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ALGORITHMS FOR SOLVING LINEAR AND POLYNOMIAL ...

ALGORITHMS FOR SOLVING LINEAR AND POLYNOMIAL ...

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with probability 3/4 for a random function GF(2) 5 → GF(2), and a random input.Heuristically, relations that are valid with low probability for a random functionand random input produce a more rapid narrowing of the keyspace in the sense ofa Constraint Satisfaction Problem or CSP. We are unaware of any attack on Keeloqthat uses this fact to its advantage.An example of the possibility of using I/O degree to take cryptanalytic advantageis the attack from the author’s joint paper on DES, with Nicolas T. Courtois,where the S-Boxes have I/O degree 2 but their actual closed-form formulas are ofhigher degree [CB06].2.3.6 Disposing of the Secret Key Shift-RegisterThe 64-bit shift-register containing the secret key rotates by one bit per round.Only one bit per round (the rightmost) is used during the encryption process. Furthermore,the key is not modified as it rotates. Therefore the key bit being used isthe same in round t, t + 64, t + 128, t + 192, . . .Therefore we can dispose of the key shift-register entirely. Denote k 63 , . . . , k 0the original secret key. The key bit used during round t is merely k t−1 mod 64 .2.3.7 Describing the Plaintext Shift-RegisterDenote as the initial condition of this shift-register as L 31 , . . . , L 0 . This correspondsto the plaintext P 31 , . . . , P 0 . Then in round 1, the values will move one placeto the right, and a new value will enter in the first bit. Call this new bit L 32 . Thus12

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