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Lexical representations in spoken language comprehension

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LANGUAGE AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES, 1988,3(1) 1-16<strong>Lexical</strong> Representations <strong>in</strong> SpokenLanguage ComprehensionWilliam Marslen-WilsonMax-Planck Institute for Psychol<strong>in</strong>guistics, Nijmegen, The Netherlandsand M. R. C. Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge, U. K.Col<strong>in</strong> M. BrownMax-Planck Institute for Psychol<strong>in</strong>guistics, Nijmegen, The NetherlandsLorra<strong>in</strong>e Komisarjevsky TylerDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge,Cambridge, U. K.This study <strong>in</strong>vestigates the tim<strong>in</strong>g with which lexical <strong>representations</strong> aredeployed at different levels of the <strong>language</strong> system, contrast<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>guisticaspects of verb argument frames with their consequences for <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong>the doma<strong>in</strong> of non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic, conceptual models. The experiment exam<strong>in</strong>edmonitor<strong>in</strong>g latencies to noun targets that were either normal with respect tothe preced<strong>in</strong>g verb, or which violated either pragmatic, semantic, or categorialconstra<strong>in</strong>ts imposed by the verb’s argument frame and its associatedco-occurrence restrictions. The results show that syntactic and semanticconstra<strong>in</strong>ts derived from the verb have immediate effects on process<strong>in</strong>g, andthat there is also a very rapid projection of the thematic properties of verbargument frames on to non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic doma<strong>in</strong>s of <strong>in</strong>terpretation and <strong>in</strong>ference,<strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g the listener’s mental model of the discourse.I NTRODUCTI ONThe <strong>comprehension</strong> of a <strong>spoken</strong> utterance requires the listener to <strong>in</strong>tegratetogether a variety of different types of l<strong>in</strong>guistic and non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic knowledge.In particular, the l<strong>in</strong>guistic properties of the utterance-its acoustic-phonetic,lexical, syntactic, and semantic properties-must <strong>in</strong> someway be mapped onto a mental model of the current discourse, tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>toRequests for repr<strong>in</strong>ts should be addressed to William Marslen-Wilson, M.R.C. AppliedPsychology Unit, 15 Chaucer Road, Cambridge CB2 ZEF, U.K.0 1988 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. & V.S.P. Publications


2 MARSLEN-WILSON, BROWN, TYLERaccount the listener’s general non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic knowledge of the world. It hasbecome <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly evident , from developments <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>guistics , psychol<strong>in</strong>guistics,and computational l<strong>in</strong>guistics, that lexical <strong>representations</strong> play acentral role <strong>in</strong> this process of <strong>in</strong>tegration. Not only do lexical <strong>representations</strong>provide the basic bridge between sound and mean<strong>in</strong>g, l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g thephonological properties of word-forms with clusters of syntactic andsemantic attributes, but also they provide the basic structural framework <strong>in</strong>terms of which the l<strong>in</strong>guistic representation of the utterance is constructed,and <strong>in</strong> terms of which this l<strong>in</strong>guistic representation is projected on to an<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong> a mental model.In the research reported here we exploit the diverse properties of theargument frames associated with verbs, <strong>in</strong> order to exam<strong>in</strong>e the basictim<strong>in</strong>g with which lexical <strong>representations</strong> are deployed at different levels ofthe <strong>comprehension</strong> process, and <strong>in</strong> order to assess the relative importanceof these lexically based processes at each level. We beg<strong>in</strong> with a briefsummary of the l<strong>in</strong>guistic and psychol<strong>in</strong>guistic background to this research.BackgroundThe psychol<strong>in</strong>guistically most <strong>in</strong>fluential analysis of the properties oflexical <strong>representations</strong> is still Chomsky’s (1965) treatment of the cooccurrenceconstra<strong>in</strong>ts associated with a given lexical item. In a complexanalysis of how these constra<strong>in</strong>ts could be expressed as part of the basecomponent of a transformational grammar, he dist<strong>in</strong>guished two majortypes of context-sensitive subcategorisation rules. Strict subcategorisationrules specify the categorial context <strong>in</strong> which lexical entries can occurstat<strong>in</strong>g,for example, that a verb like grow can be followed either by an NP,by an Adjectival form, or by noth<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>transitive use). Selectionalrules further subcategorise lexical items <strong>in</strong> terms of the syntactic features ofthe items that can fill the categorial possibilities specified by the subcategorisationrules. By syntactic features, Chomsky meant properties such as[*Animate] or [+.Abstract], which <strong>in</strong> later treatments have usually beenclassified as semantic <strong>in</strong> nature (e.g. Jackendoff, 1972).All subsequent analyses of the properties of lexical <strong>representations</strong> havepreserved, <strong>in</strong> one form or another, this fundamental dist<strong>in</strong>ction betweenthe categorial properties of the verb argument frame and the semantic andsyntactic properties of the items that can fill these argument slots. And,certa<strong>in</strong>ly, to develop a psychol<strong>in</strong>guistic model of how lexical <strong>representations</strong>participate <strong>in</strong> <strong>language</strong> <strong>comprehension</strong>, it is necessary to capture <strong>in</strong>some way the process<strong>in</strong>g implications of such a dist<strong>in</strong>ction. When averb-form is identified, what k<strong>in</strong>ds of subcategorisation and selectionalconstra<strong>in</strong>ts are made available, and when and how do they affect theprocess<strong>in</strong>g of the subsequent <strong>in</strong>put? These are questions that have received


LEXICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN SPOKEN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION 3surpris<strong>in</strong>gly little attention <strong>in</strong> psychol<strong>in</strong>guistic research. Scattered attemptswere made <strong>in</strong> the early literature (e.g. Downey & Hakes, 1968; Fodor,Garrett, & Bever, 1968; Hakes, 1971; Moore, 1972) to explore some of theprocess<strong>in</strong>g consequences of Chomsky’s proposals for lexical representation,but the results of these studies were contradictory and <strong>in</strong>conclusive.Recent developments <strong>in</strong> the l<strong>in</strong>guistic analysis of lexical <strong>representations</strong>make their process<strong>in</strong>g implications all the more salient for an on-l<strong>in</strong>etheory of <strong>language</strong> <strong>comprehension</strong>. Essentially every major <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>in</strong>generative l<strong>in</strong>guistics over the past decade has served to move lexical<strong>representations</strong> <strong>in</strong>to a central position <strong>in</strong> determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the syntactic andsemantic properties of a str<strong>in</strong>g-<strong>in</strong>deed, as Wasow (1985) remarks, clausestructure has come to be viewed as a projection of lexical semantics. Forexample, <strong>in</strong> both the Government-B<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g approach (Chomsky, 1981; vanRiemsdijk & Williams, 1986) and <strong>in</strong> <strong>Lexical</strong> Functional Grammar (Bresnan,1982), lexical <strong>representations</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>e the basic relations betweenelements at both syntactic and semantic levels of the theory. Government-B<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g achieves this through the comb<strong>in</strong>ed effects of the Theta-Criterionand the Projection Pr<strong>in</strong>ciple, operat<strong>in</strong>g on the argument structures associatedwith verbs, whereas <strong>Lexical</strong> Functional Grammar assumes that lexicalentries have a dual specification, pair<strong>in</strong>g predicate argument structureswith specifications of grammatical functions. The grammatical functionsassociated with lexical items map on to a syntactic constituent structure,whereas the lexical predicate argument structure determ<strong>in</strong>es the functionalstructure of the str<strong>in</strong>g, which <strong>in</strong> turn determ<strong>in</strong>es its semantic properties atthe appropriate level of representation.What is important about these developments is the closeness with whichthey l<strong>in</strong>k the subcategorisation properties of a lexical item with its argumentstructure <strong>in</strong> a semantic representation. The argument frames associatedwith lexical items specify not only how these arguments mightfunction <strong>in</strong> a purely syntactic representation of the str<strong>in</strong>g, but also <strong>in</strong> itssemantic <strong>in</strong>terpretation. And it is this semantic <strong>in</strong>terpretation that determ<strong>in</strong>es,<strong>in</strong> turn, how the str<strong>in</strong>g is projected on to a discourse model. Ineffect, on this type of enriched account of lexical <strong>representations</strong>, theargument frames associated with verbs have consequences not simply forthe l<strong>in</strong>guistic analysis of an utterance, but also for the construction of an<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong> the non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic, conceptual doma<strong>in</strong> (c.f. Carlson &Tanenhaus, 1987).But even <strong>in</strong> this current l<strong>in</strong>guistic climate of emphasis on the importanceof the lexicon, the on-l<strong>in</strong>e process<strong>in</strong>g functions of lexical <strong>representations</strong>rema<strong>in</strong> relatively neglected-especially <strong>in</strong> the auditory doma<strong>in</strong>. A numberof studies have begun to appear look<strong>in</strong>g at lexical effects <strong>in</strong> the pars<strong>in</strong>g ofwritten texts. These range from questionnaire studies (e.g. Ford, Bresnan,& Kaplan, 1982), to studies us<strong>in</strong>g more on-l<strong>in</strong>e measures (e.g. Clifton,


