SAFEDOR 1st Open Workshop

The vision of SAFEDORSAFEDORENHANCE SAFETY THROUGH INNOVATIONTO STRENGTHEN THE COMPETITIVENESSOF THE EUROPEAN MARITIME INDUSTRYLast modified:2006-02-12, PCSSAFEDOR-P-SC-2006-02-14-GL-open-workshop-overviewp 2 / 7Safety through Innovation

ObjectivesSAFEDORIncrease the safety and security ofwaterborne transport cost-effectivelyby treating safety as designobjectiveIncrease the competitiveness ofEuropean industry by systematicinnovation in design andoperations and by modernizingthe regulatory systemDevelop a formalised risk-baseddesign framework, develop andintegrate methods and tools toassess critical scenarios with dueaccount for the human elementPropose a risk-based regulatoryframework to facilitate firstprinciples approaches to safetyProduce prototype designs for safety-critical and knowledge-intensivevessels to validate the methodology and demonstrate its practicability(2 cruise ships, 3 RoPax, 2 gas tankers, 1 container ship, 1 oil tanker)Improve training and provide stimulus establishing a safety cultureLast modified:2006-02-12, PCSSAFEDOR-P-SC-2006-02-14-GL-open-workshop-overviewp 3 / 7Safety through Innovation

Ship design and approvalSAFEDORThe traditional processrules design approval operationThe proposed process for risk-based shipsreq.concept designHAZIDpreliminaryapprovaldetailed designrisk assessmentapprovalop.Last modified:2006-02-12, PCSMethodsand ToolsRegulatoryFrameworkApplicationSAFEDOR-P-SC-2006-02-14-GL-open-workshop-overviewp 5 / 7Safety through Innovation

First results of SAFEDORSAFEDORRisk-based ship design concept (SP5.1)FSA studies (SP4.x)• HAZID• risk levelsRisk-based ship regulatory framework (SP4.5)Safety-performance prediction (WP2)Safety-critical technologies (WP3)Innovative ship concepts (WP6)Acceptance criteria (T452)req.concept designHAZIDpreliminaryapprovaldetailed designrisk assessmentapprovalop.Methodsand ToolsRegulatoryFrameworkApplicationLast modified:2006-02-12, PCSSAFEDOR-P-SC-2006-02-14-GL-open-workshop-overviewp 6 / 7Safety through Innovation

Outlook for year 2SAFEDORComplete the development of safetyperformanceprediction toolsComplete innovative ship conceptsand select the two best for refinementContribute to continuous developmentof regulatory framework- Submit FSA studies to IMO forconsideration- Present for discussion draft riskbasedregulatory frameworkUpdate www.safedor.org to presentmore public materialLast modified:2006-02-12, PCSSAFEDOR-P-SC-2006-02-14-GL-open-workshop-overviewp 7 / 7Safety through Innovation

SAFEDORSAFEDOR WORKSHOPRisk-Based Ship DesignProfessor D. VassalosSSRC, NAMEUniversities of Glasgowand StrathclydeIMO. London, 2006-02-14

Presentation OutlineSAFEDOR• Ship Concept Design• Risk-Based Design• Example - Large Passenger Ship Safety• Concluding RemarksLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 2Safety through Innovation

Ship Concept DesignSAFEDORRequirementsConceptDesign StudiesFinal ConceptDesign SolutionTimeContractLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 3Safety through Innovation

Ship Concept DesignSAFEDORLogistics Business “Perceived” RiskOwnerRequirementsConceptDesign StudiesNeeded functions, basicservices, costs, earning potential,etc…Long promenade, pod propulsion,low NOx/SOx, high speed,manoeuvrability, etc.Expected safety level forall accident categoriesRegulations: subdivision,double hull, LSA, fireprotection, etc.Final ConceptDesign SolutionTimeContractLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 4Safety through Innovation

Ship Concept DesignSAFEDORLogistics Business “Perceived” RiskOwnerRequirementsNeeded functions, basicservices, costs, earning potential,etc…PerformanceFunctionalityLong promenade, pod propulsion,low NOx/SOx, high speed,manoeuvrability, etc.Expected safety level forall accident categoriesSafety RulesRegulations: subdivision,double hull, LSA, fireprotection, etc.ConceptDesign StudiesFinal ConceptDesign SolutionTimeContractLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 5Safety through Innovation

Ship Concept DesignSAFEDORLogistics Business “Perceived” RiskOwnerRequirementsNeeded functions, basicservices, costs, earning potential,etc…PerformanceFunctionalityLong promenade, pod propulsion,low NOx/SOx, high speed,manoeuvrability, etc.Expected safety level forall accident categoriesSafety RulesRegulations: subdivision,double hull, LSA, fireprotection, etc.ConceptDesign StudiesFinal ConceptDesign SolutionTimeContractLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 6Safety through Innovation

Design for Safety Philosophy– Innovation PotentialSAFEDORFunctionalityInnovationpotentialPerformanceSafety rulesLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 8Design Solutions SpaceSafety through Innovation

Risk-Based DesignSAFEDORLogistics Business “Perceived” RiskOwnerRequirementsNeeded functions, basicservices, costs, earning potential,etc…PerformanceFunctionalityLong promenade, pod propulsion,low NOx/SOx, high speed,manoeuvrability, etc.Expected safety level forall accident categoriesSafety RulesRegulations: subdivision, Safetydouble hull, LSA, fireprotection, etc.ObjectivesYardConceptDesign StudiesFinal ConceptDesign SolutionExperience, Talent!Damage stability andsurvival capailityCost estimatesLogbased WP1Input (Module 1 to 6)Available KnowledgeDesign ToolsmethodsTrim, intact stabilityAdditionalDesign CriteriaLight ship weight andcapacitiesTimeContractProportions andpreliminary poweringLines and body planHydrostatics andhull shapeDillon, 1969 and Erichsen 1989Final designHull arrangement andfreeboardPowering and propulsionarrangementStructure arrangementand strengthGeneral arrangement“SafetyPerformance”AnalysisToolsLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 10Safety through Innovation

Design Decision Making- Innovation LevelSAFEDORLowNothing new or unusualWell understood issuesEstablished practiceCodes & StandardsSAFETY RULESMediumUncertainty/deviation fromstandard practice. Possiblesafety trade-offs. Economicand lifecycle implications.HighNovel or/challengingconcepts. Largeuncertainties. Significantsafety trade-offs.EngineeringjudgementRisk-based designFirst-principlesRISK ASSESSMENTLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 11Safety through Innovation

Risk-Based DesignSAFEDORPax. servicesTransport taskCargo handlingEtcFunctionalityP j(f)SafetyIn normal operationduring emergencies:Human lifeShip & propertyEnvironmentP i(s)Parametric Model/Design OptimisationP k(p)PerformanceVessel fit for purpose:SeaworthinessEfficiencyLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 12Safety through Innovation

Risk-Based Design- Decision Making ShiftSAFEDORAssignedCostsKnowledgeabout the shipFreedom to make changesConcept DesignTimeContractLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 13Safety through Innovation

Risk-Based Design- Decision Making ShiftSAFEDORIncreasedknowledgeKnowledgeabout the shipDecision making shiftFreedom to make changesConcept DesignTimeContractLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 14Safety through Innovation

Risk-Based DesignSAFEDORA formalised design methodology thatintegrates systematically risk analysis in thedesign process with prevention/ reduction ofrisk embedded as a design objective,alongside standard design objectives (hencepossibility of trade-offs); routine utilisation offirst-principles tools.Last modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 15Safety through Innovation

Large Passenger Ship Safety– Safety Goal (SLF 47)SAFEDOR“The ship should be designed forimproved survivability so that, in theevent of a casualty, persons can staysafely on board while the shipproceeds to port”Last modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 16Safety through Innovation

SAFEDOR- Water ingress / Flooding- Fire / Explosion / SmokeThe ship must be able to stay upright, afloat,and remain habitable for as long asnecessary in order to:Return to port / wait for assistance[abandonment not necessary]Carry out orderly assembly /disembarkation and abandonmentof all people on boardLast modified:2005-06-03This implies that the Time Line development of differentaccident scenarios (flooding / fire / evacuation) needs to beinvestigated. Use of available simulation tools is necessary.SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 17Safety through Innovation

Large Passenger Ship Safety– Casualty ClassificationSAFEDORType I: vessel remains upright and afloat and isable to return to port under own power. Allhabitability functions possible for [5] days.Type II: as above, but unable to return to portunder own power (towing arrangements). Allhabitability functions possible for [5] days.Type III: vessel likely to capsize/sink. Able toensure basic habitability functions for [3] hours.Abandonment of the vessel may be necessaryLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 18Safety through Innovation

Large Passenger Ship Safety– Functional RequirementsSAFEDORHigh-level functionsnecessary to meetthe safety goalsShip FunctionsSystemsTransportHabitabilitySurvivability• Propulsion• Stability• Power generation•more…?PodsMainCommunication systemsEm’cy lighting EnginesystemsBilgesystemsWT safetysystemsLSAsystemsFire safetysystemsEtc…Rudersystem(Functionality + Safety) - related functionsLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 19Safety through Innovation

Large Passenger Ship Safety– Design CriteriaSAF E D O“examples”RSafety GoalsReflect safety philosophy: “The ship shouldbe designed for improved survivability sothat, in the event of a casualty, personscan stay safely on board while the shipproceeds to port”Last modified:2005-06-03Functional RequirementsDesign (critical) ScenariosDesign Criteria(Performance criteria)Verification Process(tools/methods)GuidelinesRecommendationsProceduresReflect high-level functional model:•Transport return to portState how to verify compliance withfunctional requirements:• 1500 nm, 12 kn, etc…SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 20•Habitability sustain people for 5 days•Stability upright and afloat•Tenability sustain people for [5] days• comfort, fresh water [15] litres/person/day• Deck edge not submerged, heeling anglenot to exceed [φ] degrees, …• Visibility, temperature, toxicity, etc…Safety through Innovation

Large Passenger Ship Safety– Design Scenarios AnalysisSAFEDORAccidentCategories:CollisionGrounding Fire Etc.RiskAnalysis:HAZIDIdentification of of Critical DesignScenarios ScenariosSurvivability AnalysisElements of AIndex calculationsSurvivability/Fireanalysis toolsDesignCriticalCase?Evacuationanalysis toolsyesImproveSurvivalFeasible?noyesMake sure all people can beevacuated Evacuability safely Analysis within thetime available !Find solutions (RCO) toimprove evacuability!noDemonstrable?yesAcceptable DesignSolutionLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 21Safety through Innovation

Design Scenario Analysis– Identification of Critical ScenariosSAFEDOR1∑( − s )1 − A = p ⋅v⋅ 1= 0.249iiiiR = 0.821∆A 0.07A∑=ipi⋅ vi⋅ si= 0.7510Last modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 22Safety through Innovation

Design Scenario Analysis– Identification of Critical ScenariosSAFEDORALT - 0Basis ShipA=0.7510.30.250.2∆A = 0.07 P.V.(1-S)0.150.11-A = 0.2490.0500.00480 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01 0.012P.V.(1-S)Last modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 23Safety through Innovation

Design Scenario Analysis– Identification of Critical ScenariosSAFEDORALT 0Basis ShipA=0.7510.012R=0.8210.010dARisk = P.V.(1-S)0.0080.0060.004CriticalScenarios0.00480.0020.0000 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200XM (m)1-zone 2-zone 3-zone 4-zone 5-zone critLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 24Safety through Innovation

