrimeMinister Madhav Kumar Nepal, of the United-Marxist-Leninist (UML) party, but the pressure,combined with the imminent discussion of thesituation in Nepal in the Security Council in lateJanuary, encouraged progress. The governmentestablished a high-level political mechanism to“speed-up” the peace process and drafting of theconstitution. UNMIN began supporting thelong-delayed discharge of over 4,000 minors andother Maoist army personnel deemed ineligiblefor cantonment during UNMIN’s earlier verificationprocess. 3 And the special committee agreedthat the integration and rehabilitation of theMaoist army personnel should be completed by15 May 2010.The process soon stalled once again. In lateApril the Secretary-General told the Security Council,just weeks before the expiration of UNMIN’ssupposedly final mandate, that “despite continuingefforts, no substantive forward movement hasbeen made on the main outstanding tasks of thepeace process.” 4 Constitution-making had becomeentwined with the issue of the establishment of aunity government as well as the integration andrehabilitation of the Maoist army. A series of generalstrikes called by the Maoists in early May failedto force a change of government, but it was evidentthat a final draft of the constitution would not beready by the deadline of 28 May. A last minuteagreement to extend the term of the constituentassembly by a year was accepted by the Maoistson the basis that Prime Minister Madhav Nepalwould resign within five days, opening up the wayfor a unity government that would include them.In the event, a month of political acrimony wouldpass before Madhav Nepal eventually resigned on30 June.UNMIN’s contributionIn early 2009, UNMIN had been scaled backfor a second time and Ian Martin, the Special

92 | Mission ReviewsRepresentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG),replaced as Head of UNMIN by his former deputy,and now Representative of the Secretary-General,Karin Landgren. The mission was extended inJuly 2009 for six months; in January 2010, until15 May 2010; and on 12 May 2010 for a furtherfour-month period.UNMIN remained focused on monitoringcompliance of the Nepal Army and the Maoist armywith the Agreement on Monitoring the Managementof Arms and Armies (AMMAA) reached inlate 2006, as well as efforts to achieve the dischargeof minors and disqualified Maoist army personnel.Arms monitors maintained round-the-clocksurveillance of weapons storage areas at the Maoists’seven main cantonment sites whilst visitingthe satellite cantonment sites and the Nepal armyweapons storage site. They also continued to takepart in the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee( JMCC), a mechanism composed of botharmies’ representatives and chaired by the UN thathad met regularly since its establishment by theAMMAA and developed a critical role as a meansto respond to and defuse potential crises.These activities were in<strong>here</strong>ntly valuable.However, the UN became increasingly concernedby arms monitoring’s growing disconnect from thepolitical process. T<strong>here</strong> was a risk that UNMIN’spresence was perpetuating an unstable status quo.An additional problem was mounting criticismof UNMIN in the Nepali press by political actorsunwilling or unable to understand the limitednature of UNMIN’s responsibilities in the cantonments– which it neither had the mandate norcapacity to police.The UN’s political good offices were notspecifically mentioned in UNMIN’s mandate, butwere in<strong>here</strong>nt in a mission headed by a representativeof the Secretary-General. Good offices wereemployed to encourage the Nepali parties to takethe steps that would allow UNMIN to complete itstasks and leave Nepal, but also to help promote thetrust and communication between the parties thatwould allow for the peace process to advance. Inpractice this meant pursuing bilateral engagementwith all sides, at times carrying messages from oneparty to another, proposing short term measuresto build confidence or avert crises, and advising onlonger-term strategies to address tension amongthe parties.From UNMIN’s earliest days good officeshad met resistance of varying degrees both fromNepalis concerned about losing “ownership” ofthe peace process and from India. Over time, asthe political environment became more complex,particularly after the elections, this resistancemounted. Consequently, as the political impassethat set in mid-2009 took hold, UNMIN founditself at a disadvantage. It continued to engagewith all sides, but in an environment in which fear,insecurity, and a reluctance to accept the Maoists’leading role in Nepali politics by the mainstreampolitical parties was countered by ambition anddogma of some sections of the Maoists, t<strong>here</strong> wasa tendency for UNMIN to become a scapegoat.A variety of political processes – electoral, constitutional,local level political conflicts – other thanthe peace process dominated the parties’ preoccupations.The utility of UNMIN’s good offices wasnevertheless evident in early 2010 as it facilitatedthe complex processes surrounding the dischargeof the minors and other personnel from theMaoists’ cantonments.UNMIN’s coordination roleUNMIN had not been established as an integratedmission or with a mandate for peacebuilding, yetit sought to adopt an integrated approach to itsresponsibilities and engaged with other actors inthe UN system on this basis. A coordination unitwas built into UNMIN’s structure, and later inthe office of the UN Resident Coordinator (RC),to ensure co<strong>here</strong>nce at the working level. AfterUNMIN’s downsizing, the utility of a separate presenceof the OHCHR – which remained as the onlyeyes and ears of the United Nations in the districtsafter the departure of UNMIN’s civil affairs presence– was evident, as was the policy UNMIN hadlong pursued of collaboration with other entities ofthe UN system (UNICEF, UNIFEM and the officeof the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, forexample) with the mandate and resources for longterm engagement on issues such as those related tochild soldiers and gender.The office of the RC had worked hard to preparea peace and development strategy for Nepal.However, what was already a challenge had beeninterrupted by the crisis that developed in May

Nepal | 932009 and the impasse that then ensued. Difficultiesin<strong>here</strong>nt in forging a common approach betweendonors and the national government in a fragileperiod of transition ensured that a close workingrelationship between the office of the RC andUNMIN was a high priority.ConclusionThe last minute deal postponing the deadlinefor the drafting of Nepal’s new constitutionprevented imminent political disaster but didnot lift the country out of the impasse. A difficultnegotiation of UNMIN’s new mandatewithin the Security Council reflected growingconcern regarding Nepal’s struggling transitionas well as doubts about the mission’s capacity toimpact it. UNMIN began its new mandate withprospects for implementing the remaining peaceprocess tasks at a low ebb. The short time framebefore it – and the continuing upheaval withinNepali politics – suggests that difficult decisionslay ahead.notes1 “Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,” A/57/1, September 2002, para. 25.2 Nepal’s Constituent Assembly Election: Preliminary Statement by the Carter <strong>Center</strong>, April 12, 2008.3 This was in accordance with an Action Plan agreed during a mid-December visit to Nepal by the SRSGfor Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomeraraswamy.4 “Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peaceprocess,” S/2010/214, 28 April 2010.

Somalia | 953.8M i s s i o n R e v i e w sSomaliaSomalia is the world’s prototypical failed state:fourteen successive internationally recognizedgovernments have been unable to impart stabilitysince the early 1990s. The country now presents theinternational community and the United Nationsa complex set of challenges: piracy off its coastlinethreatening international commercial routes; asecurity vacuum filled by domestic jihadist groupswith links to Al Qaida; an internal conflict that isfuelled in part by regional powers and finally one ofthe world’s worst humanitarian crisis.The humanitarian situation has followed adownward trajectory along with political and securityprospects. Nearly half the population relies onexternal assistance and more than 2 million are displacedwithin the country’s borders or in neighboringstates. Both the world’s largest internally displacedsettlement (roughly 500,000 people displaced rightoutside Mogadishu), and the world’s largest refugeecamp (in Dadaab, Kenya) are products of the Somalisecurity crisis.While political developments in early 2009presented an opportunity for a reduction in thelevel of violence and greater stability, the past twelvemonths have been marred by frequent attacks witha high number of civilian casualties, as well as slowprogress on the political front. The dimensions ofthe conflict are at once local – with the resurgenceof clan-based politics and warlordism – and global,with the international community’s rhetoric eagerto associate Somali Islamists with Al Qaida. Governmentcontrol remains confined to a few blocksin Mogadishu, and talks of reconciliation betweenvarious groups often does not translate into freedomfrom harm for civilians. To a large extent, the politicalnegotiations convened by the UN, which mostlytake place in foreign capitals in the region, havebeen delinked from events inside Somalia.BackgroundThe United Nations Political Office for Somalia(UNPOS) was established in April 1995, immediatelyfollowing the withdrawal of UNOSOM II– a UN peacekeeping operation that had benefitedfrom ambitious international support but had largelyfailed in its aim to promote national reconciliation.As thousands of UN troops and staff withdrew,

96 | Mission ReviewsUN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)Authorization Date 28 March 1995(UNSC Report S/1995/23)Start Date 15 April 1995SRSGAugustine P. Mahiga (Tanzania)Budget$17.0 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 37early 2010 Local Civilian: 6For detailed mission information see p. 211the Secretary-General instructed his representativeto relocate to Nairobi, establishing a small officedesigned to monitor political developments andmaintain communication with relevant actors insideSomalia. Over the years UNPOS’ role has expandedand the office was involved in the facilitation of anumber of peace processes, including the formationof the Transitional National Government in2000, and the 2002-2004 IGAD 1 led process thatestablished the Transitional Federal Charter and thecurrent Transitional Federal Government (TFG).While the country has been marred by conflictfor the past two decades, the last three years havebeen particularly brutal. Worried by the rise of agrass-roots movement called the Union of IslamicCourts, Ethiopia invaded southern Somalia in late2006 to protect its interests and install the TFG inMogadishu. The occupation, which was tacitly supportedby the US and lasted until early 2009, fueledthe current Islamic insurgency.In February 2007 the UN Security Councilauthorized the deployment of an African Unionpeacekeeping mission to Somalia (AMISOM) –with a mandate to support political reconciliation,protect the Transitional Federal Institutions and,somewhat controversially, facilitate the deliveryof humanitarian assistance. The composition ofAMISOM was to grow to a total of 8,000 troops,but its capacity increased slowly so that as of July2010, it consists of just over 6,200 troops fromUganda and Burundi.The limited capacity of the AMISOM mission,coupled with the sharp deterioration of security andhumanitarian conditions, led to calls in 2008 for thedeployment of a large UN peacekeeping mission totake over.In late December 2008, isolated andunpopular, Somalia’s President Abdullahi Youssufresigned, paving the way for the election – by Parliamentariansconvening in Djibouti – of SheikhSharif Sheikh Ahmed to the presidency. SheikhSharif, a moderate Islamist who had been headof the Union of Islamic Courts, brought somelegitimacy to the position and was expected tobring members of the opposition into the politicalfold. The election in January 2009 coincidedwith the withdrawal of the last Ethiopian troopsfrom Somalia.The early optimism surrounding the arrivalof the new Somali leadership faded away over thecourse of 2009 as political talks faltered. The mainIslamist group, Al Shabaab, vowed to fight on.Attacks against the government and AMISOMtroops – including suicide bombings which killedTFG ministers and the AMISOM deputy forcecommander – intensified. Furthermore, insurgentgroups were not united and confronted each otheras they jockeyed for greater territorial and economiccontrol. In June 2009, the TFG declared astate of emergency. Fearing that the governmentwould surrender its position and collapse, theUS sent arms and ammunition to support TFGsecurity forces.In recent years the international profile ofthe Somali conflict has increased, but attentionhas mainly focused on the issue of piracy offSomalia’s coast. Taking advantage of the prevailinglawlessness, Somali pirates have considerablyincreased the number of attacks and the size oftheir ransoms.UNPOS’ raison d’être remains the promotionof peace and stability in Somalia – an arduous taskmade even more difficult by the loaded history ofthe UN and foreign interventions in the country.In the summer of 2008, UNPOS achieved a breakthroughby convening a High Level Committeebetween TFG representatives and the leaders of thearmed opposition – calling themselves the Alliancefor the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). The talksled to a temporary ceasefire and the withdrawalof Ethiopian troops. The resulting three-pageagreement paved the way for a process of politicalreconciliation – the Djibouti Process – which is stillongoing today.UNPOS views the Djibouti process as astructured mechanism to address political grievances

Somalia | 97The AU Panel of Eminent African PersonalitiesIn January 2008, the African Union mandated the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, chaired by former UNSecretary-General Kofi Annan, to mediate in the crisis following Kenya’s contested 2007 elections. On 1 February2008, the Kenyan government and the opposition Orange Democratic Movement embarked on a process of talksentitled “The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation” (KNDR). In mid-February, they agreed to form a coalitiongovernment. In March, they agreed to set up a commission of inquiry into the post-electoral violence, a Truth,Justice and Reconciliation Commission, and an Independent Review Committee to look into the conduct of theelections themselves.While the mediation phase of the KNDR was declared complete in July 2008, implementing the agreementsremained a significant challenge. The Panel, and especially Kofi Annan, continued to engage in Kenyan politics.To support its work, a Coordination and Liaison Office (CLO) was mandated “to assist in the implementation ofthe agreements reached by the National Dialogue and to support the Coalition Government as it seeks to addressthe root causes of the 2007 post-election crisis.” The CLO replaced a larger team of officials set up in Nairobi toserve the Panel in early 2008.While the CLO provides support to the Coalition – running, for example, a government project to archive theKNDR’s work – the Panel hired an independent firm, South Consulting, to report on progress on the peaceaccord. South, with a grant from the Open Society Institute, has published quarterly monitoring reports since January2009.CLO does not maintain a high profile – its head, an experienced diplomat, has the relatively functional title “Chief ofStaff” – but Kofi Annan and other Panel members have kept up pressure on all parties to avoid a return to violence.On more than one occasion, Annan criticized Kenyan leaders for acting in ways that could unravel the peace deal.Nonetheless, Kenya passed an important milestone when voters approved a new constitution in an August 2010referendum, limiting the president’s powers.The CLO is an unusual political mission, providing technical services to both the Panel and the government, whileworking under the overall aegis of the AU. As such, it provides an interesting model for field-based support todrawn-out mediation processes.as well as security, human rights and humanitarianissues. However, Al Shabaab dismisses the process,while humanitarians are keen to distance themselvesfrom the political initiative.The Djibouti process can claim some successes,most notably the establishment in early 2009 of anational unity government; the enlargement of parliamentfrom 275 to 550 members (200 including75 seats for civil society groups and the Diaspora)as well as the indirect presidential elections inJanuary 2009.At present the intensity and breadth of theUN’s engagement in Somalia is at its highest sincethe mid 1990s. UNPOS’ mandate has considerablyevolved to encompass a much broader rangeof tasks, as reflected in the latest Security CouncilResolutions. UNPOS’ current responsibilitiesinclude the implementation of the Djibouti peaceprocess and coordinating international efforts tosupport the process; assisting the re-establishment,training and retention of Somali securityforces, including military, police and judiciary,and to solicit contributions and establish a trustfund in support to these activities; coordinatingall activities of the UN in Somalia, providinggood offices and political support for the efforts toestablish lasting peace and stability, and mobilizingresources and support from the internationalcommunity for recovery and long-term economicdevelopment of the country; coordinatingcounter-piracy initiatives in the region, includingfacilitating information sharing and coordinationbetween the TFG, Puntland and “Somaliland”authorities; and working with the TFG to develop

98 | Mission Reviewsits capacity to address human rights issues andto support the Justice and Reconciliation workinggroup created through the Djibouti process tocounter impunity.These expanded responsibilities, however,have not been matched by a commensurate increasein staff, either in New York or in Nairobi, restrictingthe mission’s ability to effectively engage in theimplementation of its mandate. Moreover, despitethe presence of military advisors and humanrights officers, the ability of UNPOS to monitorsecurity and human rights developments has beenextremely marginal due to lack of physical presenceinside Somalia.UNPOS constitutes a minimally integratedfield presence. While the SRSG heads the mission,the eighteen UN agencies, funds and programs areunder the leadership of the Resident and HumanitarianCoordinator (RC/HC), who is placedoutside the mission structure. The main benefitof this arrangement is that humanitarian agencies,such as the World Food Program and the UN HighCommissioner for Refugees, can claim to operateindependently from political imperatives. OneUNHCR official mentioned that he “would neverride in a UNDP convoy” for fear of being associatedwith the political process. However, in practice, theSRSG has been promoting greater integration andcoordination between the various UN bodies.UN Somalia Sanctions Committee andMonitoring GroupThe Somalia Sanctions Committee was firstestablished in 1992 to oversee the complete armsembargo that the Security Council imposed onthe country. A Monitoring Group that succeededa Panel of Experts first established in 2002 supportsthe work of the Committee by generatinginformation on violations of the arms embargo. InNovember of 2008 Security Council Resolution1844 expanded the Somalia sanctions regime toinclude a travel ban and assets freeze on violatorsof the arms embargo, individuals who threaten thepeace, security and stability of Somalia or impedethe delivery of or access to humanitarian assistance.An exemption to this resolution was granted in May2009 in order to allow the US to fund and deliverweapons and ammunition to the TFG.The Committee is composed of representativesfrom all Security Council member states. It is responsiblefor making recommendations for SecurityCouncil action to be taken in response to violationsof the sanctions regime. In doing so, the Committeetakes both technical and political considerations intoaccount when formulating recommendations. Assuch, the Committee receives briefings from boththe Monitoring Group on Somalia and UNPOS.The relationship between UNPOS and theMonitoring Group has room for improvement, asthe information exchange between UNPOS andmembers of the Group has been negligible. Overall,t<strong>here</strong> has been very little cooperation or collaborationbetween these two bodies. That said, UNPOS maysend representatives to attend the Group’s technicallevel briefings before the Sanctions Committee.In March 2010, the Monitoring Group issueda report detailing violations of the arms embargo,and more controversially asserting that businessand insurgent groups in collusion with World FoodProgram subcontractors diverted up to 50 percentof food aid away from its intended beneficiaries.ConclusionUNPOS faces challenges from both the externaloperating environment and the internal UN dynamicsbetween the mission, UN headquarters and otherUN bodies and agencies. While the TFG remains(somewhat tenuously) based in Mogadishu, UNPOSoffices for now continue to be located in neighboringKenya. However, some fifteen years after the“temporary” office was established in Nairobi, theUN in early August 2010 considered re-establishinga light presence of UNPOS personnel first in Puntland,then in Somaliland and finally in Mogadishuin the near future. The UN announced its plansafter African Union leaders in late July pledged toboost AMISOM to its mandated strength of 8,000troops. Thus far, the security situation has been toovolatile, and threats against foreign institutions tooacute to allow UNPOS to relocate to Somalia’s capital,presenting more than just a logistical obstacle.Many UNPOS staff rarely, if ever, set foot insideSomali territory, which renders communicationsand dialogue more remote, and hampers the politicalmediation efforts. Only a few senior UNPOSstaff travel on a regular and frequent basis for daily

Somalia | 99visits into Mogadishu. Whether the enhanced troopstrength will enable AMISOM to stabilize the countryand allow the UN to effectively increase its staffin Somalia remains to be seen.So far, the level of insecurity is of such magnitudethat security sector reform has been near-impossibleto implement on the scale necessary to have a meaningfulimpact. The weakness of security institutionssuch as the police or the army, as well as the overalllack of TFG legitimacy and control within thecountry, has led to real concerns that donor moneymight end up falling in the hands of the powerfulmilitias that control large parts of south-centralSomalia, including much of the capital.Moreover, the international community, andin particular the US, has tended to view Somaliathrough the prism of the global war on terror. Thedecision to add Al Shabaab and some of its leadersto the State Department’s terrorist list has made itmore politically difficult for the UN to engage relevantactors in constructive dialogue. The focus ofdonor countries on the issue of terrorism has alsoresulted in the support of certain warlords over others– which has, in effect, destabilized the peaceprocess. Similarly, the focus on piracy – with littleappetite from donors to address its root causes – hasshifted attention and resources away from the situationinside the country.From September 2007 to June 2010, UNPOSwas under the leadership of SRSG AhmedouOuld-Abdallah. A retired Mauritanian diplomatnearing the end of his career, he had some successin bringing greater international attention onSomalia and engaged the vocal Somali Diaspora.However, critics charge that in the process he systematicallyisolated himself and his office from otherUN agencies, organizations and funds, and evenhis colleagues at UN headquarters in New York.Despite the precarious security situation in Somalia,Ould-Abdallah made the relocation of UNPOSto Mogadishu a cornerstone of his strategy, arguingthat the international community, and by extensionaid organizations, could best serve Somalis throughproximity. His successor Augustine Mahiga, theformer Tanzanian Ambassador to the UN, partlyshares this notion. Mr. Mahiga is well-liked in NewYork circles and his experience on both political andhumanitarian issues – he served UNHCR in variouscapacities – is seen as an asset.In addition to ensuring a secure and gradualincrease of UN staff in Somalia, one of Mr. Mahiga’sfirst tasks will be to mend the difficult relationship inNairobi between UNPOS, the UN Country Teamand the humanitarian organizations both withinand outside of the UN system. These problems canbe largely traced to a lack of information exchangebetween UNPOS and various UN actors and thatUNPOS initiatives and decisions often take otherUN stakeholders by surprise and vice versa. Mostcontroversially, the humanitarian community hasvoiced concerns that their assistance is perceived asbeing co-opted by UNPOS for political gains.The relationship between UNPOS and theUN headquarters staff in New York – both in theDepartment of Political Affairs and the Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations – is strained. It isfelt that DPKO’s cautious stance on the deploymentof a UN force, a requirement for the success of UNoperations in Somalia in the eyes of the previousSRSG, has impeded the relationship between thetwo entities. Between UNPOS and the Departmentof Political Affairs, poor information and analysissharing has made it difficult for staff at UNHQto advocate on behalf of UNPOS for new fundingand human resources. In addition, the previousSRSG’s assertive leadership approach frequentlyled to a disconnect between policy decisions madeat headquarters and the field level.Going forward, it is difficult to imagine anoptimistic scenario. The weakness of the TFG derivesin large part from the perception that it is an entityimposed on the country by foreign interests, and assuch, increased international support – includingUNPOS support – to the institution is very mucha double edged sword. The TFG has also failed toenhance its legitimacy through the delivery of basicservices to Somalis. In fact, quite the opposite, TFGforces have been repeatedly accused of being predatoryand harassing the civilian population, a factwhich has implications for the acceptance, legitimacy,and t<strong>here</strong>fore effectiveness, of institutions likeUNPOS, whose sole focus has been on the TFG.Political discussions have too often fallen intozero-sum negotiations for individual or clan gains.The power of UNPOS – with or without the internationalcommunity’s support – to impose or evencajole political players into a political outcome isseverely limited. The lessons learned of the pasttwo decades suggest that even an external force

100 | Mission Reviews– be it a peacekeeping mission or an internationallysanctioned military intervention – is unlikely tochange this dynamic. In fact, experience has shownthat this sort of intervention is likely to exacerbateviolence and further complicate the already intractablepolitical tensions. Calls for a “Somali owned”political solution may have become a cliché in policycircles, but the perceived illegitimacy of foreignentities in the Somali context dictate that UNPOS’most useful role is not as a policy leader or chiefmoderator, but as the facilitator of a Somali-ledprocess, if such a process is ever to emerge.notes1 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional development organization in East Africadevoted to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and humanitarian affairs.

Mission Notes 44.1 Caucasus and Moldova4.2 Central America and the Caribbean4.3 Central Asia4.4 Myanmar4.5 Western Sahara101

102 | Mission Notes4.1M i s s i o n N o t e sCaucasus and MoldovaIn the 1990s, the Organization for Security andCo-operation in Europe (OSCE) deployed asignificant number of missions to former Sovietstates in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Theseincluded operations in Estonia, Georgia, Latviaand Ukraine and an assistance group in Chechnya(Russia). Today, the organization’s footprint in t<strong>here</strong>gion is reduced, but it still maintains missions inArmenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova in addition tooffices in Belarus and Ukraine. The EU has alsodeployed a number of Special Representatives(EUSRs) and civilian missions to the region in thelast decade.The outlook for the international presence inthese former Soviet states is uncertain. The 2008war between Russia and Georgia led to a significantshake-up of the political and monitoring presencesin the country. Prior to the war, a UN peacekeepingoperation (UNOMIG) had patrolled the secessionistregion of Abkhazia while OSCE monitorscovered South Ossetia, which also claimed independence.Both of these missions survived the war, buthave since been closed due to political differencesbetween Russia (which now recognizes Abkhaziaand South Ossetia as sovereign states) and othermembers of the UN Security Council and OSCEMinisterial Council. The UN and OSCE continueto co-facilitate talks on the secessionist regions inGeneva with the EU, which maintains both a monitoringmission and a number of EUSRs coveringGeorgian affairs.In the last year attention has switched tomounting tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijanover the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh,Armenian police officers undergo public order management training in Yerevanduring an assessment conducted by the OSCE Office, 22 February 2010.with which the OSCE has long been involved. Bycontrast, t<strong>here</strong> have been signs that Russia and theEU may cooperate to resolve the frozen conflict inMoldova and the secessionist Transdniestrian region.South CaucasusSince the closure of its mission in Georgia in2009, the OSCE field presence in the SouthCaucasus has consisted of offices in Baku andYerevan, the capitals of Azerbaijan and Armenia.However, the OSCE’s engagement in the disputeover Nagorno-Karabakh is also channeledthrough an envoy (the Personal Representativeof the Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealtwith by the OSCE Minsk Conference) based inTblisi, Georgia.OSCE/Laura Hayruni

CaucasUs and Moldova | 103The offices in Baku and Yerevan are relativelysmall (t<strong>here</strong> are twelve and seven internationalstaff in the respective offices) and both havewide-ranging mandates to work with bothgovernment and civil society on political, security,social and economic issues. Much of their workinvolves supporting government activities throughcommissioning independent studies of policychallenges: in 2010, for example, the office inYerevan published reports on issues ranging fromreligious tolerance to military detention.Both offices also monitor human rights, theadministration of justice and press freedom, workingclosely with the OSCE Office for DemocraticInstitutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). In2008, ODIHR published a critical report on theAzeri presidential election.The broad mandates of both missions meanthat they sometimes become involved in issues mostpolitical missions would not. In 2010, the Office inYerevan – coordinating with the World Bank andthe UN Food and Agriculture Organization – laidout proposals for dealing with a hazardous chemicalwaste dump which the government implemented.However, while the two offices are specificallycharged with tracking political developments, bothare explicitly distinct from the OSCE’s efforts toresolve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute through theMinsk Process. Nagorno-Karabakh is an Armenianmajorityarea within Azerbaijan, and was in a stateof civil war from 1988 to 1994. The OSCE launcheddiplomatic efforts to resolve the war in 1992, overseenby the “Minsk Group” of states concerned withthe conflict. In 1994, OSCE members decided todeploy a peacekeeping force to Nagorno-Karabakhin the event of a peace agreement.While large-scale hostilities ended in 1994, nosuch agreement has been made. The “Republic” ofNagorno-Karabakh, which has no internationalrecognition, remains outside Azeri governmentcontrol. Armenian forces control not only Nagorno-Karabakh but also Azerbaijani territory to the westand south of the secessionist region.The OSCE has maintained an unusual set ofmechanisms to deal with the frozen conflict andprepare the way for a peacekeeping mission if oneis ever required. These include not only the MinskGroup but a High-Level Planning Group of sixmilitary staff officers based in Vienna responsibleCiO Representative on Minsk ConferenceAuthorization Date 10 August 1995 (DOC. 525/95)Start Date January 1997Head of Mission Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk(Poland)Budget$1.5 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 61 August 2010 Local Staff: 11For detailed mission information see p. 286EUSR for the Crisis in GeorgiaAuthorization 15 September 2008(2008/736/ CFSP)Start DateFebruary 2009 (2008/760/CFSP)Head of Mission Pierre Morel(France)Budget$.7 million(1 March 2010-31 August 2010)EUSR for the South CaucasusAuthorization andStart DateHead of MissionBudget7 July 2003 (2003/496/CFSP)Peter Semneby(Sweden)$2.4 million(1 March 2010-31 August 2010)for operational preparations. Since 1995, the PersonalRepresentative has been the OSCE’s primaryface in the region itself – literally so, as the widelyrespectedAndrzej Kasprzyk of Poland has held thepost since its inception.The Personal Representative has “fieldassistants” in Baku, Yerevan and Nagorno-Karabakhitself. With a very limited number of staff,Ambassador Kasprzyk is required to monitor afrontline of nearly two hundred kilometers. Thomasde Waal, an expert on the conflict, notes that “themonitors must give advance warning of several daysif they wish to visit a section of the frontline” andargues that their main function is to act as “a meansof communication between the Armenian andAzerbaijani military commanders.”