4 MARSLEN-WILSON, BROWN, TYLERFrazier, & Conn<strong>in</strong>e, 1984; Mitchell, 1987; Mitchell & Holmes, 1985;Tanenhaus, Stowe, & Carlson, 1985). All of these studies show thatlexical “preferences”-the relative salience of different subcategorisationframes associated with the same word-form-have an immediate effect onsubsequent structural process<strong>in</strong>g. But <strong>in</strong> the auditory doma<strong>in</strong>, as far as weare aware, there is no research which has looked explicitly at the on-l<strong>in</strong>erecognition of verb-forms and the activation of their associated argumentframes.The research which seems most relevant to the current study is someresearch of our own which did not directly vary lexical variables at all. Thiswas an experiment (Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980) designed to track thetime-course with which different types of process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation-globallydef<strong>in</strong>ed as syntactic and semantic-became available as listeners heard a<strong>spoken</strong> utterance. The subjects monitored for word-targets at differentserial positions <strong>in</strong> three k<strong>in</strong>ds of prose material: Normal Prose, AnomalousProse, and Scrambled Prose. Anomalous Prose differed from NormalProse <strong>in</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g no semantic organisation while preserv<strong>in</strong>g syntactic andprosodic structure. Scrambled Prose differed from both <strong>in</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g neithersyntactic nor semantic organisation. These three types of test materialswere presented either as isolated sentences, or <strong>in</strong> the context provided by apreced<strong>in</strong>g lead-<strong>in</strong> sentence. The pattern of monitor<strong>in</strong>g responses acrossword positions for the three prose materials led to a view of sentenceprocess<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> which, from the first word of an utterance, the syntactic andsemantic properties of the <strong>in</strong>com<strong>in</strong>g speech are immediately <strong>in</strong>terpreted <strong>in</strong>the context of the current discourse model (Marslen-Wilson& Tyler, 1980;1981).These global claims about the properties of on-l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>language</strong> process<strong>in</strong>ghave a rather direct <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong> the lexical doma<strong>in</strong> we have beendiscuss<strong>in</strong>g and, certa<strong>in</strong>ly, the enriched functions that are be<strong>in</strong>g associatedwith lexical <strong>representations</strong> make it easier to see how the speech <strong>in</strong>put canbe <strong>in</strong>terpreted as it is be<strong>in</strong>g heard. They imply that as a lexical entry isaccessed, this immediately makes available <strong>in</strong>formation about its argumentframe and places syntactic and semantic constra<strong>in</strong>ts on the types ofelements that can fill these slots. These argument frames are specified <strong>in</strong> away that has immediate consequences not only for the local syntacticrelations of items <strong>in</strong> the str<strong>in</strong>g, but also for their thematic or functionalroles. This means that the elements that fill these argument slots areassigned a value not only with respect to some putative level of syntacticorganisation, but also with respect to a semantic and ultimately pragmatic<strong>in</strong>terpretation. In the follow<strong>in</strong>g section of the paper we describe anexperiment designed to establish how far lexical <strong>representations</strong> do makeavailable <strong>in</strong>formation or constra<strong>in</strong>ts that operate at these different levels,and the tim<strong>in</strong>g with which these come <strong>in</strong>to operation.


LEXICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN SPOKEN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION 5Local Violation of <strong>Lexical</strong> Constra<strong>in</strong>tsIn an earlier study (Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980), the availability ofdifferent types of process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation was evaluated us<strong>in</strong>g global distortionsof complete texts-as, for example, <strong>in</strong> the overall contrast betweenNormal Prose and Anomalous Prose. The problem with this technique is,first, that it rules out the possibility of look<strong>in</strong>g at the process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formationmade available by any specific lexical item and, secondly, that it makesit difficult to decide exactly what are the types of <strong>in</strong>formation of which aglobal distortion is <strong>in</strong> fact depriv<strong>in</strong>g the listener (cf. Cowart, 1982; Marslen-Wilson& Tyler, 1983). Marslen-Wilson & Tyler (1980) presented thecontrast between Normal and Anomalous Prose as a difference <strong>in</strong> semantic<strong>in</strong>terpretability, but without systematically dissociat<strong>in</strong>g this from pragmatic<strong>in</strong>terpretability. Furthermore, as Cowart (1982) po<strong>in</strong>ts out, AnomalousProse may have conta<strong>in</strong>ed violations of syntactic constra<strong>in</strong>ts as well as ofsemantic constra<strong>in</strong>ts.These problems are avoided by look<strong>in</strong>g at the local violation of lexicalconstra<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> otherwise normal sentence contexts. Specifically, by hold<strong>in</strong>gthe sentence constant, and vary<strong>in</strong>g the properties of the verb, we candeterm<strong>in</strong>e how and when different aspects of the verb’s argument frameaffect the process<strong>in</strong>g of a <strong>spoken</strong> sentence. Take as an example thefollow<strong>in</strong>g set:la. John carried the guitar.lb. John buried the guitar.lc. John drank the guitar.Id. John slept the guitar.These are four identical str<strong>in</strong>gs, all with the same monitor<strong>in</strong>g target(guitar), where the only variation is <strong>in</strong> the verb, and <strong>in</strong> the argumentframes associated with the verb. In so far as these variations <strong>in</strong>volveproperties of lexical <strong>representations</strong> that are significant for on-l<strong>in</strong>e process<strong>in</strong>g,then they will affect the listener’s response to the monitor<strong>in</strong>g target.In sentence (la) the relationship between the verb (carried) and thetarget (guitar) is fully acceptable on syntactic, semantic, and pragmaticgrounds. The subcategorisation requirements of the verb allow for anounphrase as direct object, a guitar has the appropriate semantics for theaction of carry<strong>in</strong>g, and carry<strong>in</strong>g a guitar is a perfectly reasonable activity <strong>in</strong>the context of a standard model of the world. Response times to targets <strong>in</strong>Normal contexts like (la) form the basel<strong>in</strong>e condition for the experiment.Sentences (lb) and (lc) illustrate two grades of potential violation of thelexical <strong>representations</strong> evoked by the verb. In both cases the target NP(guitar) rema<strong>in</strong>s categorially appropriate-the verbs are transitive and