Verification - SurvivabilitySAFEDORAccidentCategories:Grounding Collision Fire Etc.RiskAnalysis:HAZIDIdentification of DesignScenariosSurvivability AnalysisElements of Aindex calculationsSurvivability/Fireanalysis toolsDesignyesImproveSurvivalFeasible?noyesCriticalCase?Make sure allpeople can beevacuated safelywithinthetimeavailable !Evacuationanalysis toolsFind solutions (RCO) toimprovevacuability!noDemonstrable ?yesAcceptable DesignSolutionTime (minutes)PROTEUS0’ 10’ 30’ 60’ 70’ Time (minutes)Survival Boundaries and CriteriaTime to capsizeLast modified:2005-06-03Hs [m]SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 25Probability of capsize100% ship capsizep(capsize)Potential Regionfor design and/orregulationstime0% ship capsizeSafety through InnovationGM intact [m]

Verification – EvacuabilitySAFEDORCollisionLowercompartmentsflooded Heel 20degreesHeel 75degrees0’ 10’ 30’ 60’ 70’Time (minutes)Potential loss of lifeTime to sink/capsize/reach untenable conditionsAlarmsystem &CreweffectIncreasingheelingangleExcessiveheelingangleVesselSinksReducedreactiontimeReducedwalkingspeedEmbarkationLimit !!Severely reduced“walking” speedAgentscannotmoveFatalities !Last modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 26Safety through Innovation

Large Passenger Ship Safety– Design Scenario AnalysisSAFEDORSimilar Approach to be followedfor Fire SafetyLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 27Safety through Innovation

Large Passenger Ship Safety– Habitability (Redundancy?)SAFEDORLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 28Safety through Innovation

Large Passenger Ship Safety –Expected OutcomeIllustration onlySAFEDORReturn to port under towwait for assistanceReturn to port underown means possibleAbandonmentnecessary!Ensure necessary basicfunctions and systems aremaintained (redundancyavailability)Try to find solutions to avoid need forabandonment. Otherwise, ensuresurvivability for as long as necessary toallow for safe and orderly abandonmentLast modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 29Safety through Innovation

Concluding RemarksSAFEDOR• A new philosophy on “Design for Safety” and thedevelopment of a Risk-Based Design (RBD) methodologyenable ship safety to be dealt with in a systematic and allembracing way by treating safety as a objective in the designprocess.• RBD opens the door to innovation and offers competitiveadvantage to the maritime industry by facilitating costeffectivesafety; without RBD optimal design solutions arenot possible!• Adopting a risk-based framework is synonymous withpromoting rational decision making; in this respect, such anapproach can support and guide contemporary regulatorydevelopments at IMO, e.g., on Goal-Based Standards.Last modified:2005-06-03SAFEDOR-P-5.1.2-2005-06-10-GL-working-meeting Page 30Safety through Innovation

SAFEDORRisk Evaluation CriteriaSAFEDOR D.4.5.2Rolf Skjong, Erik Vanem, Øyvind EndresenLondon, February 14th 2006

IntroductionScope of Risk Evaluation Criteria- How are risks measured?- What levels of risk are acceptable?- What levels of investment in risk reduction are necessary?Risk Analyses only necessary for events associated with probabilitiesand consequences- No need to use in assessment of regular releases and losses- Need to define the system with boundaries that are subject to risk analysesRisk Acceptance Criteria- Many alternative risk evaluation criteria available- Preferable with standardised risk acceptance criteria (e.g. IMO)- Intended for use in evaluation of new regulations/deviations from currentregulations (principle of equivalency) – should not be used in operativedecisionsPrevious submission to IMO:- MSC 72/16 (Norway), MSC 78/19/2 (IACS), MSC 81/18/XX (CG FSA)SAFEDOR14 February2006p 2 / 18Safety through Innovation

Risk Acceptance CriteriaSAFEDORSAFETY- Individual and societal risk acceptance criteria• Intolerable, ALARP or Negligible- Cost effectiveness criteria (Value of preventing a fatality)• GCAF/NCAF- Non-fatal injuries and ill health• QALY, DALYEnvironmental risk- Acceptability based on recovery time and period between damages- Cost effectiveness criteria based on cost of an accident• CATS – Cost of Averting a Tonne of oil SpiltEconomic and Property risk- Assumed appropriately controlled by self-regulation• Risk acceptance criteria not considered14 February2006p 3 / 18Safety through Innovation

Example FN-curves, tankersSAFEDORRisk acceptance criteria14 February2006p 4 / 18Safety through Innovation

Value of preventing a fatalitySAFEDORCurrent practice within IMO: USD 3 million- Possibly, higher values can be used for risks that are barely tolerable,and lower values for risks that are close to negligible.- I.e. in the range USD 1.5 – 6 millionOther regulators have used other values- DoT: USD 3 million- OSHA: USD 3.5 million- EPA: USD 6 million- BP: USD 0.9 – 9 million$ ?- Shell: USD 7.5 million- USCG: USD 3 millionMaximum value for cost-per-life-saved can be found- Regulations costing more than this are expected to havecounterproductive effect on mortality rate – Net killers14 February2006p 5 / 18Safety through Innovation

NCAF criteria for OECD countriesS A F E D O R1816141210864$US million20AustraliaAustriaBelgiumCanadaCzech RepublicDenmarkFinlandFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryIcelandIrelandItalyJapanKoreaLuxembourgMexicoNetherlandsNew ZealandNorwayPolandPortugalSpainSwedenSwitzerlandTurkeyUnited KingdomUnited StatesAverage OECDOECD Average (USD million)Purely economic considerations0.76Derived from societal indicators (LQI)2.65Limit for net killers8.9314 February2006p 6 / 18Safety through Innovation

Maritime environmental riskSAFEDORRegular discharges, illegal dumping and accidental release of hazardousmaterial into the seaRisk assessment only suitable for accidental releases14 February2006p 7 / 18Safety through Innovation

IMO and FSA for environmental risksSAFEDORNo application of FSA on environmental issues so far- No detailed discussions on environmental risk criteria- Most debates initiated by accidentsMARPOL 73/78 established the principle of equivalency for pollutionfrom oil tankers- Regulation 13F(5) of Annex I- Probabilistic tools have been available since late 80’s (in DNV)Current status – after MSC 80 (May 2005):- A new intersessional correspondence group with the following task:Consider the development of a risk index relevant to the protection ofthe marine environment, taking into account the outcome of MEPC 5314 February2006p 8 / 18Safety through Innovation

Oil inputs into the marine environmentSAFEDOR24% of oil inputs into the marine environment attributable to oiltransportation and shipping (1990 numbers)Main contributors are land-based sources (municipal/industrial)Estimates of annual inputs of oil to themarine environment• Municipal/industrial• Transportation• Atmosphere• Natural sources• Offshore production/exploration14 February2006p 9 / 18Safety through Innovation

Oil input to the marine environment – shippingonly20% due to accidental spillageSAFEDORTanker accidents accounts for almost 95% of thisOil input, Shipping onlyAccidental spillage• Operational discharge ofcargo oil• Dry docking• Marine terminals• Bilge and fuel oil• Scrapping of ships• Accidental spillage•Tanker accidents•Non-tanker accidents• Risk Analyses are only relevant for accidental spillage of oil• The risk of accidental tanker oil spills will be considered further14 February2006p 10 / 18Safety through Innovation

Oil tanker accidentsSAFEDORNumber of oil spills > 700 tonnesQuantities of oil spilt (in 1000 tonnes)Some observations- The majority of oil spills are small (85 % are < 7 tonnes)- A few very large spill accounts for a high percentage of the total oil spilt- Decreasing trend in the number and size of oil spills- Collision and grounding account for > 60% of all oil spills > 700 tonnes14 February2006p 11 / 18Safety through Innovation

Factors affecting the cost of oil spillsSAFEDORThe type of oilThe location of the spillCharacteristics of the affected area$ ?- Physical, biological, economicand political characteristicsAmount of oil spiltThe timing of the spillQuality of contigency planManagement and control of responseoperationsEtc…14 February2006p 12 / 18Safety through Innovation

Cleanup cost of oil spills by locationSAFEDORMinimum: USD 1,000/tonne spilled (Africa)Maximum: USD 25,000/tonne spilled (USA, excluding Exxon Valdez)Assumed global average: USD 10,000/tonne spilled (≈ European average)14 February2006p 13 / 18Safety through Innovation

Criteria for implementation of RCOsSAFEDORBasic idea:Cost of averting an accident < F x Cost of an occurred accident- F > 1, insurance factorSeparate cost elements- Environmental, i.e. costs per tonne oil spilt- Safety, i.e. costs per life lost- Monetary, i.e. property damage, downtime, etc.Cost of averting an accident < F env x (RC + ED) + F safety x (LL) + F property X (SD + CL + LI)- RC = Rescue and cleanup costs- ED = Environmental damage- LL = Loss of lives- SD = Ship damage- CL = cargo loss- LI = Loss of income14 February2006p 14 / 18Safety through Innovation

Criteria for implementation of oil spill RCOsSAFEDORAssuming RCO do not enhance safety- I.e. LL = 0Cost of averting an oil spill < F envx (RC + ED)- Assuming global (European) average: RC = 10,000 USD/tonnes spilt- Assuming ED = 2 x RCCost effectiveness criteria for oil spill RCOs:CATS < F x USD 30,000- CATS: Cost of Averting a Tonne of oil Spilt- F, insurance factor between 1 and 3This is global average. May be justifiable to use higher values for areasassociated with higher costs, e.g. USA14 February2006p 15 / 18Safety through Innovation

Cost effectiveness of existing regulations(OPA 90)SAFEDORCore group of 11 rules used as proxy for the OPA 90 rulesBoth individual and marginal cost effectiveness assessedImplicit insurance factors associated with OPA 90 rulesOPA 90 rule F marginalF individualOverall 1.2Double hulls 9.2 4.0 ÷Deck spill control 4.2 1.2Spill source control and containment 0.5 0.2Lightering of single hull vessels 0.2 0.1Overfill devices 3.9 1.2Operational measures for single hull vessels 0.5 0.1Licences, certificates and mariner’s documents 0.6 0.2Financial responsibility 0.02 0.02Vessel response plans 8.8 3.7 ÷Facility response plans 0.4 0.2PWS equipment & personnel requirements 14.8 5.5÷14 February2006p 16 / 18 Safety through Innovation

SummarySAFEDORRisk acceptance criteria forSafety:- Individual risk: Boundaries for intolerable, ALARP, negligible• For crew, passengers and third parties- Societal risk: Boundaries for intolerable, ALARP, negligible• For different types of ships- Cost effectiveness criteria within ALARP area: CAF (GCAF/NCAF)- Non-fatal injuries: utilizing e.g. QALY, DALY (HeaLY, COHLY, RIDDOR)Environmental damage:- Boundaries for intolerable, ALARP, negligible from offshore sector reviewed- Cost effectiveness criteria for oil spills: CATS (GCATS/NCATS)Property:- No risk acceptance criteria considered. (Commercial/NPV)14 February2006p 17 / 18Safety through Innovation

SummaryRisk acceptance criteria forSafety:- A lot of experience with CAFs- Works well- No use of QALY/DALYEnvironmental damage:- Used in FSA/ECDIS (DK/NO) submitted to MSC 81- Used in FSA/SRA/Hull Girder (IACS) submitted toMSC 81Property:- Seems like IMO has no stopper for regulatingcommercial issuesSAFEDOR14 February2006p 18 / 18Safety through Innovation