104 | Mission NotesOSCE Office in BakuAuthorization Date 16 November 1999 (PCDEC/318)Start Date July 2000Head of Mission Ambassador Bilge Cankorel(Turkey)Budget$3.7 million(1 January 2010-31December 2010)Strength as of 1 International Staff: 11August 2010 Local Staff: 27For detailed mission information see p. 265OSCE Office in YerevanA Moldovan border guard and friend.EUBAMAuthorization Date 22 July 1999 (PC.DEC/314)Start Date February 2000Head of Mission Ambassador Sergey Kapinos(Russian Federation)Budget$3.9 million(1 January 2010-31December 2010)Strength as of 1 International Staff: 21August 2010 Local Staff: 74For detailed mission information see p. 273The frontline has become increasinglyunstable in 2010, with a series of clashes resultingin fatalities for both sides. The number of incidentsspiked in August and September, and the co-chairsof the Minsk Group (France, Russia and the US)appealed for calm. Russia has made sustained diplomaticefforts to handle the crisis this year, hostingthe Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers forbilateral talks in June. Nonetheless, t<strong>here</strong> is a riskthat the conflict may deteriorate, leaving the MinskProcess’s future in question.The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is also on theagenda of the European Union’s Special Representative(EUSR) for the South Caucasus, currentlyPeter Semneby of Sweden. The EUSR’s involvementin the conflict is complicated by the fact thatthe EU is not formally represented in the MinskGroup but Ambassador Semneby (who took uphis post in 2006) has attempted to ease tensions.To assist him, the EU appointed political advisersto the EUSR based in Yerevan and Baku in 2007.In 2010, the EUSR publicly underlined concernsabout the escalating conflict in parallel with theMinsk Group.In spite of this engagement on Nagorno-Karabakh, the role of the EUSR for the SouthCaucasus – originally created in 2003 – was moreclosely associated with Georgian affairs beforethe 2008 war. Ambassador Semneby’s predecessorHeidi Talvitie played a mediating role in the peacefulre-entry of the breakaway region of Ajara intoGeorgia in 2004. In 2005, the EU deployed a oneyearjustice mission to Georgia and also considereddeploying a border monitoring mission to replace aprevious OSCE monitoring operation.Apparently concerned by Russian objectionsto the deployment of a full-scale EU mission,the EU instead created a Border Support Team(BST) answering to the EUSR. Launched in 2006,the BST consists of six international staff and threeGeorgian experts, that work closely with the nationalauthorities on improving border management. Evenprior to the 2008 war, the BST could not operate inAbkhazia and South Ossetia.

CaucasUs and Moldova | 105The 2008 war resulted in an expansion andcomplication of the EU presence in Georgia. TheEU not only deployed a stand-alone monitoringmission reporting directly to Brussels (EUMM)but also designated a new EUSR for the Crisisin Georgia. Pierre Morel (who also acts as theEUSR for Central Asia) is responsible for givingpolitical guidance to the EUMM and co-moderatesthe talks in Geneva with the OSCE and theUN. Twelve rounds of talks had taken place bymid-2010, but this process has largely focused ontechnical issues rather than addressing the causesof the conflict. In June 2010, Abkhaz negotiatorsthreatened to suspend participation, but relentedshortly afterwards.Peter Semneby has continued to be involved inGeorgian affairs, following the formula of “engagementwith recognition” with Abkhazia and SouthOssetia. However, in July 2010 it was decided thatthe EUSR for the South Caucasus’s mandate wouldend in early 2011.OSCE Mission to MoldovaAuthorization Date 4 February 1993 (19-CSO/Journal No. 3, Annex 3)Start Date April 1993Head of Mission Ambassador Philip N. Remler(United States)Budget$2.7 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 131 August 2010 Local Staff: 37For detailed mission information see p. 254EUSR for MoldovaAuthorization Date 23 March 2005 (2005/265/CFSP)Start Date November 2005Head of Mission Kálmán Mizsei(Hungary)Budget$2.7 million(1 January 2010 - 31 December 2010)MoldovaIn 1992, tensions between Moldova and thesecessionist region of Transdniestria escalated tocivil war. The conflict was complicated by thefact that, while Transdniestria is relatively small,significant numbers of Russian troops are based t<strong>here</strong>.In February 1993, the OSCE deployed a missionto Moldova, mandated to help facilitate a politicalsettlement. Although t<strong>here</strong> has been no returnto war, talks on a political settlement broke downin 2004 and stalled again in 2006 and the conflictremains unresolved.The OSCE mission is relatively small, withjust thirteen international staff, but has played avariety of technical roles aimed at mitigating theeffects of the frozen conflict. These have includedthe verification of the withdrawal and destructionof Russian military equipment under the ConventionalForces in Europe (CFE) Treaty; developingproposals to increase military transparency betweenMoldovan and Trandniestrian forces; and effortsto combat human trafficking. The mission hasalso monitored elections and rule of law issues,developing new trial-monitoring mechanisms inrecent years.EU Border AssistanceMission to Moldova (EUBAM)Authorization Date 7 October 2005(The Memorandumof Understanding)Start Date 30 November 2005Head of Mission Udo Burkholder (Germany)BudgetAbout $30.9 million(December 2009-November 2011)Strength as of International Staff: 10027 May 2010 Local Staff: 100In 2009, Moldova was briefly gripped by riotingafter presidential elections. In 2010, oppositionparties instigated a referendum aimed at nullifyingthose elections. The OSCE was criticized in Moldovanmedia for not monitoring this – criticismsthe head of mission dismissed as “baseless” – but theturnout was below the legally-required minimum.The EU has engaged heavily in Moldovanaffairs since 2005, when it appointed its first EUSRto the country. That year, the EU also launched aBorder Assistance Mission (EUBAM) aimed atcracking down on smuggling between Ukraine

106 | Mission Notesand Moldova (unusually, the EU does not run thismission directly but sub-contracts it to the UNDevelopment Programme). This went down badlywith the Transdniestrian authorities, who controlpart of the border area and profited from illegalcross-border trade. EUBAM is headquartered inOdessa, Ukraine, and operates in both Ukraineand Moldova.In a complex arrangement, the EUSR doesnot have direct authority over EUBAM, but theborder mission’s leader is double-hatted as a politicaladvisor to the EUSR. The EUSR also has asupport team of advisors based in Moldova andUkraine – the EUSR himself is based in Brussels. InJuly 2010 it was decided to terminate the EUSR’smandate in 2011.T<strong>here</strong> have been some positive signs of progresstowards a political settlement in Moldova however.In mid-2010, Germany and Russia proposed settingup a joint EU-Russia Security Committee, andsuggested that Transdniestra top its initial agenda.Better cooperation between Brussels and Moscowmay help end the frozen conflict. It would alsoreduce the role of the OSCE as a mediator in thislong-running stand-off.ConclusionWhile t<strong>here</strong> may be new openings for a settlementin Moldova, the situations in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh do not seem set for imminent resolution.Although the EU is rationalizing its role in t<strong>here</strong>gion, and the OSCE has a much-reduced role overGeorgia, it is likely that a variety of political missionswill be required in these former Soviet statesfor some time yet – especially as the potential forfurther conflicts remains significant.notes1 Details on EUSRs in this mission note draw heavily on Giovanni Grevi, “Pioneering Foreign Policy: the EUSpecial Representatives,” Chaillot Paper No. 106, Institute for Security Studies, October 2007.2 Thomas de Waal, “Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process,” Survival, Vol. 52, No. 4, August 2010, p166.

Central America and the Caribbean | 1074.2M i s s i o n N o t e sCentral America and the CaribbeanSince its founding in 1948, the Organizationof American States (OAS) has served as theprimary political forum in the America’s regionthat works to address issues of peace and justiceamongst its 35 member states. In serving this role,the OAS has deployed a variety of missions duringits history, below are descriptions of four missionscurrently in the field.ColombiaSince January 2004 the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS) Mission to Support the PeaceProcess in Colombia (MAPP) has been deployedto support the ongoing dialogue between the Governmentof Colombia and opposition forces, verifyand monitor the demobilization of the rightwing rebel group, United Self Defense Forces ofColombia (UAC), as well as to provide support tocommunities who were victims of violence.Originally a mission of only 44 civilian experts,MAPP’s size was roughly doubled in 2006 followinga critical performance assessment conducted bythe OAS and growing criticism from ColombianNGOs that the mission lacked the resources togo beyond basic demobilization verification. Theenhanced mission strength yielded a heightenedMAPP presence and activity in the field. Since itsestablishment, MAPP has assisted in the disarmingof over 30,000 UAC paramilitaries and t<strong>here</strong>bel group no longer appears as an actor on thepolitical stage.Despite this progress, in the first half of 2010OAS Secretary-General José Miguel Insulzawarned that just as the mission had contributed tothe evolution of stability in Colombia, challengesrelated to the reintegration of the demobilizedUAC fighters and the emergence of illicit sub-statestructures threatened the country’s achievements.Indeed, during the year, MAPP observed theincreasing phenomenon of paramilitary “recycling,”w<strong>here</strong> illegal armed groups comprised of boththe dismantled forces and new adolescent recruitshave emerged seeking to control illegal economicactivities. These units are connected to drug traffickingactivities and over the course of the lastthree years have established presences throughoutColombia’s territory. The emergence of the groupshas had a deleterious effect on the peace processw<strong>here</strong> as a result of extortion, murders – whichrose by alarming levels in urban centers throughoutthe year - and acts of intimidation, the majorityof Colombia’s population sees little change in theirpersonal security.Recognizing the necessity for a comprehensivenational strategy aimed at stemming recruitmentto illegal armed groups, providing reintegrationopportunities and reinforcing the authorityof the state, MAPP worked closely with Colombia’sDepartment for Reintegration (ACR) in itsongoing development of a National ReintegrationPolicy. From MAPP’s perspective, Colombia’sreintegration model must rest on the commitmentof society as a whole to coexist peacefully. Here,the participation of Colombia’s private sector

108 | Mission NotesOAS Mission to Support thePeace Process in Colombia (MAPP/OAS)Authorization and 6 February 2004 (CP/RES. 859)Start DateHead of Mission Marcelo Alvarez (Argentina)Staff Strength International Civilian: 30as of 2009 Local Civilian: 59OAS Special Mission for StrengtheningDemocracy in HaitiAuthorization Date 16 January 2002 (CP/RES.806 (1303/02))Start Date June 2004Head of Mission Denneth Modeste (Grenada)OAS Office in the Adjacency Zone betweenBelize and Guatemala (OAS/AZ)Authorization and 7 February 2003Start Date(Agreement on the Promotion ofConfidence-Building Measures)Head of Mission Miguel Angel (Trinidad)OAS Mission of Good Offices betweenColombia and Ecuador (MIB/OEA)Authorization and 17 March 2008Start Date(RC.25/doc.15/08 andRC.25/RES.1/08 rev. 1)Head of Mission Victor Rico (Bolivia)businesses is crucial to providing alternatives forformer combatants and vulnerable adolescents, yetMAPP observed a record of disorganized privatesector engagement that could prove to be moreconfusing than helpful if not addressed.Similarly, MAPP continued to supportColombia’s implementation of the Justice andPeace Law throughout the year. The law, passed in2005, seeks to bring to justice combatants allegedof crimes during Colombia’s conflict. While thelaw has elicited the participation of more than280,000 victims of paramilitary violence, the lackof final judgments in these cases was a source ofconcern for the mission. Further, despite the apparentcommitment to justice, the requisite structuresnecessary for enforcing judicial decisions remainunderdeveloped, a reality that holds implications forthe development of trust amongst the population -a crucial component for the long-term consolidationof peace. Considering the progress that Colombiahas registered with the support of MAPP and themultitude of outstanding issues that remain to beaddressed to entrench the peace, both the missionand the Colombian government will need to redoubletheir efforts in the coming years.HaitiThe OAS has also maintained an operation inHaiti. The OAS Special Mission for StrengtheningDemocracy in Haiti was deployed in 2004 toassist the country through the tense political periodthat followed the end of the country’s conflict earlierthat year.Beyond its political facilitation role, the OASmission was also mandated by the OAS GeneralAssembly to assist in the preparation for Haiti’spresidential elections in 2006, in cooperation withUN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).A memorandum between the two organizationsassigned principal responsibility for voter registrationto the OAS, while MINUSTAH was taskedwith supervising all aspects of the electoral process,and with providing security. The OAS’s NationalHaiti Office, which had been operating in thecountry since 1956, significantly supplemented theSpecial Mission’s work in support of the elections.Haiti’s 2006 elections were considered relativelysuccessful and were followed by growing security inits urban areas. Nevertheless, the political situationhas remained volatile, with the need for the OAS’scontinued political facilitation clear. This realitywas best demonstrated when a protracted period ofgovernment inefficiency in Haiti was capped withthe ouster of Prime Minister Pierre Louis in October2009. While the prime minister was quicklyreplaced, Haiti remains prone to political conflict asit continues its post-conflict recovery.During 2007 and with an eye towardstreamlining its activities in the country, the OAS

Central America and the Caribbean | 109General Assembly consolidated the organization’spresence under the single representation ofthe OAS Haiti Office. In its current form, theOAS works on a range of projects supportingdemocratic governance, human rights, socioeconomicdevelopment and the strengthening ofHaiti’s political institutions.The January 2010 earthquake in Haiti haddramatic impact on the OAS’s mission in thecountry, but also served as an impetus for the organizationto maintain its presence and heighten itsefforts to confront what will continue to presentpolitical challenges necessary of facilitation.In support of Haiti’s legislative and presidentialelections – delayed after the earthquake andrescheduled for 28 November 2010 – the OASalong side the Caribbean Community (CARI-COM) will deploy a Joint Electoral ObservationMission. The 150 observers in the mission willoversee various aspects of the electoral process,including voter registration, providing technicalassistance to the country’s Provisional ElectoralCouncil technical and logistical support to votetabulation centers.The Belize and GuatemalaAdjacency ZoneDuring 2000, Belize and Guatemala resumednegotiations on their centuries old territorial disputeunder the auspices of the OAS. By 2003 the talksyielded an agreement to continue negotiations untilstatus of the disputed area was reached, creatingan Adjacency Zone (AZ) in the disputed territorialarea. The agreement also established the Officeof the OAS General Secretariat in the AdjacencyZone (OAS/AZ) for the dual tasks of overseeingand assisting in confidence-building measuresbetween Belize and Guatemala and monitoring thezone for verification of violations. Beyond thoseverifications requested in writing by the governments,the OAS/AZ performs unrequested verificationsthat are identified by the Incident EarlyWarning System designed by the mission to defusepotentially volatile situations. The OAS/AZconducts over 100 verifications each year.Beyond the primary tasks described above,the OAS/AZ supports the normalization ofrelations between the armed forces of Guatemalaand Belize. Here, the mission’s activity with themilitaries has served to coordinate and standardizegeographic names used in the AZ and establishedtheir agreed locations on maps. The OAS/AZ alsosupported the resettlement of communities locatedin the AZ to their respective national borders.This activity involves not only the relocation of thecommunities, but also the building of new homes,creation of basic services and replanting of crops tosustain them.During 2008, and at the suggestion of theOAS Secretary General, the parties agreed torefer their territorial dispute to the InternationalCourt of Justice. Subsequent to this agreement,both countries are preparing for simultaneousreferendums in each country on the decision toask the International Court of Justice to settle thedispute. Meanwhile, Guatemala and Belize continueto negotiate in good faith, with representativesof both countries agreeing under the auspices ofthe OAS in March 2010 to create a High LevelWorking Group to facilitate direct and continuouscommunications between both countries on thesituation in the Adjacency Zone and to identifyareas of shared concern.Colombia and EcuadorColombia’s March 2008 military incursion intoEcuador’s territory sparked a diplomatic crisisbetween the two nations, with Ecuador cuttingits diplomatic ties with Colombia. In responseto the heightened tensions that followed thecrisis, the OAS authorized the Colombia –Ecuador Good Offices Mission (MIB/OEA)at the XXV Meeting of Ministers of ForeignRelations. The mission focuses on promoting t<strong>here</strong>-establishment of trust among the two governmentsthrough confidence building measures,verifying compliance with the commitmentsmade by both countries in the aftermath of thecrisis and works to prevent and verification ofincidents on the border.

110 | Mission NotesThe mission is composed of a team ofcivilian experts on political, security, defense andtrans-border cooperation. MIB/OEA receivesadditional supported from the OAS missionin Bogota. Since its establishment, MIB/OEAhas convened a series of meetings betweenhigh-ranking civilian and military representativesfrom both Ecuador and Colombia in an effort torebuild relations between the two countries andremains deployed.notes1 See Human Rights Watch report Paramilitaries’ Heirs, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/88058/section/4.

Central Asia | 1114.3M i s s i o n N o t e sCentral AsiaThe 2008-2009 economic and financial criseshit Central Asia hard. Although the negativeeffect on national GDPs was less than expected, thecrises – when combined with rising food and energyprices – exacerbated strains on livelihoods, increasedinequalities and contributed to regional insecurity.In early April 2010, the Kyrgyz government wasoverthrown in the bloodiest unrest the region hasseen in the past five years. The continuation ofviolence in Kyrgyzstan, even after the installment ofan interim government, has raised fears of possiblespillover into the broader region. Meanwhile,regional security is jeopardized by the precarioussituation in neighboring Afghanistan.The United Nations Regional Centre forPreventive Diplomacy for Central Asia(UNRCCA) was established at the initiative ofthe governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to addressregional security threats such as terrorism, drugtrafficking, organized crime and environmentaldegradation. 1 The UN was not the first organizationto set up a political mission in the region.The OSCE has maintained a network of officesin regional capitals, in some cases for more than adecade, and t<strong>here</strong> is an EU Special Representative(EUSR) for Central Asia (see box).Inaugurated on 10 December 2007 at itsheadquarters in Ashgabad, Turkmenistan,UNRCCA’s mandate includes liaising with thegovernments of the region and, with their concurrence,with other parties concerned on issues relevantto preventive diplomacy; maintaining relationshipswith regional organizations and encouraging theirEthnic Uzbeks fleeing violence in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, wait in the border village ofSuratash, hoping to enter Uzbekistan, 15 June 2010.peacemaking efforts and initiatives; providing apolitical framework and leadership for the preventiveactivities of the UN country teams and residentcoordinators across the region; and maintainingclose contact with the United Nations AssistanceMission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).Key DevelopmentsIn order to put its broad mandate to best use,UNRCCA together with its member states hasidentified three top priorities for the region. Theseare cross-border threats from illicit activities:terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking;environmental degradation and managementUN Photo

112 | Mission NotesPerm'CENTRAL ASIAPOLITICAL MISSIONSKazan'2009-2010Dates below the mission names represent authorization dates(UN missions) and starting dates (non-UN missions).SamaraR U S S I A NChelyabinskQostanayF E D E R A T I O NPetropavlKöshetauOmskHQ0 2000 100OSCE Centre in Astana07/1998400 600 800 km200 Novosibirsk 300400500 miUKRAINEVolgogradOralAqtöbeTemirtauAstanaQaraghandyÖskemenMONGOLIAZaysanZhezqazghanLake BalqashGEORGIAARMENIATbilisiYerevan AZERBAIJANTehranCaspianSeaBakuAralSeaQyzylordaTaldyqorghanBishkekNukusShymkentYsyk KölDashhowuz UrganchK Y R G Y Z S T A NTashkentNamanganTürkmenbashiUZBEKISTANOshOSCE Centre in AshgabatHQ 07/1998Bukhoro SamarqandOSCE Office in TajikistanHQUNRCCAHQ 02/1994Chärjew05/2007T A J I K I S T A NQarshiC H I N ATURKMENISTAN DushanbeAshgabatMaryISLAMIC REPUBLICOF I R A NK A Z A K H S T A NA F G H A N I S T A NKabulHQOSCE Centre in Bishkek01/1999The boundaries and names shown andthe designations used on this map do notimply official endorsement or acceptanceby the United Nations.Map No. 4408June 2010UNITED NATIONSDepartment of Field SupportCartographic Sectionof common resources such as water and energy;and the implications from the precarious situationof Afghanistan.UNRCCA has had some successes in its work.The SRSG has emerged as a credible partner bygaining the confidence of the senior political leadershipof the respective Central Asian states. Thisalone is significant, given the degree of disparateinterests in the region. In practice, the mission isutilized as a conduit for dialogue between the governmentsthat do not have a long history of bilateraldiscussions on common issues. As such, UNRCCAcontinues to serve as a facilitator assisting its memberstates in the implementation of the UN GlobalCounter-Terrorism strategy.In regard to the member states’ secondpriority on water and energy resources, UNRCCAwas able to draw on the expertise of the UN Departmentof Political Affair’s (DPA) Mediation SupportUnit, which deployed an expert on water sharingto support the SRSG. UNRCCA also helped assistthe regional governments in technical discussionsand developing initiatives with, for example, theInternational Fund for Saving the Aral Sea.In order to handle its third priority – addressingimplications from the precarious situation of Afghanistan– UNRCCA hosts a UNAMA liaison officer atits headquarters and regularly exchanges informationwith UNAMA. The two UN missions are consideringa joint initiative to facilitate the positive contributionof Central Asia in the stabilization and economicrecovery of Afghanistan. However, as of August 2010,this initiative had not yet been made operational.In April 2010, UN Secretary-General BanKi-moon used his visit to UNRCCA and its memberstates to encourage increased efforts to findmutually acceptable solutions to shared problems inthe region. He delivered a very firm human rightsmessage as well, linking reforms in this area withensuring conditions for economic growth.Later the same month, civil unrest inKyrgyzstan was violently suppressed by police forces

Central Asia | 113and precipitated the fall of President Bakiyev andthe appointment of an interim administration.Although this stabilized the country temporarily, inJune 2010, southern Kyrgyzstan saw the outbreakof inter-ethnic violence, which resulted in severalhundred fatalities, mass displacement as well aswidespread destruction and threatened to spilloverinto neighboring Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.UNRCCA was not involved in mediationefforts prior to the crisis, reflecting its focus onregional and trans-boundary challenges. However,in the aftermath of the crisis, UNRCCA has beenactive in efforts to stabilize the country to preventfurther conflict by coordinating the UN response,working with regional organizations and supportingefforts by the Kyrgyz authorities, such as the conductof parliamentary elections on 10 October 2010.Also in response to the crisis, the OSCE agreed todeploying a small police mission to Kyrgyzstan.Despite UNRCCA’s modest successes, thechallenges facing the Centre as a political mission,with a mandate of conflict prevention are significant.Its mandate to liaise with the governmentsof the region and seek political consensus on thepolitical issues facing member states is a difficulttask, given their rivalries and “zero sum” approach tomost issues. This reality is further compounded by alack of resources for the mission that has to fund itsactivities, such as convening meetings and the implementationof projects, by extra-budgetary means.Conducting such activities depends on the extent towhich UNRCCA and the UN Secretariat carry outsuccessful fundraising activities, somewhat limitingthe Centre’s ability to take the lead on initiatives.Regional ModelAs a UN model, the regional framework offers anumber of obvious benefits. Institutionally, t<strong>here</strong>gional approach makes missions more palatablein environments w<strong>here</strong> member states may be otherwisedisinclined to accept a UN mission. In thecase of UNRCCA, the work plan of the Centreis developed in partnership with the five membercountries, reflecting the shared “ownership” of themission. Moreover, the regional approach allowsDPA to develop practical policies through a collaborativeapproach with the member states. Finally,as the mission is as much an collaboration withUN Regional Centre for PreventiveDiplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA)Authorization Date 7 May 2007(UNSC Letter S/2007/279)SRSGMiroslav Jenča (Slovakia)Deputy SRSG Fedor Klimtchouk (Russia)Budget $3.3 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 7early 2010 Local Civilian: 13For detailed mission information see p. 216OSCE Centre in AshgabatAuthorization Date 23 July 1998 (PC.DEC/244)Start Date January 1999Head of Mission Ambassador Arsim Zekolli(former Yugoslav Republicof Macedonia)Budget $1.8 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 51 August 2010 Local Staff: 18For detailed mission information see p. 242OSCE Centre in AstanaAuthorization Date 23 July 1998 (PC.DEC/243)Start Date January 1999Head of Mission Ambassador AlexandreKeltchewsky (France)Budget $2.8 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 61 August 2010 Local Staff: 20For detailed mission information see p. 246the regional members, it allays common perceivedtensions over issues of sovereignty and its SRSGhas enjoyed a relative ease of access to the region’shigh-level officials.Notwithstanding these benefits, organizationallythe regional set-up also poses some challenges.Given that the mission is addressing issues througha regional lens, it must negotiate partnerships withfive UN Country Team (UNCT) 2 structures, whichare country specific and not as involved in regionalissues. As the concept of integration, the guiding

114 | Mission NotesThe OSCE and EUThe OSCE maintains Centres in Ashgabat (Turkmenistan), Astana (Kazakhstan), and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) as wellas an office in Tajikistan and a project coordinator in Uzbekistan. The OSCE also runs an Academy in Bishkekthat offers a Master’s program in political science for students from Central Asia. In 2009 it opened a BorderManagement Staff College in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), although this is still in its start-up phase and t<strong>here</strong> have beenobstacles to training personnel from Afghanistan, a key goal.Although some are relatively small, the OSCE’s field presences have very broad mandates, ranging fromenvironmental affairs to security projects. The latter include assistance on counter-terrorism issues, supportto police reform and more practical issues such as helping secure ammunition from the Soviet era. In a regionw<strong>here</strong> human rights problems are common, the OSCE’s field presences are largely confined to indirect effortsto promote rights norms. These include holding events with civil society and governments, and commenting ondraft legislation. The OSCE presences in Central Asia do not monitor the administration of justice directly, unlikeits missions in the Balkans and Caucasus.The region’s governments are typically skeptical about any greater OSCE intervention in their internal affairs.However, the organization’s relevance to the region was brought to the fore in 2010 with the Kyrgyz crisis, in partbecause Kazakhstan held the OSCE’s presidency (the first Central Asian state to do so). The Centre in Bishkekhad been conscious of the threat of violence towards the Uzbek minority, having opened a field office in Osh – theepicenter of this year’s violence – in 2000. The field office, with four international staff, had focused on improvingcross-border contacts to reduce tensions.When the initial Kyrgyz political crisis broke in April 2010, the Kazakh Chairman-in-Office’s special envoy, KanatSaudabayev, took a prominent role in mediating the transition to the new government. In June, the OSCE’s HighCommissioner for National Minorities, Knut Vollebaek, urged the organization’s Permanent Council to act on therapidly increasing inter-ethnic violence in Osh and its region. In July, the Permanent Council agreed to deploya Police Advisory Group (PAG) to reassure the public and “strengthen the capacities of the police and help inrestoring public trust.” The PAG – initially mandated to deploy 52 police personnel for a four-month period - wasapproved “within the mandate” of the Centre in Bishkek.The PAG has its own head - Markus Mueller, a Swiss diplomat who ran the Centre from 2003-2008. The mission’simminent arrival sparked protests from Kyrgyz groups concerned that it would foster Uzbek separatism. Effortsto agree a memorandum of understanding with the government on the PAG’s remit were delayed through August.NGOs such as the International Crisis Group have called for a much larger international presence in Kyrgyzstan,although this remains unlikely at present.In September, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) opened an electionobservation mission for the October parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan. The mission that was deployedfollowing an invitation from the Kyrgyz government comprises 17 experts based in Bishkek and 22 long-termobservers, who are deployed throughout the country. Immediately prior to election day the mission will be joinedby 300 additional short-term observers.The OSCE’s diplomacy in Kyrgyzstan has been coordinated not only with the UN but also the EU, which has hadan EUSR for Central Asia since 2005. The first holder of this office was Slovakia’s Jan Kubis, who was replaced in2006 by Pierre Morel, a French diplomat. The EUSR’s mandate places a particular emphasis on energy securityin the region. However, his leverage is limited by a very small support team – primarily based in Brussels – andthe lack of a strong EU consensus on Central Asian affairs. Suggestions that the EU might deploy an operationto Kyrgyzstan this year did not get far. The post of EUSR for Central Asia is not one of those to be terminated in2011, reflecting the strategic sensitivity and uncertainty of the region.principle for the majority of political missions, doesnot apply to regional offices t<strong>here</strong> is no automaticparticipation from the UN funds and programs inthe <strong>Center</strong>’s activities and the SRSG has no authorityover the UNCT’s activities. However, the SRSGmanaged to forge close cooperation with the UNResident Coordinator in Turkmenistan and developedeffective relationships with the UN ResidentCoordinators in the remaining countries.As for the relations with the Organization for

Central Asia | 115Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) andits offices in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, whose mandates includeelements similar to UNRCCA’s conflict preventionrole, the challenge for UNRCCA is to identify a divisionof labor that would maximize opportunities forcooperation. In the case of regional OSCE initiatives,concerning border issues and counter-terrorism, forexample, UNRCCA has shown its added value inbuilding links with other regional actors such as theCollective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),strengthening cooperation and promoting increasedcoordination amongst regional organizations.ConclusionUNRCCA received a boost from the Secretary-General’s visit in April 2010, increasing its overallprofile and legitimacy in the region. The fall of theKyrgyz government in the same month and theensuing violence underline the potential for unrestand the value of a coordinated response by neighboringcountries, regional organizations and theUN system. The relatively successful response to thehumanitarian crisis following the outbreak of violencein June 2010 in Kyrgyzstan can be attributed,in part, to the high degree of dialogue and exchangeamong regional organizations and humanitarianactors, facilitated by UNRCCA. Such an example isespecially important as the situation in Afghanistancontinues to deteriorate, affecting regional development,particularly in the bordering countries ofTajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.OSCE Centre in BishkekAuthorization Date 23 July 1998 (PC.DEC/245)Start Date January 1999Head of Mission Ambassador Andrew Tesoriere(United Kingdom)Budget $7.2 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 171 August 2010 Local Staff: 69For detailed mission information see p. 250OSCE Office in TajikistanAuthorization DateStart DateHead of MissionEUSR for Central Asia19 June 2008 (PC.DEC/852)Renamed the OSCE Office inTajikistan 1 July 2008Ambassador Ivar Vikki (Norway)Budget $7.8 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Staff: 271 August 2010 Local Staff: 121For detailed mission information see p. 269Authorization Date 13 June 2005 (2005/588/CFSP)Start Date July 2005Head of Mission Pierre Morel(France)Budget $1.0 million (1 March 2010-31 August 2010)notes1 See Security Council Resolutions 279 (2007) and 280 (2007)2 The UNCT consist of UN agencies, funds and programs.