6 MARSLEN-WILSON, BROWN, TYLERaccept a nounphrase as direct object. Sentence (lb), however, constituteswhat we will label a pragmatic anomaly, and contrasts with (lc), whichconstitutes a semantic anomaly. This, <strong>in</strong> effect, is the dist<strong>in</strong>ction betweenthe l<strong>in</strong>guistic and the non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic aspects of the lexical representation ofa verb. The anomaly-or the “oddness”-of “John buried the guitar”cannot be part of the l<strong>in</strong>guistic specification of the semantics of the lexicalitems <strong>in</strong>volved. In fact, it is not someth<strong>in</strong>g that is likely to be pre-stored atall. The pragmatic oddness of bury<strong>in</strong>g a guitar is someth<strong>in</strong>g that we have to<strong>in</strong>fer, given our knowledge of the world, and given what we know aboutguitars, the likely effects of bury<strong>in</strong>g them, and so on.The first question we ask here, therefore, is whether such pragmaticviolations affect the on-l<strong>in</strong>e response to the monitor<strong>in</strong>g target-that is,whether responses are slower than <strong>in</strong> the normal condition. This will onlybe the case if the response <strong>in</strong> the normal condition reflects, at least <strong>in</strong> part,the pragmatic normality of the actions or events <strong>in</strong>volved. And this, <strong>in</strong>turn, can only hold if the lexical <strong>representations</strong> associated with the verbhave already begun to have consequences for an <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong> a mentalmodel of the discourse. This requires, we should remember, not only theconstruction of a l<strong>in</strong>guistic argument frame, realis<strong>in</strong>g the structural constra<strong>in</strong>tson the relationship between the verb and its potential arguments,but also the projection of the thematic consequences of these relations <strong>in</strong>tothe non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic doma<strong>in</strong>.The second type of violation, <strong>in</strong> (lc), can plausibly (though not necessarily)be treated as a violation of the l<strong>in</strong>guistically specifiable properties ofthe lexical <strong>representations</strong> associated with a given verb-a violation, <strong>in</strong>Chomskian terms, of the selection restrictions on the semantic propertiesof the items that can fill the argument slots made available by the verb’ssubcategorisation properties. It is plausible that the l<strong>in</strong>guistic specificationof dr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g (that it <strong>in</strong>volves liquids) and of guitars (that they are solidobjects) is sufficient to make guitar anomalous follow<strong>in</strong>g dr<strong>in</strong>k withouthav<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>voke knowledge or operations outside the l<strong>in</strong>guistic doma<strong>in</strong>.That is why we refer to this as a semantic rather than a pragmatic violation.Our second question, therefore, is twofold: Are semantically anomaloustargets responded to more slowly than normal targets, and are they alsoresponded to more slowly than pragmatically anomalous targets? If thefirst of these holds, then this reflects the tim<strong>in</strong>g with which the semanticrestrictions associated with argument frames start to become available, andbeg<strong>in</strong> to be <strong>in</strong>tegrated with the semantic properties of potential fillers forthese slots. If the second of these holds, and semantic anomalies are moredisruptive than pragmatic anomalies, then this tells us someth<strong>in</strong>g about therelative significance, for the on-l<strong>in</strong>e analysis process, of these two types ofdisruptions (we will return later <strong>in</strong> the paper to the question of how farsemantic and pragmatic anomalies can be kept qualitatively dist<strong>in</strong>ct).


LEXICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN SPOKEN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION 7F<strong>in</strong>ally, we can also predict that if the orig<strong>in</strong>al difference between NormalProse and Anomalous Prose <strong>in</strong> Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1980) was<strong>in</strong>deed equivalent, as orig<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>in</strong>tended, to violations of semantic cooccurrencerestrictions, then the reaction time difference between Normaland Semantic targets here should be of the order of 55-60 msec.The third type of sentence, exemplified <strong>in</strong> (Id), differs from the othertwo <strong>in</strong> violat<strong>in</strong>g the subcategorisation frame associated with a given verb.A verb-form like sleep is subcategorised as an <strong>in</strong>transitive verb, and has nosubcategorised argument slot <strong>in</strong>to which a nounphrase like guitar can fit.This categorial violation should be highly disruptive of monitor<strong>in</strong>g performance.The target nounphrase will be heard <strong>in</strong> the context of a verbargument frame to which it cannot be attached. This means that thelistener cannot construct the appropriately configured structural object forprojection on to any other doma<strong>in</strong> of <strong>in</strong>terpretation. The collocation ofsleep and guitar simply has no <strong>in</strong>terpretation, either semantically or pragmatically.This means that the monitor<strong>in</strong>g decision that the word guitar ispresent can be based only on the bottom-up sensory <strong>in</strong>put. If the dist<strong>in</strong>ctionhere between semantic and categorial anomalies is equivalent to thedist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>in</strong> the earlier study (Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1980) betweenAnomalous and Scrambled Prose, then reaction times <strong>in</strong> the categorialcondition should be on the order of 25-30 msec slower than <strong>in</strong> the semanticcondition, and about 90-100 msec slower than targets <strong>in</strong> the normalsentences.In a f<strong>in</strong>al manipulation, over and above the four primary contrastsalready described, we will <strong>in</strong>vestigate further the role of the discoursemodel <strong>in</strong> these lexical activation processes, by compar<strong>in</strong>g responses tonormal targets (as <strong>in</strong> la) when the test sentence coheres normally to itspreced<strong>in</strong>g discourse context as opposed to cases where there is no coherentrelationship. When the utterance conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the target word cannot bereadily mapped onto the scenario established <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g sentence,does this slow down responses? These are not, strictly speak<strong>in</strong>g, localviolations, but we <strong>in</strong>clude them here <strong>in</strong> order to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> comparabilitywith the earlier study, where we did f<strong>in</strong>d effects of the presence or absenceof a discourse context for target-positions early <strong>in</strong> the test sentence.MaterialsMETHODThe test materials consisted of 40 sets of sentence pairs. Each pair with<strong>in</strong>these sets was made up of a lead-<strong>in</strong> sentence and a cont<strong>in</strong>uation sentence.The monitor<strong>in</strong>g target always occurred <strong>in</strong> the second sentence, placed <strong>in</strong>object position, immediately follow<strong>in</strong>g the verb. Four k<strong>in</strong>ds of cont<strong>in</strong>ua-