SAFEDORWP 4.5.1Novel and Risk-Based Design Approval ProcessIMO premises London, 14 Feb 2006DNV

SAFEDORBackgroundPurpose and objectivesProject approachAPPROVAL PROCESSAPPROVAL TEAMFurther project processLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 2 / XSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORBackgroundPurpose and objectivesProject approachAPPROVAL PROCESSAPPROVAL TEAMFurther project processLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 3 / XSafety through Innovation

BackgroundSAFEDOR• There is an economic motivation fornovel designs• New or modified designs to fulfil newoperational requirements• Recent regulatory changes openingup for more risk-based designs (e.g.SOLAS-II.2/17)• Changes are expected at IMO withrespect to including risk-basedmethodology within the regulatoryregime, e.g. Goal Based StandardsNovel and risk-based designed vessels are typically knowledge intensive and safety criticalvessels, which are difficult or impossible to handle with current approval processesLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 4 / XSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORPurpose and ObjectivesThe purpose is to develop a high level proposal for the entire approval process for novel andrisk-based designsThe objectives of defining the high level approval process for novel and risk-based designsare as follows:- Proposing a sound, transparent and harmonized approval process to be used in orderto ensure that novel and risk-based designs are handled in a safe and efficientmanner.- Contributing to the ongoing discussions related to use of risk assessmentmethodology, acceptance criteria, etc.Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 5 / XSafety through Innovation

A number of important questions needed tobe answeredSAFEDOR1. Do we need a harmonized approval process for novel and risk-based design?2. Do we need different levels of approval processes?3. What should the overall approval process look like?4. What is required of studies and what is to be submitted?5. How do we organize the communication?6. What is to be issued by the end of the approval process?Through INTERVIEWS and LITERATURE REVIEWS, the questions were answered- as will be illustrated in the following presentationLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 6 / XSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORBackgroundPurpose and objectivesProject approachAPPROVAL PROCESSAPPROVAL TEAMFurther project processLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 7 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval process for novel or risk-baseddesignsSAFEDORDesign Preview (DP)Novel/Risk-based designProven designDefine approval basisMonitor and review HazIdPreliminary approvalConventionalapproval processMonitor and review risk assessmentsDefine detailed requirementsReview of analyses and testingApprove documents and drawingsApprovalAPPROVED DESIGNLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 8 / XSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORDesign PreviewAs a first step in the approval process, the client should be invited to a Design Preview (DP)meeting:- To discuss the concept, the novel or risk-based features, relevantrules/guides/codes/standards, as well as the further steps involved in the approvalprocess.- The purpose of this meeting is to identify whether or not this is a novel or risk-baseddesign. If YES - describe items requiring special attention and plan for how theseitems should be handled with respect to approval.Categorization of novel concepts/designsTechnology statusApplication Area1Proven2Limited field history3New or unproven1. Known 1 2 32. New 2 3 4Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 9 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval process for novel or risk-baseddesignsSAFEDORDesign Preview (DP)Novel/Risk-based designProven designDefine approval basisMonitor and review HazIdPreliminary approvalConventionalapproval processMonitor and review risk assessmentsDefine detailed requirementsReview of analyses and testingApprove documents and drawingsApprovalAPPROVED DESIGNLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 10 / XSafety through Innovation

Definition of approval basisSAFEDORThe approval authority and the client may have to meet one or several times to discuss:- the concept- its purpose and objectives- its novel or risk-based features- deviations from conventional approaches- relevant rules and regulations- proposed operations- potential impact on other systems, components, etc.+ plans for risk assessments, testing and analysesBy the end of this phase, a document will be issued by the approval authority describingrequirements (including a HazId requirement) for achieving a preliminary approval.Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 11 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval process for novel or risk-baseddesignsSAFEDORDesign Preview (DP)Novel/Risk-based designProven designDefine approval basisMonitor and review HazIdPreliminary approvalConventionalapproval processMonitor and review risk assessmentsDefine detailed requirementsReview of analyses and testingApprove documents and drawingsApprovalAPPROVED DESIGNLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 12 / XSafety through Innovation

Monitoring and review of HazIdSAFEDORAll novel or risk-based designs will be subject to a HazId requirement. The client isresponsible for facilitating the HazId, and is required to invite a representative from theapproval authority to attend the HazId.Benefits of including the approval authority representative in the HazId are:- Point to issues relevant for approval that should be discussed- Expert within certain areas - drawing attention to issues that may unintentionallyhave been left out of discussions- Amount of questions and misunderstandings will be reduced during the review ofthe HazId and in the overall approval process.The HazId will be formally reviewed by the approval authority – to make sure that the:- Team is qualified- Standard procedures for HazId’s are followed- Identified hazards are rankedLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 13 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval process for novel or risk-baseddesignsSAFEDORDesign Preview (DP)Novel/Risk-based designProven designDefine approval basisMonitor and review HazIdPreliminary approvalConventionalapproval processMonitor and review risk assessmentsDefine detailed requirementsReview of analyses and testingApprove documents and drawingsApprovalAPPROVED DESIGNLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 14 / XSafety through Innovation

Preliminary ApprovalSAFEDORThe purpose of the Preliminary Approval (PA) is to verify that the concept is feasible, and itenables the client to demonstrate that an independent third party attests to the design,which may be useful with respect to:- Project partners- Financial institutions- Regulatory agenciesIt assists the client in staying focused on the most important issues and ensure that themoney is spent wisely.The PA is to be issued with a set of conditions outlining the requirements and necessarysteps the client must satisfy in order to achieve approval. (It will also include a list ofdocuments required to be submitted in order to achieve approval.)Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 15 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval process for novel or risk-baseddesignsSAFEDORDesign Preview (DP)Novel/Risk-based designProven designDefine approval basisMonitor and review HazIdPreliminary approvalConventionalapproval processMonitor and review risk assessmentsDefine detailed requirementsReview of analyses and testingApprove documents and drawingsApprovalAPPROVED DESIGNLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 16 / XSafety through Innovation

Monitoring and review of risk assessmentSAFEDORThe requirements related to the risk assessments will be based on degree of novelty of theconcept, and the risk assessment plans defined in the previous stage.Typically, descriptions of the following should be submitted:- Hazards- Risk model- Data references, assumptions, uncertainties and sensitivities- Cost-Benefit assessments- Selected risk reducing measures- Issues that may require further analyses and testing- Issues that may require special attention with respect to operations, accessibility andinspectionsLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 17 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval process for novel or risk-based designsSAFEDORDesign Preview (DP)Novel/Risk-based designProven designDefine approval basisMonitor and review HazIdPreliminary approvalConventionalapproval processMonitor and review risk assessmentsDefine detailed requirementsReview of analyses and testingApprove documents and drawingsApprovalAPPROVED DESIGNLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 18 / XSafety through Innovation

Define detailed requirementsSAFEDORThe PA is issued with a set of conditions outlining the requirements and necessary steps theclient must satisfy in order to achieve approval.As the level of understanding of the concept has increased, following the clients detaileddesign phase and the risk assessment phase, the PA conditions may be revised.Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 19 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval process for novel or risk-based designsSAFEDORDesign Preview (DP)Novel/Risk-based designProven designDefine approval basisMonitor and review HazIdPreliminary approvalConventionalapproval processMonitor and review risk assessmentsDefine detailed requirementsReview of analyses and testingApprove documents and drawingsApprovalAPPROVED DESIGNLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 20 / XSafety through Innovation

Review of analysis and testingSAFEDORThe engineering analyses and test are used to verify that the design is feasible with respect tointentions and overall safety in all phases of operation.Typically, the following should be submitted:- Statements of relevant codes and standards applied and deviations made to theirapplication- Selection of appropriate acceptance criteria used to assess the design- Analyses reports (including objectives, scope, assumptions, results, conclusions andrecommendations)- Test reports (including descriptions of modelling/test set-up, as well as testobjectives, scope, results, analyses, conclusions and recommendations)- Error and uncertainty discussionsThe approval authority needs to review both the manner in which the analyses and tests areperformed and the results itself.Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 21 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval process for novel or risk-based designsSAFEDORDesign Preview (DP)Novel/Risk-based designProven designDefine approval basisMonitor and review HazIdPreliminary approvalConventionalapproval processMonitor and review risk assessmentsDefine detailed requirementsReview of analyses and testingApprove documents and drawingsApprovalAPPROVED DESIGNLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 22 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval of documents and drawingsSAFEDORAll documents and drawings required submitted by the client should be approved by theapproval authority.For novel or risk-based features, the documents and drawings are to be approved based onrequirements defined in the PA and the “detailed requirement” phases.Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 23 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval process for novel or risk-based designsSAFEDORDesign Preview (DP)Novel/Risk-based designProven designDefine approval basisMonitor and review HazIdPreliminary approvalConventionalapproval processMonitor and review risk assessmentsDefine detailed requirementsReview of analyses and testingApprove documents and drawingsApprovalAPPROVED DESIGNLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 24 / XSafety through Innovation

ApprovalSAFEDORThe approval phase will cover typical approval submittals, such as drawings, specifications,and support documentation, in addition to the submissions specified during the process.Approval will in most cases of novel and risk-based design involve conditions related to inservicesurveys, inspections, monitoring, and possibly testing.Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 25 / XSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORBackgroundPurpose and objectivesProject approachAPPROVAL PROCESSAPPROVAL TEAMFurther project processLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 26 / XSafety through Innovation

Approval teamSAFEDORThe team should have the combined necessary competence with respect to:- design- structures- systems- equipment- construction- operation- legal issues- risk and safety issuesas necessary for the specific novel or risk-based concept.The approval team is responsible for planning and executing the approval process, as well asdocumenting it.Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 27 / XSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORBackgroundPurpose and objectivesProject approachAPPROVAL PROCESSAPPROVAL TEAMFurther project processLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 28 / XSafety through Innovation

The deliverable submitted this year is apreliminary approval processSAFEDOR• Input to the SAFEDOR project group – proposed draft approval process will beconsidered in the various tasks within SAFEDOR• SAFEDOR will contribute to an increased understanding and acceptance of aharmonized process for approving novel and risk based design• Improvements in the approval process will result in approval being performed ina more professional and harmonized manner.Based on feedback from the different subprojects in SAFEDOR– the proposed approval process for novel and risk-based design will be revisedLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 29 / XSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORThank you!Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.5.1 2006-02-14p 30 / XSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORRisk-Based Structural DesignSubproject 2.2 Probabilistic Assessment ofthe Strength of Ship StructuresTorfinn Hørte (DNV)

Risk-based Structural DesignSAFEDORExample:- Double Hull Tankers- Hull Girder Ultimate StrengthVertical Sagging Bending Moment,θBuckled regionloaded condition, heavy weatherMM- 5 test ships: Product, Aframax,Suezmax, 2 VLCCsUse: Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)• Structural Reliability Analysis (SRA)• Cost Benefit Assessment (CBA)• Rule as a function of safety levelSRA analysis, ref. JTP background, section 9 (currently being revised).http://www.jtprules.com/background/CostCost benefit analysisNet benefitCost of RCOFailure costTarget safety levelLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 2 / 16Safety through Innovation

