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Emerging Doctrine for Political Missions | 23is essentially an enabling role w<strong>here</strong>as the last usespolitical authority and military or economic powerto pressure the parties towards an agreement. Specialpolitical missions, by definition, do not have militaryresources at their disposal although some aredeployed alongside military forces. The EU missionin Kosovo, for example, benefits from NATO’s militarypresence. UNAMA is co-deployed with ISAF,which creates both opportunities for and obstaclesto political action. The United Nations SpecialCoordinator in Lebanon (UNSCOL) benefits fromthe United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’s(UNIFIL) high profile, based on a clear divisionof labor between the two missions. BONUCA/BINUCA, on the other hand, has not really benefittedfrom the presence of the better resourcedMINURCAT in part because the leadership of thetwo missions do not coordinate well.The authority that comes with UN SecurityCouncil backing is the principal source of leveragefor UN missions. How much leverage this providesdepends on the unity and the attentiveness of theCouncil. This has been a source of contention inrespect of missions established by an exchange ofletters between the SG and the Security Council,like UNRCCA. The five countries in the regionwanted a political facilitator, but the wider UNmembership was not enthusiastic about a centerfor preventive diplomacy. Ultimately establishedthrough an exchange of letters with the SG, someSC members see it as essentially an SG initiative,contributing to a disconnect between the Counciland the center. Other missions established inthe same way — UNOWA, UNSCOL and theCNMC — do not suffer from that problem. Theinfluence of EUSRs depends in part on the extentto which the EU is unified behind their mandate(consider Kosovo, w<strong>here</strong> different attitudestowards Kosovo’s declaration of independence hascreated divisions within the EU). OSCE officesare often in a delicate position based on divergencesbetween Russia and the West, for examplein Armenia and Azerbaijan. Regardless of formalauthority, the central point is that politicalmissions have little more than diplomatic and persuasivepower to rely on and so the extent to whichthey can point to the strong backing of an internationalorganization (and the diplomatic powerthat resides t<strong>here</strong>) the more influential they arelikely to be.T<strong>here</strong> is a caveat, however. Hammarskjold’snegotiation of the release of the American aircrew inChina gave birth to the so-called ‘Peking formula’:in order to be effective the SG must sometimesdistance himself from political bodies. 19 Secretary-General Kofi Annan operated on the same basiswhen he went to Iraq in 1998 to negotiate a memorandumof understanding for the return of weaponinspectors. While he had the blessing of the SecurityCouncil, he deliberately avoided getting explicitterms of reference, not wanting to appear a mere“letter carrier” (a fate that befell Perez de Cuellar in1990). 20 The calculus may be different for enduringmissions as opposed to one-off diplomatic efforts,but it does suggest that political micro-managementby the authorizing body can be detrimental. This isespecially true when micro-management is subjectto sharp differences among powerful states in theorganization or, conversely, is seen as the hand ofa single powerful state with a national interest in aparticular outcome.Guiding principles for politicalmissionsWhile developing doctrine for political missions atthis stage would be premature, it is not too soon tobegin codifying best practices. The principles beloware a first attempt, motivated by the sense that t<strong>here</strong>is enough accumulated wisdom and experience toidentify some basic lessons to help guide the formationof mandates and operational strategies. As withpeacekeeping, 21 peacebuilding 22 and mediation 23principles — and military doctrine for that matter —these are rules of thumb, to be applied flexibly andtailored to context.1) Implied MandatesMandates given by intergovernmental bodies tendto set out the core tasks of a political mission inbroad terms, leaving considerable discretion in howto fulfill those tasks. At least some functions shouldbe seen as implied, that is “conferred upon [the mission]by necessary implication as being essential tothe performance of its duties.” 24 A political missioncould not succeed in any of its enumerated tasksunless it is understood to have at least the followingpowers, regardless of whether expressly conferred