FINEST HOUR - Winston Churchill

no evidence to support it. His own account in fact providesabundant evidence of what did happen: a chaoticand demoralized French command structure, an overwhelmedBritish liaison apparatus in France, a War Officedistracted by post-Dunkirk reorganization, and,drifting over everything, the "fog of war." It is not responsiblebehavior for a historian (as opposed to a novelistor scriptwriter) to make such statements absentevidence.Churchill made errors. He had faults. He wrote hismemoirs to tell his story (whose should he have told?).But, on present evidence, he did not cynically write offthe 51st Division to prove to the French that the Britishtoo could die. Historians must constantly revisit thepast, asking new questions. Only thus does knowledgeadvance. But asking new questions and divising an eyecatchingtitle are two distinct enterprises.Whig Vision versusOffensive SpiritWILLIAM JOHN SHEPHERDChurchill and Hitler: Essays on thePolitical-Military Direction of TotalWar, by David Jablonsky, London:Cass, 256pp, $45 hardbound, $22.50softbound, ICS price $36 and $18 +$4 to ship. Order from R. Langworth,Box 385, Hopkinton NH03229 USA (ICS New Book Service).THIS compilation of essays, originally publishedbetween 1988 and 1993, is part of the Cass Serieson Politics and Military Affairs edited by MichaelHandel and is Jablonsky's third overall contribution toa series currently containing eight studies. His mildlyrevisionist and somewhat technocratic presentation analyzesvarious aspects of the style, thought, and actionsof Churchill and Hitler as they apply to the direction oftotal war. On the balance, Churchill emerges as theclearly superior "warlord," which is sure to enrageHitler apologist David Irving and Chamberlain apologistJohn Charmley.In his masterful introduction, written specifically forthis volume and the only comparative analysis therein,Jablonsky elaborates upon the "Clausewitzian Trinity"of government, military, and people, and how the twoMr. Shepherd is Assistant Archivist at Catholic University.rivals fit into these interlocking rubrics of grand strategy.Both men were highly egocentric personalitiesforged in the crucibles of unhappy childhoods, battlefieldheroics, and political infighting. Both viewedthemselves as men of action who exemplified courageand rewarded loyalty. However, Churchill's experienceswere on the officer level in combat and the cabinet levelin politics, while Hitler was merely an infantry corporaland upstart party leader before his sudden rise to nearabsolute power in 1933.Both men had unusual work habits, keeping strangehours and making impossible demands upon their ministersand staff. However, Churchill believed in an efficientlyrun machinery of government and he devouredreports and wrote magisterial directives, while Hitlergenerally preferred to bypass his ministers and to pontificateat length, relying upon his unique intuitionrather than evidence. Churchill relished a good argumentand did not suffer 'yes men' as he expected to winhis points in stimulating debates with worthy opponents.Hitler, on the other hand, could not suffer to becontradicted and so required an increasing number ofsycophants expected to confirm his version of reality, nomatter how bizarre.Both men were highly combative, but Churchill wasinevitably magnanimous in victory while Hitler remainedhateful and vindictive no matter what situationprevailed. Their philosophical viewpoints had little incommon. Hitler was essentially a revolutionary with aprimitive and nihilistic outlook focusing on German expansionand Jewish extermination, while Churchill wasa romantic and conservative intellectual with a Whigvision of England's steady progress through the centuries.On the other hand, Churchill was not blind tothose destructive forces lurking beneath the veneer ofhuman civilization, those forces eventually personifiedby Hitler: "that evil man."Chapters 2, 4, and 6 are essays of widely varyinglength (60, 20, and 8 pages respectively) which focus, inturn, on Churchill as grand strategist, Victorian 'man ofaction,' and author of landmarks of defense literaturesuch as The World Crisis and Marlborough. Jablonskyargues that historians often focus on Churchill's"Wilderness Years" rather than his many years of gainfulemployment and long apprenticeship as both a soldierand politician which, in the final result, enabledhim to become a master of grand strategy. In addition,Churchill personified the Victorian "man of action" inwhich his public image of resistance and defianceagainst all odds came to symbolize the spirit of theBritish nation. This image of the modern "warlord,"both archaic and heroic, was the result of Churchill'ssense of historical continuity and tribute to his greatFINEST HOUR 88/32