8 MARSLEN-WILSON, BROWN, TYLERtion sentences were constructed by vary<strong>in</strong>g the relationship between theverb and the target noun <strong>in</strong> the embedded verb-noun sequence. With<strong>in</strong>each item set the target noun was kept constant. This gave the follow<strong>in</strong>gfour anomaly conditions, together with one extra condition constructed byvary<strong>in</strong>g the congruence of the lead-<strong>in</strong> sentence with the cont<strong>in</strong>uationsentence:1. Normal: Here the verb and the target noun form a natural sequence <strong>in</strong>standard Dutch subject-verb-object order (e.g. “The boy held theguitar”, where “guitar” is the target).2. Pragmatic: Here the verb <strong>in</strong> comb<strong>in</strong>ation with the target noun forms apossible, but pragmatically implausible real-world situation (e .g. “Theboy buried the guitar”).3. Semantic: Here the semantic properties of the verb are <strong>in</strong>compatiblewith the semantic properties of the noun (e.g. “The boy drank theguitar”).4. Categorial: Here the verb forms a syntactically illegal comb<strong>in</strong>ation withthe target noun. This was done by choos<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>transitive verbs that couldnot be followed by a noun <strong>in</strong> direct object position (e.g. “The boy sleptthe guitar”).5. Discourse Congruence: A fifth manipulation applied to the Normalcont<strong>in</strong>uation sentences only. Here the lead-<strong>in</strong> sentence was varied togive either a natural or an unnatural discourse l<strong>in</strong>kage with the cont<strong>in</strong>uationsentence.The follow<strong>in</strong>g example shows one complete stimulus set, with thesubjects hear<strong>in</strong>g either lead-<strong>in</strong> sentence (1) plus one of the four lead-<strong>in</strong>sentences (a)-(d), or lead-<strong>in</strong> sentence (2) plus cont<strong>in</strong>uation sentence (a).Note that the orig<strong>in</strong>al materials were <strong>in</strong> Dutch (the set given here is forillustration only):1. The nurses walk to their work each morn<strong>in</strong>g.2. Christmas falls on a Friday this year.a. They puss the beach on their way to the hospital.b. They measure the beach on their way to the hospital.c. They chew the beach on their way to the hospital.d. They yawn the beach on their way to the hospital.Pre-testsThe 40 sets of test materials were selected from a larger <strong>in</strong>itial pool of 60sets, on the basis of three types of pre-tests.1. A predictability pre-test was run to ensure that the target nouns were


LEXICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN SPOKEN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION 9not easily predictable given the discourse sentences and the various pretargetverbs. Three sentence comb<strong>in</strong>ations were tested: the normal condition(la above), the discourse <strong>in</strong>congruence condition (2a above), and thepragmatic anomaly condition (lb above). A total of 36 subjects were tested<strong>in</strong> three groups, us<strong>in</strong>g a written cloze procedure, with items rotated acrossgroups such that no subject had to predict the same target word twice. Thesubjects’ responses were scored on a 4-po<strong>in</strong>t scale. A scale value of 4corresponded to responses unrelated to the target noun, 3 to responsesrelated to the target noun, 2 to responses that were synonyms of the targetnoun, and 1 to cases where subjects responded with the actual target noun.The overall mean predictability rat<strong>in</strong>gs for the 40 test sentences was verylow for all three conditions-3.86 for normal, 3.91 for discourse <strong>in</strong>congruence,and 3.87 for pragmatic anomaly.2. A subcategorisation pre-test was run to ensure that the <strong>in</strong>transitiveverbs used <strong>in</strong> the verb-noun sequences did <strong>in</strong>deed exclude the possibilityof <strong>in</strong>sert<strong>in</strong>g nouns <strong>in</strong> direct object position immediately follow<strong>in</strong>g the verb.The same 60 sentence pairs from the predictability pre-test were used,along with 30 fillers. The fillers conta<strong>in</strong>ed sentences that did allow for theuse of direct objects. Twelve subjects read the neutral lead-<strong>in</strong> sentencefollowed by the (d)-cont<strong>in</strong>uation sentence, up to and <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>transitiveverb, and were asked to write down a cont<strong>in</strong>uation. They were alsoasked to <strong>in</strong>dicate on a 7-po<strong>in</strong>t scale whether or not they thought thesentence pair-<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g their own cont<strong>in</strong>uation-was a natural one, bothwith respect to grammar and mean<strong>in</strong>g. Responses were checked for theoccurrence of direct objects. If direct objects were given along with anatural rat<strong>in</strong>g, the sentence pair was removed from the stimulus pool. Veryfew prospective stimuli failed this test.3. In a naturalness pre-test, we tested the naturalness of the discoursel<strong>in</strong>kage between the lead-<strong>in</strong> and the cont<strong>in</strong>uation sentences (as well as theunnaturalness of the l<strong>in</strong>kage for the discourse <strong>in</strong>congruence pairs). Twogroups of 12 subjects were given 60 typed sentence pairs conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g anequal number of normal (la) and <strong>in</strong>congruent (2a) pairs. Subjects wererequired to give naturalness judgements on a 7-po<strong>in</strong>t scale, with value 1represent<strong>in</strong>g “very unnatural”, and value 7 represent<strong>in</strong>g “very natural”.The mean rat<strong>in</strong>g for the f<strong>in</strong>al stimulus set was 6.35 for the normal pairs and1.31 for the <strong>in</strong>congruent pairs.Filler MaterialsIn order to distract subjects from the specific construction of the testsentence pairs, 80 filler items were constructed. These also consisted of alead-<strong>in</strong> sentence and a cont<strong>in</strong>uation sentence. Three k<strong>in</strong>ds of variationswere made on the filler items:


