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10 | Thematic Essaysand retired officers, on the understanding that allwould be unarmed and in civilian attire. In orderto mount an around-the-clock presence at weaponsstorage sites before UN monitors could providethis, the Maoists and the government proposedthe recruitment of an Interim Task Force (ITF) ofNepali ex-servicemen from the Indian Army. Thisfurther unorthodox arrangement gave rise to morenervousness at UN Headquarters, and UNMINtook no formal responsibility for the ITF. But its111 members, selected by consensus between thetwo sides, became invaluable to the overall monitoringpresence at the cantonments, even after thefull deployment of UNMIN’s 186 arms monitors.Beyond arms and armies, the broader role soughtfrom the UN was focused on the constituent assemblyelection, together with a continuation of humanrights monitoring by OHCHR-Nepal and a moregeneral request to assist in monitoring the ceasefirecode of conduct, later subsumed in the ComprehensivePeace Agreement (CPA). The UN offered toprovide technical assistance to the Election Commissionat national, regional and district levels, andto deploy a team of five expert monitors to review theelectoral process, independently of UNMIN, as wellas encouraging observation by others.Ensuring adequate political space and a levelplaying field for all political parties in the ruralareas, w<strong>here</strong> t<strong>here</strong> had been a prolonged absence ofan effective state, would be crucial for the credibilityof the election. UNMIN t<strong>here</strong>fore planned fora civil affairs component which, together with districtelectoral advisers and OHCHR human rightsofficers, would make up a significant UN presencebeyond Kathmandu.The Nepalese political actors took justifiablepride in the fact that their peace process was theirown, and not imposed or mediated by any externalactor. 2 T<strong>here</strong> was no formal facilitation of overallnegotiations, although the UN’s chief militaryadviser chaired the negotiation of the crucial agreementon monitoring arms and armed personnel.Thus UNMIN was tailored to the request of theparties and its constraints.For those of us planning the mission, t<strong>here</strong> wasone particular respect in which we believed at theoutset that the constraints led the mission to fall shortof the needs of the situation. The UN was consciousthat it was assuming the responsibility of monitoringtemporary arrangements for the two armies withSigning of the agreement on the management of arms and armies,8 December 2006.only vague definitions in the CPA of processes bywhich the Interim Government would address theirfuture: the “integration and rehabilitation” of Maoistcombatants and the “democratization” of the NepaleseArmy. We would have preferred to includetechnical assistance to resolving these security sectorissues in the mandate and staffing of the mission, andwere told that such UN assistance would be requiredeventually; it was mainly Nepal’s deference to Indianwishes that precluded a request for any such UN role.UNMIN in PracticeThe achievements in the period for whichUNMIN was conceived and planned, through tothe holding of the constituent assembly election,were considerable. Within the Joint MonitoringCoordination Committee ( JMCC), skillfullychaired by UNMIN’s Chief Arms Monitor, initiallyfrosty dealings between senior officers of the twoarmies thawed into cooperation. Not a shot wasfired between the two armies, and t<strong>here</strong> was not asingle known case of weapons being removed fromthe storage containers. The relationships forgedwithin the JMCC enabled UNMIN to interveneto defuse situations that threatened the politicalprocess or could derail the election.The Election Commission, which happilyproved to be both highly competent and ofunimpeachable integrity, successfully navigated twoelection postponements and overcame the considerabletechnical and logistical challenges it faced forthe April 2008 poll. Campaigning was peaceful inUN Photo