Structural Reliability AnalysisSAFEDORApplication overview:Load Analysis Reliability Analysis Capacity AnalysisWave loadanalysisTransferFunctions(RAO’s) formidshipbendingmoment(generated prior toProban analysis)Jointenvironmentalmodel, H s, T p(North Atlantic)Geometry andmaterial (incl.uncertainties)PROBANg=Capacity-LoadP fImportanceDesign pointStillwaterloads(Loads) geometry,materialPULS(panel buckling analysis ofdeck)Bending momentCapacityLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 3 / 16Safety through Innovation

Degradation, Net Thickness ApproachSAFEDORProbabilityof failure(log scale)Assumed degradationfor cost benefitLowHighTarget safety level?Degradation with time,not included in the SRAControl theminimum state ofthe structure,= net scantlings(50% t corrallmembers)Year 1,GrossscantlingsYear 25TimeLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 4 / 16Safety through Innovation

Annual Probability of FailureSAFEDORSRA result for initial design, various states of corrosion1.0E-05Annual probability of failureSensitivity to structural conditionCalibration:• Reduce scatter• Meet targetAnnual Pf1.0E-041.0E-031.0E-02SUEZMAXPRODUCTVLCC 1VLCC 2AFRAMAX1.0E-01Limit for steelrenewalGross Gross - 50%tcorrStructural conditionGross - 100%tcorrNot permissibleLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 5 / 16Safety through Innovation

Risk Control Option, CostsParametric modelSAFEDORDesign Parameter =“deck weight scaling factor,with a defined steeldistribution for plates andstiffeners”Cost of deck strengthening:• Cost in terms of differencecompared to the initial design• Steelwork price: $2.5/kg (Valuesbetween $1/kg (China) and $4/kg(EuroMed) are listed by Drewry (2004))• Extension of 0.4 L amidships• Impact on cargo capacity, fuelconsumption, loads etc. areignoredCost (US$ Mill)-0.5Cost as a function of the designparameter1.510.50-1-1.50.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2MDesign ParameterθBuckled region0.4 LMSuezmaxProductVLCC 1VLCC 2AframaxLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 6 / 16Safety through Innovation

Cost of Failure (loss of ship)Assumptions:SAFEDORProperty:• New-building price of the ship Drewry (2000), adjusted to2005 prices.• Linear reduction, scrapping after 25 years (Stopford(1997), US$200 per lwt.)• Value of cargo US$130 pr. tonEnvironment:• Loss of 1/5 of the cargo, with 10% chance of polluting theshore. According to Sørgård et. al (1999),• The Cost of Averting a Ton of oil Spilled (CATS), is takenfrom Skjong et al (2004), CATS = US$60,000.(10% → US$6,000)Life:• Number of crew, 30• 25% loss of crew• Cost of Averting a fatality is set to US$ 3 mill.Cost ofnew ship,US$mValue atscrapping, US$ mValue ofcargoUS$mSUEZMAX 50 4.5 19.5PRODUCT 30 1.7 4.6VLCC 1 80 8.4 39.0VLCC 2 80 8.0 39.0AFRAMAX 40 3.4 13.7Depreciation of futurecosts, 5% annually(Comparable to a riskfree rate of return assuggested in MSC72/16)Easy to check the effect of changes in these assumptionsLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 7 / 16Safety through Innovation

Cost Benefit AnalysisSAFEDORCost vs. safetyCost of failure, here loss of shipand cargo (example excl. life andenvironmental impact)1.5Cost of deck design,relative to initial design3Cost associated with failure("property" only)Cost (US$ Mill)10.50-0.5-1SuezmaxProductVLCC 1VLCC 2AframaxCost (US$ Mill)2.521.510.5SuezmaxProductVLCC 1VLCC 2Aframax-1.51.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0Target safety level, -log(Pf)01.0 2.0 3.0 4.0Target safety level, -log(Pf)Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 8 / 16Safety through Innovation

Cost Benefit Results (1)SAFEDOR2.0Including cost of property onlyCost Benefit, propertyCost (US$ Mill)1.51.00.50.0SuezmaxProductVLCC 1VLCC 2Aframaxaverage-0.52.0 3.0 4.0 5.0Target safety level, -log(Pf)Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 9 / 16Safety through Innovation

Cost Benefit Results (2)SAFEDOR2.0Including cost of property and lifeCost Effectiveness, property, lifeCost (US$ Mill)1.51.00.50.0SuezmaxProductVLCC 1VLCC 2Aframaxaverage-0.52.0 3.0 4.0 5.0Target safety level, -log(Pf)Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 10 / 16Safety through Innovation

Cost Benefit Results (3)SAFEDORIncluding cost of property, life and environmentCost Effectiveness, property, life, env2.0Cost (US$ Mill)1.51.00.50.0SuezmaxProductVLCC 1VLCC 2Aframaxaverage-0.52.0 3.0 4.0 5.0Target safety level, -log(Pf)Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 11 / 16Safety through Innovation

Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)SAFEDORNet Cost of Averting a Fatality, NCAF:∆C− ∆BNCAF =∆RNCAF (US$ Mill)43210Safety level fromnet benefitSafety level fromcost effectivenes-13.4 3.6 3.8 4 4.2Target safety level, -log(Pf)SuezmaxProductVLCC 1VLCC 2AframaxAverageLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 12 / 16Safety through Innovation

Decision making, rule criterionSAFEDORγSMSW+ γWMWV≤MγURM SWM WVM Ustill water bending moment (loading manual)wave bending moment (IACS formula)Ultimate bending moment capacity (single stepmethod)γ S , γ W , γ R partial safety factors for the still water bendingmoment, the wave bending moment and theultimate bending capacity respectivelyLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 13 / 16Safety through Innovation

Partial Safety Factors vs SafetyPartial Safety FactorCalculated safety factor, based on design point from SRA andcharacteristic value in each individual case.1.71.61.51.41.31.21.11.00.90.8WAVECAPACITYSTILLWATER0.72.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00-log(P f )Sγ W aftercalibrationγ R aftercalibrationγ MSγ S set to unityASWF+ γWEMWVDSUEZMAXSUEZMAXSUEZMAXPRODUCTPRODUCTPRODUCTVLCC 1VLCC 1VLCC 1VLCC 2VLCC 2VLCC 2AFRAMAXAFRAMAXAFRAMAXOM≤γURRLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 14 / 16Safety through Innovation

Risk-based Structural DesignConclusions:SAFEDOR• FSA appropriate for structural ruledevelopment• Structural Reliability AnalysisFSA -CBA- Quantify the probability of failure- Quantify effect of risk control option.• Cost benefit to set target safety level• Rule formulation. Calibration to SRA→ partial safety factors vs. safety level• Transparent approach, easy to quantify theeffect of the various cost assumptionsβγScantlings• Cost of Averting a Ton of oil Spilled has asignificant impact on the target for tankersLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 15 / 16Safety through Innovation

SAFEDORSignificance to GBSTier ISafetyGoalsGoalsTier IILimitStatesFunctionalRequirementsIMO GBSTier Verification III ofSRA and FSAPrescriptiveTier IVRules - PSFVerificationCriteriaPrescriptive Regulations &Class RulesDomain Standards(fatigue, env.loads Tier etc) VApplicable Industry Standards &Codes of PracticeLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR-P-WP[2].SP.2.2-2006-02-14-DNV-Riskbased_Structural_Design-rev-1p 16 / 16Safety through Innovation

SAFEDORWP 4.1 – FSA CruisePreliminary resultsIMO premises London, 14 Feb 2006DNV Maritime Solutions &Carnival plc

Introduction (1)SAFEDORWhat is Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)?• Introduced by IMO in 1997 as a reaction to previousmajor accidents• A proactive and systematic tool for supporting thedecision making process• Encompass both technical and operational aspects• Take into account human factors in ship accidentsLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 2 / XSafety through Innovation

Introduction (2)SAFEDORFormal Safety AssessmentStep Formal language Layman Language0 System Description1 Hazard identification What might go wrong?2 Risk/Data analysisHow often, how likely?3Risk control optionsidentification4 Cost benefit evaluation5 RecommendationHow bad?How can matters beimproved?How much does it cost?How much better will it beWhat actions are worthwhile totake?CompletedYet to bedoneLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 3 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 0 – System descriptionSAFEDOR• Only vessels > 20.000 GRT have been considered• Only “regular operation”, including tendering, has beenconsidered.I.e. construction, sea-trails, docking and repairs are beyond scope ofthis FSA• Fatalities are the only consequence measureI.e. environmental releases and/or property damage are notconsidered in the risk assessment• A typical “post panamax” reference vessel has beenselected to represent the fleet considered:- 110.000 GRT- 4.000 pax + crewLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 4 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 1 – Hazard id. (1)SAFEDORHazards identified during first session:Focus on ship operation, owner/operator concerns- Voyage planning 18 hazards- Arrival/dept to/from port 10 “- Voyage (open sea) 13 “- Tender operations 15 “- Emergency operations 19 “- Hazards for all op modes 6 “- Other hazards 3 “Sum84 hazardsLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 5 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 1 – Hazard id. (2)SAFEDORHazards identified during second session:Focus on design, passive barriers and structural integrity- Collision/grounding 14 hazards- Fire/explosion 13 “- Contact 7 “Sum34 hazardsLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 6 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 1 – Hazard id. (3)SAFEDORHazards rated and selected for further assessment inStep 2 – Risk analysis :- Collision- Grounding- Fire/explosion- Contact- Tender boat operationLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 7 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 2 – Risk analysis (1)SAFEDOR• Accident frequencies calculated from historic data- Lloyd’s Register Fairplay (LRFP) accident database- Lloyds World Fleet Statistics (LWFS)- Reporting period 1990-2004• Accident consequences modelled through event-treesLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 8 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 2 – Risk analysis (2)SAFEDORLast modified:2006-02-14Cruise fleet size[no of ships]20018016014012010080604020019901991source: Lloyd's World Fleet Statistics, volume 1991-2005SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14Cruise fleet development 1990-2004(ships > 20.000 GRT only)19921993199419951996199719981999p 9 / X20002001200220032004Safety through Innovation