Myanmar | 1174.4M i s s i o n N o t e sMyanmarThe political situation in Myanmar has been ina state of flux since January 2009. Myanmar’sJunta has continued to move towards the generalelections planned for later this year – step five of itsseven-step political ‘roadmap.’ It also signaled somereceptiveness to a degree of US reengagement withMyanmar; US policy was revised in September2009 to become a mix of sanctions and engagement.However 2009 was also marked by the trial onspurious charges of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader ofthe main opposition party the National League forDemocracy (NLD), which won the 1990 generalelections but has not been allowed to govern.The trial culminated in August 2009 with AungSan Suu Kyi’s conviction and an extension of herhouse arrest. Furthermore, a 60-year-old, low-levelinsurgency – the world’s longest conflict – continuesin Myanmar, pitting numerous ethnic groupsagainst Myanmar’s regime. The ceasefires brokeredby the regime with many of the ethnic groupsremain fragile, and in 2009 the military commencednew operations against some of them, includingthe Kokang ethnic group and the Karen NationalUnion. The Myanmar military also commenced apush last year to corral ethnic groups into becomingpart of a border guard. And recent reports thatMyanmar has a nuclear program, if verified, couldjeopardize the revised US policy towards Myanmarand solidify Myanmar’s international pariah status.The forthcoming elections are likely to bea point of inflection for Myanmar, a country ofaround 50 million people that has been under militaryrule since 1962. They will likely prove to beUN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (center) attends the High-Level Groupof Friends on Myanmar meeting. Vijay Nambiar (right), Chef de Cabinet, andIbrahim Gambari (second from left), then Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar, also attended, 23 September 2009.an opportunity for a younger generation within themilitary to come to the fore. The Junta has goneto considerable lengths to ensure its continuingdominance in post-election Myanmar. The 2008constitution stipulates that one quarter of parliamentaryseats will go to military personnel, andsome leading military figures have resigned theirmilitary posts with a view to taking part in the electionsas civilians. In addition, Myanmar’s electionlaw bars people with criminal convictions participatingin political parties – this disqualifies manyopposition figures, including Aung San Suu Kyi. 1The role that ethnic groups and other oppositionparties can play in the elections have been a sourceof considerable tension, and the main oppositionparty the National League for Democracy (NLD)has ruled itself out of contention: it has boycottedthe elections and, as a result, has disbanded.UN Photo

118 | Mission NotesSpecial Adviser, MyanmarAuthorization and 23 December 1994Start Date (UNGA Res. 49/197)SASGVijay Nambiar (India) (acting)*Budget$1.2 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 518 September 2009* After the former Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari wasappointed the Joint Special Representative for Darfurin December 2009, Vijay Nambiar, the UN Secretary-General’s Chief of Staff, began acting as the temporaryAdvisor.For detailed mission information see p. 168BackgroundThe UN’s diplomatic engagement in Myanmarhas a couple of sources: a 1992 Commission onHuman Rights mandate for the creation of a SpecialRapporteur, 2 and a 1993 General Assemblyresolution requesting the UN Secretary-General’sinvolvement, 3 which was followed by a 1994 GeneralAssembly resolution requesting the Secretary-General continue discussions with Myanmar’s government,4 the latter were interpreted as a mandatefor the Secretary-General to use his good offices.The General Assembly reaffirmed its support forthis mandate most recently in December 2009. 5In 1997, then Secretary-General Kofi Annanappointed Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto to theposition of Special Envoy of the Secretary-Generalfor Myanmar, a role de Soto held until 1999. T<strong>here</strong>have been two other Special Envoys since then. InApril 2000 Secretary-General Annan appointedMalaysian diplomat Razali Ismail to the position,which Ismail held until his resignation in late 2005.Ibrahim Gambari formally assumed the position inMay 2007 and held it until the end of 2009, whenhe was appointed an AU/UN Envoy to Darfur. TheUN has yet to name a formal replacement, althoughVijay Nambiar has been acting in the role.The objectives of the UN political engagementin Myanmar are to promote national reconciliationbetween the Junta and opposition parties,democratic transition, and respect for humanrights. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has setout a five point plan of specific requests made ofthe regime under the good offices’ auspices: (1) t<strong>here</strong>lease of all political prisoners; (2) dialogue whichis all-inclusive, substantive and time-bound; (3) theneed to create conditions allowing a credible politicaltransition to democratic, civilian government;(4) improving socio-economic conditions; and(5) regularizing the good offices process betweenthe UN and Myanmar by setting up a UN officein country. 6 In pursuit of these objectives, SpecialEnvoys for Myanmar have sought (when allowedaccess into Myanmar by the Junta) to engage withthe Junta and other relevant actors within Myanmarsuch as opposition figures, as well as withneighboring and other key states and regionalorganizations. The UN’s good offices role is clearlypredicated upon engagement with the Junta, whichhas agreed to the UN playing this role (in preferenceover ASEAN) and maintains that it views itsengagement with the UN as the ‘cornerstone’ ofMyanmar’s foreign policy. 7Ban Ki-moon has made Myanmar a signatureissue and has visited on two occasions. His initialvisit – the first by a UN Secretary-General in44 years – took place in May 2008 in the wake ofCyclone Nargis, which devastated Myanmar’s Deltaregion. The second visit occurred in July 2009. Inaddition to this political engagement, t<strong>here</strong> havebeen several UN Special Rapporteurs on the situationof human rights in Myanmar. The position iscurrently held by Tomas Ojea Quintana.A UN Resident Coordinator oversees a reasonablylarge UN in-country presence that includesthe UN Development Program (UNDP), the UNOffice of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and theWorld Food Program (WFP). UNDP’s mandaterestricts it from working with or through Myanmar’sgovernment, but the UN Country Teamstill played an important role in the coordinationof international relief efforts in the aftermath ofCyclone Nargis.Effectiveness of the MissionThe Secretary-General’s good offices mission toMyanmar has not met with notable success, and neitherthe Special Envoys nor the Secretary-Generalhave had much to show for their labors and visits.While some political prisoners have been releasedfrom time to time, the Junta has tightly controlled

Myanmar | 119such releases, and arbitrary arrests remain a problem.Successive envoys have been unable to pushforward reconciliation processes or make significantheadway on the issue of human rights. The missionhas also had little discernible impact on promotingdemocratic transition as the Junta implements itspolitical roadmap.T<strong>here</strong> are three main reasons for this lack ofdemonstrable success. The first is the insularity and‘recalcitrance’ of the Junta, which has been extremelyresistant to outside involvement. It has in the pastdenied access into Myanmar to the UN’s high-levelrepresentatives, and when it has granted access ithas heavily circumscribed officials’ in-country visitsand activities. Often UN officials have not beenpermitted to meet with key opposition figures theywould need to meet to fulfill their mandate. Andsecuring the Junta’s agreement to complete the fivepoint plan remains an ongoing challenge.Second, UN representatives have not had arobust toolkit at their disposal. This stems fromthe sharp divisions within the international communityover how to respond to Myanmar’s militaryregime – some states seek a more robust response,others emphasize respect for sovereignty and thatdemocratic transition is a domestic issue 8 – and inparticular over the role of the UN. As a result, theSecurity Council response has been tepid: in 2006t<strong>here</strong> was a Security Council procedural vote (whichcannot be vetoed) to formally include Myanmaron its agenda, but in early 2007, China and Russiaexercised their first double veto since 1972 on aproposed resolution on Myanmar.Third, the narrowness of the good offices mandatehas effectively put the UN and the Junta atcross-purposes. The mandate does not have a distinctfocus on the ethnic insurgencies, or include arole for the UN in peacemaking or assisting withthe maintenance of ceasefires. 9 A number of Westernstates view the situation in Myanmar primarilythrough the prism of human rights and concentrateon the leading opposition party the NLD, above allAung San Suu Kyi. The Junta, by contrast, sees thesituation through the lens of Myanmar’s ongoingethnic conflicts and the management of ceasefires.It should be noted that UN representativeshave not been entirely passive actors in thisdrama. Various Secretary-Generals have attemptedto move the diplomatic process forward, thoughwith mixed results. A 2005 meeting between thenSecretary-General Annan and Myanmar’s leaderThan Shwe helped to revive UN diplomatic effortsafter a Junta-imposed hiatus. In December 2007,Ban Ki-moon created the Group of Friends onMyanmar as a more informal mechanism. It is alarge grouping – its 14 members include the fivepermanent members of the Security Council aswell as four ASEAN states – which has lessened itseffectiveness, and it also contains many divergentviews on Myanmar. As a result it has had limitedimpact, except for generally supporting the UN’sgood offices role. In December 2008, Ban Ki-mooncalled for more consensus on the part of memberstates on the meaning of the good offices role, butthe pronounced divisions remain.T<strong>here</strong> was also a breakthrough after CycloneNargis. On his visit shortly after the cyclone hit,Ban Ki-moon succeeded in creating the foundationsfor the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), comprised ofthe UN, ASEAN and the Myanmar government,which coordinated international humanitarian aidentering the country. This was an important act ofpolicy entrepreneurship. The resulting successfulhumanitarian operation raised expectations of theprospects of a similar political effort – many spokeof the ‘window of opportunity’ afforded by Nargis.However, the Junta rebuffed attempts to broadenthe international humanitarian effort into thepolitical realm or even to extend the humanitarianefforts beyond the Delta region, and Ban Ki-moon’sJuly 2009 visit did not result in any significant diplomaticprogress.ConclusionAll in all, then, the Secretary-General’s good officesmission has had less impact on the situation withinMyanmar than might have been hoped for, exceptin a humanitarian context after Cyclone Nargis.The issue of Myanmar has a vocal and global humanrights lobby, which has loudly criticized the lack ofresults on the part of the UN mission; some analystshave argued for a reassessment of UN’s high-levelenvoy policy towards Myanmar. 10The UN’s political efforts towards Myanmarhave now largely stalled until after Myanmar’s electiontakes place later this year. The elections andtheir aftermath could be a period of considerable

120 | Mission NotesThe Special Advisor on the Prevention of GenocideIn December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Convention, which came into force in 1951, defines genocide in legalterms and makes genocide a crime under international law, applicable to all countries whether they are party tothe Convention or not. However, after the international community failed to prevent genocides in Rwanda andin the Balkans in the 1990s, it became clear that the UN had to considerably strengthen its role in genocideprevention. Subsequently, in 2001, the UN Security Council in its resolution 1366 invited the Secretary-General toprovide the Council with information and analysis on cases of serious violation of international law and potentialconflict situations stemming from ethnic, religious and territorial disputes. Responding to the Council’s request,Kofi Annan in 2004 appointed Juan Méndez as the first Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide for a fouryeartenure. In 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon chose Francis Deng as his Special Advisor. The post alsobecame a full-time position at the level of Under-Secretary-General, the third highest rank in the UN system. Theoffice of the current Special Advisor consists of five professional and five support staff.The Special Advisor is mandated 1 to act as an early warning mechanism to the UN system by collecting informationon serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that might leadto genocide and by alerting the Secretary-General and through him the Security Council to these situations. TheSpecial Advisor can make recommendations to the Council on actions to prevent genocide, liaises with the widerUN system on genocide prevention and works to enhance the UN’s capacity to analyze and manage informationrelating to genocide and related crimes.In executing his mandate, the Special Advisor works together with various UN entities, particularly the Office ofthe High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations,as well as governments, regional organizations, NGOs and academia. In addition to monitoring developments inall countries, the Special Advisor may also conduct country visits. Lastly, the Special Advisor seeks to compilelessons learnt from successful genocide prevention cases to learn how societies can best manage diversity.A nine-member UN Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide, that was established in 2006 and isexpected to meet biannually, provides further support and guidance to the Special Advisor’s work.The Genocide Convention affirms that states have the duty to “prevent and punish” genocide. 2 In a similarvein, at the 2005 World Summit UN member states agreed that “each individual State has the responsibility toprotect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” and that theinternational community has the responsibility to protect w<strong>here</strong> states fail to do so. 3 Given the strong correlationbetween the principle of the responsibility to protect and the Special Advisor’s mandate, Mr. Deng works closelywith the Special Advisor with a focus on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck. Together the Advisors workto improve information collection and analysis as well as early warning mechanisms within the UN system. TheSecretary-General’s proposal to join the two offices under the leadership of the Special Advisor on the Preventionof Genocide will be submitted to the General Assembly later in 2010.Mr. Deng is carrying out his mandate under considerable difficulties. The term genocide is highly politicized and itsdefinition generally disputed as too narrow or too broad. A substantive part of his work relies on the cooperationof governments to share information and provide him with access to specific areas within their boundaries.However, many governments see Mr. Deng’s work as interfering with their sovereignty and collaboration can thusbe sparse. Similarly, the principle of the responsibility to protect is surrounded by controversy, as some countriesfear that the notion will lead to an erosion of their sovereignty. Mr. Deng t<strong>here</strong>fore has to tread waters lightly and,in addition to his mandated tasks, raise awareness and educate about the importance of this work.1 Letter dated 12 July 2004 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/2004/567).2 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 1.3 2005 World Summit Outcome document (A/Res/60/1).

Myanmar | 121instability for Myanmar, but they might also presentopportunities for renewed diplomatic engagementby the UN once the nature of the post-election parliamentand political process becomes clear. Suchopportunities should be seized upon. The electionsmight also present opportunities for the UNand other outside actors to help build institutionalcapacity within Myanmar and build the skill setsof the next generation – to enable them to formsome attachments outside their state and to create aconstituency within Myanmar for deeper reform. Ifsuch opportunities are not taken, Myanmar’s decimatedhuman and institutional capacity will takedecades more to repair.notes1 Burma’s constitution already barred her from running for president by virtue of her marriage to a British citizen.2 Resolution 1992/583 A/RES/48/1504 A/RES/49/1975 A/RES/64/2386 A/64/3347 See the website of the Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations,http://www.myanmarmissionny.org/component/option,com_frontpage/Itemid,1/.8 See, for example, Alberto Turlon, “Is China Ready to Face Facts on Burma?,” The Irrawaddy, April 5 2010.9 A criticism made of Gambari during his tenure as Special Envoy, for example, was that he did not meet withethnic minority representatives.10 See, for example, Brian McCartan, “Another UN failure in Myanmar,” Asia Times Online, July 8 2009,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KG08Ae02.html.

Western Sahara | 1234.5M i s s i o n N o t e sWestern Saharanew Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General,A Ambassador Christopher Ross (US), wasappointed in January 2009 to one of the moredaunting political assignments in the UnitedNations. In 1975, Morocco claimed WesternSahara after the region attained independence fromSpain. This happened despite vehement oppositionby the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguiael-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), whichmaintains that the region’s people – the Sahrawis– have a right to self-determination and territorialindependence. The issue of Western Sahara isthe longest running territorial dispute in Africa,combining a high degree of political polarizationwith a situation of status quo that is comfortableenough for the international community to ensurethat a failure to find its resolution bothers very few.Progress is slow for reasons that reflectdeeply entrenched differences between the parties,Morocco and POLISARIO, regional rivalrybetween Morocco and Algeria, and the unhelpfulpositions assumed by the parties’ respective backersin the international community. In addition,the efforts of the Personal Envoy since early 2009have been strongly conditioned by the security andpolitical developments in the region. While PersonalEnvoy Ross was able to convene an informalmeeting between the parties in August 2009, inthe latter part of the year heightened political tensionbetween the actors, accompanied by Morocco’sincreased military engagement in Western Saharastalled further progress. It was only in early 2010that Ross was able to revive the process.Young boy in Dakhla City in the Western Sahara.BackgroundThe Personal Envoy works from outside the regionin parallel to the UN Mission for the Referendum inWestern Sahara (MINURSO), which is headquarteredin Laayoune. MINURSO was established inMINURSO

124 | Mission NotesPersonal Envoy, Western SaharaAuthorization and 19 March 1997Start Date(UNSC Pres. StatementS/PRST/1997/16)Personal Envoy Christopher Ross (US)Budget$0.7 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of18 September 2009 International Civilian: 1For detailed mission information see p. 160Special Advisor, CyprusAuthorization Date 21 April 1997(UNSC Letter S/1997/320)Start Date 28 April 1997SASGAlexander Downer (Australia)Deputy SASG Tayé-Brook Zerihoun (Ethiopia)Budget$3.3 million(1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of31 March 2010 International Civilian: 12For detailed mission information see p. 1631991 to verify the cease-fire between Morocco andPOLISARIO and to organize and conduct a referendumthat would allow the people of WesternSahara to decide the future status of the territory.The referendum had originally been contemplatedfor January 1992, however, a series of efforts toreach agreement on its terms and then to seek apolitical settlement found only frustration.Disappointment with the lack of progress,as well as a sense that a political effort led fromoutside the region might have more leverage thanone conducted by the SRSGs successively headingMINURSO, brought Secretary-General KofiAnnan to institute the position of the PersonalEnvoy for Western Sahara in 1997. The status andprestige of its first incumbent, former US Secretaryof State James Baker who held the position from1997-2004, reflected the priority Annan attachedto the search for a solution to the conflict, but alsohis awareness of the obstacles that lay in its way.In 2003 Personal Envoy Baker presenteda peace plan that allowed for some elementsof governance-sharing, but also provided for areferendum that would include the option of independence.The plan was accepted by POLISARIO,at Algeria’s encouragement. But in 2004 Moroccorejected it on the grounds that it could not agree toany plan that might lead to an independent WesternSahara – a position that contravened the basisfor the UN’s involvement.Baker resigned shortly afterwards. His successor,the Dutch diplomat Peter van Walsum, wasappointed in 2006, after an interlude in whichthe political process was led from MINURSO byAlvaro de Soto, who held the position of SRSGfrom 2004 to 2005. Van Walsum pursued directand unconditional negotiations. Four increasinglyacrimonious rounds of talks were held in Manhasset,New York, in 2007 and 2008, but no progresswas made in bridging the gap between an autonomyproposal put forward by Morocco and POLISA-RIO’s insistence on a referendum that wouldinclude independence as an option. Van Walsumlost the support of POLISARIO and its backerswhen he told the Security Council that an independentWestern Sahara was not a realistic propositionso long as Morocco had control of the territory andthe Security Council was not prepared to put pressureupon it. His contract expired in August 2008.Key developmentsPersonal Envoy Ross began his tenure in early 2009by consulting with the parties, as well as representativesof the neighboring states, Algeria and Mauritania,who have traditionally assumed the role ofobservers at any talks. He traveled to the region inFebruary 2009 and began working towards holdingsmall informal meetings to prepare for a fifth roundof formal negotiations. He visited the region againin late and June and after that consulted with UNmember states that are most engaged on the issueof Western Sahara, namely France, Spain and theUnited States. With Russia and the United Kingdom,these countries form a group of Friends ofWestern Sahara that has had a leading role in drivingaction in the Security Council but that has beencomplicated by the differences between them. 1Informal talks were held between the parties– with Algeria and Mauritania in attendanceas observers – in Dürnstein, Austria on August

Western Sahara | 125CyprusIn July 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed former Australian foreign minister Alexander Downeras his Special Adviser (SASG) on Cyprus. Mr. Downer’s work is formally separate from the UN peacekeepingforce in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which was launched in 1964. The SASG works alongside the Special Representativeof the Secretary-General (SRSG), Lisa Buttenheim, who has responsibility for UNFICYP.Mr. Downer was appointed during a period of optimism about the readiness of Greek and Turkish Cypriot leadersto resolve the conflict that has divided the island for decades. Beginning in March 2008, both sides accepted aseries of limited steps meant to open the way for broader negotiations on a settlement, including the formation ofworking groups and technical committees to discuss issues ranging from governance to cultural affairs.The Security Council approved the appointment of an SASG to help move talks forward. That July, Greekand Turkish Cypriot leaders agreed to hold fully-fledged talks from September under the good offices of theSecretary-General. In 2008 and 2009, contacts between the two sides were frequent, with leaders meeting asoften as once a week.These meetings also involved Mr. Downer or Ms. Buttenheim’s predecessor as SRSG Tayé-Brook Zerihoun.Downer’s role in implementing the Secretary-General’s good offices has extended well beyond direct dealingwith the two sides. He has visited Greece and Turkey for talks on a number of occasions, and held discussionsas far afield as Moscow and Beijing. The European Union has long supported the UN’s efforts to assist Cyprus,and the European Commission appointed a liaison to the SASG’s team.Downer’s team has also contributed to technical aspects of the talks by involving experts on issues like propertyrights to visit Cyprus and advice the parties. The UN has been at pains to underline that the talks are Cypriot-led,rather than an externally-driven process.As of early 2010, Ban Ki-moon saw “considerable progress” in the talks. Nonetheless, discussions paused in therun-up to Turkish Cypriot elections in April 2010. Dervis Eroglu defeated Mehmet Ali Talat, one of the initiators ofthe 2008 process, in these polls. The talks reopened in May, and Eroglu raised the stakes by calling for a solutionby the end of 2010 – creating additional interest in a report from the SASG on the situation in November. WhileMr. Downer says he is cautiously satisfied by talks this year, thorny issues remain unresolved, especially aroundproperty rights. The SASG has insisted that the parties should “take time and get it right” rather than focus ondeadlines.9 and 10. Confidence-building measures werediscussed and for the first time the two partiesaddressed human rights issues: POLISARIOaccused Morocco of numerous human rights violationsand Morocco responded by complainingabout conditions in the refugee camps in Algeria.The conversation was inconclusive, but reflected agrowing attention to the issue, and to the anomalythat the parties various allegations are not subject tofurther UN involvement. POLISARIO’s repeatedcalls for a UN monitoring mechanism have consistentlybeen rejected by Morocco, which accusesPOLISARIO of using its allegations to seek publicity.In April 2009 Morocco’s backers in the SecurityCouncil rejected pressure from elected members,led by Costa Rica, who had sought to include somereference to human rights in the resolution (SCR1871) renewing the mandate of MINURSO.In September 2009, in the margins of theGeneral Assembly, Ross received encouragementof his efforts when Morocco indicated that it wasfor the first time prepared to discuss the proposalthat POLISARIO had presented to the Councilin April 2007 (POLISARIO had long maintainedthat it would only discuss Morocco’s autonomy proposalif Morocco would consider its own proposalincluding the option for a referendum for independence).On this basis the Personal Envoy proposeda second informal meeting between the parties inlate November or early December.Beginning in October, however, a series of developmentsled to a deterioration of relations between

126 | Mission Notesthe parties. Against a backdrop of increased Moroccanmilitary activities in Western Sahara, a group ofseven independence activists from Western Saharawere detained in Casablanca after visiting Tindoufand Algiers. On November 6, on the anniversary ofthe Green March by Morocco into Western Saharain 1975, King Mohamed VI delivered a hard-hittingspeech that divided Sahrawis into two camps“patriots” (who accepted Moroccan sovereignty)and “traitors” (who did not) and identified Algeriaas the “adversary.” Finally, on November 13, theSaharwi independence activist Aminatou Haidarwas prevented from returning home to Laayounebecause she refused to swear loyalty to Morocco.She was expelled to the Canary Islands w<strong>here</strong> shebegan a hunger strike. Only after a flurry of highlevel diplomatic activity was she allowed home.Perhaps unsurprisingly, these events ledPOLISARIO in particular to question the utilityof further talks on the basis that Morocco’s actionssuggested that it was not interested in a negotiatedsettlement. By January 2010, however, tensionhad calmed and Ross was able to convene a secondinformal meeting outside New York for February10 and 11. The meeting was to have as its focus theparties’ consideration of the proposals that each hadsubmitted to the Security Council in 2007.Discussion of the proposals was preceded bya heated session of accusation and counter-accusationon the subject of human rights. As duringthe Dürnstein meeting, POLISARIO argued thatMorocco’s criticism of the human rights situation inthe Tindouf camps could be addressed by creatinga UN monitoring mechanism; Morocco counteredthat POLISARIO’s insistence on human rightsis a means to avoid addressing a political solutionto the conflict. The parties moved on to a somewhatlimited discussion of their two proposals; atthe conclusion of the talks, they agreed with Ross’summary that “neither party had accepted the proposalof the other as the sole basis of the futureof negotiations.” 2 Ross returned to the region toseek the parties’ ideas on how to move beyond theimpasse, but, as the Secretary-General reportedto the Security Council in April 2010, his effortshad produced “no movement on the core substantiveissues.” After a round of talks with members ofthe Group of Friends of the Western Sahara thissummer, Ross sent a letter to the Permanent Fivemembers of the Security Council arguing that onlytheir direct engagement (and that of the friends)could shift the parties from their current positions.ConclusionThe institution of the Personal Envoy responds tothe political limitations of a peacekeeping operation,which has, for structural and other reasons, long hadits capacity to act as an impartial mediator questioned.However, operating from outside the countrythe various Personal Envoys have – so far – not beensuccessful in finding a political solution to the conflictover Western Sahara. The underlying dynamicsof the conflict and the regional and internationalinterests surrounding it are such the responsibility forthis failing undoubtedly lies elsew<strong>here</strong>.Since assuming the position in 2009, Ross hasworked effectively with a small team drawn fromDPA’s regional division and mediation supportunit and the cooperation of the UN Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations. His deliberately lowkeyapproach reflects the hope that the UN processcan provide a framework within which the partiesmay gradually come to see the benefits of movingforward from mutually exclusive positions that havealtered little in more than thirty years. However,the Personal Envoy’s efforts are hampered by t<strong>here</strong>luctance of the broader international community,in deference to Morocco, to accede to suggestionsthat in other contexts would be obvious next steps: acall, for example, for the parties’ various allegationsof human rights violations to be subjected to independentverification; or a direct appeal to the partiesto return their two proposals to the drawing boardfor modifications that might provide the basis forfuture negotiation.notes1 France hews so closely to Morocco’s position that other states see it as a direct representation of Morocco inthe Council; the United States and the United Kingdom have deep ties to Morocco, including on issues such ascounter-terrorism, that ensure that they too will provide Morocco support; Spain has historical and emotionalties to the Sahrawis but will not jeopardize its important bilateral relationship with Morocco to satisfy them;Russia is supportive of Polisario.2 Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, S/2010/175, 6 April 2010.

Global Statisticson UN and OSCE Missions55.1 Global UN Mission Statistics5.2 Global OSCE Mission Statistics127

128 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS5.1G l o b a l S t a t i s t i c s o n U N a n d O S C E M i s s i o n sGlobal UN Mission StatisticsStaff Strength by Mission: 2009 and 2010MissionNumberUNAMA 1,733UNAMI 1,016BINUB 420UNMIN 245BONUCA/BINUCA 86UNSCOL 72UNIPSIL 58UNSCO 53UNPOS 43UNIIIC* 34UNOGBIS/UNIOGBIS 32UNOWA 27CNMC 20UNRCCA 20Special Adviser, Cyprus 12Special Envoy, LRA-Affected Areas* 6Special Adviser, Myanmar 5Special Envoy, Implementation of Resolution 1559 3Personal Envoy, Western Sahara 1Total 3,886*Indicates a closed mission.

