India's Ad Hoc Arsenal - Publications - SIPRI

36 INDIA'S AD HOC ARSENALDefence have voiced criticism and concern about the increase in non-Indiandefence capability in the Indian Ocean. However, few have asked how muchthese developments actually impinge upon the security interests of India. Norhas there been any appreciable attempt at an official level to fit naval threatperception to appropriate response in this particular theatre. The advantage toIndia in having the US presence in the region to guarantee the uninterruptedflow of oil from the Gulf is similarly overlooked. India too needs to import oilfrom the Persian Gulf and the international community's treatment of oilreserves as sacrosanct may in the future benefit India as it now does mostOrganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries, for India toohas potentially enviable oil reserves within striking distance of many Islamiccountries.There are two ways to assess India's insecurity from the direction of theOcean. First, what is the possibility that India might be invaded by an enemyapproaching from the Indian Ocean? Second, how much are India's regionaland international interests threatened by the recent activities of certain majorpowers in the Indian Ocean?From a purely military perspective India does have a sense of weakness inthe south. Ironically, it suffers from a marked surfeit of defence in depth.India's defence arrangements traditionally concentrate the country's defence inthe north, although a Southern Command has recently been established and theGovernment has been inclined to draw some of its military capabilities furtherto the south, out of the range of Pakistan's air power. The national capital iswell to the north, and its position is important for a country with a poor infrastructure.Furthermore, there is a cultural and political divide separating northand south which might complicate the Indian response to an invasion from thesouth.However, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which India would bethreatened by outright invasion from this direction. New Delhi has created oflate a blurred image of a threat from the ocean but it is no more than that. Theonly theoretically conceivable threat is from the USA, but to most observersoutside India, and to many inside as well, there is no circumstance in whichIndia could be threatened from this quarter. It is difficult to see why foreignpolicy and defence planners see such a degree of insecurity in this theatre. It isperhaps for this reason that the threat is articulated in the vaguest of terms.Second, India's perspective on the Indian Ocean raises some interestingquestions. The foreign nationals of Indian descent who reside in island or littoralstates in the Indian Ocean number approximately 4.6 million.46 However,the Indian Government has shown no particular strength of feeling when itcomes to the often disturbing status of these minorities in East Africa (Ugandaand now Kenya), Burma and Malaysia, for example. In the late 1980s, theplight of Indians in Fiji and Sri Lanka has caused much greater concern but46 Elkin, J. F., 'New Delhi's Indian Ocean Policy', Naval War College Review, vol. 15, no 413 (autumn1987), pp. 52-53.