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78 | Mission ReviewsSecurity Council Sanctions Committees and Panels of Experts (Continued)lasting for several months. The ad-hoc arrangement means that t<strong>here</strong> is no institutional home that would allowfor a permanent sanction monitoring presence and/or follow-up to situations after an expert panel concludes itswork, further limiting the long-term impact of sanctions.Sanctions Committees and Panels of Experts constitute an important mechanism in sanction implementation andmonitoring. In their reports Panels of Experts often address a country’s underlying socio-economic problems,calling attention to crucial governance deficits and recommending steps for the international community toaddress these issues. In addition, greater involvement of peace missions in the Expert Panels’ work may leadto increased regional inter-mission cooperation on issues such as border security, thus strengthening UN fieldpresences. However, t<strong>here</strong> is a sense that the mechanism has not yet achieved its full peacebuilding impact, atleast in part due to the difficult balance between the competing needs for increased institutional support andcontinuous independence.1 For more information on all current Sanctions Committees, see “Security Council Sanctions Committees: An Overview,” UnitedNations, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/index.shtml.2 Louis Charbonneau, “UN panel finishes Taliban/al Qaeda blacklist review,” Reuters, 2 August 2010, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N02111225.htm.3 Sometimes also referred to as Monitoring Mechanisms or Groups of Experts.4 For more detailed information on the work of Panels of Experts, see Katherine Andrews with Tobias C. Berkman “UnitedNations Mechanism for Combating Illegal Trade in Regions of Conflict,” Stimson Backgrounder, The Henry L. Stimson <strong>Center</strong>,June 2005.5 Stimson Backgrounder, p. 6.priorities” of elections, internal political dialogue,regional dialogue and constructive engagement andgreater aid co<strong>here</strong>nce.Security SituationThe determination of the Taliban insurgencywas demonstrated by the brazen attack on a UNGuesthouse on 28 October 2009, which killed fiveUN staff and injured a number of others. To date,UNAMA’s activities continue to be circumscribedby security concerns.The United Nations Department of Safetyand Security assesses roughly 94 districts out ofalmost 400 districts as very high risk and a further81 districts as high risk. Access to outer areas hasbecome increasingly difficult, compounded furtherby the insurgency’s aggressive tactic to cut off majorprovincial centers. Consequently, areas that havea permissible security environment are increasinglyinaccessible to the mission. In recognition ofthe changed security environment, the UN designatedAfghanistan’s southern region as a Phase 4– Emergency Operations only. Practically this meansthat the maximum number of UN internationalstaff (from both UNAMA and the UN CountryTeam) permitted in the south-east region is 20(17 in Kandahar and 3 in Uruzgan).Despite a generally good working relationshipbetween the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF) and UNAMA, the increased presence ofinternational military forces and the in<strong>here</strong>nt riskof greater civilian casualties have created tensionsbetween the two actors. In principle, ISAF seeksUNAMA’s political advice about the conduct ofmilitary operations but in reality, with a variety ofmilitary operations ongoing and the limited coverageof UNAMA’s field presence, this is often not thecase. It is to UNAMA’s credit that due to its leadershipand outspoken stance on civilian casualties in2008 and 2009, ISAF reassessed the use of air assetsduring operations, which has led to a reduction inthe number of civilian fatalities.While engaging closely with the military forcesunder ISAF, UNAMA is also mandated to executeits political role, to coordinate the facilitation of thedelivery of humanitarian aid and to monitor andcoordinate human rights protection. UNAMA ist<strong>here</strong>fore caught in the conflicting role of being animpartial political mission and a coordinator that isasked to engage directly with military actors. While