1 O MARSLEN-WILSON, BROWN, TYLER1. Target position: The standard construction of the test cont<strong>in</strong>uationsentences is subject-verb-target noun. In order to prevent subjects fromnotic<strong>in</strong>g the uniform position of the target noun, and the fact that all testtargets were nouns, we vaned both the word type and the word position ofthe filler target. Filler targets could occur either <strong>in</strong> the lead-<strong>in</strong> sentence, <strong>in</strong>the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the cont<strong>in</strong>uation sentence, <strong>in</strong> the same position as the testsentences, or late <strong>in</strong> the cont<strong>in</strong>uation sentence.2. Anomaly of target: In the test sentence pairs, three out of the fivecomb<strong>in</strong>ations have an anomalous target noun (lb, lc, Id). This could leadsubjects to believe that every anomaly is a target. To prevent this, most ofthe fillers conta<strong>in</strong>ed anomalous words which were not the monitor<strong>in</strong>gtargets (as well as conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g non-anomalous targets).3. Task: The experimental task for all test stimuli is identical monitor<strong>in</strong>g.For the filler sentences two further tasks were used, namely rhymemonitor<strong>in</strong>g and category monitor<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> order to make the test situationcomparable to that used by Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1980), and <strong>in</strong> orderto reduce the possibility that the subjects would develop special listen<strong>in</strong>gstrategies <strong>in</strong> carry<strong>in</strong>g out the identical monitor<strong>in</strong>g response. A total of 20fillers were run us<strong>in</strong>g identical monitor<strong>in</strong>g, 30 fillers us<strong>in</strong>g rhyme monitor<strong>in</strong>g,and 30 fillers us<strong>in</strong>g category monitor<strong>in</strong>g. This task distribution broughtthe total number of items presented us<strong>in</strong>g identical monitor<strong>in</strong>g up to 60 (40test and 20 filler items), balanced by 60 filler items on rhyme and categorymonitor<strong>in</strong>g.Practice SentencesA total of 25 practice sentences were also constructed. These practice itemsreflected all conditions and variations used <strong>in</strong> the test and filler sentences.A further 10 filler items were constructed to serve as start-up sentences tostabilise subject responses follow<strong>in</strong>g the breaks after the practice sessionand half-way through the test sequence.Record<strong>in</strong>gThe materials were recorded <strong>in</strong> a soundproofed booth, us<strong>in</strong>g a Revox A700reel-to-reel tape-recorder, by a female speaker who was naive with respectto the purpose and background of the experiment. All sentences were readwith a normal <strong>in</strong>tonation pattern, without contrastive stress on either thetarget words or their preced<strong>in</strong>g verbs.


LEXICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN SPOKEN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION 1 1Design and ProcedureA total of 40 test sentence pairs were used under five conditions, along with80 filler items, 10 start-up fillers, and 25 practice items. The 40 testsentence pairs were rotated by conditions over five experimental versions,with each experimental version hav<strong>in</strong>g eight items <strong>in</strong> each condition. Eachtarget word occurred only once <strong>in</strong> each version, and each subject heard anequal number of targets <strong>in</strong> each of the five test conditions. The fiveexperimental versions were made by cross-record<strong>in</strong>g from a master tape.ProcedureThe 40 subjects were tested <strong>in</strong> groups of 4. They were seated fac<strong>in</strong>g aprojection screen on to which was projected the slide specify<strong>in</strong>g themonitor<strong>in</strong>g task for the next trial, and the appropriate cue word. Only the“identical monitor<strong>in</strong>g” task was used for the test stimuli, so that the cueword was always the target itself. Thus, if the target was “beach”, thesubject would see the words “IDENTICAL” and “BEACH’. All the testmaterials were presented over closed-ear headphones.Each trial began with a warn<strong>in</strong>g tone that also triggered the projection ofthe relevant slide. The sentence pair followed 3 sec later. The subjectspressed a response button as soon as they detected the monitor<strong>in</strong>g target.They were <strong>in</strong>structed to respond as quickly as possible, to avoid guess<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>advance what the target word could be, and not to try to correct anymistakes they heard <strong>in</strong> the sentences.A complete experimental session, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>structions and practice,lasted approximately 1 hour. Subjects were given a short break half-waythrough the test sequence.SubjectsA total of 40 paid student subjects participated <strong>in</strong> the experiment, of whom20 were male and 20 female, and all were native speakers of Dutch.RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONEight subjects were run <strong>in</strong> each condition. There were 28 miss<strong>in</strong>g valuesdue to mach<strong>in</strong>e and subject error. A further 26 extreme values were set tozero because they were well outside the range of the other data po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong>the condition <strong>in</strong> which they occurred. These 54 miss<strong>in</strong>g and extreme values(totall<strong>in</strong>g 3.4% of the data) were replaced‘by the mean for the item <strong>in</strong> thecondition <strong>in</strong> which they occurred. Table 1 gives the ma<strong>in</strong> results for thecorrected data.


