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Case 1:08-cv-07837-PAC Document 51 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 24 of 26 reduction in emissions); see also Ass’n of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm’r, Mass. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000). Two 2007 cases examined a preemption question parallel and relevant to the one here. In Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007), and Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007), the courts determined that the EPCA—a fuel economy regulation—did not preempt state laws relating to emissions, even where the state’s emission rules had an impact on fuel economy. In Green Mountain, the state of Vermont passed a law establishing strict emissions standards for new automobiles. The main issue in the case was whether the EPCA and CAA conflicted with each other in relation to the state’s regulation of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. 508 F. Supp. 2d at 344. In a related issue, the court found that because Vermont’s law targeted emissions and not fuel economy standards, it was not preempted by the EPCA. Id. at 352-55. First, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the emissions rule was a de facto fuel economy standard because the evidence in the case showed that “compliance with the regulation is not achieved solely by improving a fleet’s fuel economy.” Id. at 352-53. Second, the court looked at the language of the EPCA preemption statute, 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a), and determined that Congress did not intend that rules related to emissions “be automatically subject to express preemption as a ‘law or regulation relating to fuel economy standards.’” Id. at 354. Likewise, in Central Valley, the court also found that a state law regulating vehicle emissions was not preempted under the EPCA. In looking at the EPCA preemption statute, the court found that the statute should preempt “only those state regulations that are explicitly aimed at the establishment of fuel economy standards, or that are the de facto equivalent of mileage regulation . . . .” 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 24
Case 1:08-cv-07837-PAC Document 51 Filed 10/31/2008 Page 25 of 26 2. Application Plaintiffs argue that the 25/30 Rules should be preempted under the CAA because, even though the TLC rules regulate fuel economy, their purpose and effect is to regulate emissions, which is the exclusive province of the federal government. This argument would appear to be foreclosed under the reasoning of Green Mountain and Central Valley, where the courts found that GHG emissions regulations were not preempted by the EPCA because the regulations were not de facto fuel economy standards and because emissions regulations do not “relate to” fuel economy standards within the meaning intended by Congress in the EPCA preemption statute. See Green Mountain, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 353-54; Cent. Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. In this case the argument is reversed—Plaintiffs claim that a fuel economy regulation should be preempted by the CAA, which exclusively governs emissions regulation. Plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of success on this issue because both Green Mountain and Central Valley make clear that the preemption provisions of the EPCA and the CAA relate specifically to their defined categories—fuel economy and emission regulation, respectively— and while they may overlap, they do not conflict. Thus, crossover between the two for preemption purposes is not automatic. Cent. Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. It follows that Plaintiffs here cannot simply stretch the CAA’s preemption provision for emissions regulation to cover the 25/30 Rules, which by their terms cover only mileage standards and are silent as to emissions. Plaintiffs fail to show how the 25/30 Rules are a “standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles,” as required under the preemption provision of CAA § 209. At this stage of the proceedings the Court cannot accept Plaintiffs’ argument that the only purpose of the 25/30 Rules is to affect emissions. As indicated, the Court has limited its review 25
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