Global UN Mission Statistics | 129Staff Strength by Mission: 2009 and 201017501500Number of Staff10005000UNAMAUNAMIBINUBUNMINBONUCA/BINUCAUNSCOLUNIPSILUNSCOUNPOSUNIIIC*UNOGBIS/UNIOGBISUNOWACNMCUNRCCASpecial Adviser, CyprusSpecial Envoy, LRA-Affected Areas*Special Adviser, MyanmarSpecial Envoy, Implementationof Resolution 1559Personal Envoy, Western SaharaNational Representation of International Staff: 31 January 2010Rank Nationality Number1 United States of America 782 United Kingdom 483 Canada 374 Kenya 375 Fiji 366 India 347 Philippines 338 France 329 Germany 2410 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1911 Australia 1812 Cameroon 1713 Ghana 1714 Nigeria 1715 Romania 1716 Russian Federation 1717 Ethiopia 1518 Pakistan 1519 Finland 1420 New Zealand 1421 South Africa 14Rank Nationality Number22 Italy 1323 Japan 1324 Tajikistan 1325 Croatia 1226 Lebanon 1227 Sierra Leone 1228 Sweden 1229 Austria 1030 Bangladesh 1031 Belgium 1032 Serbia 1033 Tanzania, United Rep. of 1034 Netherlands 935 Occupied Territories 936 Rwanda 937 Trinidad and Tobago 938 Uganda 939 Ukraine 940 Cote d’Ivoire 841 Egypt 842 Nepal 8

130 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSNational Representation of International Staff: 31 January 2010 (Continued)Rank Nationality Number43 Peru 844 Ireland 745 Jamaica 746 Senegal 747 Jordan 648 Liberia 649 Mali 650 Thailand 651 Argentina 552 Benin 553 Norway 554 Spain 555 Sudan 556 Switzerland 557 Togo 558 Zimbabwe 559 Angola 460 Brazil 461 Burkina Faso 462 Burundi 463 Congo, Dem. Rep. 464 Denmark 465 Greece 466 Malaysia 467 Morocco 468 Poland 469 Portugal 470 Sri Lanka 471 Syrian Arab Republic 472 TFYR of Macedonia 473 Uzbekistan 474 Barbados 375 Bulgaria 376 Ecuador 377 Guinea 378 Indonesia 379 Iran 380 Iraq 3Rank Nationality Number81 Kyrgyzstan 382 Republic of Korea 383 Zambia 384 Algeria 285 Armenia 286 Bhutan 287 Bolivia 288 Cambodia 289 Czech Republic 290 Djibouti 291 Eritrea 292 Estonia 293 Gambia 294 Guatemala 295 Guyana 296 Haiti 297 Honduras 298 Iceland 299 Lithuania 2100 Mauritania 2101 Myanmar 2102 Tunisia 2103 Afghanistan 1104 Albania 1105 Antigua and Barbuda 1106 Azerbaijan 1107 Belarus 1108 Botswana 1109 Cape Verde 1110 China 1111 Colombia 1112 Congo 1113 Cuba 1114 Dominican Republic 1115 El Salvador 1116 Georgia 1117 Hungary 1118 Israel 1

Global UN Mission Statistics | 131National Representation of International Staff: 31 January 2010 (Continued)Rank Nationality Number119 Lao, People’s Dem. Rep. 1120 Latvia 1121 Malawi 1122 Mexico 1123 Mongolia 1124 Niger 1125 Not Applicable 1126 Paraguay 1Rank Nationality Number127 Samoa 1128 Sao Tome & Principe 1129 Slovakia 1130 Somalia 1131 Turkey 1132 Venezuela 1Total 1,019Source: DFS FPDHighest National Representation of International Staff: 31 January 20108070Number of International Staff6050403020100United States of AmericaUnited KingdomCanadaKenyaFijiIndiaPhilippinesFranceGermanyBosnia and HerzegovinaAustraliaCameroonGhanaNigeriaRomaniaRussian FederationEthiopiaPakistanFinlandNew ZealandSouth Africa

132 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSInternational Civilian Occupations: 31 March 2010Occupational GroupNumberSecurity 215Political Affairs 166Administration 120Logistics 58Information Systems and Technology 54Human Rights 50Human Resources 43Finance 42Programme Management 34Civil Affairs 29Public Information 28Transport 27Aviation 22Engineering 22Procurement 20Rule of Law 20Humanitarian Affairs 18Legal Affairs 14Medical Services 13Electoral Affairs 9Information Management 7Social Affairs 6Management and Programme Analysis 2Economic Affairs 1Total: 1,020Source: DFS FPD

Global UN Mission Statistics | 133International Civilian Occupations: 31 March 2010250Number of International Staff200150100500Human ResourcesSecurityPolitical AffairsAdministrationLogisticsInformation Systems and TechnologyHuman RightsFinanceProgramme ManagementCivil AffairsPublic InformationTransportAviationEngineeringProcurementRule of LawHumanitarian AffairsLegal AffairsMedical ServicesElectoral AffairsInformation ManagementSocial AffairsEconomic AffairsManagement and Programme Analysis

134 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSBudget Requirements by Mission: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10MissionBudget Requirements(in thousands of US dollars)UNAMA 241,944.3UNAMI 158,989.3BINUB 46,258.0UNIOGBIS 19,016.6BINUCA 17,991.6UNPOS 17,029.5UNIPSIL 16,934.5UNMIN 16,743.0UNSCO (Jan ‘10-Dec ‘11) 16,333.5UNIIIC (Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09)* 10,056.0CNMC 8,930.1UNSCOL 8,405.8UNOWA 6,966.1Special Adviser, Cyprus 3,279.2UNRCCA 3,175.0Special Envoy, LRA-Affected Areas (Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09)* 1,775.2Special Adviser, Myanmar 1,159.1Special Envoy, Implementation of Resolution 1559 695.0Personal Envoy, Western Sahara 690.7Total 596,372.5*Indicates a closed mission.Budget Requirements by Mission: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10250,000Budget Requirements(In thousands of US dollars)200,000150,000100,00050,0000UNAMAUNAMIBINUBUNIOGBISBINUCAUNPOSUNIPSILUNMINUNSCO (Jan '10-Dec '11)UNIIIC (Jan '09-Dec '09)*CNMCUNSCOLUNOWASpecial Adviser, CyprusUNRCCASpecial Adviser, MyanmarSpecial Envoy, LRA-Affected Areas(Jan '09-Dec '09)*Special Envoy, Implementationof Resolution 1559Personal Envoy, Western Sahara

Global OSCE Mission Statistics | 1355.2G l o b a l S t a t i s t i c s o n U N A n d O S C E M i s s i o n sGlobal OSCE Mission StatisticsStaff Strength by Mission: 1 August 2010MissionNumberOMIK 651OSCE BiH 508OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje 199OSCE Mission to Montenegro 162OSCE Mission to Serbia 158OSCE Office in Tajikistan 148OSCE Presence in Albania 95OSCE Centre in Bishkek 86OSCE Mission to Moldova 50OSCE Office in Yerevan 45OSCE Office in Baku 38OSCE Centre in Astana 26OSCE Centre in Ashgabat 23Personal Representative/Minsk Conference 17Total 2,206Source: OSCE Department of Human ResourcesNotes: Our global figures for the OSCE exclude those of its field presences that we have not treated as political missions in thisvolume: (i) the Office in Zagreb (20 staff); the Office in Minsk (13 staff); the Project Coordinator in Ukraine (42 staff) and the ProjectCoordinator in Uzbekistan (20 staff).

136 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSStaff Strength by Mission: 2009 and 2010800700700Number of Staff600500400300Number of Staff60050040030020020010010000OMIKOSCE BiHOSCE Spillover Mission to SkopjeOSCE Mission to MontenegroOSCE Mission to SerbiaOSCE Office in TajikistanOSCE Presence in AlbaniaOSCE Centre in BishkekOSCE Mission to MoldovaOSCE Office in YerevanOSCE Office in BakuOSCE Centre in AstanaOSCE Centre in AshgabatO

Global Statistics on OSCE Missions | 137International and Local Occupational Groups: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Occupational GroupQuantityOffice of Head of Mission 465.5Fund Administration Unit 406.5Human Dimension 279.5Human Rights andCommunities252Common Operational Costs 203.5Democratization 75Police Development 57Police Affairs 55Democratization 50Security and Public Safety 47Rule of Law and HumanRightsEconomic andEnvironmental Activities4236Human Dimension Activities 32Monitoring and GoodGovernance31Rule of Law 30Occupational GroupQuantityPolitico-Military Activities 28Security Co-Operation 27Political and MilitaryAspects of Security16Media 13Police Reform Programme 11Governance in Economicand Environmental IssuesConflict Prevention/ResolutionAnti-Trafficking/Gender 5Human Rights Monitoring/DemocratizationRegional Stabilization/ArmsControlGood Governance 4Human Rights 3Conflict Prevention andConfidence and SecurityBuilding98552

138 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSConflict Prevention and Confidenceand Security BuildingHuman RightsGood GovernanceMediaRegional Stabilization/Arms ControlAnti-Trafficking/GenderConflict Prevention/ResolutionHuman Rights Monitoring/DemocratizationPolice Reform ProgrammePolitico-Military ActivitiesHuman Dimension ActivitiesDemocratizationMonitoring and Good Governance Rule of LawInternational and Local Occupational Groups: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10500400300200Number of Staff1000Office of Head of MissionFund Administration UnitHuman Rights and CommunitiesCommon Operational CostsHuman DimensionDemocratizationPolice AffairsPolice DevelopmentFund Administration UnitFund Administration UnitSecurity Co-Operation Political andMilitary Aspects of SecurityEconomic and Environmental ActivitiesSecurity and Public SafetyRule of Law and Human RightsGovernance in Economic and Environmental Issues

Global Statistics on OSCE Missions | 139Budget Requirements by Mission: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10MissionBudget Requirements(in thousands of US dollars)OMIK 30,285,707.1OSCE-BiH 19,874,725.1OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje 11,001,816.3OSCE Mission to Serbia 10,559,304.4OSCE Office in Tajikistan 7,798,719.0OSCE Centre in Bishkek 7,220,503.8OSCE Presence in Albania 4,365,699.1OSCE Office in Yerevan 3,921,661.7OSCE Office in Baku 3,713,845.0OSCE Mission to Montenegro 3,177,615.7OSCE Centre in Astana 2,883,752.9OSCE Mission to Moldova 2,748,144.6OSCE Centre in Ashgabat 1,846,264.1Personal Representative/Minsk Conference 1,457,287.6Total 110,855,046.4Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923Budget Requirements by Mission: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘1035,000,00030,000,00025,000,000Budget Requirements(In US dollars)20,000,00015,000,00010,000,0005,000,0000OMIKOSCI-BiHOSCE Spillover Mission to SkopojeOSCE Mission to SerbiaOSCE Office in TajikistanOSCE Centre in BishkekOSCE Presence in AlbaniaOSCE Office in YerevanOSCE Office in BakuOSCE Mission to MontenegroOSCE Centre in AstanaOSCE Mission to MoldovaOSCE Centre in Ashgabat

UN6Mission-by-Mission Statistics6.1 BINUB6.2 BINUCA (formerly BONUCA)6.3 CNMC6.4 Personal Envoy, Western Sahara6.5 Special Adviser, Cyprus6.6 Special Adviser, Myanmar6.7 Special Envoy, Implementation of Resolution 15596.8 Special Envoy, LRA-Affected Areas6.9 UNAMA6.10 UNAMI6.11 UNIIIC6.12 UNIOGBIS (formerly UNOGBIS)6.13 UNIPSIL6.14 UNMIN6.15 UNOWA6.16 UNPOS6.17 UNRCCA6.18 UNSCO6.19 UNSCOL141

142 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS6U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sIntroductionThis chapter contains data for 19 UN-commandedpolitical missions. The mandates of UNIIICand the Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areashave since been terminated, but the last availabledata before liquidation of each mission has beenincluded for all applicable sections. For all missions,data is based on public UN documents and sources,combined with data provided by the UN Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and theUN Department of Field Support (DFS) and insome cases from the UN Volunteer Programme(UNV). Discrepancies in dates associated with thedata stem from different reporting timeframes orvariations among acquisition dates of the data. Amore detailed explanation of the sources and dataincluded in this chapter is as follows:Key FactsThis section lists latest key resolutions, first mandatesand current and first heads of missions.Personnel StrengthData on staff strength is broken down intointernational civilian staff, local civilian staff, MilitaryExperts on Mission (MEMs), police, troops andUnited Nations Volunteers (UNVs), as applicable toeach mission. MEMs refer to all military personnelengaged for peacekeeping service in an observer,liaison, or advisory capacity, including MilitaryObservers (MilObs), Military Liaison Officers(MLOs) or Military Advisers (MilAds). Whenknown, MEM personnel have been further classifiedas one of the three.All civilian data has been provided by theField Personnel Division (FPD) at DFS. With afew exceptions, all figures for local civilian staff arerepresented up to 31 January 2010. Internationalcivilian staff data are current as of 31 March 2010.Exceptions include figures on UNVs, which wereobtained from the UNV Programme as of 31March 2010. In addition, data for the missions ofthe Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, SpecialAdviser for Myanmar and Special Envoy for theImplementation of Resolution 1559 has beencompiled from recent budget reports, and is thus upto-dateas of 18 September 2009. As the missionsof the Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areasand UNIIIC have both been terminated, statisticson staff strength are taken from the last financialreports before the complete drawdown of staff (22September 2008 and 3 March 2009, respectively).Data on military and police personnel forBINUB, UNAMA, UNAMI, and UNMIN are allcurrent as of 31 May 2010. For all other missionswith military and police components, data is currentas of 28 February 2010. All statistics on militaryand police personnel have been provided by theForce Generation Service (FGS) at DPKO.Personnel Gender StatisticsIn this section, all data on the gender breakdownof international and local civilian staff has beenprovided by DFS FPD (31 January 2010).All statistics on the gender breakdown ofmilitary and police personnel are provided by DPKOFGS. For BINUCA, UNIOGBIS, UNOWAand UNPOS, data is current as of 28 February2010. Data for BINUB, UNAMA, UNAMI andUNMIN are up-to-date as of 31 May 2010.For the following missions, the genderbreakdown of staff was not available: PersonalEnvoy for Western Sahara, Special Adviser forMyanmar, Special Envoy for the Implementation ofResolution 1559, Special Envoy for LRA-AffectedAreas and UNIIIC.

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 143International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group andPost GradeThis section compares the occupational groupsand post grades of international civilian staff, asprovided by DFS FPD up to 31 March 2010. Postgrades of international civilian staff include thefollowing categories:• Senior Appointments (USG and ASG)• Professional and higher categories (D-2 andD-1, P-5 through P-1)• Field Service (FS-PL and FS-OL)• General Service and related categories (GS-Pand GS-OL, S-S)Data is unavailable for the following missions:Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Special Adviserfor Myanmar, Special Envoy for the Implementationof Resolution 1559, Special Envoy for LRA-AffectedAreas and UNIIIC.FatalitiesData on fatalities, as available from the SituationCentre at DPKO for BINUCA, UNAMA, UNAMI,UNIPSIL and UNMIN, are given in the context ofpersonnel and incident type. This section covers allfatalities since the inception of the mission up to 30April 2010. Figures are listed on a yearly, and whenpossible, monthly basis. Information on fatalities forapplicable missions not incorporated in the 2010Annual Review of Special Political Missions will beincluded in future editions.VehiclesInformation on vehicles was obtained from theLogistics Support Division (LSD) at DFS, andcovers only UN Owned Equipment (UNOE), anddoes not include vehicles that are Contingent OwnedEquipment (COE) or National Owned Equipment(NOE). Data is represented up to 31 March 2010.The following missions do not have UNOE vehiclesat their disposal: Personal Envoy for Western Sahara,Special Adviser for Myanmar and Special Envoy forthe Implementation of Resolution 1559.AircraftAll data on aircraft inventory are current as of 31March 2010, and have been submitted by DFSLSD. BINUCA, CNMC and UNIOGBIS do notutilize any aircraft, but receive air support on an adhoc basis.Budget and ExpendituresAll figures on the most recent budget cycle(2008-2010) have been derived from publiclyavailable documents of the UN AdvisoryCommittee on Administrative and BudgetaryQuestions (ACABQ) or the UN’s Administrativeand Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee). Thissection covers appropriations (1 January 2008 to 31December 2009), estimated or actual expendituresas available (1 January 2008 to 31 December 2009),approved budgets (1 January to 31 December 2009)if provided and requirements for the following year(1 January to 31 December 2010). An exceptionis UNSCO, for which the most recent financialreporting covers appropriations from January 2008to December 2009 and estimated expenditures fromJanuary 2010 to December 2011. It is important tonote that all estimated expenditures are preliminaryand subject to change. Requirements for 2010are further broken down into the three followingcategories, with some variation as applicable toeach mission:Military and police personnel. Includes missions’subsistence allowances, travel on emplacement,rotation and repatriation, death and disabilitycompensation, rations and clothing allowances formilitary and police personnel.Civilian personnel. Includes provisions forsalaries, staff assessment and common staff costs,overtime and hazardous duty stations allowances, aswell as costs associated with UNVs.Operational costs. Costs associated with consultantsand experts, official travel, facilities and infrastructure,ground, air and/or naval transportation in mission,communications, IT, medical, special equipment,other supplies, services and equipment and quickimpact projects.Mission ExpendituresAll data on historical expenditures covers thetimeframe from 2000, or the inception of themission if more recent, until 2008. See Budget andExpenditures for categories and subcategories ofexpenditures.

144 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS6.1U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sBINUB(UN Integrated Office in Burundi)BINUB Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateERSGDeputy ERSGFirst ERSG17 December 2009 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 1902 (twelve month duration)25 October 2006 (date of issue); 1 January 2007 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1719 (twelve month duration)Charles Petrie (UK/France)SG letter of appointment 23 March 2010Bintou Keita (Guinea)Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia)BINUB PersonnelCategoryQuantityInternational Civilian 117Local Civilian 243MEM 5Police 8UNV 47Total 420Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGS, UNVNotes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff and UNVs as of 31 March 2010,data for MEMs and police as of 31 May 2010.

BINUB | 145BINUB Personnel Gender StatisticsCategory Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 76 43 63.9% 36.1%Local Civilian 158 85 65.0% 35.0%MEM 5 0 100.0% 0.0%Police 8 0 100.0% 0.0%Total 247 128 65.9% 34.1%Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGSNotes: Data for international and local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for MEMs and individual police as of 31 May 2010.BINUB International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010Occupational Group USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - 1 - 2 3 - - 13 - - - 19Aviation - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Civil Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - 4Finance - - - - - 1 1 - - 4 - - - 6Human Resources - - - - - 1 2 - - 2 - - - 5Human Rights - - - 1 - 4 5 1 - - - - - 11Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Information Management - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 2Information Systems andTechnology- - - - - - - - - 6 - - - 6Legal Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Logistics - - - - 1 - 2 - - 4 - - - 7Management and ProgrammeAnalysis- - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Medical Services - - - - - 1 1 - - 1 - - - 3Political Affairs - 1 1 1 1 5 3 - - - - - - 12Procurement - - - - - - 1 - - 2 - - - 3Programme Management - - - 1 1 - 2 - - - - - - 4Public Information - - - - 1 1 1 1 - - - - - 4Rule of Law - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - - 2Security - - - - - - - 2 - 21 - - - 23Social Affairs - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - 2Transport - - - - - - 1 - - 2 - - - 3Total - 1 1 4 5 20 23 4 - 59 - - - 117Source: DFS FPD

146 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSBINUB Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 137Ambulances 4Automobiles 2Buses 21Engineering Vehicles 2Material Handling Equipment 5Trucks 27Vans 4Total 202Source: DFS LSDBINUB Aircraft: 30 April 2010Fixed WingHelicopterMi-8 - 1Total - 1Source: DFS LSD

BINUB | 147BINUB Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Military and Police Personnel 955.9Military Advisers 350.4Police Advisers 605.5Civilian Personnel 29,072.4Common Staff Costs 27,166.2United Nations Volunteers 1,906.2Operational Costs 16,229.7Consultants 130.0Official Travel 800.0Facilities and Infrastructure 4,428.0Ground Transportation 809.0Air Transportation 6,547.7Communications 1,755.0IT 1,230.0Medical 294.0Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 236.0Gross Requirements 46,258.0Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 46,258.0Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 46,258.0Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3BINUB Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09EstimatedExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Military and Police Personnel 1,809.6 1,547.4 1,002.7Civilian Personnel 45,216.8 47,468.7 23,642.4Operational Costs 23,141.1 21,151.4 13,253.3Gross Requirements 70,167.5 70,167.5 37,898.4Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 70,167.5 70,167.5 37,898.4Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 70,167.5 70,167.5 37,898.4Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

148 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSBINUB Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07(in thousands of US dollars)Category Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07Military and Police Personnel 772.2Civilian Personnel 15,898.6Operational Costs 8,970.3Gross Requirements 25,641.1Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 25,641.1Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 25,641.1Source: UN Document A/62/512/Add.3

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 1496.2U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sBINUCA (formerly BONUCA)(UN Integrated Peace-building Office in the CentralAfrican Republic)BINUCA Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSRSGDeputy SRSGFirst SRSG21 December 2009 (date of issue); 1 January 2010 (date of effect)UNSC Pres. Statement S/PRST/2009/35(succeeding BONUCA, twelve month duration of BINUCA)3 March 2009 (date of issue) UNSC Letter S/2009/1287 April 2009 (date of issue)UNSC Pres. Statement S/PRST/2009/5Sahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia)SG letter of appointment 26 May 2009Bo Schack (Denmark)Sahle-Work Zewde (Ethiopia)BONUCA Key FactsFirst MandateFirst SRSG10 February 2000 (date of issue); 15 February 2000 (date of effect)UNSC Pres. Statement S/PRST/2000/5 (twelve month duration)Cheikh Tidiane Sy (Senegal)

150 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSBINUCA PersonnelCategoryQuantityInternational Civilian 26Local Civilian 54MEM 2Police 2UNV 2Total 86Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGS, DPKO OROLSI, UNV, UN Document DPI/2166/Rev.83Notes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff and UNVs as of 31 March 2010,data for MEMs and police as of 30 April 2010. MEMs are further classified as Military Liaison Officers.BINUCA Personnel Gender StatisticsCategory Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 16 9 64.0% 36.0%Local Civilian 41 13 75.9% 24.1%MEM 2 0 100.0% 0.0%Police 2 0 100.0% 0.0%Total 61 22 85.0% 15.0%Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGS, DPKO OROLSINotes: Data for international and local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for MEMS as of 28 February 2010.MEMs are further classified as Military Liaison Officers.

BINUCA (formerly BONUCA) | 151BINUCA International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010Occupational Group USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - 1 - - - - 4 - - - 5Aviation - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Civil Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Finance - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - 2Human Resources - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Human Rights - - - - 1 - 1 1 - - - - - 3Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Information Management - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Information Systemsand Technology- - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Legal Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Logistics - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Management andProgramme Analysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Political Affairs - 1 1 - - 1 3 - - - - - - 6Procurement - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - 2Programme Management - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Public Information - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Rule of Law - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Security - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - 2Social Affairs - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Transport - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Total - 1 1 - 2 3 5 1 - 13 - - - 26Source: DFS FPD

152 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSBONUCA/BINUCA Fatalities by Personnel Type: 30 April 2010Time PeriodPersonnel TypeMilAd Police Intl Staff Local Staff Total2000 - - - - -2001 - - - - -2002 - - - - -2003 - - - - -2004 1 - - - 1June 1 - - - 12005 - - - - -2006 - - - - -2007 - - - - -2008 - - - - -2009 - - - - -Total Fatalities 1 - - - 1Source: DPKO Situation CentreBONUCA/BINUCA Fatalities by Incident Type: 31 December 2009Time PeriodIncident TypeMalicious Act Illness Accident Other Total2000 - - - - -2001 - - - - -2002 - - - - -2003 - - - - -2004 - 1 - - 12005 - - - - -2006 - - - - -2007 - - - - -2008 - - - - -2009 - - - - -Total Fatalities - 1 - - 1Source: DPKO Situation CentreNotes: The Other category refers to incident types that are unknown, uncertain or under investigation.Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

BINUCA (formerly BONUCA) | 153BINUCA Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 31Automobiles 1Buses 2Total 34Source: DFS LSDNotes: BINUCA also receives air support on an ad hoc basis.BINUCA Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Military and Police Personnel 218.8Military and Police Advisers 218.8Civilian Personnel 10,543.0Common Staff Costs 10,543.0Operational Costs 7,229.8Government-Provided Personnel 80.9Consultants 80.9Official Travel 603.2Facilities and Infrastructure 1,932.9Ground Transportation 1,008.8Air Transportation 239.3Communications 1,906.7IT 668.9Medical 76.0Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 632.2Gross Requirements 17,991.6Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 17,991.6Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 17,991.6Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

154 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSBONUCA Requirements: Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Military and Police Personnel 236.2Military Observers 138.1Civilian Police Advisers 98.1Civilian Personnel 5,374.9Common Staff Costs 5,374.9Operational Costs 3,207.0Consultants 36.6Official Travel 176.7Facilities and Infrastructure 483.2Ground Transportation 708.3Air Transportation 225.9Communications 997.3IT 190.6Medical 46.7Supplies, Services and Equipment 341.7Gross Requirements 8,818.1Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 8,818.1Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 8,818.1Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.3BONUCA Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘08Estimated ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘08Military and Police Personnel 227.0 180.8Civilian Personnel 4,442.1 4,650.8Operational Costs 1,740.8 2,068.5Gross Requirements 6,409.9 6,900.1Staff Assessment Income - -Net Requirements 6,409.9 6,900.1Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) - -Total Requirements 6,409.9 6,900.1Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.3

BINUCA (formerly BONUCA) | 155BONUCA Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘00-Dec ‘08(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryJan ‘00-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Military and Police Personnel 317.9 180.8Military Observers 217.3Other Costs Pertainingto Military Personnel100.6Civilian Personnel 3,834.3 4,650.8Civilian Police 289.9International and Local Staff 3,544.4Operational Costs 886.6 2,068.5Premises/Accomodation 161.3Transport Operations 204.5Aircraft Operations -Communications 281.2Other Equipment 116.4Supplies and Services 116.8Air and Surface Freight 6.4Other Programmes 317.7Political Programmes -Military Programmes -Civilian and Police Programmes -Public Information Programmes 60.2Training Programmes 257.5Human Rights Programmes -Gross Requirements 5,356.5 7,727.0 10,073.5 11,009.2 6,900.1Staff Assessment Income - - - - -Net Requirements 5,356.5 7,727.0 10,073.5 11,009.2 6,900.1Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - - - -Total Requirements 5,356.5 7,727.0 10,073.5 11,009.2 6,900.1Source: UN Document A/C.5/56/25, A/C.5/58/20, A/60/585, A/62/7/Add.29, A/63/346/Add.3

156 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS6.3U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sCNMC(Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission)CNMC Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateChairmanFirst Chairman30 November 2009 (date of issue)UNSC Letter S/2009/64217 March 2004 (date of issue)UNSC Letter S/2004/298Said Djinnit (Algeria)SG letter of appointment 21 February 2008; Entry on duty 1 April 2008Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)CNMC PersonnelCategoryQuantityInternational Civilian 12Local Civilian 6MEM 2Total 20Source: DFS FPD, UN Document A/64/349/Add.3Notes: Data for MEMs as of 26 October 2009, data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff asof 31 March 2010. MEMs are further classified as Military Advisers.

