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90 | Mission ReviewsUN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)Authorization 23 January 2007and Start Date (UNSC Res. 1740)SRSGKarin Landgren (Sweden)Budget $16.7 million (1 January 2010-31 December 2010)Strength as of International Civilian: 43early 2010 Local Civilian: 118Military Experts on Mission: 68UN Volunteers: 16For detailed mission information see p. 202arms and armies, technical assistance to the electoralprocess, and support to the monitoring ofthe broader aspects of the ceasefire. Moreover, fora mission with military responsibilities, its armsmonitoring component was unusually light, consistingof unarmed arms monitors (serving andretired officers) in civilian attire deployed withthe cooperation of the parties. Given the shorttime frame with which it was conceived, UNMINwas not established as an integrated mission,although it assumed an “integrated approach” toits responsibilities.That UNMIN took shape at all was aconsequence of careful political work by the UNduring the three years preceding the signing of theCPA, as well as the successful deployment of anOffice of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights (OHCHR) in Nepal in mid-2005. The UN’spolitical involvement in Nepal dated back to September2002, when Secretary-General Kofi Annanhad offered to “consider the use of his good officesto help achieve a peaceful solution” to Nepal’s conflict.1 On the basis of this offer, Tamrat Samuel, anofficial within the Department of Political Affairs,began visiting the country in mid-2003 and engagingwith all political actors, including the Maoists.Reservations that India – the regional powerand a neighbor with both significant interests inand major influence over Nepal – and some Nepalisheld about an overt “political” role for the UNcontributed to the narrow definition of UNMIN’smandate. This would emerge as a core weakness ofthe mission and the source of ambiguity and confusionabout its role.UNMIN’s arms monitoring and electoral assistancecontributed positively to Nepal’s ability tohold an election in April 2008 that was recognizedas “remarkable and relatively peaceful.” 2 However,a poor understanding of the mandate in Nepal– never effectively countered by UNMIN’s considerableefforts at communication and outreach– created a situation in which high expectations ofthe UN’s contribution were inevitably disappointed,even as some of those opposed to a more active UNrole pushed back against UNMIN’s initiatives. Themission numbered a little over 1,000 national andinternational staff at its pre-election maximum andsubsequently downsized to less than 300. That itwas small in comparison to most UN peace operationscould not redress Nepali perceptions thatits considerable size compared unfavorably to itsimpact upon the parties.UNMIN’s original mandate was designedwith the horizon represented by the elections tothe constituent assembly in mind. Some politicalparties had supported the electoral process – andthe UN role within it – with the expectation thatit would conclude with the Maoists’ defeat. TheMaoists’ success at the polls consequently changedNepal’s political landscape dramatically. In thepost-election period a lack of cooperation betweenthe political parties undermined further progressand proved a complicating factor for UNMIN.Indeed the mission’s mandate, linked to the “temporary”but ongoing presence of two cantoned andbarracked armies, became increasingly out of kilterwith the challenges Nepal now encountered.UNMIN quite properly retained the peace processas the center of its activities. However, that thepeace process assumed a central role in the longerterm calculations of either Nepal’s various politicalactors – locked in a struggle for power – or India, nolonger appeared evident.UNMIN downsized promptly in June 2008;its electoral affairs and civil affairs offices – whichhad been specifically linked to creating the conditionsfor the election – and its five regional officeswere closed; arms monitors were reduced from 186to 73 even as arms monitoring remained a centralelement in the mission’s work.The peace agreements reached in 2006 had notbeen able to negotiate the future of the armies fully,