Step 2 – Risk analysis (3)SAFEDORAccidents per ship year1,2E-021,0E-028,0E-036,0E-034,0E-032,0E-030,0E+001,1E-021,0E-026,3E-032,9E-03Collision Contact Grounding Fire/Exp.Cruise vessel Collision Contact Grounding Fire/Exp.LRFP accidents recorded 1990-2004 [no of accidents] 11 5 19 18Shipyears 1990-2004 [total no of cruise shipyears] 1 742 1 742 1 742 1 742Cruise vessel base frequency [accidents per shipyear] 6,3E-03 2,9E-03 1,1E-02 1,0E-02Return period [ship years per accident] 158 348 92 97source: Lloyd's World Fleet Statistics, volume 1991-2005.Lloyds Register Fairplay accident database, 2005.Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 10 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 2 – Risk analysis (4)SAFEDORCollisionMinor damage0,87Non fatal impactImpact only 0,80,3Fatal impact0,2CollisionRemains afloat6,3E-03 Struck ship 0,60,5 Flooding0,6 Slow sinkingSinking 0,640,4Rapid capsize0,36Minor damageSerious casualty Fire 0,50,13 0,1 Major damage0,4Total loss0,1Non fatal impactImpact only 0,80,5Fatal impact0,2Striking shipRemains afloat0,5 0,9Flooding0,4 Slow sinkingSinking 0,640,1Rapid capsize0,36Minor damageFire 0,50,1 Major damage0,4Total loss0,1Level 1 Level 2 Level 3Level 4 Level 5Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 11 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 2 – Risk analysis (5)SAFEDORGroundingminor incident0,71Drift groundingGrounding 0,1 0,151,1E-02no flooding0,84flooding double bottom onlyhard aground0,33flooding above DBremains afloat0,01 0,85serious casualty floats free slow sinking0,29 0,67 0,1rapid capsize0,05no flooding0,55Powered grounding flooding double bottom only0,9 0,35hard aground0,33flooding above DBremains afloat0,1 0,75floats free slow sinking0,67 0,15rapid capsize0,1Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 12 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 2 – Risk analysis (6)SAFEDORFire/explosionminor incident0,86people inside0,7rapid extinguishing no people inside0,9 0,3contained withincompartment of ignitionpeople insideFire/expl 0,9 0,61,0E-02 slow extinguishing no people inside0,1 0,4serious casualty0,14low denisty of people0,4rapid extinguishing med density of people0,8 0,2high density of people0,4contained to adjacentcompartmentslow denisty of people0,06 0,4slow extinguishing med density of people0,2 0,3high density of people0,3low denisty of peoplecontained within 0,4fire zonemed density of people0,03 0,3high density of people0,3restrainedescalation beyond 0,8fire zone0,01total loss0,2Level 1 Level 2Level 3 Level 4Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 13 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 2 – Risk analysis (7)SAFEDORContactminor damage0,83no flooding0,5icebergsremains afloatContact 0,05 0,782,9E-03 flooding slow sinking0,5 0,20rapid capsize0,02serious casualty0,17no flooding0,8offshore structuresremains afloat0,25 0,85flooding slow sinking0,2 0,14rapid capsize0,01no floodingbridges 0,90,1 remains afloat0,895flooding slow sinking0,1 0,1rapid capsize0,005no flooding0,9harbor structuresremains afloat0,6 0,945flooding slow sinking0,1 0,05rapid capsize0,005Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 14 / XSafety through Innovation

Step 2 – Risk analysis (8)SAFEDORPreliminary results:• Collision & Grounding together account for some90-95% of the total risk• The risk contribution of Tender boat operations isnegligible• Individual risk:- Crew approx. 5*10 -5 [fatalities per crew year]- Passengers approx. 5*10 -6 [fatalities per passenger year]• Societal risk: Still to be verifiedLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 15 / XSafety through Innovation

Challenges & learningSAFEDOR• Emphasis on establishing an overall and high-level riskpicture for cruise ships• For the risk model to have practical value for anowner/operator, the level of details must be increased• More emphasis has been put on technical aspects thanoperational matters• Occupational accidents have not been incorporated inthe risk modelLast modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 16 / XSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORThank you!Last modified:2006-02-14SAFEDOR WP 4.1 FSA Cruise 2006-02-14p 17 / XSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORFSA on LNG carriers, step 2 -Risk analysisSafedor P 4.3.2Erik Vanem, DNV Research1 st year SAFEDOR workshopLondon, 14.02 2006

Introduction – LNG characteristicsSAFEDOR• LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas- Cryogenic liquid, approximately ÷ 162° C- Stored and transported at atmospheric pressures- Volume about 600 times less than natural gas- LNG vapour flammable in concentrations between 5 – 15 %• Need ignition source – autoignition temperature > 500° CLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 2 / 17Safety through Innovation

Introduction – LNG shippingSAFEDOR• More than 40 years of experience with LNG shipping- First LNG shipment by sea in 1959, first purpose built LNGtanker in 1964• Current fleet- 190 vessels (Another 130 in the order books)- Typical size around 120,000 – 140,000 cubic meters- Main ship types: Spherical and membrane tankersLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 3 / 17Safety through Innovation

Scope of study – FSA on LNG carriers- High level, global, generic study (detailed study of specific ships,trades, port environments, waterways etc. are out of scope)SAFEDOR- Risk to crew and third parties on other vessels (third party onshoreis out of scope)- Operational phase (construction, repair, scrapping are out of scope)- Accidents of a certain scale (occupational accidents are out of scope)- Safety (security is out of scope)- Shipping phase onlyLNG Exportterminal(Liquefaction)LNG CarrierLNG Receiving terminal(Storage andregasification)L N GExplorationandProductionS C O P EEndusersLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 4 / 17Safety through Innovation

Background – FSA studySAFEDOR• Utilized information sources:- Results from HAZID (Safedor P 4.3.1)- Accident statistics, historic accident experience- Previously released studies and safety regulations- Review of LNG fleet and trade development- Reference vessel (138,000 m 3 membrane carrier)- Opinion of experts• Frequency estimates from historic accident experience(no fault tree modelling)• Consequence assessment by use of event treesLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 5 / 17Safety through Innovation

Risk acceptance criteriaS A F E D O• Individual risk acceptance criteria adopted from D.4.5.2R- Maximum tolerable risk to crew members: 10 -3 per year- Negligible risk below 10 -6 per year• Societal risk acceptance criteria established based onMSC 72/16 (Economic value of activity)- Established criteria quite strictF (Frequency of N or more fatalities)Risk acceptance criteria for LNG tankers1,00E-011,00E-021,00E-031,00E-041,00E-051,00E-061 10 100F (Frequency of N or more fatalities)1,00E-011,00E-021,00E-031,00E-041,00E-051,00E-06Risk acceptance criteria for LNG tankerscompared with previous criteria for tankers1 10 100Fatalities (N)Fatalities (N)Last modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 6 / 17Safety through Innovation

Selected accident scenariosSAFEDOR• Overall risk model- 7 scenarios identified- 2 negligible contributions- 5 scenarios to be analysedCollision riskCollision riskGrounding riskGrounding riskContact riskTotal riskTotal riskContact riskfire/explosion riskfire/explosion Loss of intact risk stability riskLoading/Unloading risk riskCargo Containment riskLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 7 / 17Safety through Innovation

Collision risk modelSAFEDORCollisionfrequency modelCollision frequencyLoadingcondition modelProbability of being loaded/in ballastDamage extentmodelProbability distribution of damageextentCargo leakagefrequency modelProbability of cargo releaseLNG hazardmodelProbability distribution ofLNG hazards materializingSurvivabilitymodelProbability ofsinkingThird partiesmodelEvacuationmodelNumber offatalities, othervesselNumber offatalities, LNGcrewConsequenceLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 8 / 17Safety through Innovation

Grounding risk modelSAFEDORGroundingfrequency modelGrounding frequencyLoadingcondition modelProbability of being loaded/in ballastDamage extentmodelProbability distribution of damageextentCargo leakagefrequency modelProbability of cargo releaseLNG hazardmodelProbability distribution ofLNG hazards materializingSurvivabilitymodelProbability ofsinkingEvacuationmodelNumber offatalities, LNGcrewConsequenceLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 9 / 17Safety through Innovation

Contact risk modelSAFEDORContactfrequency modelContact frequencyLoadingcondition modelProbability of being loaded/in ballastDamage extentmodelProbability distribution of damageextentCargo leakagefrequency modelProbability of cargo releaseLNG hazardmodelProbability distribution ofLNG hazards materializingSurvivabilitymodelProbability ofsinkingEvacuationmodelNumber offatalities, LNGcrewConsequenceLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 10 / 17Safety through Innovation

SAFEDORFire and explosion risk modelFire/explosion frequency modelFire/explosion frequencyEngine room fire Accommodation area fire Compressor room fireLoadingcondition modelProbability of being loaded/in ballast,at sea/portFire protectionmodelProbability of fire protection systemfailingFrom Oil tanker dataCargo leakagemodelLNG hazardmodelProbability of cargo releaseSurvivabilitymodelProbability distributionof LNG hazardsmaterializingProbability ofsinkingEvacuationmodelNumber offatalitiesLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1Consequencep 11 / 17Safety through Innovation

Loading/unloading risk modelSAFEDORLoading/ unloadingincident frequency modelProbability of loading/unloading incidentSpillage extentmodelProbability of extent of spillageLNG hazard modelProbability distribution of LNGhazards materializingAccident modelNumber of fatalities, LNG crew,terminal workersConsequenceLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 12 / 17Safety through Innovation

Example event tree - CollisionSAFEDORCollisionA crew of 30 is assumedCollision frequencymodelStrikingshipLoadingconditionmodelIn ballast(no LNG)CargoSurvivabilityDamage extent model leakageLNG Hazaard model Evacuation modelThird party modelLNG crewmodelmodelDamageoutsidecargo areaonly≤ criticaldamageNo driftingNo cryogenicvapourcloudignitionNo leakagedamage toof LNGhullNo poolfireSurvivingProbability offatalities # fatalitiesamong crewProbabilityof fatalitieson othervesselOthervessel notpassengervesselNot largepassengership ( ≤20.000 GRT)# fatalitieson othervesselRisk contributionThird partiesConsequence Frequency Risk Consequence Frequency Risk0,0067 0,5 0,5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 00,5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 00,5 0,5 0,35 0,95 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 00,05 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 01 0,978 12,9 0 0 12,9 2,8668E-05 0,000369810,65 0,914 1 1 1 0 0 0 00,086 1 1 0 0 0 0 01 0,978 12,9 0 0 12,9 9,1573E-05 0,001181290,5 0,35 0,95 1 1 1 0 0 0 00,05 1 1 0 0 0 01 0,978 12,9 0 0 12,9 2,8668E-05 0,000369810,65 0,856 1 1 1 0 0 0 00,144 01 0→ Yes → 1 0,9 0,89 0↓No 1 0,978 12,9 0,98 0,87 3,11 12,9 0,00012282 0,00158435 3,11 0,0001071 0,00033299↓0,13 0,97 62,7 62,7 1,552E-05 0,000973040,11 00,03 627 627 4,8E-07 0,000300941 0,989 16 0,98 0,87 3,11 16 1,535E-05 0,00024561 3,11 1,323E-05 4,1156E-050,13 0,97 62,7 62,7 1,918E-06 0,000120260,03 627 627 5,932E-08 3,7195E-05TOTAL RISKFor Crew 0,0044153rd party 0,00159fatalities per shipyearfatalities per shipyear0,1 01 01 0,989 16 0,98 0,87 3,11 16 1,5506E-05 0,00024809 3,11 1,337E-05 4,1572E-050,13 0,97 62,7 62,7 1,937E-06 0,000121480,03 627 627 5,992E-08 3,7571E-05Sum Risk LNG Crew 0,00399896 3rd party 0,00159049fatalities per shipyeaLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 13 / 17Other Crew 0,00041572fatalities per shipyeaSafety through Innovation

SAFEDORRisk summationAccident scenarioPLL(Crew)• Individual risk for crew: ~ 1.6 x 10 -4 per year (fatality risk)- ALARP according to risk acceptance criteriaPLL(Passengers)Collision 4.42 x 10 -3 1.59 x 10 -3Grounding 2.93 x 10 -3 0Contact 1.46 x 10 -3 0Fire or explosion 6.72 x 10 -4 0Heavy weather/Loss of intact stability ≈ 0 0Incidents while loading/unloading of cargo 2.64 x 10 -4 0Failure/leakage of cargo containment system ≈ 0 0Total PLL 9.74 x 10 -3 1.59 x 10 -3- Reasonable agreement with historical data ( ~ 1.2 x 10 -4 )Last modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 14 / 17Safety through Innovation