CNMC | 157CNMC Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 January 2010Category Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 9 2 81.8% 18.2%Local Civilian 4 2 66.7% 33.3%MEM 2 0 100.0% 0.0%Total 15 4 78.9% 21.1%Source: DFS FPDNotes: MEMs are further classified as Military Advisers.CNMC International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010Occupational Group USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - 2Aviation - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Civil Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Economic Affairs - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - 3Finance - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1Human Resources - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Human Rights - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Information Management - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Information Systems andTechnology- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Legal Affairs - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1Logistics - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Management andProgramme Analysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Political Affairs 1 - - - 1 1 - - - - - - - 3Procurement - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Programme Management - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Public Information - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Rule of Law - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Security - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Total 1 - - - 3 5 2 - - 1 - - - 12Source: DFS FPD

158 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSCNMC Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 5Motorcycles 1Total 6Source: DFS LSDUNOWA/CNMC Aircraft: 31 March 2010Fixed WingHelicopterLearjet 1 -Total 1 -Source: DFS LSDNotes: CNMC receives additional air support on an ad hoc basis.CNMC Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Military Personnel 183.4Military Advisers 183.4Civilian Personnel 2,333.6International/National Staff 2,333.6Operational Costs 6,413.1Consultants 2,072.9Official Travel 760.6Facilities and Infrastructure 298.5Ground Transportation 152.3Air Transportation 2,599.0Naval Transportation 52.8Communications 203.1IT 68.9Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 205.0Gross Requirements 8,930.1Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 8,930.1Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 8,930.1Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

CNMC | 159CNMC Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Estimated ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Military Personnel 334.0 276.5 172.2Civilian Personnel 4,127.6 4,120.0 2,197.1Operational Costs 11,497.0 9,664.2 5,730.6Gross Requirements 15,958.6 14,060.7 8,099.9Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 15,958.6 14,060.7 8,099.9Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 15,958.6 14,060.7 8,099.9Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3CNMC Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘04-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05 Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07 Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Military and Police Personnel 215.1 161.8Civilian Personnel 3,525.6 1,930.6Operational Costs 8,180.5 5,766.4Gross Requirements 6,580.6 11,921.2 7,858.8Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 6,580.6 11,921.2 7,858.8Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 6,580.6 11,921.2 7,858.8Source: UN Document A/60/585, A/62/512/Add.3, A/63/346/Add.3

160 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS6.4U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sPersonal Envoy, Western SaharaPersonal Envoy, Western Sahara Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandatePersonal EnvoyFirst Personal Envoy30 April 2009 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 1871 (twelve month duration)19 March 1997 (date of issue)UNSC Pres. Statement S/PRST/1997/16Christopher Ross (US)SG letter of appointment 6 January 2009James A. Baker, III (US)Personal Envoy, Western Sahara Personnel: 18 September 2009PositionQuantityInternational Civilian 1Total 1Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1

Personal Envoy, Western Sahara | 161Personal Envoy, Western Sahara Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10(in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Civilian Personnel 192.9International Staff 192.9Operational Costs 497.8Consultants 124.9Official Travel 170.8Facilities and Infrastructure 14.3Communications 2.0IT 2.3Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 183.5Gross Requirements 690.7Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 690.7Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 690.7Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1Personal Envoy, Western Sahara Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Estimated ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 289.6 201.9 158.7Operational Costs 924.2 293.5 469.7Gross Requirements 1,213.8 495.4 628.4Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 1,213.8 495.4 628.4Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 1,213.8 495.4 628.4Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1

162 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSPersonal Envoy, Western Sahara Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘04-Dec ‘08(in thousands of US dollars)Category Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05 Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07 Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 130.9Operational Requirements 454.5Gross Requirements 222.6 623.2 585.4Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 222.6 623.2 585.4Voluntary Contributionsin Kind (budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 222.6 623.2 585.4Source: UN Document A/60/585, A/62/7/Add.29, A/63/346/Add.1

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 1636.5U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sSpecial Adviser, CyprusSpecial Adviser, Cyprus Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSASGDeputy SASGFirst SASG14 December 2009 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 189821 April 1997 (date of issue); 28 April 1997 (date of effect)UNSC Letter S/1997/320Alexander Downer (Australia)SG letter of appointment 10 July 2008; Entry on duty 14 July 2008Tayé-Brook Zerihoun (Ethiopia)Diego Cordovez (Ecuador)Special Adviser, Cyprus Personnel: 31 March 2010PositionQuantityInternational Civilian 12Total 12Source: DFS FPDSpecial Adviser, Cyprus Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 January 2010Category Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 4 9 30.8% 69.2%Total 4 9 30.8% 69.2%Source: DFS FPD

164 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSSpecial Adviser, Cyprus International Civilian Staff by Occupational Groupand Post Grade: 31 March 2010OccupationalGroup USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - 3Aviation - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Civil Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Finance - - - - - - - - - - - - - -HumanResources- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Human Rights - - - - - - - - - - - - - -HumanitarianAffairsInformationManagementInformationSystems andTechnology- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Legal Affairs - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Logistics - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Managementand ProgrammeAnalysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Political Affairs 1 - - 1 1 3 - - - - - - - 6Procurement - - - - - - - - - - - - - -ProgrammeManagement- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Public Information - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Rule of Law - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Security - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - 2Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Total 1 - - 1 1 4 - - - 2 - 3 - 12Source: DFS FPD

SPECIAL ADVISER, CYPRUS | 165Special Adviser, Cyprus Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantityAutomobiles 10Total 10Source: DFS LSDNotes: All vehicles of the office of the Special Adviser, Cyprus are rented and not UNOE.Special Adviser, Cyprus Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10(in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Civilian Personnel 2,288.6Common Staff Costs 2,288.6Operational Costs 990.6Consultants 212.4Official Travel 394.0Facilities and Infrastructure 88.1Ground Transportation 106.0Air transportation 8.4Communications 123.2IT 18.4Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 40.1Gross Requirements 3,279.2Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 3,279.2Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 3,279.2Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1

166 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSSpecial Adviser, Cyprus Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec’ 09(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Estimated ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 3,522.5 1,723.9 2,736.1Operational Costs 1,706.0 1,448.8 867.1Gross Requirements 5,228.5 3,172.7 3,603.2Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 5,228.5 3,172.7 3,603.2Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 5,228.5 3,172.7 3,603.2Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1

SPECIAL ADVISER, CYPRUS | 167Special Adviser, Cyprus Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘02-Dec ‘08(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryJan ‘02-Dec ‘02Military Personnel Costs -Military Observers -Other Costs Pertaining toMilitary Personnel-Jan ‘02-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 708.5 786.4Civilian Police -International and Local Staff 708.5UN Volunteers -Operational Costs 1.5 838.9Premises/Accomodation -Transportation -Air Operations -Communications -Other Equipment -Supplies and Services 1.5Air and Surface Freight -Other Programmes -Public InformationProgrammesTraining Programmes --Gross Requirements 710.0 1,834.1 1,077.0 52.1 1,625.3Staff Assessment Income - - - - -Net Requirements 710.0 1,834.1 1,077.0 52.1 1,625.3Voluntary Contributions inKind (budgeted)- - - - -Total Requirements 710.0 1,834.1 1,077.0 52.1 1,625.3Source: UN Document A/C.5/56/25/Add.2, A/C.5/58/20, A/60/585, A/62/7/Add.29, A/63/346/Add.1

168 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS6.6U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sSpecial Adviser, MyanmarSpecial Adviser, Myanmar Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSASGFirst SASG26 March 2010 (date of issue)UNGA Res. 64/23823 December 1994 (date of issue)UNGA Res. 49/197Vijay Nambiar (India) (acting)*Alvaro de Soto (Peru)*After the former Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari was appointed the Joint Special Representative for Darfur inDecember 2009, Vijay Nambiar, the UN Secretary-General’s Chief of Staff, began acting as the temporary Advisor.See “Daily Press Briefing by the Offices of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General,” 6 January 2010,http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/db100106.doc.htm.Special Adviser, Myanmar Personnel: 18 September 2009PositionQuantityInternational Civilian 5Total 5Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1

SPECIAL ADVISER, MYANMAR | 169Special Adviser, Myanmar Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10(in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Civilian Personnel 809.3Common Staff Costs 809.3Operational Costs 349.8Consultants 24.8Official Travel 228.6Facilities and Infrastructure 71.5Communications 10.2IT 7.6Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 7.1Gross Requirements 1,159.1Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 1,159.1Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 1,159.1Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1Special Adviser, Myanmar Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09EstimatedExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 846.5 807.4 501.1Operational Costs 521.5 557.4 252.1Gross Requirements 1,368.0 1,364.8 753.2Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 1,368.0 1,364.8 753.2Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 1,368.0 1,364.8 753.2Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1

170 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSSpecial Adviser, Myanmar Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘02-Dec ‘08(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryJan ‘02-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 345.4Operational Costs 269.4Gross Requirements 352.6 399.7 218.4 614.8Staff Assessment Income - - - -Net Requirements 352.6 399.7 218.4 614.8Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - - -Total Requirements 352.6 399.7 218.4 614.8Source: UN Document A/C.5/58/20, A/60/585, A/62/7/Add.29, A/63/346/Add.1

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 1716.7U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sSpecial Envoy, Implementationof Resolution 1559Special Envoy, Implementation of Resolution 1559 Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSpecial EnvoyFirst Special Envoy19 April 2010 (date of issue)UNSC Report S/2010/19314 December 2004 (date of issue); 3 January 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1559Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)SG letter of appointment 14 December 2004Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)Special Envoy, Implementation of Resolution 1559 Personnel:18 September 2009PositionQuantityInternational Civilian 3Total 3Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1

172 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSSpecial Envoy, Implementation of Resolution 1559 Requirements:Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Civilian Personnel 275.3Common Staff Costs 275.3Operational Costs 419.7Official Travel 327.7Facilities and Infrastructure 42.9Ground Transportation 1.0Communications 39.9IT 6.7Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 1.5Gross Requirements 695.0Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 695.0Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 695.0Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1Special Envoy, Implementation of Resolution 1559 Budget and Expenditures:Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Estimated ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 466.7 455.7 257.3Operational Costs 1,075.9 742.7 594.7Gross Requirements 1,542.6 1,198.4 852.0Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 1,542.6 1,198.4 852.0Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 1,542.6 1,198.4 852.0Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.1

SPECIAL ENVOY, IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 1559 | 173Special Envoy, Implementation of Resolution 1559 Estimated Expenditures:Jan ‘05-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05 Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07 Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 209.4Operational Costs 481.2Gross Requirements 1,045.3 1,135.3 690.6Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 1,045.3 1,135.3 690.6Voluntary Contributions inKind (budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 1,045.3 1,135.3 690.6Source: UN Document A/60/585/Add.2, A/62/7/Add.29, A/63/346/Add.1

174 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS6.8U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sSpecial Envoy, LRA-Affected AreasSpecial Envoy, LRA-Affected Areas Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSpecial EnvoyFirst Special Envoy26 May 2009 (date of issue); 30 June 2009 (date of effect)UNSC Letter S/2009/281 (suspension of mission)30 November 2006 (date of issue)UNSC Letter S/2006/930Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique)30 November 2006 (date of issue)Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique)Special Envoy, LRA-Affected Areas Personnel: 22 September 2008PositionQuantityInternational Civilian 5Local Civilian 1Total 6Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.1

SPECIAL ENVOY, LRA-AFFECTED AREAS | 175Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Requirements: Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09(in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 847.6Common Staff Costs 847.6Operational Costs 927.6Consultants 210.7Official Travel 272.5Facilities and Infrastructure 55.5Ground Transportation 32.4Air Transportation 308.3Communications and IT 34.1Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 14.1Gross Requirements 1,775.2Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 1,775.2Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 1,775.2Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.1Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Budget and Expenditures:Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘08Estimated ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 834.5 624.2Operational Costs 1,012.3 938.6Gross Requirements 1,846.8 1,562.8Staff Assessment Income - -Net Requirements 1,846.8 1,562.8Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- -Total Requirements 1,846.8 1,562.8Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.1

176 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSSpecial Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Estimated Expenditures:Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 624.2Operational Costs 938.6Gross Requirements 1,562.8Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 1,562.8Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 1,562.8Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.1

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 1776.9U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNAMA(UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)UNAMA Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSRSGDeputy SRSGFirst SRSG22 March 2010 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1917 (twelve month duration)28 March 2002 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 1401 (twelve month duration)Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)SG letter of appointment 26 January 2010; Entry on duty 1 March 2010Political Affairs: Martin Kobler (Germany)Relief, Reconstruction and Recovery: Robert Watkins (Canada)Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)UNAMA PersonnelPositionQuantityInternational Civilian 338Local Civilian 1,336MEM 16UNV 43Total 1,733Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGS, UNVNotes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff and UNVs as of 31 March 2010, data forMEMs as of 31 May 2010. MEMs are further classified as Military Observers.

178 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNAMA Personnel Gender StatisticsCategory Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 223 114 66.2% 33.8%Local Civilian 1,265 71 94.7% 5.3%MEM 16 0 100.0% 0.0%Total 1,504 185 89.0% 11.0%Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGSNotes: Data for international and local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for MEMs as of 31 May 2010. MEMs are further classifiedas Military Observers.UNAMA International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010Occupational Group USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - 1 2 2 2 2 - 25 - - - 34Aviation - - - - - 2 1 - - 3 - - - 6Civil Affairs - - - 1 2 5 1 15 - - - - - 24Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - 1 1 1 - - - - - 3Engineering - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - 2Finance - - - - 1 2 2 2 - 6 - - - 13Human Resources - - - - 1 2 4 - - 7 - - - 14Human Rights - - - - 1 8 10 3 - - - - - 22Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - 1 2 1 - - - - - 4Information Management - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 2Information Systems andTechnology- - - - - 1 - - - 15 - - - 16Legal Affairs - - - - 1 2 - - - - - - - 3Logistics - - - - - - - 1 - 7 - - - 8Management andProgramme Analysis- - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Medical Services - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 2Political Affairs 1 1 3 - 11 17 23 10 - - - - - 66Procurement - - - - - 1 1 - - 3 - - - 5Programme Management - - - - 1 6 8 - - - - - - 15Public Information - - - 1 - 2 2 6 - - - - - 11Rule of Law - - - - 2 6 - - - 4 - - - 12Security - - - - 1 1 10 4 - 42 - - - 58Social Affairs - - - - - 2 - 1 - - - - - 3Transport - - - - - 1 - - - 13 - - - 14Total 1 1 3 3 23 65 69 46 - 127 - - - 338Source: DFS FPD

UNAMA | 179UNAMA Fatalities: 30 April 2010Time PeriodPersonnel TypeMilOb Police Intl Staff Local Staff Total2002 - - - 1 1December - - - 1 12003 - - - 1 1December - - - 1 12004 - - - 2 2January - - - 1 1June - - - 1 12005 - - - - -2006 - - - 1 1October - - - 1 12007 - - 1 4 5April - - - 2 2May - - 1 - 1June - - - 1 1September - - - 1 12008 - - - 1 1September - - - 1 12009 - - 2 3 5August - - - 2 2October - - 2 - 2November - - - 1 1Total - - 3 13 16Source: DPKO Situation CentreTime PeriodIncident TypeMalicious Act Illness Accident Other Total2002 - - 1 – 12003 - 1 - – 12004 - 2 - – 22005 - - - - -2006 - - - 1 12007 - 2 2 1 52008 1 - - - 12009 4 - - 1 5Total 5 5 3 3 16Source: DPKO Situation CentreNotes: The Other category refers to incident types that are unknown, uncertain or under investigation.Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

180 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNAMA Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 355Ambulances 2Armoured 1Automobiles 4Buses 39Material Handling Equipment 9Trucks 19Vans 12Total 441Source: DFS LSDUNAMA Aircraft: 31 March 2010Fixed WingHelicopterMi-8 - 3Mi-171 - 1Kingair 200 1 -Dash 7 1 -Regional Jet 1 -Learjet 1 -Total 4 4Source: DFS LSD

UNAMA | 181UNAMA Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘10(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09EstimatedExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09ApprovedBudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09RequirementsJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Military and Police Personnel 2,266.1 2,136.3 1,225.7 1,578.5Military Observers 1,734.8 1,605.0 881.5 1,218.1Civilian Police 531.3 531.3 344.2 360.4Civilian Personnel 128,688.8 132,955.9 72,373.8 105,778.3International Staff 86,508.8 88,375.5 48,111.3 74,171.6National Staff 37,852.3 40,337.4 21,806.4 28,532.2United Nations Volunteers 4,327.7 4,243.0 2,456.1 3,074.5Operational Costs 112,939.8 121,501.3 81,339.3 134,587.5Consultants and Experts 427.4 427.4 213.7 1,261.2Official Travel 2,688.3 3,132.8 1,628.3 3,015.8Facilities and Infrastructure 26,430.7 28,056.2 17,834.8 40,509.8Ground Transportation 31,586.7 31,294.7 26,503.0 21,810.3Air Transportation 37,525.8 44,717.1 25,489.4 50,586.0Communications 6,592.3 6,241.7 4,334.8 6,930.2IT 4,797.0 4,797.0 3,310.5 5,531.2Medical 787.7 730.5 499.4 819.2Other Supplies, Servicesand Equipment2,103.9 2,103.9 1,525.4 2,423.8Quick-Impact Projects - - - 1,700.0Gross Requirements 243,894.7 256,593.5 154,938.8 241,944.3Staff Assessment Income - - - -Net Requirements 243,894.7 256,593.5 154,938.8 241,944.3Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - - -Total Requirements 243,894.7 256,593.5 154,938.8 241,944.3Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.4

182 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNAMA Estimated Expenditures: Apr ‘02-Dec ‘07 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Apr ‘02-Dec ‘03 Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05 Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07Military and Police Personnel 1,501.7Military Observers 1,182.1Civilian Police 319.6Civilian Personnel 73,060.6International Staff 50,950.4National Staff 19,919.0United Nations Volunteers 2,191.2Operational Costs 48,908.5Consultants and Experts 447.2Official Travel 2,465.3Facilities and Infrastructure 13,127.3Ground Transportation 5,029.7Air Transportation 18,383.2Communications 5,181.4IT 2,369.3Medical 451.7Other Supplies, Services andEquipment1,453.4Gross Requirements 80,111.9 104,896.6 123,470.8Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 80,111.9 104,896.6 123,470.8Voluntary Contributions inKind (budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 80,111.9 104,896.6 123,470.8Source: UN Document A/C.5/58/20, A/60/585, A/62/512/Add.4

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 1836.10U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNAMI(UN Assistance Mission for Iraq)UNAMI Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSRSGDeputy SRSGsFirst SRSG7 August 2009 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1883 (twelve month duration)14 August 2003 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1500 (twelve month duration)Ad Melkert (the Netherlands)SG letter of appointment 6 July 2009Political, Electoral and Constitutional Support:Jerzy Skuratowicz (Poland)Humanitarian, Reconstruction and Development Affairs:Christine McNab (Sweden)Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil)UNAMI PersonnelPositionQuantityInternational Civilian 322Local Civilian 460MEM 13Contingent Troop 221Total 1,016Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGSNotes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff as of 31 March 2010, data for MEMs andcontingent troops as of 31 May 2010.

184 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNAMI Personnel Gender StatisticsCategory Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 259 74 77.8% 22.2%Local Civilian 359 101 78.0% 22.0%MEM 13 0 100.0% 0.0%Contingent Troop 221 0 100.0% 0.0%Total 852 175 83.0% 17.0%Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGSNotes: Data for international and local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for MEMs and contingent troops as of 31 May 2010.UNAMI International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010Occupational Group USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - 1 2 3 2 - - 18 - - - 26Aviation - - - - - 1 - 1 - 8 - - - 10Civil Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - 1 - - 3 1 - - - - - - 5Engineering - - - - - 2 3 - - 6 - - - 11Finance - - - - - 2 3 - - 7 - - - 12Human Resources - - - - - 2 4 - - 9 - - - 15Human Rights - - - 1 - 5 3 - - - - - - 9Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - 3 5 - - 6 - - - 14Information Management - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 2Information Systems andTechnology- - - - - 2 1 - - 16 - - - 19Legal Affairs - - - - 1 4 1 - - - - - - 6Logistics - - - - - 1 3 - - 29 - - - 33Management andProgramme Analysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - 1 1 1 - - 2 - - - 5Political Affairs 1 2 1 1 3 11 4 1 - - - - - 24Procurement - - - - - - 1 - - 6 - - - 7Programme Management - - - - 1 1 1 1 - - - - - 4Public Information - - - 1 1 - 2 - - - - - - 4Rule of Law - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Security - - - 1 - 3 3 8 - 94 - - - 109Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - 1 1 - - 5 - - - 7Total 1 2 2 5 9 46 39 11 - 207 - - - 322Source: DFS FPD

UNAMI | 185UNAMI Fatalities: 30 April 2010Time PeriodPersonnel TypeTroop MEM Intl Staff Local Staff Total2003 - - - - -2004 - - - - -2005 - - 2 - 2March - - 1 - 1October - - 1 - 12006 1 - - 1 2March 1 - - - 1July - - - 1 12007 1 - 1 1 3April - - - 1 1September - - 1 - 1October 1 - - - 12008 1 - 1 1 3January 1 - - - 1April - - - 1 1June - - 1 - 12009 - - 1 - 1February - - 1 - 1Total 3 - 5 3 11Source: DPKO Situation CentreTime PeriodIncident TypeMalicious Act Illness Accident Other Total2003 - - - - -2004 - - - - -2005 - 1 - 1 22006 - 2 - - 22007 1 1 1 - 32008 - 2 1 - 32009 - - - 1 1Total 1 6 2 2 11Source: DPKO Situation CentreNotes: The Other category refers to incident types that are unknown, uncertain or under investigation.Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.

186 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNAMI Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 231Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 1Ambulances 3Armoured 30Automobiles 3Buses 13Material Handling Equipment 6Trucks 13Vans 4Total 304Source: DFS LSDUNAMI Aircraft: 31 March 2010Fixed WingHelicopterEmbraer 1 -EC 135 (under procurement) - 2Total 1 2Source: DFS LSD

UNAMI | 187UNAMI Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘10(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09EstimatedExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09ApprovedBudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09RequirementsJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Military and Police Personnel 26,305.1 23,009.1 14,143.6 14,513.7Military Liaison Officers 2,604.6 2,188.2 1,727.1 1,177.0Military Contingents 23,700.5 20,820.9 12,416.5 13,336.7Civilian Personnel 148,139.0 145,254.6 80,894.8 68,699.4International Staff 125,372.6 122,481.5 69,614.5 52,199.9National Staff 22,766.4 22,773.1 11,280.3 16,499.5Operational Costs 91,395.0 87,351.5 53,893.4 75,776.2Consultants and Experts 679.0 990.3 518.5 584.0Official Travel 4,426.6 5,855.0 1,143.3 3,678.0Facilities and Infrastructure 24,450.4 20,797.3 17,452.1 17,122.9Ground Transportation 17,240.1 14,909.0 2,530.7 2,939.8Air Operations 21,817.3 17,646.7 18,761.4 23,037.5Communications 11,352.5 13,968.2 6,312.9 7,683.7IT 5,562.8 6,374.4 3,291.2 5,667.0Medical 1,011.3 878.7 656.3 999.3Special Equipment 129.6 30.0 88.4 90.0Other Supplies, Services andEquipment4,725.4 5,901.9 3,138.6 13,974.0Gross Requirements 265,839.1 255,615.2 148,931.8 158,989.3Staff Assessment Income - - - -Net Requirements 265,839.1 255,615.2 148,931.8 158,989.3Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - - -Total Requirements 265,839.1 255,615.2 148,931.8 158,989.3Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.5

188 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNAMI Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘02-Dec ‘07 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Jan ‘02-Dec ‘03 Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05 Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07Military and Police Personnel 22,897.9Civilian Personnel 117,361.3Operational Requirements 83,039.1Gross Requirements 9,633.0 134,345.8 223,298.3Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 9,633.0 134,345.8 223,298.3Voluntary Contributions inKind (budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 9,633.0 134,345.8 223,298.3Source: UN Document A/C.5/58/20, A/60/585, A/62/512/Add.5

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 1896.11U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNIIIC(UN International Independent Investigation Commission)UNIIIC Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionsFirst MandateCommissionerTribunal’s RegistrarFirst Commissioner17 December 2008 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 1852 (two month duration)30 May 2007 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 1757 (Special Tribunal for Lebanon to succeed UNIIIC)7 April 2005 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 1595 (three month duration)Daniel Bellemare (Canada)SG letter of appointment 12 November 2007Robin Vincent (UK)Detlev Mehlis (Germany)UNIIIC Personnel: 3 March 2009PositionQuantityInternational Civilian 15Local Civilian 19Total 34Source: A/63/346/Add.6Notes: Represents the proposed personnel strength for the last month (June 2009) before the complete drawdown of UNIIIC staff.

190 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNIIIC Requirements: Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Total Requirements Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 6,672.8Common Staff Costs 6,461.6Government-provided Personnel 211.2Operational Costs 3,383.2Consultants 384.4Official Travel 151.0Facilities and Infrastructure 1,597.0Ground Transportation 394.4Communications 224.4IT 89.8Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 542.2Gross Requirements 10,056.0Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 10,056.0Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 10,056.0Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.6UNIIIC Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘08ActualExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘08AppropriationsJan ‘09-Dec ‘09TotalAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 25,297.6 25,109.4 3,851.5 29,149.1Operational Costs 5,488.7 6,194.5 2,665.4 8,154.1Gross Requirements 30,786.3 31,303.9 6,516.9 37,303.2Staff Assessment Income - - - -Net Requirements 30,786.3 31,303.9 6,516.9 37,303.2Voluntary Contributions inKind (budgeted)- - - -Total Requirements 30,786.3 31,303.9 6,516.9 37,303.2Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.6

UNIIIC | 191UNIIIC Expenditures: Jan ‘06-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryEstimated ExpendituresJan ‘06-Dec ‘07Actual ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 30,013.6 25,109.4Operational Costs 11,520.1 6,194.5Gross Requirements 41,533.7 31,303.9Staff Assessment Income - -Net Requirements 41,533.7 31,303.9Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) - -Total Requirements 41,533.7 31,303.9Source: UN Document A/62/512/Add.3, A/63/346/Add.6

192 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS6.12 6.X U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNIOGBIS (formerly UNOGBIS)(UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Guinea-Bissau)UNIOGBIS Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSRSGFirst SRSG26 June 2009 (date of issue); 1 January 2010 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1876 (succeeding UNOGBIS, twelve monthduration of UNIOGBIS)26 June 2009 (date of issue); 1 January 2010 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1876 (succeeding UNOGBIS, twelve monthduration of UNIOGBIS)Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)SG letter of appointment 27 January 2009Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)UNOGBIS Key FactsFirst MandateFirst SRSG26 February 1999 (date of issue)UNSC Letter S/1999/232Nana Sinkan (Cameroon)UNIOGBIS PersonnelPositionQuantityInternational Civilian 18Local Civilian 13MEM 1Total 32Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGSNotes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for MEMs as of 28 February 2010, data for international civilian staffas of 31 March 2010. MEM is further classified as a Military Observer.

