Eurasianism and the Concept of Central Caucaso-Asia

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80 Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava East and the West. 327 This means that the Central Caucasus can serve as a bridge between Central Asia, a geopolitically closed region, and the West. 328 It should be said in this context that, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Azerbaijan is the most important geopolitical pivot in the geographic continent of Eurasia. 329 The “geopolitical pivot” status 330 is determined by the country’s geographic location and its potential vulnerability to what the “active geostrategic players” might undertake in relation to it. The “active geostrategic players” are the states strong and determined enough to spread their rule beyond their limits. 331 By describing Azerbaijan as the “cork in the bottle” filled with the riches of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, Brzezinski stresses that: “The independence of the Central Asian states can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully subordinated to Moscow’s control.” 332 Kazakhstan is another of America’s target countries in Central Caucaso- Asia, which is amply illustrated by the Americans’ intention to maximize their investments there. 333 The idea of post-Soviet state independence and its strengthening, as the linchpin of state interests for the Central Caucaso-Asian states, rule out their 327 For example, Howard Chase, “Future Prospects of Caucasian Energy and Transportation Corridor. The Role of Caucasian Energy Corridor in European Energy Security,” Georgian Economic Trends, No. 3 (2002), pp. 85-87; Kalicki, “Caspian Energy at the Crossroads;” Jan H. Kalicki and Jonathan Elkind, “Eurasian Transportation Futures,” in Jan Kalicki and David L. Goldwyn, eds., Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005), pp. 149-174; Rustam Makhmudov, “The Problem of Exporting Energy Resources from Central Asia,” in Boris Rumer and Lau Sim Yee, eds., Central Asia and South Caucasus Affairs: 2002 (Tokyo: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2002), pp. 163-188; Müller, “Energy Development;” John Roberts, “Energy Reserves, Pipeline Routs and the Legal Regime in the Caspian Sea,” in Gennady Chufrin, ed., The Security of the Caspian Sea Region (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 33-68; S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell, “The Politics of Pipelines: Bringing Caspian Energy to Markets,” SAISPHERE (2005), pp. 57-61. 328 Janatkhan Eyvazov, Bezopasnost’ Kavkaza i stabil’nost razvitia Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki [Caucasian Security and Stability in the Development of the Azerbaijan Republic] (Baku: Nurlan Publishers, 2004), p. 132. 329 Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, p. 41. 330 Ibid. 331 Ibid. p. 40. 332 Ibid. pp. 46-47, 129. 333 Utkin, Amerikanskaia strategia dlia XXI veka, p. 105.
Rethinking Central Eurasia 81 acceptance not only of Eurasianism, but also of the Heartland theory. They both assert their subordination to the imperial schemes of Russia and the West. The leaders of those Central Caucaso-Asian countries who are seeking a tighter grip on power rather than stronger and developed state sovereignty, to say nothing of democratization, human rights, and a market economy, are prepared to embrace any theory (or rather pseudo-theory) to camouflage their true intentions or justify them. It would be naive to expect the world and regional powers to step aside and leave Central Caucaso-Asia alone. Reality dictates that these countries should carefully match their national interests with their choice of world and regional powers as partners. Eurasianism clearly preaches Russia’s revival as an empire, but even more moderate ideas now current in Russia do not exclude the “soft” alternative of imposing its interests on at least some of the local states, irrespective of their national interests. According to some Russian analysts, only Georgia could be said to be lost for Russia. 334 The same author has argued that “the economic importance of Armenia and Georgia for Russia is minimal,” even though “Armenia is Russia’s objective partner.” 335 In Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, Russia has economic interests in the production and transportation of hydrocarbons, while stronger integration processes are contemplated in relation to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 336 The United States, on the other hand, is guided by objective considerations: 337 first, being far removed from the region, it knows it cannot dominate over it, and second, it is powerful enough on a global scale not to become involved in unnecessary complications in this vast area of Central Caucaso-Asia. From this it follows that the United States prefers a situation in which none of the countries dominates Central Caucaso-Asia and the 334 Lounev, “Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus,” p. 24. 335 Ibid. 336 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 337 Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, p. 148.
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Eurasianism and the Concept of Central Caucaso-Asia

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