FN curve – LNG crewSAFEDORRisk level - LNG carriers0,01F - frequency of N or more fatalities0,0010,00010,000011 10 100N - number of fatalities• ALARP according to risk acceptance criteriaLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 15 / 17Safety through Innovation

FN curve - third party (not onshore)SAFEDORRisk to passengers from LNG carrier operations1,E-04F - frequency of N or more fatalities1,E-051,E-061,E-071,E-081 10 100 1000 10000N - Number of fatalities• ALARP according to risk acceptance criteriaLast modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 16 / 17Safety through Innovation

Conclusions and recommendations(input to P 4.3.3)SAFEDOR• Risk level in the ALARP area- Cost effective risk control options should be implemented• Main risk contributions comes from collision, groundingand contact scenarios- Prospective cost effective RCOs might be related to:• Navigational safety (not only for LNG carriers)• Manoeuvrability (e.g. steering and propulsion reliability)• Collision and grounding avoidance• Cargo protection (e.g. structural strength, deformability)• Damage stability (e.g. protecting hull from spillages)• Evacuation (e.g. escape way layout, LSA arrangements)- This will be further investigated in P 4.3.3Last modified:2006-16-01SAFEDOR-P-4.3.2-2006-16-01-DNV-LNG Carrier-ver0.1p 17 / 17Safety through Innovation

SAFEDORWP2: Design tools for safetyperformance predictionTo develop and / or refine suchadvanced design toolsTo enable integration of the tools intoa design environmentTo evaluate risk and the effect of riskcontroloptionsJørgen Juncher Jensen

SP2.1: Fast and accurate floodingpredictionSAFEDORThe primary goal is to devise a robust methodologycapable of modelling realistically the behaviour of adamage ship in severe seas during progressive floodingthat may lead to sinking/capsizing.A number of risk control measures that can be consideredat early stages of the design process to improve shipsurvivability in critical scenarios are also evaluated.2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 2 / 24Safety through Innovation

SP2.1: Fast and accurate floodingpredictionSAFEDOR2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 3 / 24Safety through Innovation

Achievements- 1st year, SP 2.1SAFEDORReview of all pertinent literature on stochastic methods for non-linearprocesses, the available research on predictions of water ingress andegress and, the damaged ship response and survivability in random waveenvironment.Findings:• The existing deterministic SOLAS regulations are simplistic, as theyignore the environment from the assessment.• The latest regulations building on a probabilistic concept of subdivisionmight not be adequate in all situations, as they still rely on traditionallyderivedstatic stability characteristics of the ship.• Time domain simulations are too slow for routine applications, as well asthey are still not quantitatively accurate in modeling dynamics of damagedships.• Model experiments are too expensive and time consuming for use in thedesign process.2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 4 / 24Safety through Innovation

Expected outcome, SP 2.1SAFEDORIt seems that the only technique to comprehensively consider thecomplex relationship between the damage, the instantaneous wateringress and its spread through the internal subdivision, theenvironment, ship loading conditions and the ship response, is thatof model experiment or numerical simulation, until properunderstanding of this relationships is established, and subsequentsimpler generic models are developed.2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 5 / 24Safety through Innovation

SP2.2: Probabilistic assessment ofthe strength of ship structuresSAFEDORThe primary goal is to apply structural reliability analysisto calibrate a design equation for the limit statescorresponding to hull girder collapse due to globalbending moments. State-of-the-art first principle analysistools for load effects and capacity are applied inprobabilistic analysis model.In addition, cost-effectiveness analysis will be used toevaluate the target reliability level and risk controloptions.2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 6 / 24Safety through Innovation

SP2.2: Probabilistic assessment ofthe strength of ship structuresSAFEDORLoad AnalysisReliabilityAnalysisDAMAGE SCENARIOSCapacityCalculationHydrodynamicanalysisEnvironment,Modify jointdist., Hs, TpGeometry,materialMu calculationprogramAlt. 1. Linked toPROBANRAO, momentshear, torsion???(Stored on files).May be necessaryto use a simplifiedapproach?Probabilistic Analysis(PROBAN)G=”R-S”(FORM or SORM)Alt. 2 Computeresponse surface forrelevant grid ofuncertainties.Still water bendingmoment.Probability of failureSensitivitiesImportance factors2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 7 / 24Safety through Innovation

Achievements- 1st year, SP 2.2SAFEDORTest ships selected: VLCC and LLNGLoads: Hydrodynamic analyses for intact and damagedcondition. The effect of flooding on the still water bendingmoment is determinedCapacity: Hull girder capacity using incremental method(Smith’s method) determinedReliability analysis: Model uncertainties have beendefined. Test application using the “model correctionfactor” completed, and will be applied for the capacityDamage scenarios, damage sizes: Work on Bayesiannetwork model to identify the most likely critical damagescenarios and distributions of damage size and location.Risk-based design: Demonstrate use of FSA forstructural rule development (Hull girder ultimate limit state):- Show effect of consequences to property, life andenvironment on target safety- Show link between the resulting rule and structuraldimensions to the level of safety2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 8 / 24Safety through Innovation

Expected outcome, SP 2.2SAFEDORMain Results:Probability of hull girder failure, to be used in an overall risk assessmentEffect of risk control options (structural means) on the probability of failureSome risk evaluations will be carried out for comparisonCost benefit analysisNet benefitCostCost of RCOFailure costTarget safety level2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 9 / 24Safety through Innovation

SP2.3: Probabilistic assessment ofintact stabilitySAFEDORThe primary goal of this subproject is to develop aprobabilistic framework aimed at quantifying theprobability of capsize (or of exceeding specified extrememotion levels) for any given ship in intact condition.The input is real stochastic wave data and the probabilityof capsizing will be evaluated using several differentapproaches.In addition, possible risk control options will be identifiedand assessed from a ship design and operationperspective.2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 10 / 24Safety through Innovation

Achievements- 1st year, SP 2.3SAFEDORDistribution of Initial Cause CodeTotal 156 casualties20%3%15%5%18%39%Capsize Damage Cargo Loss&DamageEngine Failure Collision Steering Problem2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 11 / 24Safety through Innovation

Achievements- 1st year, SP 2.3SAFEDORwave height [m]roll angle [deg]yaw angle [deg]50-50 50 100 150 200 250time [s]300-30-60-900 50 100 150 200 250time [s]403530250 50 100 150 200 250time [s]1.51.20.90.60.3Roll [rad]φ 0 =0.30.60.910.5CDF (N=100)#1#20-0.3-0.6-0.90 100 200 300 400time t [sec]00.3 0.6 0.9Maximum roll angle φ 0 [rad]2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 12 / 24Safety through Innovation

Expected outcome, SP 2.3SAFEDORMain Results:Probability of probability of capsize (or of exceeding specifiedextreme motion levels) for any given ship, to be used in an overallrisk assessmentEffect of risk control options on the probability of failureSome risk evaluations will be carried out for comparisonIncorporation of captain’sdecision process in scenariosimulation2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 13 / 24Safety through Innovation

SP2.4: Prevention of collision andgrounding eventsSAFEDORThe primary goal of this subproject is to provide amethodological approach for the probability of collisionand grounding events taking into account ship systems,environment and people by estimating the causationfactor and effectively assessing the resulting damagedistributions.Suitable Risk Control Options that affect the probability ofcollision or grounding will be identified and evaluated.2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 14 / 24Safety through Innovation

SP2.4: Prevention of collision andgrounding eventsSAFEDOR•To estimate the causation factor,with due account to the integratedbridge system;•To estimate the probability ofdisabled ship as function of ship type;•To estimate the probability ofdisabled ship drifts towards objects,with due account of wind and current;•To effectively assess the resultingdamage distributions followingcollision and grounding;•To identify Risk Control Options thataffects the probability of collision orgrounding.•Calibration of available drift modelsby use of simulators.2.4.5/6RCODRIFTMODELDISABLEDSHIP2.4.8NEURALNETWORKCOLLISION ORGROUNDINGRCO2.4.4OPERATORMODELUNCONTROLLEDPOWERED SHIPDURING ANENCOUNTER2.4.7 2.4.3TASKANALYSIS2.4.92.4.1 2.4.2TO SP2.12.4.102.4.112006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 15 / 24Safety through Innovation

Achievements- 1st year, SP 2.4SAFEDOREach object is a Bayesian Network2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 16 / 24Safety through Innovation

Achievements- 1st year, SP 2.4SAFEDORArtificial Neural Network to predict damage extent (RoRo)Delta = damage penetrationi = simulation no.Blue = training dataRed = estimated results2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 17 / 24Safety through Innovation

Expected outcome, SP 2.4SAFEDORMain results:Modelling of ship systems to account for the effect of bridge layout, bridgeresource management, ergonomics, navigational aids, AIS, ECDIS,communications, steering and propulsion systems availability;Modelling of ship external environment to account for the effect of traffic,routes and VTS, weather, topography;Modelling of crew to account for the effect of manning, procedures,training, piloting;Developing and/or fine-tuning of probabilistic methods to predict extent andlocation of structural damage after collision or grounding for world-wide aswell as specific service;Identifying and assessing suitable risk control options affecting the aboveprobabilities.2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 18 / 24Safety through Innovation

Expected outcome, SP 2.4SAFEDOR2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 19 / 24Safety through Innovation

SP2.5: Prevention of fire andexplosion eventsSAFEDORThe primary goal is to identify ship design issues that canbe addressed with new and/or alternative design andarrangements for which fire protection is an importantdesign factor.The project also intends to develop and demonstrate arisk assessment methodology encompassing firstprinciplefire engineering science, the implementation ofwhich will allow the achievement of the fundamental firesafety objectives implicit in the new SOLAS regulations.2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 20 / 24Safety through Innovation

SP2.5: Prevention of fire andexplosion eventsSAFEDORT1-QDRHuman life safetyT2-QRAHuman life safetyT6-IntegrationT5-Data/ToolsHuman life safetyT8-Data/ToolsCargo safetyT4-QRACargo safetyT7-IntegrationT3-QDRCargo safety2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 21 / 24Safety through Innovation

Achievements- 1st year, SP 2.5SAFEDORQualitative Design Review (QDR)• Fire accidents/incidents statisticsassociated with container vessels• Potential for fire risk reduction bydesign• HAZID session• Failure Mode and Effect Analysis(FMEA)2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 22 / 24Safety through Innovation

Expected outcome, SP 2.5SAFEDORQuantitative Risk Analysis (QRA): Robust methods/toolsto assess the severity of consequences of specific fire /explosion events (design scenarios – from human lifesafety viewpoint)• Fire engineering calculations: zone/finite-volume (CFD)models simplified regression modelsOn this basis, to propose appropriate evaluation criteriafor human life safety:ToxicityHeat Fluxes / TemperatureVisibility2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 23 / 24Safety through Innovation

WP2 SummarySAFEDORWP2 aims at providing tools for fast and reliable evaluationof various risks associated with failure of the ship or itssubsystems. Thereby, WP6 dealing with design of actualship projects might be able to• make a fast screening of various scenarios in order toidentify the important ones• make a detailed analysis of those scenarios therebyidentified• suggest appropriate risk control options2006-2-14 SAFEDOR-WP2-DTUp 24 / 24Safety through Innovation

SAFEDORDesign, Operation and Regulationfor SafetyWP3 StatusSAFEDOR Workshop2006-02-14IMO London