UNIOGBIS (formerly UNOGBIS) | 193UNIOGBIS Personnel Gender StatisticsCategory Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 6 5 54.5% 45.5%Local Civilian 10 3 76.9% 23.1%MEM 1 0 100.0% 0.0%Total 17 8 68.0% 32.0%Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGSNotes: Data for international and local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for MEMs as of 28 February 2010.MEM is further classified as a Military Observer.UNIOGBIS International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010Occupational Group USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - 3Aviation - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Civil Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Finance - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - 2Human Resources - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - 2Human Rights - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -InformationManagementInformation Systemsand Technology- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Legal Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Logistics - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Management andProgramme Analysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Political Affairs - 1 - - 1 1 1 - - - - - - 4Procurement - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1ProgrammeManagement- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Public Information - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Rule of Law - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1Security - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Total - 1 - - 3 3 2 - - 9 - - - 18Source: DFS FPD

194 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNIOGBIS Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 12Buses 1Total 13Source: DFS LSDNotes: UNIOGBIS also receives air support on an ad hoc basis.UNIOGBIS Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Military and Police Personnel 595.9Military Advisers 48.0Police Advisers 547.9Civilian Personnel 11,876.8Common Staff Costs 11,831.2United Nations Volunteers 45.6Operational Costs 6,543.9Consultants 119.0Official Travel 549.3Facilities and Infrastructure 2,113.4Ground Transportation 882.8Air Transportation 416.7Naval Transportation 20.0Communications 1,235.9IT 662.5Medical 174.6Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 369.7Gross Requirements 19,016.6Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 19,016.6Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 19,016.6Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

UNIOGBIS (formerly UNOGBIS) | 195UNOGBIS Requirements: Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Military and Police Personnel 154.7Military and Police Advisers 154.7Civilian Personnel 2,715.1Common Staff Costs 2,715.1Operational Costs 1,963.2Consultants 36.5Official Travel 144.0Facilities and Infrastructure 647.6Ground Transportation 207.0Air Transportation 286.1Communications 209.8IT 135.8Medical 49.1Supplies, Services and Equipment 247.3Gross Requirements 4,833.0Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 4,833.0Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 4,833.0Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.3UNOGBIS Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘08Estimated ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘08Military and Police Personnel 129.8 144.8Civilian Personnel 2,428.2 2,008.6Operational Costs 1,081.8 1,483.1Gross Requirements 3,639.8 3,636.5Staff Assessment Income - -Net Requirements 3,639.8 3,636.5Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) - -Total Requirements 3,639.8 3,636.5Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.3

196 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNOGBIS Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘00-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryMilitary andPolice PersonnelJan ‘00-Dec ‘01Military Observers 68.3Other Costs Pertainingto Military PersonnelJan ‘02-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08118.3 261.4 144.850.0Civilian Personnel 3,595.3 3,692.5 2,008.6Civilian Police 17.8International andLocal StaffOperationalRequirementsPremises/Accomodations3,577.51,122.8 1,502.4 1,483.1273.1Transport Operations 175.1Aircraft Operations -Communications 361.5Other Equipment 76.0Supplies andServices213.5Air and Surface Freight 23.6Other Programmes -Political Programmes -Military Programmes -Civilian andPolice ProgrammesPublic InformationProgrammesTraining Programmes -Human RightsProgrammes---Gross Requirements 4,836.4 4,663.7 4,818.5 5,456.3 3,636.5Staff Assessment Income - - - - -Net Requirements 4,836.4 4,663.7 4,818.5 5,456.3 3,636.5Voluntary Contributions inKind (budgeted)159.2 - - - -Total Requirements 4,995.6 4,663.7 4,818.5 5,456.3 3,636.5Source: UN Document A/C.5/56/25, A/C.5/58/20, A/60/585, A/62/512/Add.3, A/63/346/Add.3

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 1976.13U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNIPSIL(UN Integrated Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone)UNIPSIL Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateERSGFirst ERSG15 September 2009 (date of issue); 30 September 2009 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1886 (twelve month duration)4 August 2008 (date of issue); 1 October 2008 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1829 (twelve month duration)Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)SG letter of appointment 5 January 2009Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)UNIPSIL PersonnelPositionQuantityInternational Civilian 27Local Civilian 30UNV 1Total 58Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGS, UNVNotes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff and UNVs as of 31 March 2010.UNIPSIL Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 January 2010Category Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 20 9 69.0% 31.0%Local Civilian 20 10 66.7% 33.3%Total 40 19 67.8% 32.2%Source: DFS FPD

198 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNIPSIL International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010Occupational Group USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - 1 - 1 - - 3 - - - 5Aviation - - - - - 1 - 1 - 1 - - - 3Civil Affairs - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - 2Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1Engineering - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Finance - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Human Resources - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - 2Human Rights - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Information Management - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Information Systems andTechnology- - - - - - - - - 3 - - - 3Legal Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Logistics - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Management andProgramme Analysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Political Affairs - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - - 2Procurement - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Programme Management - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1Public Information - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - 2Rule of Law - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - 2Security - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Total - 1 - - 4 6 5 1 - 10 - - - 27

UNIPSIL | 199UNIPSIL Fatalities: 30 April 2010Time PeriodPersonnel TypeIntl Staff Local Staff Total2008 - 1 12009 - - -Total - 1 1Source: DPKO Situation CentreTime PeriodIncident TypeMalicious Act Illness Accident Other Total2008 - 1 - - 12009 - - - - -Total - 1 - - 1Source: DPKO Situation CentreNotes: The Other category refers to incident types that are unknown, uncertain or under investigation.Other includes what were previously qualified as self-inflicted.UNIPSIL Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 59Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 2Ambulances 1Automobiles 1Material Handling Equipment 1Trucks 10Total 74Source: DFS LSDUNIPSIL Aircraft: 31 March 2010Fixed WingHelicopterMi-8 - 1Total - 1Source: DFS LSD

200 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNIPSIL Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Civilian Personnel 6,639.9Common Staff Costs 6,639.9Operational Costs 10,294.6Government-provided Personnel 277.3Consultants 87.0Official Travel 507.9Facilities and Infrastructure 2,030.2Ground Transportation 517.3Air Transportation 5,004.3Communications 1,225.4IT 285.0Medical 172.0Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 188.2Gross Requirements 16,934.5Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 16,934.5Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 16,934.5Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3UNIPSIL Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Estimated ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 5,740.9 5,020.3 5,740.9Operational Costs 9,464.1 10,184.7 9,464.1Gross Requirements 15,205.0 15,205.0 15,205.0Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 15,205.0 15,205.0 15,205.0Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 15,205.0 15,205.0 15,205.0Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

UNIPSIL | 201UNIPSIL Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08(in thousands of US dollars)Category Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 1,296.6Operational Costs 2,154.4Gross Requirements 3,451.0Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 3,451.0Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)-Total Requirements 3,451.0Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.3

202 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS6.14U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNMIN(UN Mission in Nepal)UNMIN Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSRSGFirst SRSG12 May 2010 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 1921 (four month duration)23 January 2007 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1740 (twelve month duration)Karin Landgren (Sweden)SG letter of appointment 27 January 2009Ian Martin (United Kingdom)UNMIN PersonnelPositionQuantityInternational Civilian 43Local Civilian 118MEM 68UNV 16Total 245Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGS, UNVNotes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff and UNVS as of 31 March 2010,data for MEMs as of 31 May 2010.UNMIN Personnel Gender StatisticsCategory Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 30 17 63.8% 36.2%Local Civilian 87 31 73.7% 26.3%MEM 63 5 92.6% 7.4%Total 180 53 77.3% 22.7%Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGSNotes: Data for international and local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for MEMs as of 31 May 2010.

UNMIN | 203UNMIN International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010OccupationalGroup USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - 3Aviation - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - 2Civil Affairs - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Finance - - - - - - 1 - - 2 - - - 3Human Resources - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - 2Human Rights - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -InformationManagementInformation Systemsand Technology- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - 1 - - - 5 - - - 6Legal Affairs - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Logistics - - - - - 1 - - - 7 - - - 8Managementand ProgrammeAnalysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Political Affairs - - 1 - 2 2 2 - - - - - - 7Procurement - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1ProgrammeManagement- - - - - - 2 - - - - - - 2Public Information - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1Rule of Law - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Security - - - - - - 1 - - 2 - - - 3Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Total - - 1 - 3 6 10 - - 23 - - - 43Source: DFS FPD

204 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNMIN Fatalities: 30 April 2010Time PeriodPersonnel TypeMEM Intl Staff Local Staff Total2007 - - - -2008 4 - 2 6March 4 - 2 62009 - - - -Total 4 - 2 6Source: DPKO Situation CentreTime PeriodIncident TypeMalicious Act Illness Accident Other Total2007 - - - - -2008 - - 6 - 62009 - - - - -Total - - 6 - 6Source: DPKO Situation CentreNotes: The Other category refers to incident types that are unknown, uncertain or under investigation. Other includes what werepreviously qualified as self-inflicted.UNMIN Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 59Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 4Ambulances 1Buses 8Material Handling Equipment 2Total 74Source: DFS LSDUNMIN Aircraft: 31 March 2010Fixed WingHelicopterMi-8 - 1Total - 1Source: DFS LSD

UNMIN | 205UNMIN Requirements: Dec ‘10-Jan ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Military and Police Personnel 1,271.0Military Advisers 1,271.0Civilian Personnel 6,166.7Common Staff Costs 6,166.7Operational Costs 9,305.3Consultants 23.4Official Travel 396.1Facilities and Infrastructure 895.9Ground Transportation 396.6Air Transportation 5,196.9Communications 1,135.9IT 628.0Medical 114.5Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 518.0Gross Requirements 16,743.0Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 16,743.0Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 16,743.0Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3UNMIN Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09(in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09EstimatedExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Military and Police Personnel 5,530.5 6,350.7 1,404.0Civilian Personnel 33,278.5 36,195.8 5,992.7Operational Costs 28,048.8 31,115.5 9,382.0Gross Requirements 66,857.8 73,662.0 16,778.7Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 66,857.8 73,662.0 16,778.7Voluntary Contributions inKind (budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 66,857.8 73,662.0 16,778.7Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

206 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNMIN Expenditures: Jan ‘06-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryEstimated ExpendituresJan ‘06-Dec ‘07Actual ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘08Military and Police Personnel 3,390.6 4,126.5Civilian Personnel 21,756.3 27,285.8Operational Costs 49,592.4 18,666.8Gross Requirements 74,739.3 50,079.1Staff Assessment Income - -Net Requirements 74,739.3 50,079.1Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) - -Total Requirements 74,739.3 50,079.1Source: UN Document A/62/512/Add.3, A/63/346/Add.6

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 2076.15U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNOWA(UN Office for West Africa)UNOWA Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSRSGFirst SRSG28 November 2007 (date of issue); 1 January 2008(date of effect)UNSC Letter S/2007/753 (three year duration)26 November 2001 (date of issue); 1 January 2002(date of effect)UNSC Letter S/2001/1128 (three year duration)Said Djinnit (Algeria)SG letter of appointment 21 February 2008; Entry on duty 1April 2008Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)UNOWA PersonnelPositionQuantityInternational Civilian 13Local Civilian 10MEM 4Total 27Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGSNotes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for MEMs as of 28 February 2010, data for international civilian staffas of 31 March 2010. MEMs are further classified as Military Advisers.UNOWA Personnel Gender StatisticsCategory Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 8 6 57.1% 42.9%Local Civilian 6 4 60.0% 40.0%MEM 4 0 100.0% 0.0%Total 18 10 64.3% 35.7%Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGSNotes: Data for international and local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for MEMs as of 28 February 2010.MEMs are further classified as Military Advisers.

208 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNOWA International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010OccupationalGroupUSG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - - 1 - - - 2 - - - 3Aviation - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Civil Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Finance - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Human Resources - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Human Rights - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -InformationManagementInformationSystems andTechnology- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Legal Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Logistics - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Managementand ProgrammeAnalysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Political Affairs 1 - - 1 1 3 - - - - - - - 6Procurement - - - - - - - - - - - - - -ProgrammeManagement- - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Public Information - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Rule of Law - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Security - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Total 1 - - 1 1 6 - - - 4 - - - 13Source: DFS FPDUNOWA Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 4Motorcycles 2Total 6Source: DFS LSD

UNOWA | 209UNOWA/CNMC Aircraft: 31 March 2010Fixed WingHelicopterLearjet 1 -Total 1 -Source: DFS LSDUNOWA Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Military and Police Personnel 183.4Military Advisers 183.4Civilian Personnel 3,232.6Common Staff Costs 3,232.6Operational Costs 3,550.1Consultants 175.5Official Travel 530.2Facilities and Infrastructure 237.7Ground Transportation 45.4Air Transportation 2,138.9Communications 236.4IT 74.6Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 111.4Gross Requirements 6,966.1Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 6,966.1Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 6,966.1Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

210 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNOWA Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Estimated ExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Military and Police Personnel 237.8 183.6 161.7Civilian Personnel 4,992.1 5,107.2 2,593.5Operational Costs 5,847.1 5,389.3 2,959.2Gross Requirements 11,077.0 10,680.1 5,714.4Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 11,077.0 10,680.1 5,714.4Voluntary Contributionsin Kind (budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 11,077.0 10,680.1 5,714.4Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3UNOWA Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘02-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryJan ‘02-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Military and Police Personnel 76.1Civilian Personnel 2,398.6Operational Requirements 2,887.9Gross Requirements 2,283.7 3,996.7 6,887.2 5,362.6Staff Assessment Income - - - -Net Requirements 2,283.7 3,996.7 6,887.2 5,362.6Voluntary Contributionsin Kind (budgeted)- - - -Total Requirements 2,283.7 3,996.7 6,887.2 5,362.6Source: UN Document A/C.5/58/20, A/60/585, A/62/7/Add.29, A/63/346/Add.3

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 2116.16U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNPOS(UN Political Office for Somalia)UNPOS Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSRSGFirst SRSG26 May 2009 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 187228 March 1995 (date of issue)UNSC Report S/1995/23131 May 1995 (date of issue)UNSC Letter S/1995/451Augustine P. Mahiga (Tanzania)SG letter of appointment 9 June 2010Dr. Abdul Hamid Kabia (Sierra Leone)UNPOS PersonnelPositionQuantityInternational Civilian 37Local Civilian 6Total 43Source: DFS FPD, DPKO FGSNotes: At the time of publication, the MEM positions of Chief of Joint Security Committee Secretariat and Joint Security ForceSupport Cell have yet to be formally established.Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff as of 31 March 2010.UNPOS Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 January 2010Category Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 20 14 58.8% 41.2%Local Civilian 2 4 33.3% 66.7%Total 22 18 55.0% 45.0%Source: DFS FPD

212 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNPOS International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010OccupationalGroup USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - 1 - 2 - - 6 - - - 9Aviation - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Civil Affairs - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 2Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Finance - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Human Resources - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Human Rights - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - 2Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -InformationManagementInformation Systemsand Technology- - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Legal Affairs - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Logistics - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Management andProgramme Analysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Political Affairs 1 - 1 - 1 3 3 - - - - - - 9Procurement - - - - - - - - - - - - - -ProgrammeManagement- - - - - 2 2 - - - - - - 4Public Information - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 2Rule of Law - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - 2Security - - - - - 1 - - - 3 - - - 4Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Total 1 - 1 - 5 9 9 1 - 11 - - - 37Source: DFS FPDUNPOS Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 11Buses 1Total 12Source: DFS LSD

UNPOS | 213UNPOS Aircraft: 31 March 2010Fixed WingHelicopterLearjet 1 -Total 1 -Source: DFS LSDUNPOS Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryRequirementsJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Civilian Personnel 7,984.2General Staff 7,984.2Operational Costs 9,045.3Consultants 82.7Official Travel 1,973.5Facilities and Infrastructure 1,546.6Ground Transportation 1,056.9Air Transportation 1,998.0Communications 1,712.4IT 323.5Medical 96.6Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 255.1Gross Requirements 17,029.5Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 17,029.5Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 17,029.5Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

214 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNPOS Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09EstimatedExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 10,419.6 10,004.9 6,865.3Operational Costs 15,006.9 13,801.3 8,396.9Gross Requirements 25,426.5 23,806.2 15,262.2Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 25,426.5 23,806.2 15,262.2Voluntary Contributionsin Kind (budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 25,426.5 23,806.2 15,262.2Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

UNPOS | 215UNPOS Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘00-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryJan ‘00-Dec’01Military Personnel -Military Observers -Other Costs Pertaining toMilitary Personnel-Jan ‘02-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05Jan ‘05-May ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 1,327.4 1,287.2 5,350.1 4,104.1Civilian Police -International Staff - 1,259.9National Staff - 27.3International/National Staff 1,327.4Operational Requirements 350.5 508.2 3,383.8 6,543.9Premises/accomodation 1.1Transport Operations 35.2Aircraft Operations 58.2Communications 93.5Other Equipment 17.1Supplies and Services 141.4Air and Surface Freight 4.0General Temporary Assistance 54.4Official Travel 129.1Facilities and Infrastructure 49.9Ground Transportation 61.3Air Transportation 22.4Communications 144.0IT 5.7Medical -Other Supplies, Services andEquipmentGross Requirements 1,677.9 1,855.3 4,630.6 1,795.4 8,733.9 10,648.0Staff Assessment Income - - - - - -Net Requirements 1,677.9 1,855.3 4,630.6 1,795.4 8,733.9 10,648.0Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - - - - -Total Requirements 1,677.9 1,855.3 4,630.6 1,795.4 8,733.9 10,648.0Source: UN Document A/C.5/56/25, A/C.5/58/20, A/59/534/Add.4, A/60/585, A/62/512/Add.3, A/63/346/Add.341.4

216 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS6.17U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNRCCA(UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacyfor Central Asia)UNRCCA Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSRSGDeputy SRSGFirst SRSG19 June 2009 (date of issue)SC Press Statement SC/96867 May 2007 (date of issue)UNSC Letter S/2007/279Miroslav Jenča (Slovakia)SG letter of appointment 28 April 2008Fedor Klimtchouk (Russia)Miroslav Jenča (Slovakia)UNRCCA PersonnelPositionQuantityInternational Civilian 7Local Civilian 13Total 20Source: DFS FPDNotes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff as of 31 March 2010.UNRCCA Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 January 2010Category Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 6 1 85.7% 14.3%Local Civilian 8 5 61.5% 38.5%Total 14 6 70.0% 30.0%Source: DFS FPD

UNRCCA | 217UNRCCA International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010OccupationalGroup USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 2Aviation - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Civil Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Finance - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Human Resources - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Human Rights - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -InformationManagementInformation Systemsand Technology- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Legal Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Logistics - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Management andProgramme Analysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Political Affairs - 1 - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - 3Procurement - - - - - - - - - - - - - -ProgrammeManagement- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Public Information - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Rule of Law - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Security - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Total - 1 - - 1 2 1 - - 2 - - - 7Source: DFS FPD

218 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNRCCA Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 4Automobiles 1Buses 1Total 6Source: DFS LSDUNRCCA Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Civilian Personnel 2,031.6Common Staff Costs 2,031.6Operational Costs 1,143.4Official Travel 260.7Facilities and Infrastructure 420.6Ground Transportation 32.2Communications 252.8IT 66.7Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 110.4Gross Requirements 3,175.0Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 3,175.0Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) 120.0Total Requirements 3,295.0Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

UNRCCA | 219UNRCCA Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09EstimatedExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 2,184.9 1,985.9 1,466.9Operational Costs 1,821.4 1,785.9 736.9Gross Requirements 4,006.3 3,771.8 2,203.8Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 4,006.3 3,771.8 2,203.8Voluntary Contributions inKind (budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 4,006.3 3,771.8 2,203.8Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3UNRCCA Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 727.6Operational Costs 1,812.1Gross Requirements 1,812.1Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 1,812.1Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) 120.0Total Requirements 1,932.1Source: UN Document A/63/346/Add.3Notes: Figures are based on, but may vary from, information provided in A/63/346/Add.3.

220 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS6.18U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNSCO(UN Special Coordinator Office for theMiddle East Peace Process)UNSCO Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSpecial CoordinatorDeputy Special CoordinatorFirst Special Coordinator8 January 2009 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 186016 September 1999 (date of issue); 1 October 1999 (date of effect)UNSC Letter S/1999/983Robert H. Serry (Netherlands)SG letter of appointment 28 November 2007Maxwell Gaylard (Australia)Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)UNSCO PersonnelPositionQuantityInternational Civilian 27Local Civilian 26Total 53Source: DFS FPDNotes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff as of 31 March 2010.UNSCO Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 January 2010Category Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 21 6 77.8% 22.2%Local Civilian 20 6 76.9% 23.1%Total 41 12 77.4% 22.6%Source: DFS FPD

UNSCO | 221UNSCO International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010OccupationalGroup USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - 3Aviation - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Civil Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Finance - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1Human Resources - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Human Rights - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -InformationManagementInformation Systemsand Technology- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Legal Affairs - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1Logistics - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Management andProgramme Analysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Political Affairs 1 - 1 - 2 3 2 - - - - - - 9Procurement - - - - - - - - - - - - - -ProgrammeManagement- - - - 1 - 2 - - - - - - 3Public Information - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1Rule of Law - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Security - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 6 7Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Total 1 - 1 - 6 3 6 - - 4 - - 6 27Source: DFS FPD

222 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNSCO Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 50Automobiles 11Buses 1Total 62Source: DFS LSDUNSCO Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘11 (in thousands of US dollars)AppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Estimated ExpendituresJan ‘10-Dec ‘11Gross Requirements 15,940.5 16,333.5Staff Assessment Income - -Net Requirements 15,940.5 16,333.5Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- -Total Requirements 15,940.5 16,333.5Source: A/64/6 (Sect. 3)UNSCO Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘00-Dec ‘07 (in thousands of US dollars)Jan ‘00-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07Gross Requirements 7,167.7 10,352.1 11,496.6 13,385.1Staff Assessment Income - - - -Net Requirements 7,167.7 10,352.1 11,496.6 13,385.1Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- - - -Total Requirements 7,167.7 10,352.1 11,496.6 13,385.1Source: UN Document A/58/6 (Sect. 3), A/60/6 (Sect. 3), A/62/6 (Sect. 3), A/64/6 (Sect. 3)

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 2236.19U N M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sUNSCOL(Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon)UNSCOL Key FactsLatest Key ResolutionFirst MandateSpecial CoordinatorDeputy Special CoordinatorFirst Special Coordinator24 August 2007 (date of issue)UNSC Res. 177313 February 2007 (date of issue)UNSC Letter S/2007/85Michael C. Williams (UK)SG letter of appointment 30 July 2008Marta Ruedas (Spain)Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)UNSCOL PersonnelPositionQuantityInternational Civilian 21Local Civilian 51Total 72Source: DFS FPDNotes: Data for local civilian staff as of 31 January 2010, data for international civilian staff as of 31 March 2010.UNSCOL Personnel Gender Statistics: 31 January 2010Category Male Female Percent Male Percent FemaleInternational Civilian 15 5 75.0% 25.0%Local Civilian 45 6 88.2% 11.8%Total 60 11 84.5% 15.5%Source: DFS FPD

224 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNSCOL International Civilian Staff by Occupational Group and Post Grade:31 March 2010OccupationalGroup USG ASG D-2 D-1 P-5 P-4 P-3 P-2/1 FS-PL FS-OL GS-P GS-OL S-S TotalAdministration - - - - 1 - - - - - - 2 - 3Aviation - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Civil Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Economic Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Electoral Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Engineering - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Finance - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1Human Resources - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1Human Rights - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Humanitarian Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -InformationManagementInformation Systemsand Technology- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Legal Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Logistics - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Management andProgramme Analysis- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Medical Services - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Political Affairs 1 1 - 1 1 3 1 1 - - - - - 9Procurement - - - - - - - - - - - - - -ProgrammeManagement- - - - - - - - - - - - - -Public Information - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Rule of Law - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1Security - - - - - 1 - 1 - 4 - - - 6Social Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Transport - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Total 1 1 - 1 3 4 2 2 - 5 - 2 - 21Source: DFS FPDUNSCOL Vehicles: 31 March 2010Vehicle TypeQuantityArmoured 34x4 Vehicles 17Buses 1Trucks 1Total 22Source: DFS LSD

UNSCOL | 225UNSCOL Requirements: Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Requirements Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Civilian Personnel 5,969.6Common Staff Costs 5,969.6Operational Costs 2,436.2Consultants 73.8Official Travel 158.8Facilities and Infrastructure 981.5Ground Transportation 134.2Communications 661.4IT 297.4Medical 8.3Other Supplies, Services and Equipment 120.8Gross Requirements 8,405.8Staff Assessment Income -Net Requirements 8,405.8Voluntary Contributions in Kind (budgeted) -Total Requirements 8,405.8Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3UNSCOL Budget and Expenditures: Jan ‘08-Dec ‘09 (in thousands of US dollars)CategoryAppropriationsJan ‘08-Dec ‘09EstimatedExpendituresJan ‘08-Dec ‘09Approved BudgetJan ‘09-Dec ‘09Civilian Personnel 9,070.3 8,704.6 5,252.9Operational Costs 3,552.3 3,917.5 1,469.9Gross Requirements 12,622.6 12,622.1 6,722.8Staff Assessment Income - - -Net Requirements 12,622.6 12,622.1 6,722.8Voluntary Contributions inKind (budgeted)- - -Total Requirements 12,622.6 12,622.1 6,722.8Source: UN Document A/64/349/Add.3

226 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSUNSCOL Estimated Expenditures: Jan ‘06-Dec ‘08 (in thousands of US dollars)Category Jan ‘06-Dec ‘07 Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Civilian Personnel 3,076.0 3,749.1Operational Costs 1,754.7 2,150.7Gross Requirements 4,830.7 5,899.8Staff Assessment Income - -Net Requirements 4,830.7 5,899.8Voluntary Contributions in Kind(budgeted)- -Total Requirements 4,830.7 5,899.8Source: UN Document A/62/512/Add.1, A/63/346/Add.1

OSCEMission-by-Mission Statistics77.1 OMIK (OSCE Mission in Kosovo)7.2 OSCE BiH (OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina)7.3 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat7.4 OSCE Centre in Astana7.5 OSCE Centre in Bishkek7.6 OSCE Mission to Moldova7.7 OSCE Mission to Montenegro7.8 OSCE Mission to Serbia7.9 OSCE Office in Baku7.10 OSCE Office in Tajikistan7.11 OSCE Office in Yerevan7.12 OSCE Presence in Albania7.13 OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje7.14 Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office on theConflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference227

228 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS7.1O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOMIK(OSCE Mission in Kosovo)OMIK Key FactsAuthorization Date1 July 1999PC.DEC/305Start Date July 1999Head of MissionAmbassador Werner Almhofer (Austria)Budget $30.3 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OMIK Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 166 199Local 485 499Total 651 698Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

OMIK | 229OMIK Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 153Head of Mission 1Deputy Head of Mission 1Senior Co-ordination Officer 1Chief of Mission Security 1Head of Legal Affairs 1Mission Spokesperson 1Deputy Chief Mission Security 1Mission Internal Oversight Officer 1Security Officer 5Special Assistant to the Head of Mission 1Planning and Co-ordination Officer 1Director of Regional Centre 5Head of the Office of Political Affairs 1Deputy Director of Regional Centre 1Deputy Head, Legal Affairs 1Head of Project Co-ordination Unit 1Senior Legal Adviser 2Senior Political Officer 3Senior Public Affairs Officer 1Political Officer 2Project Officer 1National Deputy Spokesperson 1National Legal Adviser 1National Political Officer 2National Press Officer 1National Graphic Presentation Officer 1National Legal Adviser 1National Public Information Officer 1National Co-ordination Officer 1Personal Assistant to Head of Mission 1Senior Co-ordination Assistant 1Senior Internal Oversight Assistant 1Senior Legal Assistant 1Senior Monitoring Assistant 1Senior Press and Public Information Assistant 1Senior Project Assistant 1Senior Public Information Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Security Planning Assistant 1Senior Secretary 2Situation Centre Duty Assistant 5Fire and Safety Assistant 1Intranet/Internet Assistant 1CCTV Technician 1Fire Safety Assistant 1Investigation Assistant 1Media Monitor Assistant 3Office Assistant 1Security Administrative Assistant 1Security Assistant 5Security Planning Assistant 1Security Shift Supervisor 4Translation Assistant 1Radio Operator 13Radio Operator/Guard 3Security Control Room Operators 4Security Escort Unit Member 4Security Shift Team Leader 4Security Guard 45Fund Administration Unit 145Head, Administration and Finance 1Chief Medical Officer 1Chief of Financial Management 1Chief, Human Resources Management 1Chief, ICT 1Head, General Services 1Chief, Building Management Services 1Contracts/Procurement Officer 1Human Resources Officer 1ICT Officer 1Material Management Officer 1

230 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOMIK Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (continued)CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Transport Services Officer 1Customs Clearance Officer 1National Medical Officer 1National Chief of Accounts 1National Database Design Officer 1National Budget Officer 1National Electrical Engineer 1National Engineering Co-ordination Officer 1National Finance Officer 1National Human Resources Officer 1National Human Resources Officer 1National ICT Engineer, MobileCommunicationsNational ICT Officer 2National ICT Officer, VOIP 1National Supply Officer 1National Training Co-ordinator 1National ICT Engineer, Microwave/VSAT 1National Archives Officer 1National Asset Management Officer 1National Finance Officer 1National Procurement Officer 1National Training Officer 1National Travel Officer 1National Building Maintenance Officer 1Executive Assistant 1Senior Administrative Assistant 5Senior Conference Services Assistant 1Senior Finance Assistant 1Senior Human Resources Assistant 2Senior ICT Assistant 1Senior ICT Assistant, HD Team Leader 1Senior ICT Technician 4Senior ICT Technician Internet 1Senior ICT Technician LAN 3Senior ICT Technician Microwave/VSAT 11Senior ICT Technician, MobileCommunicationsSenior Materials Control Assistant 1Senior Payroll Assistant 1Senior Procurement Assistant 1Senior Transport Assistant 1Senior Treasury Assistant 1Senior Human Resources/Payroll Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Budget Audit Assistant 1Building Management Assistant 1CS Technician Microwave/ConferenceEquipmentDatabase Development Assistant 1Electrical Foreman 1Finance Assistant 1Fleet Assistant 1Generator Mechanic 1Generator Technician 1Human Resources Assistant 5ICT Admin/Billing Co-ordinator 1ICT Assistant Equipment Management andRepairICT Assistant, Helpdesk 3ICT Technician 1ICT Technician Microwave/VSAT 3ICT Technician Mobile Communications 2Logistics Assistant 3Logistics Assistant 1Maintenance Foreman 1Material Management Assistant 1Nurse 1Procurement Assistant 1Secretary to the FMMC 1Supply Assistant 1Training Assistant 2Travel Assistant 1111