~~12 MARSLEN-WILSON, BROWN, TYLERTABLE 1Item Means by Conditions (msec)Normal Incongruous Pragmatic Semantic Categorial241 235 268 291 320Two separate one-way analyses of variance were computed, on subjectsand on items. The ma<strong>in</strong> effect of conditions was highly significant (m<strong>in</strong>F’(4,46)=16.678, P


LEXICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN SPOKEN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION 13pended on non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic aspects of <strong>in</strong>terpretation and anomalies that didnot. A pragmatic anomaly-someone, for example, bury<strong>in</strong>g a guitarcouldonly exist as an anomaly on the basis of some form of <strong>in</strong>ferentialcomputation, <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g not only the lexical semantics of terms like guitarand bury, but also more general knowledge of the world. A semanticanomaly-someone, for example, dr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g a guitar-could be <strong>in</strong>stantiatedsimply as a function of the stored l<strong>in</strong>guistic properties of terms like guitarand dr<strong>in</strong>k, without <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic systems of knowledge at all.The empirical question we asked, then, was whether pragmatic anomaliesdid significantly affect the on-l<strong>in</strong>e response to the monitor<strong>in</strong>g target, orwhether the effect was restricted only to the semantic anomalies. Theresults show clear effects of each type of anomaly, with pragmatic anomalies(at 268 msec) and semantic anomalies (at 291 msec) both significantlyslower than responses to normal targets (241 msec). The effect for pragmaticanomalies means that the lexical <strong>representations</strong> associated with theverb must be be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terpreted on-l<strong>in</strong>e, not only with<strong>in</strong> a l<strong>in</strong>guistic systemof analysis, but also with respect to the listener’s mental model of theutterance-that is, with respect to a level of representation which <strong>in</strong>corporates<strong>in</strong>ferential processes operat<strong>in</strong>g on non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic as well as l<strong>in</strong>guisticknowledge. This <strong>in</strong> turn is consistent with a view of lexical process<strong>in</strong>gwhich stresses the immediacy with which the thematic consequences of agiven lexical argument frame can be projected on to non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic doma<strong>in</strong>sof <strong>in</strong>terpretation.It is also worth po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out that these conclusions hold even if one takesthe view of monitor<strong>in</strong>g performance argued for by Tanenhaus, Carlson,and Seidenberg (1985), <strong>in</strong> which the sorts of context effects described <strong>in</strong>Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1980) are re-analysed as a form of sophisticatedguess<strong>in</strong>g. Even if this were the way that context effects are mediated, thedifference between normal and pragmatic conditions still requires theon-l<strong>in</strong>e computation of the pragmatic plausibility that the target will appearas the object of the verb <strong>in</strong> the two conditions. The listener’s estimate, onthe guess<strong>in</strong>g account, of the likelihood that guitar will be the object ofbury, can only differ from the subjective likelihood follow<strong>in</strong>g curry on thebasis of some form of <strong>in</strong>ference process, dependent on the properties of theactual verb be<strong>in</strong>g heard. These <strong>in</strong>ferences would require the projection ofverb properties onto a non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic doma<strong>in</strong>, so that the pattern ofresponses still rema<strong>in</strong>s as evidence for the immediacy with which thisprojection takes place.Turn<strong>in</strong>g to the effects for semantic anomalies, these confirm, first of all,that semantic aspects of lexical <strong>representations</strong> are also immediatelyactivated <strong>in</strong> on-l<strong>in</strong>e process<strong>in</strong>g. Secondly, the comparability between thesize of the effect for these stimuli (at 50 msec) and the effect for thecontrast between Normal Prose and Anomalous Prose <strong>in</strong> Marslen-Wilson


