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Somalia | 99visits into Mogadishu. Whether the enhanced troopstrength will enable AMISOM to stabilize the countryand allow the UN to effectively increase its staffin Somalia remains to be seen.So far, the level of insecurity is of such magnitudethat security sector reform has been near-impossibleto implement on the scale necessary to have a meaningfulimpact. The weakness of security institutionssuch as the police or the army, as well as the overalllack of TFG legitimacy and control within thecountry, has led to real concerns that donor moneymight end up falling in the hands of the powerfulmilitias that control large parts of south-centralSomalia, including much of the capital.Moreover, the international community, andin particular the US, has tended to view Somaliathrough the prism of the global war on terror. Thedecision to add Al Shabaab and some of its leadersto the State Department’s terrorist list has made itmore politically difficult for the UN to engage relevantactors in constructive dialogue. The focus ofdonor countries on the issue of terrorism has alsoresulted in the support of certain warlords over others– which has, in effect, destabilized the peaceprocess. Similarly, the focus on piracy – with littleappetite from donors to address its root causes – hasshifted attention and resources away from the situationinside the country.From September 2007 to June 2010, UNPOSwas under the leadership of SRSG AhmedouOuld-Abdallah. A retired Mauritanian diplomatnearing the end of his career, he had some successin bringing greater international attention onSomalia and engaged the vocal Somali Diaspora.However, critics charge that in the process he systematicallyisolated himself and his office from otherUN agencies, organizations and funds, and evenhis colleagues at UN headquarters in New York.Despite the precarious security situation in Somalia,Ould-Abdallah made the relocation of UNPOSto Mogadishu a cornerstone of his strategy, arguingthat the international community, and by extensionaid organizations, could best serve Somalis throughproximity. His successor Augustine Mahiga, theformer Tanzanian Ambassador to the UN, partlyshares this notion. Mr. Mahiga is well-liked in NewYork circles and his experience on both political andhumanitarian issues – he served UNHCR in variouscapacities – is seen as an asset.In addition to ensuring a secure and gradualincrease of UN staff in Somalia, one of Mr. Mahiga’sfirst tasks will be to mend the difficult relationship inNairobi between UNPOS, the UN Country Teamand the humanitarian organizations both withinand outside of the UN system. These problems canbe largely traced to a lack of information exchangebetween UNPOS and various UN actors and thatUNPOS initiatives and decisions often take otherUN stakeholders by surprise and vice versa. Mostcontroversially, the humanitarian community hasvoiced concerns that their assistance is perceived asbeing co-opted by UNPOS for political gains.The relationship between UNPOS and theUN headquarters staff in New York – both in theDepartment of Political Affairs and the Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations – is strained. It isfelt that DPKO’s cautious stance on the deploymentof a UN force, a requirement for the success of UNoperations in Somalia in the eyes of the previousSRSG, has impeded the relationship between thetwo entities. Between UNPOS and the Departmentof Political Affairs, poor information and analysissharing has made it difficult for staff at UNHQto advocate on behalf of UNPOS for new fundingand human resources. In addition, the previousSRSG’s assertive leadership approach frequentlyled to a disconnect between policy decisions madeat headquarters and the field level.Going forward, it is difficult to imagine anoptimistic scenario. The weakness of the TFG derivesin large part from the perception that it is an entityimposed on the country by foreign interests, and assuch, increased international support – includingUNPOS support – to the institution is very mucha double edged sword. The TFG has also failed toenhance its legitimacy through the delivery of basicservices to Somalis. In fact, quite the opposite, TFGforces have been repeatedly accused of being predatoryand harassing the civilian population, a factwhich has implications for the acceptance, legitimacy,and t<strong>here</strong>fore effectiveness, of institutions likeUNPOS, whose sole focus has been on the TFG.Political discussions have too often fallen intozero-sum negotiations for individual or clan gains.The power of UNPOS – with or without the internationalcommunity’s support – to impose or evencajole political players into a political outcome isseverely limited. The lessons learned of the pasttwo decades suggest that even an external force