OMIK | 231OMIK Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (continued)CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Treasury Assistant 1Archives Assistant 2Conference Equipment Technician 1Customs Assistant 1Dispatcher 3Facilities Assistant 1Generator Overhaul Mechanic 1Inspection Assistant 1Maintenance Assistant 1Office Assistant 2Photocopy Technician 1Secretary 2Supply Assistant 2Technical Assistant 1BMS Technical Clerk 1Electrician 3Fleet Clerk 1ICT Billing Clerk 1Inventory Clerk 3Mail Clerk 1Maintenance Clerk 1Movement Control/Vehicle Tracking Clerk 2Plumber 1Technical Clerk 2Technical Clerk/Air-Conditioning 1Truck Driver/Forklift Operator 1Warehouse Clerk 1Pool Operator 1Switchboard Operator 1Handyman 1Common Operational Costs 26Driver 1Driver/Bus 3Driver/Truck 3Senior Driver to Deputy Head of Mission 2Senior Driver to Head of Mission 2Cleaner Supervistor 1Driver 14Security and Public Safety 47Deputy Director 1Director 1Chief 1Chief of Section 1Chief of Section 1Chief of Section 1Senior KCPSED Adviser 1Senior Training Development Officer 4Senior Community Policing Officer 3Senior Organized Crime Adviser 2Senior Organized Crime Adviser 2National Administrative Officer 1National KCPSED Adviser 1National Programme Officer 1National Public Safety Awareness Officer 1National Training Development Officer 1National PIK Adviser 1National Organized Crime Adviser 1Senior Programme Assistant 2Senior Programme Assistant 1Senior Project Assistant 1Senior Analysis and Reporting Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Monitoring Assistant 1Programme Assistant 7Programme Assistant 4Senior Secretary 1Programme Assistant 3Democratization 75Chief, Elections Division 1Administrative Officer 1IT Officer 1Deputy Director 1

232 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOMIK Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (continued)CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Director 1Chief of Section 1Field Activities Co-ordinator 1Chief of Division 1Chief, Analysis and Reporting Cell 1Deputy Chief of Division/Senior MediaAdviserDeputy Chief/Senior Legal Officer 1Election Technical Adviser 1Elections Operations Adviser 1Senior Adviser on Higher Education,Academic ManagementSenior Adviser to the IMC 1Senior Programme Officer 1Senior Project Adviser 1Senior Reporting and Information Officer 1Special Adviser to OI 1Unit Co-ordinator/Senior Adviser on HigherEducationSenior Adviser on Independent Institutions 1Programme Officer 2National Deputy Chief, Elections Division 1National Legal Officer 2National Programme Officer 11National Training Officer 1National Voter Services Officer 1National Elections External Relations Officer 1Personal Assistant 1Senior Administrative Assistant 1Senior Election Compliance Auditor Assistant 1Senior Election Field Assistant 6Senior Election Technical Assistant 1Senior Elections Operations Assistant 1Senior Programme Assistant 3Senior Training Assistant 1Senior Translator/Interpreter 9Monitoring Assistant 2111Programme Assistant 2Programme Assistant 1Programme Assistant 5Office Clerk 1Human Rights and Communities 252Special Adviser on Non-AlbanianCommunities and Outreach Co-ordinationBudget/Administrative Officer 1Deputy Director 1Director 1Chief of Anti-Trafficking Section 1Chief of Communities Section 1Chief of Legal System Monitoring Section 1Chief of Legislative Review Section 1Chief of Property Section 1Chief of Security Monitoring Section 1Field Activities Co-ordinator 1Chief of Analysis and Reporting Cell 1Chief of Human Rights Section 1Human Rights Adviser, Security MonitoringSectionLegal Analyst 2Senior Adviser 3Senior Communities Adviser, Protection 2Senior Communities Policy Adviser 2Senior Democratization Officer 5Senior Human Rights Adviser/Property 1Senior Human Rights/Legal Adviser 1Senior Legal Officer, Legislative ReviewSectionSenior Human Rights Adviser 1Special Adviser to Kosovo Judicial Institute 1Senior Human Rights Officer 4Senior Human Rights Officer 1Senior Human Rights Adviser 1Communities Policy Officer 1Communities Protection Officer 1161

OMIK | 233OMIK Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (continued)CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Human Dimension Officer 55Human Rights Adviser/Property 1Human Rights Legal Adviser 1Legal Officer, Legislative Review Section 1Legal System Monitor 6Human Rights Officer, Property 1Municipal Co-ordination Officer 1National Communities Policy Adviser 1National Co-ordinator, Criminal Monitoring 1National Language Services Co-ordinator 1National Legal Adviser on Women andChildrenNational Human Rights Adviser 1National Anti-Trafficking Officer 1National Budget/Administrative Officer 1National Civil Legal Adviser 1National Communities Policy Adviser 1National Human Rights Legal Adviser 1National Legal Adviser 1National Legal Adviser, Security MonitoringSection12National Legal Officer, Legislative ReviewSectionNational Legal Officer, Property 2National Legal System Officer 6National Programme Officer 1National Property Officer 4Personal Assistant 1Senior Legal Assistant 1Senior Programme Assistant 38Senior Translator/Interpreter 5Administrative Assistant 2Anti-Trafficking Assistant 1Human Rights Assistant 6Legal Assistant 1Legal System Assistant 9Assistant/Secretary/Interpreter 5Programme Assistant 40Office Clerk 1Receptionist 1Total 6983Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

234 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOMIK Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantityArmoured 44x4 Vehicles 210Automobiles 2Vans 5Buses 18Trucks 13Ambulances 1Total 253Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOMIK Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 4,887,998.9Fund Administration Unit 4,069,770.2Common Operational Costs 6,092,049.1Security and Public Safety 1,676,378.0Democratization 4,383,432.1Human Rights and Communities 9,176,078.8Total 30,285,707.1Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

OMIK | 235OMIK Budget Jan ‘99-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘99-Dec ‘99*Jan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head of Mission 3,069,180.2 5,548,990.2 5,533,165.2 6,784,237.9 5,288,858.6 5,753,712.0Fund Administration Unit 20,103,085.1 8,509,598.6 7,012,727.4 5,952,418.5 5,363,095.9 4,831,604.9Common Operational Costs - 7,917,553.9 8,495,734.5 8,386,927.1 7,547,314.3 6,700,933.0Security and Public Safety - - - 3,036,396.4 2,723,468.2 2,584,245.2Democratization 7,503,690.8 7,763,639.7 7,984,194.4 - - 4,926,370.0Human Rights andCommunities- - - - - 9,805,516.2Monitoring Programme - - - - 10,782,326.6 -Assistance Programme - - - - 6,891,183.6 -Good Governance andDemocratic Institutions- - - 6,146,726.1 - -Human Rights, Decentralizationand Communities- - - 10,513,792.1 - -Police Education andDevelopment6,175,906.3 6,108,083.1 3,203,805.0 - - -Human Rights and Rule of Law 6,117,227.5 5,618,029.0 6,320,034.7 - - -Elections 6,612,771.1 1,233,899.2 1,387,055.3 - - -Temporary Media Commission/IMC185,857.6 202,352.3 - - - -Ombudsperson Institution 545,627.6 243,952.7 - - - -Total 63,017,715.8 109,266,325.8 89,548,195.5 65,060,760.7 57,732,829.2 50,313,346.2 43,146,098.7 39,936,716.5 40,820,498.1 38,596,247.2 34,602,381.3Secretariat Augmentations - 3,805,149.4 4,475,868.1 4,294,837.8 4,194,016.6 4,141,657.8 4,079,410.1 3,894,339.8 3,912,824.6 - -ODIHR Augmentations - 334,233.5 334,155.6 334,127.2 338,732.7 338,745.2 379,318.8 367,273.9 340,812.8 - -Grand Total 63,017,715.8 113,405,708.7 94,358,219.2 69,689,725.7 62,265,578.5 54,793,749.2 47,604,827.6 44,198,330.2 45,074,135.5 38,596,247.2 34,602,381.3Source: OSCE Documents Annual Report 1999 on OSCE Activities, PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DEC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1,PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888.Notes: *Refers to the Spending Authority approved through PC.DEC/282 and PC.DEC/286 for the Kosovo Verification Mission, and later utilized for the transitional OSCE Task Force for Kosovo aswell as the OSCE Mission to Kosovo.

236 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS7.2O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE BiH(OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina)OSCE BiH Key FactsAuthorization and Start DateHead of Mission8 December 1995MC(5).DEC/1Ambassador Gary D. Robbins (United States)Budget $19.9 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE BiH Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 69 86Local 439 448Total 508 534Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

OSCE BiH | 237OSCE BiH Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 64Head of Mission 1Deputy Head of Mission 1Director of Policy and Planning 1Senior Representative of the HOM 3Election Adviser 1Executive Assistant to HOM 1OHR/EUSR Liaison Officer 1Programme Evaluation Officer 1Senior Political Adviser 1Executive Assistant to DHOM 1National Chief of Security 1National Spokesperson 1National Deputy Chief of Security 1National Personal Assistant to DHOM 1National Personal Assistant to HOM 1National Political Officer 6National Political Officer 1National Press Officer 4National Reporting Officer 1National Website Manager 1Political Assistant 1Programme Assistant 1Public Information Assistant 1Senior Interpreter 6Website Assistant 1Assistant/Interpreter 3Language Lector 3Operations Assistant 1Press Assistant 1Close Protection Specialist 1Security Guard 15Fund of Administration Unit 87.5Chief of Fund Administration 1Chief, Human Resources 1Chief of Finance 1Chief of Procurement and Logistics 1CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Legal Adviser 1National Chief of Budget 1National Medical Officer 1National Chief of ICT Services 1National Accounting Officer 1National Budget Officer 1National Executive Assistant 1National Finance Officer 2National Procurement Officer 2National Deputy Chief of ICT Services 1National Administrative Officer 1National Archives Officer 1National Communications Officer 1National ERP System Administrator 1National FMMC Officer 1National General Services Officer 2National Network Administrator 1National Personnel Officer 1National Recruitment Officer 1National Treasury Officer 1National Information Systems Developer 1Senior ICT Assistant 1Senior Inventory Assistant 1Senior Supply Assistant 1Senior Transport Assistant 1Budget Assistant 1Finance Assistant 5Investigations Assistant 2IT/Help Desk Co-ordinator 1Payroll Assistant 1Procurement Assistant 1SMS Server Operator/Helpdesk Operator 1Storekeeper 1Training Support Assistant 1Transport Maintenance Supervisor 1Travel and Accommodation Assistant 2Administrative Assistant 3

238 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE BiH Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (continued)CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Archivist Assistant 2Assistant Building Manager 3Dispatcher 1General Services Assistant 2IT/Communications Assistant 5Personnel Assistant 3Procurement Assistant 1Transport Assistant 1Administrative Clerk 11Documents Management Clerk 2Receptionist 2.5Switchboard Operator 2Common Operational Costs 78.5Driver for DHOM 1Senior Driver 1Senior Driver 1Driver 47.5Cleaner 27Cleaner 1Security Co-operation 20Director of Security Co-operation 1Head of Arms Control Section 1Head of Director’s Office/Policy and PlanningOfficer 1Head of Institution Building Section 1Head of Parliamentary Section 1Arms Control Implementation Officer 1Parliamentary Officer 1Policy and Information Officer 1National Compliance Officer 1National Legal Officer 1National Politico-Military Officer 1National Defence and Security Officer 1Logistics Assistant, Arms Control 1Personal Assistant 1Senior Interpreter 1Assistant/Interpreter 5Jan ‘10-CategoryDec ‘10Human Dimension 279.5Head, Human Dimension Department 1Deputy Director, Operations Unit 1Deputy Director, Programmes Unit 1Senior Human Dimension Officer 5Community Engagement Co-ordinator 1Judicial and Legal Reform Co-ordinator 1Parliamentary Monitoring and Support Coordinator1Municipal Development Co-ordinator 1Equality, Economic and Social Rights Coordinator1Education Institutions and Legislation Coordinator1Diversity and Inclusion in Schools Co-ordinator1Field Advocacy Co-ordinator 1Human Rights Adviser, Economic and SocialRights 1Legal Adviser 1Legal Adviser, Analysis and Reporting 1Legal Adviser, Anti-Discrimination 1Legal Adviser, Human Rights Institutions 1Legal Adviser, Judicial and Legal Reform 2Legal Adviser, War Crimes 2Policy and Co-ordination Adviser 1Policy and Regional Co-ordinator 1Head of Field Office 8Human Rights Officer 10Governance Officer 12National Anti-Trafficking Officer 1National Education Adviser, Access and Non-Discrimination 1National Education Adviser, Civic Involvement 1National Finance and Management Adviser 1National Legal Adviser 3National Legal Adviser 6National Legal Affairs Co-ordinator 1National Policy and Regional Co-ordinator 1

OSCE BiH | 239OSCE BiH Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (continued)CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10National Co-ordinator, Education Support 1National Education Officer 27National Human Rights Officer 9National Information and Reporting Officer 1National Legal Officer 2National Parliamentary Adviser 1National Programme Officer, Citizen Participation13National Programme Officer, CommunityDevelopment 1National Programme Officer, Local EconomicDevelopment 1National Programme Officer, Municipal Communication1National Programme Officer, Municipal Development20National Programme Officer, Municipal Legislation1National Programme Officer, Participation andPartnership 1National Programme Officer, Youth Adviser 1National Property Rights Adviser 1National Reporting and Information Officer 1National Trial Monitoring Officer 1National Monitoring and Evaluation Officer 1Senior Database Assistant 0.5Senior Programme Assistant 1Language Assistant 1Legal Assistant 6Parliamentary Support Project Assistant 1Personal Assistant 1CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Personal Assistant 1Programme Assistant 2Programme Assistant 2Programme Assistant 4Programme Assistant 2Programme Assistant, CommunityDevelopment 14Programme Assistant, CommunityEngagement 2Programme Assistant, Governance 13Programme Assistant, Municipal Co-ordination 13Programme Assistant, Municipal Interventions 2Programme Assistant, Municipal Learning 4Project Assistant 1Roma Monitor 1Rule of Law Monitor 24Administrative Assistant 1Administrative Secretary 1Assistant/Interpreter 6Assistant/Interpreter 18Project Assistant 2Regional Stabilization/Arms Control 5Driver 1Military Adviser 1Operation Staff Officer 1Personal Representative of the CiO 1Administrative Secretary 1Total 534.5Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

240 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE BiH Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 7Automobiles 105Vans 2Buses 11Total 125Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE BiH Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 2,176,021.9Fund Administration Unit 2,568,185.8Common Operational Costs 4,359,059.5Security Co-operation 929,092.3Human Dimension 9,842,365.6Total 19,874,725.1Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

OSCE BiH | 241OSCE BiH Budget Jan ‘99-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘99-Dec ‘99Jan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head ofMission2,394,914.4 1,968,141.3 2,905,233.8 3,098,587.3 2,258,363.3 2,226,313.2FundAdministrationUnit4,518,695.3 3,404,734.1 2,991,478.1 2,442,645.4 2,613,572.9 2,575,012.1CommonOperationalCosts- 3,696,036.9 4,882,142.8 5,106,917.6 4,396,949.5 4,357,175.2Politico-MilitaryActivities- - - - -Economic andEnvironmentalActivities- - - - -SecurityCo-operation1,565,175.5 1,149,399.2 1,105,855.6 1,024,950.1 970,697.0 966,523.8HumanDimensionActivities- - - - -Human Rightsand Rule of Law5,734,844.2 4,183,506.9 3,745,127.0 3,881,486.1 3,493,243.6 3,482,650.1Education 2,392,669.5 2,518,551.5 2,130,325.5 2,124,850.1 2,039,853.4 2,089,567.5PublicAdministrationReform2,278,698.6 1,859,460.5 - - - -Democratization 4,219,108.9 3,036,862.2 4,213,305.4 4,194,685.8 3,975,366.2 3,996,701.5Police ReformProgramme- - - - -Total 794,765,222.8 49,924,948.5 32,771,240.6 24,108,117.4 24,801,870.4 23,104,106.4 21,816,692.6 21,973,468.2 21,874,122.4 19,748,045.9 19,693,943.4Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/282, PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888

242 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS7.3O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Centre in AshgabatOSCE Centre in Ashgabat Key FactsAuthorization Date23 July 1998PC.DEC/244Start Date January 1999Head of MissionAmbassador Arsim Zekolli (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)Budget $1.8 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE Centre in Ashgabat Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 5 6Local 18 19Total 23 25Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat | 243OSCE Centre in Ashgabat Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 9Head of Centre 1Project Co-ordinator 1National Public Information Officer 1Project Co-ordination Assistant 1Senior Secretary 1Security Guard 4Fund of Administration Unit 5Chief of Fund Administration Unit 1Senior Finance Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Procurement/Asset Management Assistant 1Human Resources and Payroll Assistant 1Common Operational Costs 4Senior Driver 1Driver 1Driver 1Cleaner 1Conflict Prevention and Confidence and Security Building 2Political Officer 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Economic and Environmental Activities 2Economic and Environmental Officer 1Programme Assistant 1Human Dimension Activities 3Human Dimension Officer 1National Legal Officer 1Programme Assistant 1Total 25Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

244 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Centre in Ashgabat Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 5Automobiles 1Total 6Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Centre in Ashgabat Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 329,140.6Fund Administration Unit 219,427.1Common Operational Costs 320,209.8Conflict Prevention and Confidence- and Security-Building 343,787.6Economic and Environmental Activities 280,694.0Human Dimension Activities 353,005.0Total 1,846,264.1Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat | 245OSCE Centre in Ashgabat Budget Jan ‘99-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘99-Dec ‘99Jan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head of Mission 209,864.4 204,069.5 323,897.0 325,384.0 332,421.0 333,447.1Fund Administration Unit 212,612.3 115,257.8 135,021.6 167,115.4 179,825.7 211,482.7Common Operational Costs - 154,077.9 246,448.5 238,084.4 284,932.3 301,553.8Conflict Prevention andConfidence and SecurityBuilding- - 302,686.0 295,336.9 343,185.3 353,963.6Economic and EnvironmentalActivities- - 304,652.4 297,210.5 281,756.5 289,971.2Human Dimension Activities - - 301,771.8 294,408.4 338,049.8 355,418.8Support for Building upDemocratic Society, Rule ofLaw and Market Reforms1,059,640.8 1,043,019.1 - - - -Total 5,399,404.0 530,366.1 729,539.2 800,832.7 1,420,593.3 1,482,117.5 1,516,424.3 1,614,477.3 1,617,539.6 1,760,170.6 1,845,837.2Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/282, PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888

246 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS7.4O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Centre in AstanaOSCE Centre in Astana Key FactsAuthorization Date23 July 1998PC.DEC/243Start Date January 1999Head of MissionAmbassador Alexandre Keltchewsky (France)Budget $2.9 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE Centre in Astana Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 6 6Local 20 22Total 26 28Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

OSCE Centre in Astana | 247OSCE Centre in Astana Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 4Head of Centre 1Deputy Head of Centre 1Senior Secretary 1Office Assistant 1Fund Administration Unit 7Chief of Fund Administration Unit 1National Administrative and Finance Officer 1Senior Finance Assistant 1Administrative/Human Resources Assistant 1Asset Management Assistant 1Finance Assistant 1Material Management Assistant 1Common Operational Costs 5Senior Driver 1Driver 3Cleaner 1Politico-Military Activities 4Political Officer 1National Political/Media Officer 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Project Assistant 1Economic and Environmental Activities 4Economic and Environmental Officer 1National Economic and Environmental Co-ordinator 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Project Assistant 1Human Dimension Activities 4Human Dimension Officer 1National Legal Officer 1Senior Legal Assistant 1Senior Project Assistant 1Total 28Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

248 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Centre in Astana Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 5Automobiles 2Total 7Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Centre in Astana Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US Dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 330,768.8Fund Administration Unit 287,164.2Common Operational Costs 517,923.5Politico-Military Activities 569,584.0Economic and Environmental Activities 604,375.8Human Dimension Activities 573,936.6Total 2,883,752.9Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

OSCE Centre in Astana | 249OSCE Centre in Astana Budget Jan ‘99-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘99-Dec ‘99Jan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec’02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head ofMission142,413.6 201,567.2 349,351.0 304,387.8 304,949.7 310,750.4Fund Administration Unit 604,226.3 119,173.8 117,093.7 257,622.7 298,890.2 300,202.6Common OperationalCosts- 355,583.0 545,064.8 507,602.4 514,376.3 473,234.2Politico-Military Activities - - 379,473.3 513,926.1 535,978.8 531,424.4Support for theDemocraticDevelopment of PoliticalInstitutions272,310.6 314,184.0 - - - -Economic andEnvironmental Activities266,086.8 329,621.0 503,220.2 514,057.9 526,758.2 567,660.9Human DimensionActivities- - 331,394.8 513,926.1 542,390.7 544,995.5DemocraticDevelopment andFreedom of the Media525,976.4 615,336.4 288,186.2 - - -Capacity-Building andCivil Society Support181,413.7 187,224.7 - - - -Assistance forDemocratic PoliceDevelopment- 197,796.7 - - - -Total 5,403,706.1 505,083.3 726,242.3 898,968.8 1,650,521.7 1,992,427.4 2,320,486.8 2,513,784.0 2,611,523.0 2,723,343.9 2,728,268.0Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/282, PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839,PC.DEC/888

250 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS7.5O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Centre in BishkekOSCE Centre in Bishkek Key FactsAuthorization Date23 July 1998PC.DEC/245Start Date January 1999Head of MissionAmbassador Andrew Tesoriere (United Kingdom)Budget $7.2 million (1 January 2010 -31 December 2010)OSCE Centre in Bishkek Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 17 17Local 69 74Total 86 91Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

OSCE Centre in Bishkek | 251OSCE Centre in Bishkek Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 24Head of Centre 1Deputy Head of Centre 1Programme Co-ordinator 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Senior Security Assistant 1Assistant to Head of Centre 1Programme Assistant 5Security Guard 13Fund Administration Unit 16Chief of Fund Administration 1National Administrative Officer 1National Finance Officer 1Senior Human Resources Assistant 1Senior Procurement Assistant 1Asset Management Assistant 1Finance and Treasury Assistant 1ICT Assistant 1Procurement Assistant 1Treasury Assistant 1Administartive Assistant 1Finance Assistant 1Human Resources Assistant 1Travel Assistant 1Office Clerk 2Common Operational Costs 14Driver/Mechanic 1Senior Driver 1Driver 7Cleaner 5Politico-Military Activities 11CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Head of Field Office Osh 1Senior Political Officer 1Adviser on Anti-Terrorism Issues 1Border Issues Co-ordination Officer 1National Media Officer 1Senior Programme Assistant 4Programme Assistant 1Project Assistant 1Economic and Environmental Activities 6Senior Economic and Environmental Officer 1Economic and Environmental Officer 1Senior Programme Assistant 4Human Dimension Activities 9Senior Human Dimension Officer 1Human Dimension Officer 1Penitentiary Reform Adviser 1National Legal Officer 1National Project Co-ordinator 1Senior Legal Assistant 1Senior Programme Assistant 2Programme Assistant 1Police Reform Programme 11Police Reform Adviser 1Community Policing Adviser 2Police Adviser 1Senior Programme Assistant 3Programme Assistant 1Project Assistant 2Translator/Interpreter 1Total 91Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

252 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Centre in Bishkek Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantityArmoured 34x4 Vehicles 43Automobiles 5Buses 6Total 57Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Centre in Bishkek Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 865,161.0Fund Administration Unit 375,483.5Common Operational Costs 769,016.6Politico-Military Activities 1,498,245.2Economic and Environmental Activities 1,161,264.4Human Dimension Activities 1,102,239.4Police Reform Programme 1,449,093.7Total 7,220,503.8Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

OSCE Centre in Bishkek | 253OSCE Centre in Bishkek Budget Jan ‘99-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘99-Dec ‘99Jan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head of Mission 353,542.4 705,125.7 1,056,967.5 1,071,853.3 1,032,298.4 866,115.3Fund Administration Unit 470,225.0 181,138.6 181,602.4 338,480.0 345,812.7 377,501.6Common Operational Costs - 558,312.9 481,109.3 623,314.5 920,089.8 754,344.3Politico-Military Activities - 632,007.6 859,860.3 621,614.9 861,439.2 1,422,485.0Economic and EnvironmentalActivities- 513,439.2 675,331.7 727,985.4 1,032,138.0 1,161,335.9Enhancing Political Stability andDemocracy205,896.6 - - - - -Scientific Co-operation in theSecond Dimension310,059.2 - - - - -Human Dimension Activities 352,393.9 646,348.0 811,223.2 688,969.7 1,068,778.9 1,094,138.1Democratic Transformation 601,167.9 - - - - -Assistance to the Legal ReformProcess227,465.4 - - - - -Police Reform Programme - - - 1,313,251.8 1,397,755.5 1,451,629.1Total 6,673,719.8 583,219.5 987,619.2 1,248,643.5 2,266,873.8 2,520,750.4 3,236,372.0 4,066,094.4 5,385,469.6 6,658,312.5 7,127,549.3Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/282, PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888

254 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS7.6O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Mission to MoldovaOSCE Mission to Moldova Key FactsAuthorization DateStart Date April 1993Head of Mission4 February 199319-CSO/Journal No. 3, Annex 3Ambassador Philip N. Remler (United States)Budget $2.7 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE Mission to Moldova Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 13 13Local 37 37Total 50 50Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

OSCE Mission to Moldova | 255OSCE Mission to Moldova Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 16Head of Mission 1Deputy Head of Mission 1Public Affairs Officer/Spokesperson 1National Legal Officer 1Senior Assistant Translator/Interpreter 1Senior Media Assistant 1Programme Assistant 1Programme Assistant 1Senior Secretary 1Office Assistant 1Security Guard 5Housekeeper 1Fund Administration Unit 12Chief of Fund Administration 1National Finance Officer 1Senior Human Resources Assistant 1Senior ICT Assistant 1Senior Procurement Assistant 1Finance Assistant 1Asset Management Assistant 1Procurement Assistant 1Travel Assistant 1CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Building Maintenance Technician 1Receptionist 2Common Operational Costs 4Senior Driver/Dispatcher 1Driver 1Cleaner 1Housekeeper 1Conflict Prevention/Resolution 8Military Member 2Political Officer 2Politico-Military Officer 2Senior Programme Assistant 1Assistant Translator/Interpreter 1Human Rights Monitoring/DemocratizationHuman Dimension Officer 2National Legal Officer 3Anti-Trafficking/Gender 5Anti-Trafficking and Gender Officer 1National Legal Officer 1National Anti-Trafficking and Gender Adviser 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Programme Assistant 1Total 505Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

256 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Mission to Moldova Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 5Automobiles 7Buses 1Total 13Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Mission to Moldova Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 497,944.1Fund Administration Unit 273,763.8Common Operational Costs 603,177.0Conflict Prevention/Resolution 611,260.8Human Rights Monitoring/Democratization 398,671.3Anti-Trafficking/Gender 363,327.6Total 2,748,144.6Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

OSCE Mission to Moldova | 257OSCE Mission to Moldova Budget Jan ‘99-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘99-Dec ‘99Jan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head ofMission385,377.5 365,762.0 425,635.0 450,566.3 455,871.5 455,868.2FundAdministration Unit649,063.9 219,931.9 197,314.6 223,371.2 225,352.5 242,267.3CommonOperational Costs- 516,722.0 460,013.7 607,600.6 602,082.9 588,985.1Conflict Prevention/Resolution345,414.8 381,311.5 479,009.7 511,871.9 570,699.7 571,972.4Human RightsMonitoring/Democratization595,379.1 475,452.8 530,470.4 352,719.6 383,048.0 383,121.5Anti-Trafficking/Gender- - - 318,045.3 342,699.4 342,765.1Total 9,808705.8 716,409.2 949,588.2 1,090,965.0 1,675,261.6 1,975,235.3 1,959,180.2 2,092,443.4 2,464,174.9 2,579,754.0 2,584,979.6Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/282, PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888

258 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS7.7O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Mission to MontenegroOSCE Mission to Montenegro Key FactsAuthorization Date29 June 2006PC.DEC/732Start Date June 2006Head of MissionAmbassador Paraschiva Badescu (Romania)Budget $3.2 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE Mission to Montenegro Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 13 14Local 32 32Total 45 46Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

OSCE Mission to Montenegro | 259OSCE Mission to Montenegro Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 10Head of Mission 1Deputy Head of Mission/ProgrammeCo-ordinator 1Senior Political Officer 1Senior Political Assistant 1Senior Programme Support Assistant 1Senior Secretary/Personal Assistant to HOM 1Assistant Translator/Interpreter 1Public Information Assistant 1Security Guard 2Fund Administration Unit 8Chief of Fund Administration 1National Finance Officer 1Senior Human Resources Assistant 1Finance Assistant 1ICT/DocIn Assistant 1Procurement Assistant 1Transport Clerk 1Receptionist 1Common Operational Costs 2Driver 1Cleaner 1Police Affairs 10Chief of Police Training Centre 1Police Expert Organized Crime 1CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Programme Manager 1Police Trainer 2Senior Programme Assistant 1Programme Assistant 4Politico-Military Activities 1National Politico-Military Officer 1Democratization 8Democratization Officer 1Programme Manager 1National Programme Officer 1National Education Officer 1National Training Officer 1Senior Programme Support Assistant 1Programme Assistant 1Project Assistant 1Media 2Programme Manager 1Programme Assistant 1Rule of Law and Human Rights 5Human Rights Officer 1Programme Manager, Rule of Law/HumanRights 1National Legal Officer 2Programme Assistant 1Total 46Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

