THE SWEDISH CLUB TRITON 1-<strong>2013</strong>PIRACY | Somali Piracy todaySomali piracy– past, present and futureHans Ti<strong>no</strong> HansenManaging Director & CEORisk Intelligence, Vedbaek, DenmarkSomali piracy has been the major threat to internationalshipping since 2007, but it can be traced back to 1994,when the first hijacking for ransom took place. <strong>The</strong> hijackedvessels and the ransoms paid have been an almost daily partof shipping life and in even in the international media it hasplayed a significant role. At one point almost 1,000 seafarerswere held for ransom on the coast of Somalia.2012 saw a dramatic reduction in Somali pirate activitywith attacks dropping from 214 in 2011 to 50 during 2012.Of these 50 the vast majority (46) occurred during the firstpart of 2012, while in the second half only four incidentstook place. By the end of 2012 Somali piracy was back to2007’s levels.So what is the explanation for this drastic reduction?Some people have suggested that it was due to the merchantships arming themselves with private armed guards. As wewill see below, it is <strong>no</strong>t quite as simple and there are <strong>no</strong>t oneor two single decisive factors, but actually a range of parametersthat together have decided the levels of Somali piracy.<strong>The</strong>se can be formulated as follows:Pirates:1. Capabilities. Vessels and equipment as well as theoverall infrastructure of pirates.2. Intentions. Tactics, strategy and business objectiveof the pirates.3. Opportunities. Chances for taking advantage ofmerchant vessels’ vulnerabilities. Return on investmentfor Somali pirate investors and alternative investmentsand business options. Politico-eco<strong>no</strong>micdevelopments in Somalia that are shaping the situatio<strong>no</strong>n land and thereby the opportunities.Merchant marine:1. Capabilities. In this case elements such as hardening,speed, vessel type, use of PMSCs2. Intentions and opportunities, such as market rates,charter, freight and fuel cost.3. Trading routes defined from (2) and (1).Navies:1. Capabilities. Number of vessels and helicopters deployed.Sensor effectiveness.2. Intentions. Types of operations, ranging from showingthe flag to offensive onshore attacks.3. Opportunities. Options for exploiting pirate vulnerabilitiesas well as political and military signalling.Rules of engagement.4. Political and financial realities and the limitationsthey impose.Environment:1. Geography, ocean currents, weather.2. Local patterns of maritime activity.Pirates<strong>The</strong> Somali pirates’ level of activity has declined since early2011. This is mainly due to the increasing difficulty in hijackingships they have encountered and less due to onshorechanges in their operating environment. <strong>The</strong> number of piratesintercepted, captured or lost at sea has increased.<strong>The</strong> number of ships being hijacked has fallen, makingthe venture less tempting for the rank-and-file, leaders andfinanciers. <strong>The</strong>re are, however, still active syndicates. <strong>The</strong>segroups have seen a fall in their success rates, capturing fewer18
THE SWEDISH CLUB TRITON 1-<strong>2013</strong>Photo: US NavyIncidents per sea zone, 2008-2011Mozambique CSomali BasinIndian OceanArabian Sea/Go OmanGulf of AdenRed Sea/BAMpirates have successfully hijacked a vessel, the outcome (interms of ransom) has been equal or higher to what has beenpreviously obtained.<strong>The</strong> pirates’ investors have seen their return of investmentfall, both in actual cases and in potential return of investment.This fall and relatively increasing returns on othermore secure criminal or legal investment has had a profoundeffect on investment in piracy. Since the cost of entry intopiracy is low and all the resources are easily available alongthe Somali coast, the pirate investors can quite quickly returnto piracy should the situation again change in theirfavour.In summary, pirate activity has declined, reducing theoverall likelihood of occurrence. <strong>The</strong>ir capabilities are intact– particularly because they do <strong>no</strong>t need much to carryout attacks – but they are currently facing a more adverseoperating environment and have <strong>no</strong>t adapted their tactics toovercome this.ships per attack and facing disruption by Naval operationsquicker than previously. <strong>The</strong> main component in the fallingsuccess rate has been the shipping business and Navalcounter-piracy strategy. <strong>The</strong> low-tech capabilities of the piratesare still there and when pirates have faced a poorly protectedship in the right circumstances, they are successful inemploying their tried and tested, low-cost methods. WhereMerchant marineSince 2008, merchant vessels have increasingly deployedbetter security measures, including both toughening theseup and procedures through Best Management Practices(BMP). Finally, the use of armed guards has been commonsince late 2010.<strong>The</strong> most pressing issue for shipping companies recently9continueson page 2019