Communicative Power in Habermas's Theory of Democracy

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European Journal of Political Theory 3(4)436is the act of reaching mutual understanding between two speakers. Habermasargues that speakers’ orientation toward mutual understanding entails a commitmentto certain presuppositions rooted in the idea of unconstrained argumentationor discourse. The process of argumentation, with its inherentpresuppositions, is a ‘reflective continuation’ of action oriented toward reachingunderstanding. Participants in discourse must presuppose that all motives otherthan the cooperative search for truth have been excluded (such as strategicmotives or coercive forces) and the only operative force is the ‘force of the betterargument’. 11 Habermas has introduced the principle of discourse (D) as a standardfor the impartial justification of norms: ‘Just those action norms are valid to whichall possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses’. 12When the range of ‘all possibly affected persons’ is all human persons then thetype of rational discourse required involves moral arguments. While the applicationof discourse theory to the sphere of moral questions has been fruitful, politicalquestions introduce further issues that cannot be settled solely by moralarguments. That is, discourse ethics cannot be applied to the democratic processwithout modification.Two interconnected steps must be taken in order to make discourse theoryrelevant to lawmaking and politics. First, the principle of discourse, which appliesto norms in general, must be brought to bear on the medium of law if it is tospecify a procedure for legitimate lawmaking. When applied to law the discourseprinciple gives rise to the principle of democracy: ‘Only those statutes may claimlegitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process oflegislation that in turn has been legally constituted’. 13 While the discourse principlerefers to the validity of action norms in general, the principle of democracyrefers to the legitimacy of legal norms in particular. Legitimacy is a form of validitythat contains a ‘volitional moment’ connected to political will-formation.The second step required to make discourse theory applicable to politics is adifferentiation in the ‘discursive process’ to include not only moral reasons, butalso what Habermas refers to as pragmatic and ethical-political reasons. In orderto deal with the complexity of political issues, he has expanded discourse theoryfrom its earlier focus on moral questions to a network of differentiated discoursesand bargaining processes. 14 The democratic principle itself does not specify theforms of argumentation involved in the discursive process of legislation. Analyzingthe possibility for rational will-formation in various discourses requires atheory of argumentation that specifies the standpoints from which pragmatic,ethical, and moral issues are addressed based on the type of practical rationalitythat is required to address them. They are distinguished in terms of the instrumentalrationality of pragmatic discourse, the hermeneutic clarification ofethical–political discourse, and the universalization involved in moral discourse.The discourse model locates the process of political will-formation within anetwork of differentiated discourses and procedurally regulated bargainingprocesses.
Flynn: Communicative Power in Habermas’s Theory of DemocracyHabermas presents this procedural model of deliberative politics as an alternativeto both liberal and republican models. 15 The classical liberal model characterizesthe political process as a conflict of interests that can only be settledthrough compromise or the aggregation of preferences through voting. In contrastto liberalism, the recent ‘republican revival’ among legal and politicaltheorists draws on the civic republican tradition in advocating a more deliberativeor dialogical politics in accord with the ideal of democratic self-rule. One of thecentral ideas of deliberative politics is that the scope of politics should extendbeyond the aggregation of self-interest. Public deliberation opens the possibilityfor new information to arise, insights to be gained, and the potential for a transformationof preferences. Deliberative politics is concerned, in this sense, with‘the public use of reason’. Toward that end, theorists of deliberative democracyhave focused on the extent to which public deliberation and the legitimation ofpolitical decisions are more or less rational.With his theory of procedural rationality, Habermas brings a distinct point ofview to the use of reason within politics. He agrees with this focus on deliberativepolitics, but contrasts his reconstruction of the normative self-understanding ofconstitutional democracy with the ‘overly concrete’ reading that the republicanmodel gives to politics:Practical reason no longer resides . . . in the ethical substance of a specific community, butin the rules of discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative contentfrom the validity basis of action oriented to reaching understanding. 16Habermas accuses communitarian republicans of ‘ethicizing’ political discourseby granting priority to ethical–political discourses of self-understanding. The ideaof a network of discourses, on the other hand, does not limit the public use ofreason to ethical–political reasons but runs the entire gamut of reasons includingpragmatic and moral reasons and extending beyond ‘rational discourse’ to bargainingprocesses. This model, which Habermas has called ‘Kantian republicanism’,places constraints on ethical–political reasoning from all sides. The networkof discourses interwoven with the principle of democracy leads to a complexnotion of legal validity:One can understand the complex validity claim of legal norms as the claim, on the onehand, to take into consideration strategically asserted particular interests in a mannercompatible with the common good and, on the other hand, to bring universalisticprinciples of justice into the horizon of a specific form of life imbued with particular valueconstellations. 17This account of the validity of legal norms is to account for the full spectrum ofreasons involved in political will-formation and ultimately in the formation ofcommunicative power. As Klaus Günther describes this conception: ‘communicativepower is dependent on reasons, but independent of the specific kind ofreasons; it only links up with the properties of the procedure which generatesthose reasons’. 18437
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