260 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Mission to Montenegro Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 6Automobiles 9Total 15Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Mission to Montenegro Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10- Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 470,797.2Fund Administration Unit 313,374.3Common Operational Costs 581,051.0Police Affairs 616,519.8Politico-Military Activities 54,460.5Democratization 611,153.3Media 166,968.0Rule of Law and Human Rights 363,291.5Total 3,177,615.7Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923OSCE Mission to Montenegro Budget Jan ‘06-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06 Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07 Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08 Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head of Mission 149,991.0 415,870.9 459,683.8 449,243.6Fund Administration Unit 110,483.4 294,071.6 312,122.8 305,880.3Common Operational Costs 249,103.8 630,359.6 606,295.3 591,239.2Police Affairs 280,820.3 594,498.4 568,169.4 577,560.5Politico-Military Affairs - - 52,074.5 54,582.1Economic andEnvironmental38,199.8 88,324.7 128,857.7 129,881.4Democratization 185,966.0 435,248.3 459,902.4 466,621.4Media 68,147.0 150,337.7 154,781.7 157,355.3Rule of Lawand Human Rights145,704.1 314,444.7 326,037.9 346,449.7Total 1,228,415.4 2,923,156.0 3,067,925.5 3,078,813.4Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/786, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888

OSCE MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 2617.8O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Mission to SerbiaOSCE Mission to Serbia Key FactsAuthorization DateStart DateHead of Mission11 January 2001PC.DEC/401, as the OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia29 June 2006 (PC.DEC/733) renamed the OSCE Mission to SerbiaAmbassador Dimitrios Kypreos (Greece)Budget $10.6 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE Mission to Serbia Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 34 42Local 124 130Total 158 172Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

262 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Mission to Serbia Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 28.5Head of Mission 1Deputy Head of Mission 1Head of Press and Public Information 1Municipal Co-ordinator 1Senior Political Officer 1Political Officer 1Political/Reporting Officer 1National Special Adviser 1National Executive Officer 1National Project Co-ordination Officer 1Personal Assistant to HOM 1Senior Press and Public Information Assistant 1.5Field Programme Assistant 2Public Information Assistant 1Reports Assistant 1Senior Secretary 1Supervisor, Security Unit 1Project Assistant 1Senior Security Guard 1Security Guard 8Fund Administration Unit 28Chief, Fund Administration 1Finance Officer 1Procurement Officer 1National Human Resources Officer 1National ICT Officer 1Senior Administrative Assistant 1Senior Human Resources and TrainingAssistant 1Senior ICT Assistant 2CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Senior Procurement Assistant 1Asset Management Assistant 1Assistant to CFA 1Budget Assistant 1Finance Assistant 2Human Resources Assistant 1Treasury Assistant 1Human Resources Assistant 0.5Human Resources Assistant 1ICT Assistant 2Procurement Assistant 1Transport Assistant 1Building Maintenance Technician 1Office Clerk 1Receptionist 1Gardener/Handyman 1Handyman 1Registry Clerk 0.5Common Operational Costs 17Senior Driver 2Driver 8Cleaner 7Police Affairs 45Accountability Programme Manager 1Border Policing Adviser 1Community Policing Adviser 2Community Policing Programme Manager 1Head Law Enforcement 1Head of Strategic Development Unit 1Organized Crime Adviser 1Organized Crime Programme Manager 1

OSCE Mission to Serbia | 263OSCE Mission to Serbia Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (continued)CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Police Education Programme Manager 1Police Training Adviser 6Strategic Planning Adviser 1Training Co-ordinator 1Accountability Adviser 1Economic Crime Adviser 1National Programme Officer 1National Programme Officer 1National Curriculum Development Officer 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Project Assistant 13Project Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Training/Language Assistant 6Democratization 22Environmental Adviser 1Governance Adviser 1Head Democratization 1Human Rights Programme Co-ordinator 1Senior Adviser on Equal Opportunities 1National Legal Adviser 1National Governance Officer 1National Programme Officer 4National Programme Officer 1Senior Governance Training Assistant 1Senior Programme Assistant 6Senior Programme Co-ordination Assistant 1Programme Assistant 1Project Assistant 1Media 11CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Head Media 1National Legal Officer 2National Programme Officer 1Senior Administrative Assistant 1Senior Media Legislation Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Media Monitoring Assistant 2Programme Assistant 1Programme Assistant 1Rule of Law and Human Rights 20Economic Transparency Adviser 1Head HR and RoL 1Legal Adviser Judicial Reform 1Legal Adviser on Organized Crime 1Legal Reform Adviser 1Senior Co-ordinator for Rule of Law andHuman Rights 1National Legal Adviser 1National Legal Officer 3National Criminal Justice System Adviser 1National Legal Officer 1National Legal Officer 1National War Crimes Trials Adviser 1Senior Legal Assistant 1Senior Administrative Assistant 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Senior Project Assistant 1Legal Translator/Interpreter 2Total 171.5Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

264 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Mission to Serbia Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 9Automobiles 24Vans 1Buses 3Total 37Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Mission to Serbia Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 1,327,073.3Fund Administration Unit 1,051,703.2Common Operational Costs 2,041,761.3Police Affairs 2,388,289.6Democratization 1,619,024.9Media 554,896.5Rule of Law and Human Rights 1,576,555.7Total 10,559,304.4Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923OSCE Mission to Serbia Budget Jan ‘06-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06 Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07 Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08 Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head of Mission 1,356,261.6 1,225,604.0 1,384,435.4 1,285,635.1Fund Administration Unit 1,061,370.1 947,172.5 1,070,486.4 1,016,175.2Common Operational Costs 2,255,142.4 1,997,497.7 2,081,109.6 2,044,327.3Police Affairs 2,707,713.1 2,230,341.1 2,499,985.9 2,421,201.1Economic andEnvironmental Affairs377,812.8 350,738.6 373,481.6 -Democratization 1,513,910.0 1,297,387.1 1,415,161.2 1,611,162.0Media 636,512.2 551,647.9 568,006.2 532,285.5Rule of Law and HumanRights1,544,144.9 1,382,510.3 1,514,771.7 1,542,829.5Total 11,452,867.0 9,982,899.2 10,907,437.9 10,453,615.8Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/786, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1. PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888

OSCE MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 2657.9O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Office in BakuOSCE Office in Baku Key FactsAuthorization Date16 November 1999PC.DEC/318Start Date July 2000Head of MissionAmbassador Bilge Cankorel (Turkey)Budget $3.7 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE Office in Baku Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 11 12Local 27 27Total 38 39Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

266 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Office in Baku Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 5Head of Office 1Deputy Head of Office 1National Press and Public Information Officer 1Language Assistant 1Senior Secretary 1Fund Administration Unit 7.5Chief of Fund Administration 1Senior Administrative and Finance Assistant 1Senior IT Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Finance Assistant 1Procurement/Asset Management Assistant 1Human Resources Assistant 0.5Office Assistant 1Common Operational Costs 4Senior Driver 1Driver 1Driver 1Cleaner 1Politico-Military Activities 7Head, Politico-Military 1Police Expert 2CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Senior Police Adviser 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Project Assistant 2Economic and Environmental Activities 4Head, Economic and Environmental Unit 1Economic and Environmental Officer 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Senior Project Assistant 1Rule of Law and Human Rights 6Head of Rule of Law Unit 1Judicial Training Officer 1National Legal Officer 1National Legal Officer 1Programme Assistant 1Office Assistant 1Democratization 5Democratization Officer 1National Capacity Building Officer 1Senior Programme Assistant 2Programme Assistant 1Total 38.5Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

OSCE Office in Baku | 267OSCE Office in Baku Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 8Automobiles 2Total 10Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Office in Baku Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 317,802.9Fund Administration Unit 274,932.1Common Operational Costs 707,697.4Politico-Military Activities 819,041.0Economic and Environmental Activities 487,457.9Democratization 537,951.8Total 3,713,845.0Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

268 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Office in Baku Budget Jan ‘00-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head of Mission 251,934.0 222,072.0 216,709.2 224,180.1 286,746.1 303,841.9Fund Administration Unit 355,843.5 224,464.2 189,411.3 194,406.7 219,417.3 245,840.5Common Operational Costs - 361,614.6 366,491.0 400,515.1 513,082.6 618,082.1Politico-Military Activities 493,902.3 478,518.5 397,652.9 1,026,552.5 869,462.4 835,586.5Economic and EnvironmentalActivities343,402.5 380,422.2 381,685.0 460,751.9 488,382.8 489,920.5Human Dimension Activities 624,742.8 577,146.5 - - - -Democratization - - 398,846.6 479,394.2 454,771.1 519,592.5Rule of Law and Human Rights - - 392,280.7 507,320.1 491,748.7 544,474.4Total 1,031,785.1 989,553.6 1,042,026.4 1,791,388.6 2,069,825.2 2,244,237.9 2,343,076.7 3,293,120.5 3,323,611.1 3,557,338.4Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DEC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888

OSCE MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 2697.10O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Office in TajikistanOSCE Office in Tajikistan Key FactsAuthorization DateStart DateHead of Mission19 June 2008PC.DEC/8521 July 2008 renamed the OSCE Office in TajikistanAmbassador Ivar Vikki (Norway)Budget $7.8 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE Office in Tajikistan Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 27 28Local 121 130Total 148 158Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

270 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Office in Tajikistan Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 63Head of Office 1Deputy Head of Office 1Security Officer 1Programme Co-ordinator 1Field Officer 1Field Officer 2Senior Field Assistant 1Senior Legal Assistant 1Senior Press and Public Information Assistant 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Assistant Translator/Interpreter 1Field Assistant 5Project Assistant 1Security Assistant 1Senior Secretary 2Administrative Assistant 5Receptionist 1Senior Security Guard 1Security Guard 32Cook 3Fund Administration Unit 26Chief, Administration and Finance 1Finance Officer 1Material Management Officer 1National Human Resources Officer 1National Accounting Assistant 1National IT/Communications Officer 1Senior Asset Management Assistant 1Senior Procurement Assistant 1Asset Management Assistant 1Budget Assistant 1CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Communications Assistant 1Finance Assistant 2IT Assistant 1Payroll Assistant 1Procurement Assistant 1Procurement Assistant 1Treasury Assistant 1Recruitment and Training Assistant 1Building Maintenance Assistant 1Human Resources Assistant 1IT Help Desk Technician 1Office Assistant 1Transport Assistant 1Travel Assistant 1Warehouse Clerk 1Common Operational Costs 23Driver/Mechanic 2Senior Driver 1Driver 9Handyman 1Senior Cook 1Cleaner 8Cook 1Political and Military Aspects of Security 16Border Management Adviser 1Border Management Officer 1Counter-Terrorism and Police Issues Adviser 1De-Mining Officer 1Political Officer 1Politico-Military Officer 1National Politico-Military Officer 1National Border Management Officer 1

OSCE Office in Tajikistan | 271OSCE Office in Tajikistan Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (continued)CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Senior Project Assistant 1Programme Assistant 6Programme Assistant 1Economic and Environmental Activities 14Senior Economic and Environmental Officer 1Senior Anti-Corruption Officer 1Economic Officer 1Environmental Officer 1Regional Economic and EnvironmentalAdviser 1Water Management Adviser 1Field Officer, Economic and EnvironmentalIssues 1National Environmental Officer 1Programme Assistant 2Programme Assistant 1Project Assistant 3Human Dimension Activities 16Senior Human Dimension Officer 1Elections Reform Officer 1Gender and Anti-Trafficking Officer 1Human Rights Officer 1Media Officer 1National Gender Officer 1National Media Development Officer 1Senior Programme Assistant 3Programme Assistant 3Project Assistant 1Senior Secretary 1Trial Monitoring Assistant 1Total 158Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

272 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Office in Tajikistan Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 36Automobiles 1Buses 4Total 41Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Office in Tajikistan Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 1,341,973.6Fund Administration Unit 591,156.3Common Operational Costs 1,749,122.4Political and Military Aspects of Security 1,524,477.8Economic and Environmental Activities 1,272,440.5Human Dimension Activities 1,319,548.5Total 7,798,719.0Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923OSCE Office in Tajikistan Budget: Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head of Mission 1,300,959.5Fund Administration Unit 463,317.25Common Operational Costs 1,463,114.0Political and Military Aspects 1,548,119.1Economic and Environmental Activities 1,297,675.0Human Dimension Activities 1,335,090.2Total 7,408,275.1Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/888

OSCE MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 2737.11O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Office in YerevanOSCE Office in Yerevan Key FactsAuthorization Date22 July 1999PC.DEC/314Start Date February 2000Head of MissionAmbassador Sergey Kapinos (Russian Federation)Budget $3.9 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE Office in Yerevan Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 5 7Local 40 40Total 45 47Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

274 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Office in Yerevan Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Jan ‘10-CategoryDec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 11Head of Office 1National Programme Co-ordinator 1National Public Information Officer 1Senior Press and Public Information Assistant 1Senior Project Assistant 1Interpreter/Translator 1Senior Secretary 1Senior Watchman 1Watchman 3Fund Adminstration Unit 7Chief of Fund Administration 1National Finance Officer 1Senior Administrative Assistant 1Senior Finance and Treasury Assistant 1Senior Human Resources Assistant 1Senior ICT Assistant 1Senior Procurement and Asset ManagementAssistant 1Politico-Military Activities 5Politico-Military Officer 1National Programme Officer 2Senior Programme Assistant 1Programme Assistant 1Economic and Environmental Activities 6CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Economic and Environmental Officer 1National Programme Co-ordinator 1National Programme Officer 2Project Assistant 1Driver 1Democratization 5Democratization Officer 1National Programme Officer 1National Programme Officer 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Programme Assistant 1Human Rights 3Human Rights Officer 1National Assistant Legal Adviser 1Senior Programme Assistant 1Good Governance 4Deputy Head of Office 1National Programme Officer 1Senior Programme Assistant 2Common Operational Costs 6Senior Driver 1Driver 3Cleaner 2Total 47Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

OSCE Office in Yerevan | 275OSCE Office in Yerevan Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 7Automobiles 4Total 11Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Office in Yerevan Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 389,671.3Fund Administration Unit 247,707.9Common Operational Costs 500,228.0Politico-Military Activities 642,979.7Economic and Environmental Activities 623,602.9Democratization 353,721.2Human Rights 361,836.5Good Governance 412,242.9Total 3,921,661.7Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

276 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Office in Yerevan Budget Jan ‘00-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head of Mission 257,679.6 477,092.0 200,688.0 278,481.4 356,176.9 401,961.1Fund Administration Unit 453,047.1 187,833.6 183,023.7 227,417.7 239,205.6 258,018.2Common Operational Costs - 448,556.1 393,848.5 422,341.7 448,555.0 519,733.8Politico-Military Activities 454,889.5 280,594.5 223,198.6 610,809.6 621,845.4 630,654.1Economic and EnvironmentalActivities322,229.9 363,323.8 446,397.3 555,664.3 568,424.1 647,714.0Human Dimension Activities 276,126.0 - - - - -Democratization - 144,787.5 191,791.2 287,045.0 326,093.4 350,631.3Human Rights - 167,184.1 157,799.5 237,672.4 263,848.8 307,213.5Good Governance - - 294,619.1 428,363.0 430,185.4 429,849.4Total 669,991.6 731,165.4 808,778.8 1,485,984.7 1,763,972.0 2,069,371.6 2,091,365.9 3,047,795.0 3,254,334.4 3,545,775.5Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DEC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888

OSCE MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 2777.12O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Presence in AlbaniaOSCE Presence in Albania Key FactsAuthorization and Start DateHead of Mission27 March 1997P.C.DEC/160Ambassador Robert Bosch (Netherlands)Budget $4.4 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE Presence in Albania Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 21 22Local 74 75Total 95 97Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

278 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Presence in Albania Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 29Head of Presence 1Deputy Head of Presence 1Chief Political, Public Affairs and ReportingOfficerProject Office Co-ordinator 1Head of Project Office 3Project Finance Officer 1National Public Affairs and Reporting Officer 1National Field Programme Officer 1National Political Officer 2National Project Co-ordination Officer 1Senior Public Affairs Assistant 1Senior Translator/Interpreter 1Field Programme Assistant 6Project Assistant 1Project Co-ordination Assistant 2Senior Secretary 2Security Guard 3Fund Administration Unit 20Chief, Fund Administration Unit 1Human Resources Officer 1Administrative and General Service Officer 1National Finance Officer 1Senior Human Resources Assistant 1Senior ICT Assistant 1Asset Management Assistant 1Finance Assistant 2ICT Assistant 1ICT Assistant 1Procurement Assistant 2Transport Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Human Resources and Training Assistant 1Registry Assistant 1Supply Assistant 1Travel Clerk/Receptionist 1Vehicle Maintenance Clerk 1Common Operational Costs 11Senior Driver 1Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/9231CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Driver 10Security Co-operation 7Head of Security Co-operation Department 1Senior Police Assistance Officer 1National Border Management Officer 1National Security Officer 1Programme Assistant 2Translator/Interpreter 1Governance in Economic andEnvironmental IssuesHead of Governance, Economy andEnvironmental Issues DepartmentEconomic and Environment and RegionalReform OfficerNational Anti-Trafficking Officer 1National Legal Officer, Property 1National Programme Officer 1Administrative Assistant 1Project Assistant 2Translator/Interpreter 1Democratization 10Head of Democratization Department 1Media Development Officer 1Senior Democratization Officer 1National Electoral Reform Officer 1National Civil Society and Gender Officer 1National Election Legal Officer 1Senior Media Development Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Programme Assistant 1Office Assistant 1Rule of Law and Human Rights 11Head of Rule of Law and Human RightsDepartmentSenior Judicial Officer 1Senior Legal Officer 1Legal Officer 1National Legal Officer 3Legal Assistant 2Programme Assistant 1Translator/Interpreter 1Total 979111

OSCE Presence in Albania | 279OSCE Presence in Albania Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 18Automobiles 3Trucks 2Buses 2Total 25Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Presence in Albania Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10- Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 949,920.1Fund Administration Unit 566,345.2Common Operational Costs 1,253,614.8Security Co-operation 296,152.4Governance in Economic and EnvironmentalIssues343,833.5Democratization 534,005.7Rule of Law and Human Rights 421,827.4Total 4,365,699.1Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

280 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Presence in Albania Budget Jan ‘99-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘99-Dec ‘99Jan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Head of Mission 1,064,703.3 914,970.1 1,187,062.6 1,218,004.3 1,209,275.5 1,064,801.7Fund Administration Unit 846,414.6 471,379.0 571,070.7 584,186.9 564,063.8 567,947.2Common OperationalCosts1,065,232.8 1,012,008.3 1,409,782.4 1,410,827.1 1,287,908.2 1,240,878.5Security Co-operation - 553,473.1 325,111.0 328,641.3 329,754.3 329,645.1Governance in Economicand Environmental Issues- 1,101,649.7 395,412.2 431,921.0 354,111.9 354,798.7Human DimensionActivities- 790,380.0 1,003,402.0 960,419.9 - -Democratization 1,061,658.7 - - - 503,298.8 502,013.7Rule of Law and HumanRights960,412.7 - - - 443,861.4 443,488.7Total 57,413,150.1 4,223,255.6 5,576,637.9 5,973,982.5 5,622,332.7 4,998,422.1 4,843,860.1 4,891,840.9 4,934,000.6 4,692,273.8 4,503,573.6Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/282, PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DEC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888

OSCE MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS | 2817.13O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sOSCE Spillover Mission to SkopjeOSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje Key FactsAuthorization Date14 August 199215-CSO/Journal No. 2, Annex 1Start Date September 1992Head of MissionAmbassador Jose-Luis Herrero (Spain)Budget $11.0 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 54 64Local 145 150Total 199 214Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

282 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 49Head of Mission 1Deputy Head of Mission 1Chief Security Officer 1Chief, Political/Reporting 1Political Adviser 1Programme Co-ordinator 1Public Information and Media Officer 1Special Assistant to the Head of Mission 1Political/Reporting Officer 1National Executive Officer 1National Political Liaison Officer 1National Records and Archives Officer 1Senior Assistant, Roma Issues 1Senior Political Assistant 1Senior Project Assistant 1Senior Public Information and MediaAssistant 2Senior Secretary 1Archives Assistant 2Language Assistant II 2Security Assistant 1Situation Centre Assistant 3Close Protection Specialist 1Radio Operator 5Senior Driver 2Office Clerk 1Security Guard 14Fund Administration Unit 37.5Head, Administration and Finance 1Chief, Finance 1Chief, General Services 1Chief, Human Resources Management 1CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Procurement Officer 1National ICT Officer 1National Supply Officer 1National Administrative Officer 1National Building Management Officer 1National Finance Officer 1National Human Resources Officer 1Nurse 1Senior Transport Assistant 1Senior IT Network Technician 1Communications Technician 1Finance Assistant 1Finance Assistant 1Human Resources Assistant 2IT Help Desk Technician 1Procurement Assistant 1Training Assistant 1Treasury Assistant 1Web/Database Developer 1Administrative Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Human Resources Assistant 1IT Help Desk Technician 1IT Help Desk Technician 1Material Management Assistant 1Procurement Assistant 1Procurement Assistant 1Vehicle Maintenance Assistant 1Material Control Clerk 1Technician 0.5Transport Dispatcher 1Material Management Clerk 1Warehouse Worker 1

OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje | 283OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (Continued)CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Common Operational Costs 9Bus Driver 2Driver 5Cleaner 1Cleaner 1Police Development 57Head Police Development Department 1Chief of Police Training 1Chief, Community Development 1Deputy Head Police DevelopmentDepartment 1Senior Border and Organized Crime Adviser 1Police Adviser, Community/Minority 1Project Officer 1Senior Police Training Adviser 1Community Police Adviser 11Police Adviser 3Police Instructor 1Police Training Adviser 3Reporting Analysis Officer 1National Legal Adviser 1Administrative Assistant 1Curriculum Development Assistant 2Project Assistant 3Publications Assistant 1Senior Secretary 1Project Management Assistant 1Administrative Assistant 1Office Assistant 2Programme Assistant 1Language Assistant 4Language Assistant I 12Rule of Law 30Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Head of Rule of Law 1Deputy Head of Rule of Law 1Senior Rule of Law Officer/Capacity-Building 1Senior Rule of Law Officer/Judicial Reform 1Senior Rule of Law Officer 1Analysis and Reporting Officer 1Rule of Law Officer 2Rule of Law Officer/Capacity-Building 1National Legal Adviser 1National Rule Law Officer 8Senior Legal Assistant 2Legal Translator Assistant 2Rule of Law Assistant 1Senior Assistant 1Programme Assistant 6Monitoring and Good Governance 31Head of Monitoring and Good GovernanceDepartment 1Chief of Good Governance Unit 1Chief of Monitoring Unit 1Senior Monitoring Officer 1Democratization/Elections Officer 1Monitoring Officer 6Education Reform Officer 2Public Administration Officer 1National Democratization Officer 1National Public Administration Reform Office 3Senior Programme Assistant 1Democratization/Elections Assistant 1Education Reform Assistant 2Office Assistant 1Language Assistant I 8Total 213.5

284 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSOSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantityArmoured 34x4 Vehicles 35Automobiles 22Trucks 1Vans 1Buses 3Total 65Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionOSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10 (in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 1,690,538.4Fund Administration Unit 1,468,263.1Common Operational Costs 1,896,451.7Police Development 2,371,222.6Rule of Law 1,912,191.6Monitoring and Good Governance 1,663,148.9Total 11,001,816.3Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje | 285OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje Budget Jan ‘99-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘99-Dec ‘99Jan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Headof Mission2,218,195.9 1,617,995.1 1,826,197.3 1,740,161.4 1,664,556.9 1,764,078.8FundAdministrationUnit5,304,873.5 2,451,368.0 1,610,342.4 1,589,968.4 1,523,738.2 1,469,436.0CommonOperationalCosts- 2,868,252.1 2,779,034.8 2,604,732.6 2,131,174.8 1,897,116.5Confidencebuilding1,802,161.8 1,512,725.7 1,219,419.8 1,115,280.3 1,023,932.6 -PoliceDevelopment5,133,897.1 3,341,590.5 2,826,748.4 2,523,998.0 2,507,466.9 2,471,381.6MediaDevelopment612,310.7 477,238.3 351,395.8 344,935.0 317,562.5 -Rule of Law 2,154,012.1 1,866,274.6 1,894,212.9 2,179,852.4 2,085,107.5 1,945,805.0Field Stations - - - - - -PublicAdminstrationSupport661,669.3 629,700.1 691,550.5 776,038.0 694,553.3 -Monitoringand GoodGovernance- - - - - 1,693,217.6Total 10,056,887.1 784,313.9 1,018,587.2 27,452,241.2 21,815,776.7 17,887,120.3 14,765,144.4 13,198,901.9 12,874,966.0 11,948,092.6 11,241,035.4SecretariatAugmentation- - 158,006.4 186,799.5 198,197.5 195,536.5 205,789.2 205,789.2 - -GrandTotal10,056,887.1 784,313.9 1,018,587.2 27,610,247.7 22,002,576.2 18,085,317.8 14,960,680.9 13,404,691.1 13,080,755.2 11,948,092.6 11,241,035.4Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/282, PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DEC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888

286 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONS7.14O S C E M i s s i o n - b y - M i s s i o n S t a t i s t i c sCiO Representativeon Minsk Conference(Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office onthe Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference)CiO Representative on Minsk Conference Key FactsAuthorization Date10 August 1995DOC. 525/95Start Date January 1997Head of MissionAmbassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland)Budget $1.5 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)CiO Representative on Minsk Conference Personnel: 1 August 2010Category Filled BudgetedInternational 6 6Local 11 11Total 17 17Source: OSCE Department of Human Resources

CiO Representative on Minsk Conference | 287CiO Representative on Minsk Conference Personnel by Post Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 5Personal Representative of the CiO 1Field Assistant to the PR 3Personal Assistant to the PR 1Fund Administration Unit 3Chief of Fund Administration 1Senior Administrative Assistant 1Finance Assistant 1Common Operational Costs 9Driver/Administrative Assistant-Yerevan 1Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923CategoryJan ‘10-Dec ‘10Driver-Stepanakert/Khankendi 1Driver Instructor/Mechanic-Tbilisi 1Driver-Baku 1Driver-Tbilisi 1Housekeeper-Baku 1Housekeeper-Stepanakert/Khankendi 1Housekeeper-Tbilisi 1Housekeeper-Yerevan 1Total 17CiO Representative on Minsk Conference Vehicles: 4 August 2010Vehicle TypeQuantity4x4 Vehicles 9Total 9Source: OSCE Asset Management SectionCiO Representative on Minsk Conference Budget Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10(in US dollars)Category Jan ‘10-Dec ‘10Office of Head of Mission 741,037.7Fund Administration Unit 240,406.2Common Operational Costs 475,843.7Total 1,457,287.6Source: OSCE Document PC.DEC/923

288 | REVIEW OF POLITICAL MISSIONSCiO Representative on Minsk Conference Budget Jan ‘99-Dec ‘09 (in US dollars)CategoryJan ‘99-Dec ‘99Jan ‘00-Dec ‘00Jan ‘01-Dec ‘01Jan ‘02-Dec ‘02Jan ‘03-Dec ‘03Jan ‘04-Dec ‘04Jan ‘05-Dec ‘05Jan ‘06-Dec ‘06Jan ‘07-Dec ‘07Jan ‘08-Dec ‘08Jan ‘09-Dec ‘09Office of Headof Mission817,527.8 761,867.8 720,577.9 720,577.9 720,577.9 653,913.4FundAdministrationUnit314,570.7 267,734.9 230,830.0 230,240.0 226,801.5 231,619.0CommonOperationalCosts- 225,635.0 303,491.4 358,645.6 388,663.9 455,356.4Total 12,335,065.7 1,124,215.4 1,192,380.5 1,300,486.4 1,273,057.8 1,132,098.5 1,255,237.7 1,254,899.3 1,309,463.5 1,336,043.3 1,340,888.8SecretariatAugmentation- - - - - - - - - - -ODIHRAugmenations- - - - - - - - - - -GrandTotal12,335,065.7 1,124,215.4 1,192,380.5 1,300,486.4 1,273,057.8 1,132,098.5 1,255,237.7 1,254,899.3 1,309,463.5 1,336,043.3 1,340,888.8Source: OSCE Documents PC.DEC/282, PC.DEC/331, PC.DEC/399/Corr., PC.DEC/469, PC.DEC/534, PC.DEC/590, PC.DEC/672, PC.DEC/740, PC.DEC/780/Corr.1, PC.DEC/839, PC.DEC/888