14 MARSLEN-WILSON, BROWN, TYLER& Tyler (1980)-where responses to Anomalous Prose were 58 msecslower-suggests that the effects <strong>in</strong> this earlier study were also due toviolations of semantic restrictions on co-occurrence relations. Thirdly,there is also a tendency for the semantic anomalies to have a moredisruptive effect on responses than the pragmatic anomalies. Although themean difference of 22 msec is not significant us<strong>in</strong>g a m<strong>in</strong> F’ based statistic,it is significant on the Neuman-Keuls us<strong>in</strong>g error terms derived either fromthe subject or the item analyses alone.This <strong>in</strong>dicates that an anomaly based on violations of semantic selectiona1restrictions-as classically def<strong>in</strong>ed-will tend to be more disruptive thanan anomaly based solely on violations of cont<strong>in</strong>gent plausibility. This doesnot, however, allow us to conclude that there is a qualitative differencebetween the types of representation <strong>in</strong>volved-that semantic anomalies<strong>in</strong>volve only disruptions with<strong>in</strong> a strictly l<strong>in</strong>guistic system of semanticrepresentation and analysis, whereas pragmatic anomalies necessarily takeus outside this doma<strong>in</strong>. This is because the semantic anomalies are anomalousnot just with respect to putatively <strong>language</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal co-occurrencerestrictions, but also with respect to considerations of real-word plausibility.If it is unusual and implausible to bury a guitar, it is far more unusual todr<strong>in</strong>k one. And while one can easily construct a context <strong>in</strong> which bury<strong>in</strong>g aguitar is perfectly plausible, it is far more difficult to construct a context <strong>in</strong>which the act of dr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g a guitar becomes possible or plausible. Theadditional <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> response time for the semantic anomalies may reflectthese additional difficulties <strong>in</strong> the doma<strong>in</strong> of pragmatic <strong>in</strong>ference, ratherthan difficulties at some other level of the system. The present researchdoes not allow us to discrim<strong>in</strong>ate between these possibilities.The f<strong>in</strong>al aspect of the results concerns the categorial violations, wherethe target noun appears <strong>in</strong> a position <strong>in</strong> the sentence that violates thesubcategorisation frame associated with the preced<strong>in</strong>g verb. This has thestrongest effect on response time, with responses be<strong>in</strong>g significantly slowerthan to the semantic anomalies, and some 79 msec slower than responsesto the same targets <strong>in</strong> normal contexts. We predicted these strong effects <strong>in</strong>the Introduction, on the argument that this type of violation of subcategorisationconstra<strong>in</strong>ts means that the listener is presented with a structurallyun<strong>in</strong>terpretable comb<strong>in</strong>ation of lexical items. The target nounphrase isheard <strong>in</strong> the context of a verb subcategorisation frame which conta<strong>in</strong>s noargument slot <strong>in</strong>to which it can be attached. This means that the listenercannot construct the appropriate structural formation for projection on tonormal doma<strong>in</strong>s of <strong>in</strong>terpretation. For the purposes of the monitor<strong>in</strong>g task,then, the listener can only have access to the monitor<strong>in</strong>g target by treat<strong>in</strong>git as a word heard <strong>in</strong> isolation.This <strong>in</strong>terpretation is supported by the similarity <strong>in</strong> the size of the effectof categorial violations here to the difference (of 85 msec) between the


LEXICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN SPOKEN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION 15Normal Prose contexts and the Scrambled Prose contexts <strong>in</strong> the Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1980) study. In Scrambled Prose the subjects heardtargets <strong>in</strong> unstructured word-lists, constructed by scrambl<strong>in</strong>g the order ofAnomalous Prose sentences. Evidently, subcategorial violations have acomparable effect, by depriv<strong>in</strong>g the target nounphrase of any k<strong>in</strong>d ofsystematic sentential context of <strong>in</strong>terpretation.The goals of this study, <strong>in</strong> conclusion, were to gather some basic<strong>in</strong>formation about the tim<strong>in</strong>g with which different aspects of lexical <strong>representations</strong>could beg<strong>in</strong> to have consequences for the process<strong>in</strong>g of subsequentitems <strong>in</strong> a <strong>spoken</strong> utterance. The results, look<strong>in</strong>g at the effects ofviolat<strong>in</strong>g the pragmatic, semantic, and structural restrictions deriv<strong>in</strong>g fromthe argument frames associated with transitive and <strong>in</strong>transitive verbs, showimmediate effects both at strictly l<strong>in</strong>guistic levels of <strong>in</strong>terpretation (asclassically def<strong>in</strong>ed) and at levels of <strong>in</strong>terpretation and <strong>in</strong>ference relevant tothe listener’s construction of a mental model of the current utterance.These are results that are consistent with approaches to <strong>language</strong> <strong>comprehension</strong>which stress its cont<strong>in</strong>uous and <strong>in</strong>cremental nature (e.g. Marslen-Wilson & Tyler, 1987; Steedman, 1988; Tyler, 1988), and which emphasisethe role of lexically derived thematic roles <strong>in</strong> construct<strong>in</strong>g these higherlevel<strong>in</strong>terpretations (e.g. Tanenhaus & Carlson, 1988).Manuscript received May 1987Revised manuscript received February 1988REFERENCESBresnan, J. (1982). The menial representation of grammatical relations. Cambridge, Mass. :MIT Press.Carlson, G. & Tanenhaus, M. (1987). Thematic roles and <strong>language</strong> <strong>comprehension</strong>. In W.Wilk<strong>in</strong>s (Ed.), Thematic relations. London and San Diego: Academic Press.Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory ofsyntux. Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress.Chomsky, N. (1981). Lectures on Government and B<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g. Dordrecht: Foris.Clark, H. (1973). The <strong>language</strong>-as-fixed-effect fallacy: A critique of <strong>language</strong> statistics <strong>in</strong>psychological research. Journal of Verbal Learn<strong>in</strong>g and Verbal Behavior, 12,335-359.Clifton, C., Frazier, L., & Conn<strong>in</strong>e, C. (1984). <strong>Lexical</strong> expectations <strong>in</strong> sentence <strong>comprehension</strong>.Journal of Memory and Language, 23,696-708.Cowart, W. (1982). Autonomy and <strong>in</strong>teraction <strong>in</strong> the <strong>language</strong> process<strong>in</strong>g system: A reply toMarslen-Wilson and Tyler. Cognition, 12,109-117.Downey, R. G. & Hakes, D. T. (1968). Some psychological effects of violat<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>guisticrules. Journal of Verbal Learn<strong>in</strong>g and Verbal Behavior, 7,158-161.Fodor, J. A,, Garrett, M., & Bever, T. G. (1968). Some syntactic determ<strong>in</strong>ants of sententialcomplexity, 11: Verb structure. Perception and Psychophysics, 3,453-461.Ford, M., Bresnan, J. W., & Kaplan, R. M. (1982). A competence-based theoryof syntacticclosure. In J. W. Bresnan (Ed.), The mental representation of grammatical relations.Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.


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