WP 3 INTRODUCTIONSAFEDORThe objective of work package 3 is:- To develop innovative technologies forRCOs to support safe operation- To develop specific tools which supportsafety (in the related RCOs under evaluation)- To evaluate their risk-reducing potential,interface to 5.1Last modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 2 / 24Safety through Innovation

WP3 SUBPROJECTS ANDSUBPROJECT LEADERSSAFEDORSP3.1 Innovative tool for safety critical ship systemsRainer Hamann, GLITI, Flensburger, Uni HULL, SAM ElectronicsSP3.2 Innovative concepts for safer navigationKarl-Christian Ehrke, SAMCarnival, D’Appolonia, Fresti, MartecSP3.3 Innovative life saving for passenger shipsTom Strang, CarnivalFincantieri, Navalimpianti, RFD Beaufort, Fassmer,Lloyd’s, Umoe Shat Harding, Lloyd’sLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 3 / 24Safety through Innovation

Subproject 3.1 - Innovative Tool forSafety Critical Ship SystemsNew power distributionsystem not compliant withcurrent prescriptive rulesSAFEDOAnalytical approach forprediction of safety andreliability of the new design,tool for automated fault treeand failure mode analysisRLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMPower Bus DesignGenetic algorithm forsubstitution of singleredundant components,fitness function to selectmost effective variants ofthe modelp 4 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.1 - Innovative Tool for SafetyCritical Ship SystemsSAFEDOR• Development of Design Proposals• Development of Assessment Methodology• Development of Analysis Software Tool Support• Validation Using Test Cases• Specification of Genetic Algorithm• Implementation of Core Optimization Algorithm• Extension of Modelling Tool• Small Test Cases and Validation• Case Study and ValidationLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 5 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.1.1 - Assessment MethodologySAFEDORTool for safety and reliability analysis with automatedsynthesis of fault trees and FMEAsModelling Power Bus System(Simulation X)Failure dataCreate fault trees(HiP-HOPS from ITI)Analyse fault treesGenerate FMEATable listingeffects of eachcomponent failureon the systemLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 6 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.1.1 - Assessment MethodologyEmergency GeneratorUPSGSmall ConsumersSAF E D OAlarm/MonitoringNavigation/CommunicationRUPSLightingUPSEmergency Switch BoardSub Station BridgeFailure ScenarioDBE Engine RoomSmall ConsumersConsumerMCCDB Engine RoomShore ConnectionDisconnector(optional)Main Switch BoardMGG G GMSteering gearGenerator X(optional)Generator 1Generator 2Generator Y(optional)Bow ThrusterLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 7 / 24Safety through Innovation

SAFEDOR3.1.1 - Assessment MethodologyMain busbar is supplied by 2 or more generators, theemergency busbar is supplied by main or emergency gen.Main busbar feeds bow thruster, bridge, etc.Emergency busbar feeds UPS navigation, steering gear, etcEvent: Main switchboard blackoutConsequences:Main busbar consumers lose supplyAlarms, nav equipm., emergency light continue by UPSEmergency generator is started and restores power foremergency busbarSteering gear supply is switched over to emergency busbarLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 8 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.1 - Innovative Tool for SafetyCritical Ship SystemsSAFEDOR•Expected ResultsImproved power distribution system design, costeffective solutions- for redundancy in case of equipment failure- for redundancy in case of water or fire- for reduced maintenance- for reduced engineering and installation costsLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 9 / 24Safety through Innovation

Subproject 3.2 - InnovativeConcepts for Safer NavigationSAFEDORAchive clear and easy tooverlook operatorworking placeOperate all workstationsfully redundantCombine innovative officetechnology like touch screen,wireless LAN and integratedcontrols with new safety conceptsfor redundant workstationsRadar, ECDIS, Conning,Safety, Automation canbe performed from anyworkstationApply first time SOLASRegV/A Reg15 principlesfor bridge designLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 10 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.2 - Innovative Concepts forSafer NavigationSAFEDOREight Tasks• User Requirements• Specification of Modules• Guidance on Bridge HMI Design (1 & 2)• Guidance on Safe SCC Architecture (1 & 2)• Application Platform (Radar, ECDIS,...)• Safety Management Platform• Final Bridge System and User Test Report• Evaluation, Validation and DemonstrationLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 11 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.2.1 - User Requirements -Eight Layer Reference ModelFollow Bridge Operational ProceduresOperate Man and Machine InterfaceWork with Individual Bridge EquipmentEnsure Safe OperationEnsure Data IntegrityProvide Equipment ConfigurationKeep Conditions for Bridge EquipmentMaintain Bridge OperationSAFEDORWatchkeeping,TrainingHMI Rules, Visibility,Alarms HandlingIEC Standards forRadar, ECDIS,...Redundancy,System IntegrityTime Stamps,Common ReferenceCarriage rules, IMORadar PairPower, Interference,Space,Temperature, Noise,LightsLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 12 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.2.2 - Modules - Generic,Standardised, RedundantLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 13 / 24SAFEDOne working place forall nautical tasksCombines Radar,ECDIS, Track keeping,Conning, Safety,AutomationFull redundancy withtwo working placesalready, cost-effectiveOHand-held wirelessconning display for nockDistributed head-updisplays, free choice ofinstrumentsRSafety through Innovation

3.2.3 - Bridge Design - OperatorAwarenessSAFEDORMost effectivecombinationof workingplaces tooptimisenautical taskIncreaseoperatorawarenessReducecollision riskLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 14 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.2.3 - Bridge Design - Protectedand Redundant ElectronicIdentified HazardsSAFEDORPool design at bowGreen waterremainsBow loaded, nextwave goes on topBridge windowsbreakBridge electronicfails due to wateringressSeparete andprotected roomsLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 15 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.2.5 - Safe Architecture (1)SAFEDOROperationalPhasesAnchoringOpen SeaHarbour.....FunctionalModelKeep trackControl depthKeep propulsion.....ConsequenceCategoriesNoneCollisionGroundingfrom LR databaseFunctional Failure Analysis (FFA)Function (keep track)Involved sub-system (track pilot)Consequence of failure (contact)Last modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 16 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.2.5 - Safe Architecture (1)SAFEDORFunctional Failure Analysis (FFA)AccidentStatisticsPreliminary HAZARD andIDENTIFICATION AnalysisHAZARD (loss of echo-sounder, ...)Phase (restricted water, open sea, ...)Consequence SI (minor, ..., catastrophic)Frequency FI (remote, ..., frequent)Risk [SI+FI]Identify safety related functionsLoss leads to one ormore fatalitiesLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 17 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.2.5 - Safe Architecture (1)SAFEDORSafety related functionsRisk assessment for safety relatedfunctions (task 3.2.6)Individual risk (few fatalities)- frequency and severitySocietal risk (whole crew)- FN curve, frequency against number of fat.Last modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 18 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.2 - Innovative Concepts forSafer NavigationSAFEDOR• Expected ResultsImproved bridge design- for increased operator awareness- for redundancy in case of equipment failure- for redundancy in case of water or fire- for reduced operator load- for reduced risk of collisionLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 19 / 24Safety through Innovation

Subproject 3.3 - Innovative LifeSaving for Passenger ShipsSAFEDOLimitation in the designof new large passengerships in 150-personcapacity limit applied tolifeboatsIn worldwide service75 % of the personsonboard must be carriedin lifeboats; the rest canbe carried in raftsLength of vesseldefines number ofpersons, max 3500RLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 20 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.3 - Innovative Life Saving forPassenger ShipsObjective: Develop and validate,5000PAXLittle spacerequired500 PAXusing risk-based approach, conceptsfor most effective LSA solutions123SAFEDHard structure withengine and inflatablepart lowered to waterOInflatable structure unrolls,pushing the boataway from the vesselPassengers descendto inflatable structurevia telescopic chute.RLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 21 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.3 - Innovative Life Saving forPassenger ShipsSAFEDOR• Global analysis and state-of-the-art report• Long range 400 PAX direct boarding• Long range detachable ship module (from SAFECRAFTS)• Mid range 1000 PAX, rigid bottom, inflatable shell• Short range 500 PAX direct boarding (survival coat)• Cost benefit analysis• Validation and risk assessment• Case study for presentation at IMOLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 22 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.3 - Innovative Life Saving forPassenger ShipsSAFEDOR330PAX• For comparisonRescube systemfrom Norsafe,integrated part ofship superstructure,evacuate severaldecks in parallel,30% less space, 50%increased survivalrateLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 23 / 24Safety through Innovation

3.3 - Innovative Life Saving forPassenger ShipsSAFEDOR• Expected Results- Improved Life Saving for large Cruise Vessels- 5000 PAX on a 330 m Vessel- Completely saved by Life Boats- Reduced Space for Live Saving Appliances- Increased Survival Rate- Direct Indoor BoardingLast modified:2006-02-14,KCE/SAMp 24 / 24Safety through Innovation

SAFEDOR1st Year SAFEDOR workshopWP6 Overview and key findingsValidation and application forinnovative ship designsLondon 2006-02-14Navantia - Francisco del Castillo

CONTENTSSAFEDORPart A. WP6 OverviewA.1ObjectivesA.2Work package organisationA.3Subprojects listPart B. Design ConceptsB.X Main Outcomes and key findings for subproject 6.XLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 2Safety through Innovation

A.1 WP 6 OBJECTIVESSAFEDORThe principal objective of WP6 of SAFEDOR is to focus on innovativeship designs that are expected to be as safe as today (with reducedbuilding costs and / or improved earning potential), or safer than currentships, but for formal reasons cannot be approved under the currentrules, class and/or flag regulations.This WP, by the use of the new developed methods and tools, aims to:- test the practicability of the proposed risk-based designapproach,- challenge some regulations that restrain innovation,- develop a common understanding for risk-based approaches byimplementing it,- gain experience that can be used to refine the documentation ofrisk-based regulatory framework and for the training, and- eventually sustain competitiveness of European maritimeindustry by producing prototype designsLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 3Safety through Innovation

A.2 WORKPACKAGEORGANISATIONSAFEDORWork is structured in three phases- Phase 1: design concept, during 1 st year. one report- Phase 2: design study, during 2 nd year. three reports- Selection of two best designs at mid-term- Phase 3: final design and “approval in principal” (only fortwo best designs). four reportsLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 4Safety through Innovation

A.2 WORKPACKAGEORGANISATIONPhase 3: Final design and preliminary approvalSAFEDORObjectives: To refine the design and seek “approval in principle”using the criteria developed in SP4.5In addition:- Final evaluation for the environmental impact- Final evaluation of the economical impact- Safety Cost-effectiveness- Documentation the innovative design aspectsUsing methods and tools developed in other subprojects.Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 5Safety through Innovation

A.2 WORKPACKAGEORGANISATIONSELECTION PROCEDURE at the end of phase 2Evaluation Criteria (equal weighting):- Economic Impact: Does the proposed design offerreduced costs and/or improved earning potential?- Environmental impact: Does the proposed designcontribute to cleaner maritime transport?- Safety Impact: Does the proposed design contribute tosafer transport?- Feasibility: Is the proposed design feasible andeconomically attractive?- Rule challenge: What is the degree of deviation fromprescriptive rules?SAFEDORLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 6Safety through Innovation

A.2 WORKPACKAGEORGANISATIONSELECTION PROCEDURE- Workshop where all designs will be presented to theevaluation panel and which will be open to Commissionofficers and the reviewers appointed by theCommission.- Evaluation panel composed by:• Members SC, Nominated experts(*) representing(Owners, Yards, Equipment manufactures, CCSS,Advisory Board)(*) to be approved by the design teams.SAFEDORLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 7Safety through Innovation

