Approved Judgment - clients.squareeye.com
Approved Judgment - clients.squareeye.com
Approved Judgment - clients.squareeye.com
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THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE EADY<br />
<strong>Approved</strong> <strong>Judgment</strong><br />
Butler-Creagh v Hersham<br />
iii) They would not have countenanced any right on his part to pass on any such<br />
exclusivity to a third party without their consent – whether for a fee or<br />
otherwise.<br />
Against that background, even if she had been unwise enough to promise him £5m,<br />
the agreement could have been set aside for misrepresentation. There would, in any<br />
event, be no identifiable consideration for the £5m. Yet she was unaware of these<br />
matters at the time, having been presented like the Marian Fathers with a false picture.<br />
20. Any reasonable onlooker is thus left wondering how Mr Butler-Creagh could possibly<br />
pursue a claim against Ms Hersham and on what legal basis. By the time he went into<br />
the witness box, his stance was un<strong>com</strong>fortably straddling two alternatives. His<br />
primary case was that Ms Hersham had agreed to pay £5m on the first day they met,<br />
in order to “step into his shoes”, accepting what he said at face value and not taking<br />
the elementary precaution of checking whether he had anything to give in exchange.<br />
What he actually said was:<br />
“The discussion was quite brief. I was asked what I wanted for<br />
her to take over my position, to step into my shoes and<br />
effectively walk away from it, and that‟s it. I put my fee<br />
forward, which was £5m and it was never negotiated.”<br />
From time to time, however, his case metamorphosed into a claim that Ms Hersham<br />
had agreed to pay him £5m to “facilitate” the sale to her by the Marian Fathers or to<br />
“facilitate” <strong>com</strong>pletion (whatever that means). An attempt was made in his closing<br />
submissions to crystallise what this term was supposed to convey, namely that Mr<br />
Butler-Creagh would take the following steps:<br />
i) relinquish the opportunity to purchase Fawley Court himself;<br />
ii) nominate a special purpose vehicle suitable to Ms Hersham to proceed with<br />
the sale;<br />
iii) satisfy the vendors as to the “suitability” of the vehicle (and those individuals<br />
behind it);<br />
iv) “secure” the exchange of contracts on behalf of the relevant corporate vehicle;<br />
v) “ensure” that <strong>com</strong>pletion took place.<br />
Another gloss put on the case was that there was “an agreement which (at its core)<br />
involved [Mr Butler-Creagh] transferring his position as preferred purchaser to Mrs<br />
Hersham for which he would be paid his fee upon <strong>com</strong>pletion”. It was also submitted<br />
that there is no requirement in law “for every baroque detail of a contract to be<br />
stipulated in order for that contract to be binding”. What matters is the “clear<br />
intention of the parties”: see e.g. Chitty on Contracts (30 th edn) at 2-113 to 2-114. I<br />
still remain unclear what Mr Butler-Creagh contends that the intention was. Was he<br />
“to walk away from it” or “to ensure that <strong>com</strong>pletion took place”?<br />
21. My first task is to decide whether there was any such agreement. Is it possible to<br />
discern any “clear intention” at all? This depends on assessing the evidence of the