A.3 WP6 SUBPROJECTSLISTSAFEDORSP Ship type Coordinator Title6.1 Cruise FIN Innovative Cruise Ship – Post-Panamax size6.2 Cruise ASD Innovative Cruise vessel6.3 RoPax DM Fast full displacement ferry6.4 RoPax FSG The 13 th Passenger6.5 RoPax DNV Lightweight composite sandwich superstructure6.7 Gas tanker LMG Risk-based design of short sea LNG vessel6.8 Container AOW Innovative top open container vessel6.9 Oil tanker SSRC Safe and competitive AFRAMAX oil tankerLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 8Safety through Innovation

CONTENTSSAFEDORPart B. Design ConceptsB.X.- Main Outcomes and key findings for subproject X:Problem to Overcome, Approach to tack the problems,and potential benefits.Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 9Safety through Innovation

B.1 - Innovative Cruise ShipPost Panamax SizeProblem to OvercomePost-Panama ships are very large and technologicallycomplex vessels – continuously growing in size, very profitableand with high economic value for the European Industry.The opportunity for adopting a goal-based design on this shiphas not been systematically explored.All aspects of ship design and operations need to beharmonised overcoming, where necessary, conventionaldesign procedures generally based on prescriptive rules.A performance-based design approach may play an importantrole in this process.SAFEDORLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 10Safety through Innovation

B.1 - Innovative Cruise ShipPost Panamax SizeProblem to Overcome (cont)Ship designers may still take advantage of some SOLASregulations offering the explicitly opportunity of proposing“equivalent” design solutions, but the difficult of this approachis that safety levels and the required performances should bedetermined and agreed before assessing the equivalent levelof safety of any alternative design.To treat safety as a design objective is necessary to establisha performance-based regulatory framework.SAFEDORLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 11Safety through Innovation

B.1 - Innovative Cruise ShipPost Panamax SizeSAFEDORDesign focus:Using a Post Panama cruise ship as reference (140000 GRT),to design, thought performance based methodology, a newPost Panama Cruise vessel with design solutions looking for amore client satisfaction and more safety level .Assessing if a performance based design is more effectivethan a conventional design, based upon prescriptive rules andregulations, and if there is a sensible cost variation which mayinfluence the decisionLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 12Safety through Innovation

B.1 - Innovative Cruise ShipPost Panamax SizeSAFEDORSpecific intentions of this design concept are to introduceamong other things: Al least a public space in excess of 1600 m2, an a designwith 5 ó 6 MVZ only Reconsideration of the prescriptive limits for fire load andmaterial certification in public spaces and spa/sliding coverarea. Type, arrangement, position and configuration of LSA. Use of stairtowers as assembly stations “Safe havens” New probabilistic damage requirements and escaperequirements from flooded compartments Improved navigation and bridge equipment OthersLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 13Safety through Innovation

B.2 Innovative Cruise VesselProblem to OvercomeAt present the safety of any vessel is defined with reference tostrict prescriptive rules, all derived and created over manyyears with a constant feedback from incidents and accidents.However the rules have primarily written for passenger linersand not for actual tourist cruise ships which are designer for ahigher number of people onboard.The increase of size have required to introduce amended rulesto SOLAS imposing further restrictions to the design andlayout of future cruise ships: Fire-Zone length, Position andtypes of lifesaving appliances, Type of fire doors, MarginLine...In addition, nowadays it is necessary to address new risks as: Terrorist attacks, Pollution of the environment in case of fire, grounding ocollision.Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 14SAFEDORSafety through Innovation

B.2 Innovative cruise LinerSAFEDORDesign FocusTo design a Cruise Liner with Risk-Based tools and methodswhich will be safer than existing one in terms of passengersafety and which shall be designed with reduced incidentaldamages to the environment in case of grounding andcollision comparing with existing vessels.And at the same time, to design a cruise vessel moreattractive to the cruise industry with maximum exterior cabins,very large public rooms, ... which can be used as it’s ownlifeboat.Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 15Safety through Innovation

B.2 Innovative cruise VesselSAFEDORSpecific intentions of this design concept are to introduceamong other things: Innovative and novel layout with very large fire-curtains, firezones and watertight compartments balconies in all passenger cabins. an upper structure working as a lifebelt in case of very largedamages. Transversal and longitudinal Cross flooding through valveoperate trunks. Novel machinery location, etc…Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 16Safety through Innovation

B.3 Fast Full DisplacementFerryProblem to OvercomePresent prescriptive regulation: SOLAS 95, StockholmAgreement , MSC 194 (80), Fire Safety and Evacuationrequirements …Do not allow for design optimisation, from a point of view ofsafety, lightweight, payload, cargo capacity, etc.Specific intentions of this design concept are: increased MFZ length beyond present SOLAS novel watertight compartment arrangement Novel machinery location / protection of vital systems Fully replace life boats with MES.SAFEDORLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 17Safety through Innovation

B.3 Fast Full DisplacementFerryDesign focusTaking state of the art reference vessel to develop anequivalent safe or safer Fast full displacement vessel......through challenging the current rules previously mentioneddoing it more attractive:increasing payload,improving survivability,Incorporating IMO “safe haven concept”, andincreasing protection of the vital systems against variousdamage and fire scenarios.And to provide an innovative platform for testing the risk-basedapproach for a concept design.Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 18SAFEDORSafety through Innovation

B. 4 The 13th PassengerProblem to OvercomeExisting rules and regulations do not explicitly reflect the riskswhich a ship or its passengers are exposed to: In the case ofdamage stability and fire safety, most rules apply if more than12 passengers are to be transported. No matter, whether thevessel is designed for 13 or 2500 passengers, therequirements are more or less the same.Consequently, the transport of a small number of passengersis economically of limited interests.Specific intentions of this project are to identify in qualitativeterms the safety level of a present vessels with 12 passengersand to design a innovative one as safe as the SOLAS vesselbut more cost- efficient.SAFEDORLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 19Safety through Innovation

B. 4 The 13th PassengerSAFEDORDesign focusTo design a RoPax ferry for about 50 passenger, using Riskbased principles and Not-SOLAS requirements, which will beas safe as a design using SOLAS but more cost-efficient.In addition to introduce high tensile steels and a power-busfor supply with electrical energy.Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 20Safety through Innovation

B. 5 Lightweight compositesandwich superstructureProblem to OvercomeThe state of the art prior to this project is that economic lightweight design solutions and fire protection systems aresuitable for HSC and Naval Ships.However, merchant ship (except HSC) have to satisfyrequirements of SOLAS convention that prevent the use ofcomposites.Specific intentions of this project are to carried out a riskbased design approach in order to allow introduction oflightweight composite structures in superstructures ofmerchant ships.To Provide benchmark examples for application of fire safetyengineering and methodsSAFEDORLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 21Safety through Innovation

B. 5 Lightweight compositesandwich superstructureSAFEDORDesign focusTo develop an economic lightweight composite sandwichdesign concept for a superstructure on a passenger ship.......through developing a fire risk model and ….To provide a quantitative measure of the fire risks associatedwith the new design concept and the economic benefitsexpected from using it.Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 22Safety through Innovation

B. 7 Risk-based design of shortsea LNG vesselSAFEDORWhy Coastal LNG?There is a growing market for small-scale LNG distribution inEurope (and Asia).Small LNG carriers may be economical with two cylindricalcargo tanks (type C). That permits the transport of LNGpressurised.The LNG vessel is developed in order to transport LNG forshort distances from small-scale LNG factories/storage tanksto small-scale end-customers, in such way Boil-offrelicuefaction is not required. Instead a thermal oxidiser couldbe installed.Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 23Safety through Innovation

B. 7 Risk-based design of shortsea LNG vesselThis scenario permit to challenge some Rules in particular:Structural Solutions – IGC rules using the new CNG(Compressed natural gas carriers) class rules which …permit to used equivalent bottom solutions if they can beshown by calculations or tests to offer the same protection tothe cargo tank against indentations and the same energyabsorption capabilities as conventional double bottom design.Gas combustion unit – No code exist for small vesselsMachinery Solutions – ICG Code: gas dangerous areasAnd also to incorporate some innovationsPower connector – ICG Code: no rules at allMedium pressure pneumatic cargo valve actuators Use of Argon as inert gasLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 24SAFEDORSafety through Innovation

B. 7 Risk-based design of shortsea LNG vesselSAFEDORDesign focusTo develop a short sea LNG vessel which can distribute gas tosmall scale customers with a structural solutions optimisedusing the principia of safety equivalency establish in the CNGrules.To test the implementation of new LNG equipments as powerconnector, gas combustion units, medium pressure pneumaticcargo valve actuators, argon… since a safety and economicpoint of view.Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 25Safety through Innovation

B. 8 Innovative open topcontainer shipSAFEDORWhy open top?•The ship-shore interface is the No 1 potential to be addressedin future research (in Feeder Containerships)•Feeder services require efficient cargo handling•Lashing becomes a crucial issue in general (stevedore safetyand cargo securing reliability)•Open top requires no lashing (except land-site mountedautomatic twistlocks)Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 26Safety through Innovation

B. 8 Innovative open topcontainer shipSAFEDORWhat happened?300number of vessels2502001501005053opentopconventionell12 472 85 833105614754 6184 216 263 25946346127 159 189 208 1390198919901991199219931994199519961997year199819992000200120022003Last modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 27Safety through Innovation

B. 8 Innovative open topcontainer ship Tonnage comparisonSAFEDORLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 28Safety through Innovation

B. 8 Innovative open topcontainer shipSAFEDORDesign focusCreation of a low gross tonnage, highly competitive andequivalent safe open-top container vessel......through challenging current rules where necessary to makeit more competitiveLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 30Safety through Innovation

B. 9 Safe and competitiveAFRAMAX oil tankerSAFEDORConstrainsIt is intention of this subproject taking as reference (state of artvessel) a DH tanker, to challenge some rules of the MARPOL73/78 and SOLAS II-2 Part b, relative to general layout of thevessel, cargo tank size, tank length limitation, capacity of thesegregated ballast tanks …among others: to get a greater overall oil outflow performance to increase cargo capacity to improve cargo handlingLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 33Safety through Innovation

B. 9 Safe and competitiveAFRAMAX oil tankerDesign focusTo evolve a Double Hull concept, as it is publicly andpolitically set to be the norm, with the following safety goals:Reduction of potential of medium to large amount oil spillssignificantlyEliminate small size oil spills due to operationalincidents/accidentsSignificantlyeffectsLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14reduced ballast water exchange and theirZero-fatality and injury rate for tanker operationsProlonged-maintenance-free structural life, and easyinspection and assessment of structure.SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 34SAFEDORSafety through Innovation

Summary 1 st year WP6 projectsa) Design concepts are already establish.b) All concept design challenge rules, although not allsuggested innovation violate the actual rules.c) To contribute to safer/cleaner transport is not an isolatedobjective, but owner economical profit seems to be ofparamount importance for some of the subprojects.d) Risk-Based design and Safety equivalence principles arethe approach required to overcome those rules that restraininnovation.SAFEDORLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 35Safety through Innovation

SAFEDORThank you for yourkind attentionLast modified:FCC – 2006/02/14SAFEDOR-P-6.0.0-2006-02-14-Navantia-1styear WP6 Overview-rev-0Page 36Safety through Innovation